Opinion
03-22-00673-CV
10-31-2024
Catherine Stevenson, Richard D. Sullivan, Appellant//Cross-Appellant, v. Richard D. Sullivan, Catherine Stevenson, Appellee//Cross-Appellee,
FROM THE 33RD DISTRICT COURT OF BLANCO COUNTY NO. CV-09009, THE HONORABLE J. ALLAN GARRETT, JUDGE PRESIDING
Before Byrne, Chief Justice Triana and Theofanis, Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Gisela D. Triana, Justice.
Appellant / cross-appellee Catherine Stevenson and appellee / cross-appellant Richard Sullivan, a licensed attorney who has represented himself throughout these proceedings, each appeal from the district court's final judgment regarding the ownership and use of a road easement on Sullivan's property that Stevenson has been using to access her property in Sandy Oaks Ranches, a residential subdivision in Blanco County. In six issues on appeal, Stevenson argues that the district court erred by: (1) concluding that The Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions of Sandy Oaks Ranches (the CCRs) required Stevenson to obtain approval from the Property Owners' Association (the POA) and / or the Architectural Control Committee to access her property via the easement; (2) finding that Stevenson violated the CCRs; (3) finding that Stevenson trespassed on Sullivan's property; (4) finding that Sullivan did not breach the CCRs; (5) enjoining Stevenson from using the easement to access her property; and (6) awarding attorneys' fees to Sullivan and denying attorneys' fees to Stevenson.
In three issues on cross-appeal, Sullivan asserts that the district court erred by: (1) not granting Sullivan a judgment declaring, as a matter of law, that Stevenson has no right to use the easement because the purpose of that easement, as a matter of law, is to afford two of his neighboring "landlocked" landowners access to the main road running through the subdivision; (2) not granting Sullivan a judgment declaring, as a matter of law, that the easement is an implied easement created by necessity for the benefit of those two landlocked landowners who would otherwise lack access to the main road, and declaring instead that the POA owns an express road easement across Sullivan's property and can therefore extend rights to any tract owner in the Sandy Oaks Ranch subdivision to cross Sullivan's property, even if such owner has no necessity to cross Sullivan's property; and (3) awarding some, but not all, of Sullivan's requested attorney's fees. We will affirm in part and reverse and remand in part the district court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
In 1999, Sandy Oaks Ranches, Ltd., filed a neighborhood plat, subdividing 789.93 acres of land in Blanco County into twenty-nine residential tracts. The plat provided in relevant part:
Sandy Oaks Ranches, LTD . . . [does] hereby subdivide said 789.93 acres of land to be known as SANDY OAKS RANCHES, in accordance with the plat shown hereon, subject to any and all easements or restrictions heretofore granted and does hereby dedicate to the owners of the property shown hereon the use of the streets and easements shown hereon.
That same year, Sandy Oaks Ranches, Ltd., filed the CCRs for the subdivision, which provided in relevant part:
The legal and fee simple title in and to each and all said streets, roads, right of ways, and access easements and common areas as shown on said plat is hereby reserved in SO RANCHES, LTD. The streets, roads, rights of way, and access easements referred to herein shall never be deemed to be dedicated to the public for any purpose and shall be solely for the benefit of SO RANCHES, LTD., OWNERS, and their guests or invitees.
In 2000, Sandy Oaks Ranches, Ltd., conveyed by warranty deed its interests in "all rights, titles, and easements reserved in the Declaration" to the Sandy Oaks Ranches Property Owners Association, thereby transferring its rights in the easements to the POA. The twenty-nine tracts in the subdivision were conveyed by warranty deed to various property owners.
Stevenson is the current owner of contiguous Tracts 7, 8, and 9 in the subdivision. Sullivan is the current owner of Tract 4. Stevenson's tracts are north of Sullivan's Tract 4, beginning with Tract 7, which is contiguous to Tract 4 as reflected in the following partial plat map of the subdivision:
(Image Omitted)
The main road that runs through the subdivision is Sandy Oaks Ranch Road, a private road that provides the property owners and their guests with access to and from FM / RR 1323, the only public road from which the property owners and their guests can access the subdivision. Eighteen of the tracts in the subdivision adjoin Sandy Oaks Ranch Road, including Stevenson's and Sullivan's tracts. However, eleven of the tracts, including Tracts 5 and 6 in the map above, do not. For those property owners and their guests to access Sandy Oaks Ranch Road, they must use one of four 30-foot-wide road easements that connect their tracts to the main road. Two of those easements are reflected in the map above: Forest Oaks Road, the easement south of Tract 29 that runs east and west on Tracts 3 and 2, ending at the boundary between Tracts 2 and 1; and Trail Crest Road, the easement on Sullivan's property, south of Stevenson's Tract 7, that runs east and west on Tracts 4 and 5, ending at the boundary between Tracts 5 and 6. It is undisputed that Stevenson and her guests were using this easement to access her properties, and the question in this case is the extent to which she has the right to do so.
In 2021, Sullivan filed suit against Stevenson, requesting declaratory judgments regarding the ownership and permissible uses of Trail Crest Road, alleging claims against Stevenson for trespass and breach of the restrictive covenants of the subdivision, and seeking a permanent injunction against Stevenson enjoining her from using any part of Tract 4, including Trail Crest Road, to bring any vehicles, persons, or materials to Tract 8 or for either ingress or egress to any part of Tract 7. After the district court granted partial summary judgment regarding issues of ownership of and rights to the Trail Crest Road Easement that were later incorporated into its final judgment, which we summarize below, the case proceeded to trial on the remaining issues of breach of the restrictive covenants, Stevenson's alleged trespass upon Sullivan's property, Sullivan's request for an injunction against Stevenson, and the award of attorney's fees.
At trial, the district court heard evidence that Sullivan purchased Tract 4 in 2004, and Stevenson and her now-deceased husband purchased Tract 9 in 2008 and Tracts 7 and 8 in 2010. Kade Hubbard, a contractor who performed construction and other work for several of the property owners in the subdivision, testified that in 2010, Stevenson's husband contracted with him to build a wire fence on the Stevensons' side of the property line between Tracts 4 and 7. The fence included a gate allowing ingress and egress to Trail Crest Road from the Stevensons' property. Hubbard initially testified that construction of the fence and gate had been approved by the Architectural Control Committee (ACC) by "handshake," although he later acknowledged that he did not get approval himself but had been told by the landowner and one of the directors of the POA that he had permission to do the work.
William Scaife, the president of the POA, testified that "there was no application made to the ACC for that gate," which he described as a "pasture gate." Scaife recounted that his first contact with Stevenson was when she called to inform him that "she was planning to build what she referred to as a guesthouse on Tract 8." "In the course of the application for building the house that is now on Tract 8," Scaife first learned of the issues regarding Tract 7 and Trail Crest Road. He explained that Stevenson's "application was strictly for Tract 8, and there was some pushback from the ACC on approval because the application was deemed . . . incomplete since it did not have a site plan for the location of the houses and the appurtenances such as [the] septic system and so on and so forth." The ACC asked Scaife to "become involved to try to get more details" from Stevenson, and on his request, Stevenson "produced what [Scaife] would describe as a hand-drawn sketch of the lot and the location of the house and the septic and where the well was going to be and stuff like that." Scaife "expressed to her that [his] main concern on that-for that issue on the ACC approval was that everything regarding the house had to-that all construction projects had to be self-contained on a lot." He added, "Since she owned three lots, I was concerned that perhaps a septic field[] might creep into Lot 7 or Lot 9 and cause problems with title later on or whatever if those properties changed hands and so I could see that there was a potential for issues there." Scaife testified that Stevenson declined to provide her plans for the house to the entire ACC but instead "took them personally from one ACC member to the next, stayed with them, and expected them to review them while in her presence, and then took them when she left. She declined to leave them or leave copies with them."
The guesthouse was for Stevenson's daughter. Scaife explained that Stevenson "already had a home that she's lived in for some time on Tract 9." Tract 9 already had an entrance from Sandy Oaks Ranch Road.
On November 5, 2020, Stevenson emailed Scaife her final plans for the house, which included plans for the eventual construction of a driveway to the house through a gate that fronted Sandy Oaks Ranch Road. Scaife forwarded the email to the ACC and commented in the email, "I am especially pleased with the driveway road fronting on Sandy Oaks Ranch Road, rather than cutting across Lot 7 from Trail Crest."
Scaife testified "that there was no application to do anything on Lot 7 at all," and he "wanted to be certain that that was the case" because he "had seen Pedernales Electric trucks going across Lot 7 to do work, to do electrical, to bring electrical service, I presume, to the new house, so I was concerned about that." Scaife explained that the first time the use of the gate on Tract 7 became an issue was when he "got a call from [Stevenson] that she was ready to pour concrete for the new house." Scaife recounted:
I had seen PEC trucks, and I believe I had also seen a water well rig that was going in-not going in but going across Lot 7 from that gate, that pasture gate on the easement. And so I asked her if she was-if they would be going in off Sandy Oaks Ranch Road or was she intending to go in on Trail Crest. She said . . . she was going to use her, quote, 'south entrance.' That's what she called that gate was her 'south entrance.' And I told her I don't think that was a very good idea. Several points. I said, 'Mr. Sullivan is going to be very unhappy with you.' And, secondly, that road is an easement, not an-it's not built for heavy traffic, heavy in terms of weight or heavy in terms of frequency, either one. I think it's probably going to be kind of damaging. And that gate, flat gate, it's only a 30-foot wide easement. In making a turn in there is going to be also kind of rough on the road and may not even-I don't even know if these guys can jockey around to get in there. They may not be able to do it. So I strongly suggested she not do it.
Scaife added that he did not prohibit Stevenson from using the gate but made "more of a very firm suggestion with reasons as to why" she should not use it. When Scaife asked Stevenson why she was unwilling to use the existing gate on Tract 8 as a construction entrance, she told him that it was "[b]ecause the heavy gear going in and out of that gate would rip up the native soil that they would be driving over" and would "cost her more to finish the driveway" that she planned to eventually build there.
Scaife further testified that after Stevenson began allowing cement trucks to access her property from Trail Crest Road, he received a call from Sullivan, telling him that the owners of Tract 6 had seen the cement trucks using the gate and asking Scaife "whether that gate was an approved access at that time." Scaife told Sullivan that "it was not an approved access" and "there was no application from Mrs. Stevenson to make that a primary or regular ingress/egress access onto Lot 7."
On January 18, 2021, Scaife hand-delivered a letter to Stevenson on behalf of the Sandy Oaks Ranches POA Board of Directors informing her that "[l]ot 8 improvements have been approved as submitted, including timely completion of the permanent driveway at 571 Sandy Oaks Ranch Rd as detailed in the application" but that "[n]o application has been received or approved by the Architectural Control Committee (ACC) for any Improvements/changes to Lot 7." The letter concluded, "Any Lot 7 Improvements/changes without ACC approval would be a violation of Sandy Oaks Ranches CCRs." Additionally on that date, the POA sent notice to all property owners of a new "operating policy statement" regarding ACC applications for improvements "on any Lot that includes gates, roads, or access onto any Sandy Oaks Ranches platted private road easement":
All applications submitted to the Architectural Control Committee for Improvements on any Lot that includes gates, roads, or access onto any Sandy Oaks Ranches platted private road easement, will be considered with strict scrutiny, and only granted upon a showing of legal right and a compelling need. An exception to this policy will be granted to those certain lots lacking direct access to Sandy Oaks Ranch Road and for which access to an easement road is necessary in order to access Sandy Oaks Ranch Road, being the only road for
ingress and egress to the Sandy Oaks Ranches Subdivision.
Scaife testified that this policy was in response to both the dispute concerning Trail Crest Road and to a dispute in 2018 regarding properties adjoining the similar Forest Oaks Road easement.
The morning after Stevenson received notice of this policy and the letter from Scaife regarding her properties, she sent Scaife the following text message:
Bill if the board is going to enforce (which I don't see how since it's not in the covenants) the new ACC 'operating plan' then the Didways can only use the south side of Woodhollow [a similar road easement in the subdivision]. They too adjoin Sandy Oaks Road. That means I get a refund of all I paid to reseal roads.I intend to utilize my south gate now and going forward.
The resealing of the roads in the subdivision was a POA project to which all property owners had contributed funds.
Sullivan testified that when the gate was built in 2010, he had a conversation with Stevenson's husband about it, and based on that conversation, Sullivan believed that the purpose of the gate was "to run cows in and out from tract to tract," and he did not object to that use. Sullivan recounted that after Stevenson's husband died in 2016, "[t]here were long periods of time no one was going in and out" of Tract 7 through the gate. However, "[t]hings changed" in November or December 2020, when Sullivan "saw PEC trucks coming on Trail Crest, and they had that gate open." Sullivan called Scaife and "asked him what was going on because they had big trucks out there with poles on them, big heavy ones, trying to get through" Trail Crest Road. Scaife told Sullivan that Stevenson had applied to build a house and that "utilities were going in" at that time.
Later, Sullivan got a call from a neighbor informing him that "cement trucks were going through there." On December 27 or 28, 2020, Sullivan "saw the general contractor driving out" to Tract 7 and "went down and flagged down the general contractor," Gary Slayton. Sullivan asked Slayton "who told him to use that gate," and Slayton answered, "Cathy," referring to Stevenson. Sullivan told Slayton that he was on private property and did not have permission to be there, and he demanded that he and his subcontractors stop using Trail Crest Road.
Sullivan testified that there was a lockbox on the gate, and he took photos "of everyday people going to the lockbox, getting out the key, unlocking it, opening it and go[ing]" into Tract 7 through the gate. Sullivan explained, "That's how people came to do all the construction in that house, through that lockbox." He added, "Gate 8 was locked. . . . I went up and checked Gate 8. It was locked. They couldn't get into Gate 8 to her house. The only way they could get to the construction [site] was to go there" to the gate on Tract 7. In Stevenson's responses to Sullivan's interrogatories, Stevenson identified several people who she had authorized to access Tract 7 from Trail Crest Road, including Hubbard, Slayton, Spring Branch Water Well Drilling, PEC, and "[v]arious unknown subcontractors who have worked on the house being constructed on Lot 8." Sullivan further testified that this was an ongoing issue:
I have picture after picture after picture up until a couple of weeks ago, workmen coming in, the Defendant coming in, her daughter coming in, all kinds of people going in and out. That's still being used as an entrance. It wasn't temporary. It was permanent. And they're still using it.
Stevenson testified that when she applied for approval to build a home on Tract 8, she told the ACC that at the end of construction, she would build a driveway from the home to Sandy Oaks Ranch Road but that "for construction" purposes, she would use the gate on Trail Crest Road "[si]mply because we had a low water crossing that ran between the new property and Sandy Oaks Ranch Road, which heavy trucks would not have been able to go across." She later added that she used the gate "[t]o avoid the wet weather creek" and because she "paid to seal coat all of those roads" and thus believed that she had "a right to drive on it."
Stevenson testified that the pasture gate was "the only gate" with access to Tract 7 from a paved road. There was no entrance to Tract 7 from Sandy Oaks Ranch Road. Stevenson testified that she "rarely" used the gate on Tract 7 between 2010 and 2020 and she "[v]ery rarely" used the gate now and that when she did, it was to mow the lawn. She added, "There's been a time or two where the main gate that we put into Lot 8 wasn't working and so we had to use the Trail Crest gate but, no, it is not a permanent entrance." Stevenson also testified that Hubbard still used the gate to move his goats between tracts and "occasionally" to store his work equipment.
Stevenson acknowledged that she had given construction personnel permission to use the gate during construction. She also acknowledged that her contractor, Slayton, had placed "big white rocks" on the ground at the gate entrance. She explained,
It's common for TxDOT to require that big white rock against-to be put on the new construction land to protect the road, and Gary said he was going to drop it to protect Trail Crest from big trucks dragging mud out onto the road. And I wasn't real crazy about the idea, but he insisted and did it. At the end of construction, I had Kade pick it all up and put crushed granite down so the grass could come back through it since that is not a permanent entrance.Hubbard testified that Stevenson had asked him to remove some rocks from the entryway to the gate on Tract 7 after construction was complete. He recounted, "After they got the house built and we opened up the-the new entrance there at that pasture gate there was some of that bigger rock there that I scraped out of there and put some granite gravel back on top to let it grow back over."
Stevenson further testified that she wanted to use Trail Crest Road as a 911 address for Tract 7. She explained,
Since Mark died, I have wanted a 911 address down there. I drive that property occasionally to check the fences. I have horses that I have put out there. And if something happens and I needed help, it would be easier for me to call 911 and say come in 101 Trail Crest, instead of having to come all the way down Sandy Oaks . . . to try to figure out where I am.
Stevenson testified that she "never" intended to turn the pasture gate into a regular entrance.
On cross-examination, Stevenson acknowledged that during the construction of the house, she sent out notices to contractors and others that the address for the entrance to the house was 100 Trail Crest and that "[m]ost of them came through Trail Crest." She also acknowledged that she never made any application for improvements to Tract 7 because "[i]t was a construction entrance. It is not a permanent entrance into the new house." She explained, "That is an unimproved path. There have been no improvements done on that. No grading. No filling in of any holes. No removing of any rocks. It was just a construction entrance. It was not a permanent, final driveway." Stevenson further acknowledged that she had "no idea" if the gate on Tract 7 had been approved by the ACC when it was first built, but she assumed that it had been approved, based on "the word of Kade" that he and her husband "had contacted the people they needed to contact to get approval for that fence and both of those gates."
Stevenson was referring to both the pasture gate on Tract 7 and the entrance gate to Tract 9.
At the conclusion of trial, the district court took the matter under advisement and later issued its final judgment. Both parties moved to modify the judgment, and the district court denied Stevenson's motion and granted Sullivan's motion. In its modified final judgment, the district court made the following declarations regarding ownership of and rights to the Trail Crest Road Easement:
[The Trail Crest Road Easement] . . . is owned by [the POA] for the benefit of all members of [the POA] and their guests and invitees, subject to the control of [the POA] pursuant to [the CCRs] . . . .
[The POA] has the power and sole discretion to determine ingress, egress and access to tracts/lots within Sandy Oaks Ranches along the roadways and easements therein.
The Deed from SO Ranches Ltd. to [the POA] . . . . transferred a road easement on Tract 4 of Sandy Oaks Ranches to [the POA], but did not transfer any Fee ownership in any tract in Sandy Oaks Ranches.
Each Tract Owner in Sandy Oaks Ranches has an implied road easement by necessity to use Sandy Oaks Ranch Road for ingress and egress from RR 1323.
Regarding Stevenson's use of the Trail Crest Road Easement, the district court found that:
[Stevenson] has Violated [the CCRS], the Court finding that [Stevenson] changed the use of the gate on Tract 7 from a Livestock and emergency use gate to an entrance for Ingress and Egress to Tract 7 without the approval of the [ACC] as required by Paragraph 9 of [the CCRs].
[Stevenson] has Trespassed upon [Sullivan's] Tract 4 property of Sandy Oaks Ranches, the Court finding that [Stevenson] has no approved Ingress and Egress access to Tract 7 from the Trail Crest Road Easement owned by the POA, that the use of the POA Trail Crest Road Easement for an unapproved Ingress and Egress of Tract 7 was not an approved use nor within the scope of the terms of the Trail Crest Road Easement and therefore exceeded the legal use of the Trail Crest Road Easement; and that [Sullivan] owns Tract 4 and did not consent to [Stevenson's] use of his property for ingress/egress access to Tract 7; and that [Stevenson] directed the Contractor to use the Trail Crest Road Easement for construction.
Based on these findings, the district court enjoined Stevenson, and those acting by and through her, "from using Tract 4 of Sandy Oaks Ranches for Ingress and Egress access to Tract 7 of Sandy Oaks Ranches" until such time as Stevenson "has obtained an approval in writing for Ingress and Egress access from the Trail Crest Road Easement from [the ACC] as provided for in Paragraph 9 of [the CCRs]." The district court also ordered that Sullivan have and recover actual damages from Stevenson in the amount of $1,000, finding that Stevenson's trespass had resulted in temporary damages to Sullivan's property in that amount.
Regarding attorney's fees, the district court awarded attorney's fees to Sullivan in the amount of $25,000, "finding that while both parties have obtained relief under their respective Declaratory Judgment actions and have incurred attorneys' fees they deemed necessary, Plaintiff has prevailed on more issues and is entitled to the greater weight of attorney's fees under the Declaratory Judgment claims." The district court also awarded Sullivan additional attorney's fees in the event of an appeal or any other post-judgment filings by Stevenson. Stevenson requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the district court made. Each party filed a notice of appeal from the district court's judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Restrictive covenants are contracts that run with the land and are 'subject to the general rules of contract construction.'" JBrice Holdings, L.L.C. v. Wilcrest Walk Townhomes Ass'n, Inc., 644 S.W.3d 179, 183 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass'n, 556 S.W.3d 274, 280 (Tex. 2018)); see Owens v. Ousey, 241 S.W.3d 124, 129 (Tex. App.- Austin 2007, pet. denied). "We review 'a trial court's interpretation of a restrictive covenant de novo.'" JBrice Holdings, L.L.C., 644 S.W.3d at 179 (quoting Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 280). "A covenant under review 'may not be enlarged, extended, stretched or changed by construction.'" Id. "Thus, to validly limit an owner's property use, a covenant must plainly prohibit that use." Id. (citing Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 280-81). "Otherwise, an owner 'who purchases for value and without notice takes the land free from the restriction.'" Id. (quoting Davis v. Huey, 620 S.W.2d 561, 566 (Tex. 1981)).
The restrictive covenants at issue in this case involve an easement. "An easement is a non-possessory property interest that authorizes its holder to use the property of another for a particular purpose." Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 736 (Tex. 2012). "'A grant or reservation of an easement in general terms implies a grant of unlimited reasonable use such as is reasonably necessary and convenient and as little burdensome as possible to the servient owner.'" Id. (quoting Coleman v. Forister, 514 S.W.2d 899, 903 (Tex. 1974)). "However, the burden on the servient estate is secondary to ensuring that the purpose of the easement is reasonably fulfilled." Id.
"We apply basic principles of contract construction and interpretation when considering an express easement's terms." Marcus Cable Assocs., L.P. v. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697, 700 (Tex. 2002) (citing DeWitt Cnty. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96, 100 (Tex. 1999)); see Davis v. Johnston, No. 03-10-00712-CV, 2012 WL 2499472, at *15-17 (Tex. App.- Austin June 28, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (applying basic principles of contract construction and interpretation to determine express easement's meaning and scope). The "starting point" is "the easement's plain language." Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Lynch, 595 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Tex. 2020) (citing Krohn, 90 S.W.3d at 700). "The contracting parties' intentions, as expressed in the grant, determine the scope of the conveyed interest." Krohn, 90 S.W.3d at 700-01 (citing DeWitt Cnty. Elec. Coop., 1 S.W.3d at 103). "When the grant's terms are not specifically defined, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning." Id. at 701 (citing DeWitt Cnty. Elec. Coop., 1 S.W.3d at 101). "Nothing passes by implication 'except what is reasonably necessary' to fairly enjoy the rights expressly granted." Id. (quoting Coleman v. Forister, 514 S.W.2d 899, 903 (Tex. 1974)).
DISCUSSION
Stevenson's appeal
Violation of CCRs
In Stevenson's first issue, she asserts that the district court erred in construing the CCRs to find that she must first get approval from the Board and / or the ACC to access her property via the Trail Crest Road easement. In her second issue, Stevenson contends that the district court erred in finding that she violated the CCRs. We will address these issues together.
The district court's fact findings that are relevant to these issues include the following:
The purpose of the Road Easements in Sandy Oaks Ranches is to provide access to Tracts that have an approved entrance for Access for ingress and egress from the Sandy Oaks Ranches Architectural Control Committee.
The Sandy Oaks Ranches Property Owners Association ("POA") acting through the Architectural Control Committee ("ACC") has the power and sole discretion to determine and approve ingress, egress and access to tracts/lots within Sandy Oaks Ranches along the roadways and easements therein.
The Defendant created an entrance for the purpose of access by ingress and egress to Tract 7 off of the Trial Crest Road Easement in 2020 by applying for a 911 address and creating a driveway attachment on unimproved property to the Trail Crest Road Easement in 2020 which required approval of the Sandy Oaks Ranches Architectural Control Committee.
The Court finds that the Policy of the POA regarding access from Road Easements is within the power and discretion of the POA and is not arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory.
Defendant has never made an application for improvements, including for access by ingress or egress to Tract 7.
The POA and the ACC did not approve any improvements on Tract 7.
The POA and the ACC did not approve any access, ingress or egress from the Trail Crest Road Easement to Tract 7.
The Court finds that the Defendant has no approved Ingress and Egress access to Tract 7 from the Trail Crest Road Easement owned by the POA, that the use of the POA Trail Crest Road Easement for an unapproved Ingress and Egress of Tract 7 was not an approved use nor within the scope of the terms of the Trail Crest Road Easement and therefore exceeded the legal use of the Trail Crest Road Easement.
Tract 7 and Defendant have no Contractual Right to demand access, egress or ingress to Tract 7 from the Trail Crest Road Easement.
Tract 7 and Defendant, Catherine Stevenson, have no Privilege to use the Trail Crest Road Easement to access Tract 7.
Stevenson argues that these findings are erroneous because in her view, "there is no limitation on the scope of the easements, and certainly no requirement that [easement] access be approved." She contends that nothing in the CCRs gives the ACC power to determine and approve ingress, egress, and access to tracts within the subdivision. Stevenson further contends that she did not violate any restriction contained within the CCRs because nothing that she did during the construction of the house on Tract 8 constituted an "improvement" as contemplated by the CCRs.
However, contrary to Stevenson's contentions, the CCRs vest broad power in the POA to regulate property use in the subdivision, including the use of easements. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the CCRs provide:
14.Powers and Functions. The ASSOCIATION shall have powers and functions provided by applicable law, as heretofore or hereafter amended, respectively, and such other powers as set forth herein, including without limitation, at its option, the right to maintain streets, rights of way, access-easements, roads, lakes, utilities, recreational areas . . . and to establish rules and regulations for the use of lakes, rivers, streets, and other SUBDIVISION facilities, specifically erected and installed and designated to be controlled by the ASSOCIATION.
15. Power to promulgate rules and regulations. The ASSOCIATION, acting by and through its Board of Directors, shall have the power to promulgate, create, amend, alter, modify, rescind, and cancel rules and regulations for the SUBDIVISION which are harmonious with the overall scheme and plan of the SUBDIVISION or to comply with any and all local, state, and federal laws.
The POA's powers extend to "common areas," "improvements" to the property, and any "plans" and "specifications" for such improvements, and those terms are defined broadly in the CCRs:
"COMMON AREAS" shall mean all real property owned by the ASSOCIATION for the common use and enjoyment of the OWNERS, including roads, streets, right-of-ways, access easements, gates, entryways and appurtenances thereto, water wells, vegetation, lighting, drainage areas, and easements.
"IMPROVEMENT" shall mean every structure and all appurtenances thereto of every type and kind, including, but not limited to buildings, outbuildings, fences, storage sheds, patios, tennis courts, swimming pools, garages, landscaping, poles, signs, exterior air conditioning, water softener fixtures or equipment, pumps, walls, tanks, reservoirs, pipes, meters, antennae, towers and/or other facilities used in connection with water, sewer, gas, electric, telephone, regular or cable television, satellite, t.v. antennas, and/or other utilities.
"PLANS" and "SPECIFICATIONS" shall mean any and all documents designed to guide or control the construction or erection of any IMPROVEMENT,
including, but not limited to, those indicating location, size, shape, configuration, materials, site plans, excavation and grading plans, foundation plans, drainage plans, landscaping and fencing plans, elevation drawings, floor plans, specifications on all building products and construction techniques, samples of exterior colors, plans for utility services, and all other documentation or information relevant to such IMPROVEMENT.
Moreover, Section 3.7.A.9 of the CCRs, which is the restriction that the district court found Stevenson violated, gives the ACC power to approve improvements to the property:
No IMPROVEMENT of any kind will be erected or placed on any PARCEL in the SUBDIVISION, nor shall any structure be altered in the exterior design after being erected or placed on or attached to any PARCEL in the SUBDIVISION, until the construction plans, landscaping plans, or other plans, specifications and a plot plan showing the location and size of such IMPROVEMENT has been submitted to the COMMITTEE, or its designated representatives for approval. After approval in writing has been given, the erecting, placing or altering of the IMPROVEMENTS on any PARCEL will be made only in accordance with the approved plans, specifications and plot plans unless variations or changes are also approved in the same manner.
In this case, Scaife testified that Stevenson provided the ACC with "no application to do anything on Lot 7 at all," and Stevenson acknowledged in her testimony that she did not seek approval from the ACC regarding using the gate on Tract 7 as a construction entrance. This evidence supports the district court's finding that Stevenson violated the CCRs by "chang[ing] the use of the gate on Tract 7 from a Livestock and emergency use gate to an entrance for Ingress and Egress to Tract 7 without the approval of the [ACC] as required by Paragraph 9 of [the CCRs]."
Stevenson does not dispute that gates, fences, and driveways are improvements that the POA and the ACC have the power to regulate, but she argues that the POA and the ACC cannot regulate ingress and egress to lots on the properties. However, by their very nature, gates, fences, and driveways control ingress and egress to property lots. Thus, by regulating the gates, fences, and driveways that property owners can construct on their lots, the POA and the ACC necessarily have the power to regulate ingress and egress to those lots. Moreover, the CCRs expressly provide that the POA has the power to regulate the use of easements, which would necessarily include any ingress and egress to road easements such as Trail Crest Road.
Stevenson also argues that no improvements have been made to the fence and the gate since 2010, when they were built, and that the statute of limitations has long since run on any claim that could have been brought for any lack of approval of that initial improvement to the property. However, changes were made to the gate during construction, specifically the white rocks that Stevenson's contractor placed at the entrance of the gate "to protect Trail Crest from big trucks dragging mud out onto the road." Additionally, the evidence showed that the use of the gate changed in 2020, from a pasture gate primarily used "to run cows in and out from tract to tract" to a construction entrance used by PEC and cement trucks, Stevenson's contractor, and various subcontractors.
Stevenson further contends that the construction entrance was not a permanent entrance unto Lot 7. However, the evidence supports the district court finding otherwise. Sullivan testified that up until two weeks before trial, he had seen "workmen coming in, the Defendant coming in, her daughter coming in, all kinds of people going in and out." Sullivan added, "That's still being used as an entrance. It wasn't temporary. It was permanent. And they're still using it." The district court could have credited this testimony. Additionally, although Stevenson testified that she used the gate "very rarely," she added that "[t]here's been a time or two where the main gate that we put into Lot 8 wasn't working and so we had to use the Trail Crest gate." Also, according to Scaife, Stevenson referred to the gate as her "south entrance," which further supports a finding that Stevenson intended to use the gate on a permanent basis moving forward. Finally, Stevenson applied for a 911 address on Trail Crest Road for emergency purposes, which is further evidence that she intended to make permanent use of the gate for ingress and egress to Trail Crest Road.
Based on the above, we conclude that the district court did not err by construing the CCRs to find that Stevenson must first get approval from the Board and/or the ACC to access her property via the Trail Crest Road easement and by concluding that Stevenson violated the CCRs by failing to do so.
We overrule Stevenson's first and second issues.
Trespass
Regarding Sullivan's trespass claim, the district court found the following:
[Stevenson] has Trespassed upon [Sullivan's] Tract 4 property of Sandy Oaks Ranches, the Court finding that [Stevenson] has no approved Ingress and Egress access to Tract 7 from the Trail Crest Road Easement owned by the POA, that the use of the POA Trail Crest Road Easement for an unapproved Ingress and Egress of Tract 7 was not an approved use nor within the scope of the terms of the Trail Crest Road Easement and therefore exceeded the legal use of the Trail Crest Road Easement; and that [Sullivan] owns Tract 4 and did not consent to [Stevenson's] use of his property for ingress/egress access to Tract 7; and that [Stevenson] directed the Contractor to use the Trail Crest Road Easement for construction.
In Stevenson's third issue, she asserts that she "had an easement of enjoyment and/or benefit, as per the CCRs, to use the Trail Crest Road Easement, so [she] could not have trespassed on Mr. Sullivan's Tract 4 by using the easement."
"A trespasser has neither express nor implied permission to enter the property of another, but enters it nonetheless." CenterPoint Energy Houston Elec. LLC v. Bluebonnet Drive, Ltd., 264 S.W.3d 381, 387 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (citing Mellon Mortgage Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 671 (Tex. 1999); Koelsch v. Indus. Gas Supply Corp., 132 S.W.3d 494, 497 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied)). "An easement holder who exceeds the rights granted by the owner of the servient estate thus commits a trespass." Id. (citing Krohn, 90 S.W.3d at 703). "A party claiming trespass must establish that the defendant committed an act that exceeded the bounds of any legal rights the defendant may have possessed." Id. (citing Koelsch, 132 S.W.3d at 497).
As discussed above, Stevenson exceeded the scope of the easement by using it for ingress and egress to Tract 7 without obtaining approval from the POA to do so. Specifically, she authorized her contractor, subcontractors, and others to use the easement to access her properties through her gate on Tract 7, thereby enabling construction trucks and other vehicles to drive on Sullivan's Tract 4 without permission. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that she committed a trespass on Sullivan's property. See McDaniel Bros. v. Wilson, 70 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1934, writ ref'd) ("[E]very unauthorized entry upon land of another is a trespass even if no damage is done or the injury is slight, and gives a cause of action to the injured party."). Stevenson also argues that she cannot be liable for any trespass committed by her independent contractor. To the contrary, "'liability for trespass is not dependent upon personal participation. One who aids, assists, or advises a trespasser in committing a trespass is equally liable with him who does the act complained of.'" Victory Energy Corp. v. Oz Gas Corp., 461 S.W.3d 159, 177 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2014, pet. denied) (quoting Parker v. Kangerga, 482 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)); Wilson, 70 S.W.2d at 621.
We overrule Stevenson's third issue.
Alleged breach of contract by Sullivan
Stevenson filed a counterclaim against Sullivan for breach of contract, alleging that Sullivan had breached the CCRs by seeking to deprive Stevenson of the rights and benefits granted to all the owners in the subdivision and that she was damaged by his efforts to deny her the use of Trail Crest Road. In her fourth issue, Stevenson asserts that the district court erred in finding against Stevenson on her breach-of-contract claim.
As we have already concluded, Stevenson used Trail Crest Road in a manner that violated the CCRs. Thus, any attempt by Sullivan to prevent her from using Trail Crest Road in that manner did not breach the covenants, including by filing this lawsuit, which he had a legal right to do under the CCRs. Additionally, Stevenson failed to prove that Sullivan prevented her from using Trail Crest Road in a manner that was consistent with the CCRs. Accordingly, Stevenson did not prove that Sullivan breached the restrictive covenants, and the district court did not err in finding against her on that counterclaim.
Paragraph 30 of the CCRs authorizes any owner of property in the subdivision to file suit alleging a violation or attempted violation of the CCRs.
We overrule Stevenson's fourth issue.
Injunction
The district court enjoined Stevenson, and those acting by and through her, "from using Tract 4 of Sandy Oaks Ranches for Ingress and Egress access to Tract 7 of Sandy Oaks Ranches" until such time as Stevenson "has obtained an approval in writing for Ingress and Egress access from the Trail Crest Road Easement from [the ACC] as provided for in Paragraph 9 of [the CCRs]." In her fifth issue, Stevenson asserts that the district court erred in enjoining her from using Trail Crest Road in this manner.
We review a trial court's issuance of injunctive relief for an abuse of discretion. Operation Rescue-National v. Planned Parenthood, 975 S.W.2d 546, 560 (Tex. 1998). An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner, or without any reference to any guiding rules or principles. Texas Health Care Info. Council v. Seton Health Plan, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 841, 850 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied). "To be entitled to a permanent injunction, a party must prove (1) a wrongful act, (2) imminent harm, (3) an irreparable injury, and (4) the absence of an adequate remedy at law." Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 792 (Tex. 2020).
When "a trespass invades the possession of a person's land, or destroys the use and enjoyment of that land, an injunction is a proper remedy." Beathard Joint Venture v. West Houston Airport Corp., 72 S.W.3d 426, 432 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.). Additionally, "[a] permanent injunction is a proper remedy to restrain repeated or continuing trespasses." Henry v. Smith, 637 S.W.3d 226, 243 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2021, pet. denied).
Here, Sullivan presented evidence that Stevenson wrongfully exceeded the scope of the easement on his property by using Trail Crest Road for ingress and egress to her property and that she was continuing to use Trail Crest Road for that purpose. On this record, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in enjoining Stevenson from using Trail Crest Road for ingress and egress access to her property until such time as Stevenson obtained approval in writing from the POA to do so.
We overrule Stevenson's fifth issue.
Sullivan's cross-appeal
Purpose of easement
The district court declared that the Trail Crest Road Easement is "owned by [the POA] for the benefit of all members of [the POA] and their guests and invitees, subject to the control of [the POA] pursuant to [the CCRs]. . . ." Sullivan asserts that this was error. In his first issue on cross-appeal, Sullivan asserts that the purpose of Trail Crest Road as a matter of law is to afford the landlocked tracts 5 and 6 access to Sandy Oaks Ranch Road. In Sullivan's view, allowing non-landlocked owners such as Stevenson to use Trail Crest Road, "other than to visit the private landlocked tracts on the easement as invitees, is senseless and imposes a needless burden on the servient estate."
Sullivan contends that the limited purpose of the road is demonstrated by the circumstances surrounding the creation of the easement. Specifically, he points to deposition testimony of the developer of the subdivision and current and former directors of the POA, who expressed their views that the road easements were intended for the use and benefit of the owners of the landlocked tracts. He also points to evidence that the subdivision plat initially was not approved by the Blanco County Commissioners' Court, which he argues shows that the developers intended the front six tracts of the subdivision to have no property common to all the owners.
This argument is based on Sullivan's interpretation of a statutory exemption to plat approval involving the amount of common property in a subdivision. See Tex. Local Gov't Code §§ 232.001(a)(3), (b)(3), .0015(f).
These arguments are unavailing. "In construing a contract, a court must ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the writing itself." Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 333 (Tex. 2011). Although "we may consider the facts and circumstances surrounding a contract" to render a contract capable of only one meaning, it is well established that "extrinsic evidence can be considered only to interpret an ambiguous writing, not to create ambiguity." Kachina Pipeline Company, Inc. v. Lillis, 471 S.W.3d 445, 450 (Tex. 2015). "If the easement's terms can be given a definite or certain meaning, 'then the language is not ambiguous, and the court is obligated to interpret the contract as a matter of law.'" Southwestern Electric Power Company v. Lynch, 595 S.W.3d 678, 686 (Tex. 2020) (quoting DeWitt Cnty. Elec. Coop., 1 S.W.3d at 100). "Importantly, a dispute over the meaning of the easement's terms is not enough to render an easement ambiguous." Id. "An easement is ambiguous only if it is susceptible to two different, reasonable meanings." Id.
The purpose of the Trail Crest Road easement is not ambiguous. The plat provides that the developer subdivided the land "in accordance with the plat shown hereon, subject to any and all easements or restrictions heretofore granted and does hereby dedicate to the owners of the property shown hereon the use of the streets and easements shown hereon." (Emphasis added.) Next to that description, the plat map showed all 29 tracts in the subdivision, not just the tracts connected to each easement. The plat also clearly identified Trail Crest Road on the map as a "30' WIDE ROAD EASEMENT," thereby categorizing it as one of the easements that was dedicated to "the owners of the property shown hereon," i.e., all the property owners. Moreover, the CCRs provide that "[t]he streets, roads, rights of way, and access easements referred to herein shall never be deemed to be dedicated to the public for any purpose and shall be solely for the benefit of SO RANCHES, LTD., OWNERS, and their guests or invitees." (Emphasis added.) "Owner" is defined in the CCRs as "the record OWNER . . . of the fee simple title to any LOT in the SUBDIVISION, or any part or interest therein." (Emphasis added.) Finally, the developer conveyed by warranty deed all of its interests in "all rights, titles, and easements reserved in the [CCRs]" to the POA, which was composed of all the property owners in the subdivision. Thus, the conveyance documents are clear and unambiguous that the easements in the subdivision, including Trail Crest Road, are dedicated to and for the benefit of any and all lot owners in the subdivision, and nothing in the conveyance documents suggests that the sole purpose of Trail Crest Road is to afford the landlocked tracts 5 and 6 access to Sandy Oaks Ranch Road.
We overrule Sullivan's first issue.
Express or implied easement
The district court found that Trail Crest Road was expressly reserved as an access easement for the benefit of all the property owners in the subdivision. In his second issue, Sullivan asserts that the district court erred in determining that Trail Crest Road is an express easement because the governing documents creating the easement do not satisfy the statute of frauds. Sullivan asserts that the surrounding circumstances show that Trail Crest Road is instead an implied easement created by necessity solely for the benefit of those owners of landlocked tracts 5 and 6 who would otherwise lack access to Sandy Oaks Ranch Road.
"Easements may be express or implied." Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 736. "Implied easements are defined by the circumstances that create the implication." Id. (citing Ulbricht v. Friedsam, 159 Tex. 607, 325 S.W.2d 669, 677 (1959). "Express easements, however, must comply with the Statute of Frauds, which requires a description of the easement's location." Id. (citing Pick v. Bartel, 659 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex. 1983)). "To be sufficient, the writing must furnish within itself, or by reference to some other existing writing, the means or date by which the land to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty." West Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac, 94 S.W.3d 248, 264 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.). "If an easement does not sufficiently describe the interest conveyed, the conveyance is void." Id.
Sullivan asserts that the conveyance documents do not satisfy the statute of frauds because they are "contradictory" and contain words and phrases that are too generic and vague to adequately describe the conveyance. We disagree. The plat provides a legal description of the property and identifies Trail Crest Road as a "30' WIDE ROAD EASEMENT," showing the precise location of the easement on the map. The CCRs refer to the plat in describing the property and include a full legal description of the property as an attachment. Similarly, the warranty deed references both the plat and the CCRs in its description of the property as follows:
BEING all grantor's interests in all rights, titles and easements reserved in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Reservations, and Restrictions of SANDY OAKS RANCHES, a subdivision in Blanco County, Texas, recorded in Volume 212, Page 236, of the Official Public Records of Real Property, Blanco County, Texas, and all grantor's rights, titles and easements shown on plat recorded in Volume 1, Pages 265-269, Plat Records, Blanco County, Texas.
We conclude that the conveyance of the easement is sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds and that it is therefore an express easement rather than an implied easement by necessity.
We overrule Sullivan's second issue.
Attorney's fees
In Stevenson's sixth issue and Sullivan's third issue, they each address the district court's award of attorney's fees to Sullivan. Stevenson asserts that because she successfully proved that Trail Crest Road was an easement for the benefit of all of the Owners in the Subdivision, she was entitled to at least some attorney's fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Sullivan asserts that he was entitled to $330,050 in attorney's fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act instead of the $25,000 that he was awarded, that he was further entitled to $39,235 in attorney's fees that the trial court found Sullivan had "properly allocated to the issue of the enforcement of the [CCRs] which allow for Attorney fees," and that he was entitled to a higher amount of appellate attorney's fees than the amount awarded by the district court.
Standard of review and governing law
"In Texas, as in the federal courts, each party generally must pay its own way in attorney's fees." Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 483 (Tex. 2019). "But there are certain circumstances in which the prevailing party can recover fees from the opposing party." Id. at 484. "When fee-shifting is authorized, whether by statute or contract, the party seeking a fee award must prove the reasonableness and necessity of the requested attorney's fees." Id.
"To determine the correct standard of review, we look first to the statute" authorizing attorney's fees. Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. 1998). A statute "provid[ing] that the court 'may' award attorney fees . . . . affords the trial court a measure of discretion in deciding whether to award attorney fees or not." Id. We review an award of attorney's fees under such a statute for abuse of discretion, i.e., whether the trial court ruled "arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without regard to guiding legal principles" or "without supporting evidence." Id.
On the other hand, "[s]tatutes providing that a party 'may recover,' 'shall be awarded,' or 'is entitled to' attorney fees are not discretionary." Id. "When a statute provides for mandatory recovery of attorney's fees, the trial court has no discretion but to award them if they are pleaded and proved." State v. Buchanan, 572 S.W.3d 746, 750 (Tex. App.-Austin 2019, no pet.).
The two statutes relevant here are Section 37.009 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.009, and Section 5.006 of the Texas Property Code, which applies to actions for breach of restrictive covenants, see Tex. Prop. Code § 5.006. "The Declaratory Judgments Act does not require an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party." Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 20. Rather, it provides that "the court may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney's fees as are equitable and just." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.009. Thus, the statute is discretionary, and that discretion includes a determination of whether the attorney's fees are "equitable and just." Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21. "The grant or denial of attorney's fees in a declaratory judgment action lies within the discretion of the trial court, and its judgment will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear showing that it abused that discretion." Brookshire Katy Drainage Dist. v. Lily Gardens, LLC, 333 S.W.3d 301, 313 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). "In the exercise of its discretion to award attorney's fees in declaratory judgment action, the trial court may award attorney's fees to the prevailing party, may decline to award attorney's fees to either party, or may award attorney's fees to the nonprevailing party, regardless of which party sought declaratory judgment." Id.
In contrast, "[i]n an action based on breach of a restrictive covenant pertaining to real property, the court shall allow to a prevailing party who asserted the action reasonable attorney's fees in addition to the party's costs and claim." Tex. Prop. Code § 5.006(a). To determine reasonable attorney's fees under this statute, the court shall consider "(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the expertise, reputation, and ability of the attorney; and (4) any other factor." Id. § 5.006(b). "If breach of a restrictive covenant is properly pleaded and proved, then the award of fees under section 5.006 is mandatory." Garden Oaks Maintenance Organization v. Chang, 542 S.W.3d 117, 140 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th] Dist. 2017, no pet.); see also Mitchell v. LaFlamme, 60 S.W.3d 123, 130 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (explaining that party "need not specifically plead the applicable statute in order to recover under it"). "Thus, whether a party is entitled to attorney's fees under section 5.006 is a question of law, and we review questions of law using a de novo standard." Teal Trading and Dev., LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n, 534 S.W.3d 558, 595 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2017), aff'd, 593 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. 2020).
Analysis
In this case, the district court awarded attorney's fees as follows:
Richard D. Sullivan recover from Defendant Catherine Stevenson the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25.000.00) in attorney's fees, the Court finding that while both parties have obtained relief under their respective Declaratory Judgment actions and have incurred attorneys' fees they deemed necessary, Plaintiff has prevailed on more issues and is entitled to the greater weight of attorney's fees under the Declaratory Judgment claims.
Richard D. Sullivan recover from Catherine Stevenson the following sums under the following circumstances: In the event Defendant files a motion for new trial. The reasonable attorney's fees incurred defending against the motion will be $2,500.00. In the event Defendant appeals the judgment to the Third Court of Appeals the reasonable attorney's fees incurred in defending against the appeal shall be $10,000.00. In the event Defendant files a Petition of Review to the Supreme Court of Texas the reasonable attorneys' fees will be $10,000.00. And in the event the Petition of Review to the Texas Supreme Court is granted, the reasonable attorney's fees for preparing and arguing the appeal will be $10,000.00.
The district court also made the following fact findings regarding attorney's fees:
While both parties have obtained relief under their respective Declaratory Judgment actions and have incurred the attorneys' fees they deemed necessary, Plaintiff has prevailed on more issues and is entitled to the greater weight of attorney's fees under the Declaratory Judgment claims.
Plaintiff has identified $39,235, dollars in time through trial properly allocated to the issue of the enforcement of the Restrictions of Sandy Oaks Ranches which allow for Attorney fees.
Plaintiff's reasonable and necessary Attorney's Fees taking into consideration the requirements of Rohrmoos are Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00).
In the event Defendant files a motion for new trial, the reasonable attorney's fees incurred defending against the motion will be $2,500.00. In the event Defendant appeals the judgment to the Third Court of Appeals the reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in defending against the appeal shall be $10,000.00. In the event Defendant files a Petition of Review to the Supreme Court of Texas the reasonable attorney's fees will be $10,000.00. And, in the event the Petition of Review to the Texas Supreme Court is granted, the reasonable attorney's fees for preparing and arguing the appeal will be $10,000.00.
The district court also referenced Rohrmoos in the following conclusion of law: "Plaintiff has complied with the requirements of Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d469 (Tex. 2019) as to the issue of reasonable and necessary Attorney's Fees." Stevenson does not challenge Sullivan's compliance with the requirements of Rohrmoos.
Regarding the parties' declaratory judgment claims, the district court was not required to award either party any attorney's fees under the UDJA, even if one of them had fully prevailed in the court below, unless the district court found that the award was reasonable and necessary and equitable and just. See Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21. The district court balanced the equities, finding that "[w]hile both parties have obtained relief under their respective Declaratory Judgment actions and have incurred the attorneys' fees they deemed necessary, Plaintiff has prevailed on more issues and is entitled to the greater weight of attorney's fees under the Declaratory Judgment claims." We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's balance in this case and in denying Stevenson's attorney's fees. We overrule Stevenson's sixth issue.
As for the district court's decision to limit Sullivan's award to $25,000, instead of the $330,050 that he requested at trial, Sullivan characterized his request for that amount as "ridiculous" at trial and acknowledged that he did not expect the district court to award him that amount. Moreover, Sullivan documented 943 hours spent working on his declaratory-judgment claims, and the district court would not have abused its discretion in finding that many of those hours were either unreasonable and unnecessary or spent pursuing Sullivan's unsuccessful claims attempting to limit the use of the easement to the owners of the landlocked tracts. See Robinson v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 51 S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that amount of attorney's fees incurred by prevailing party under Declaratory Judgment Act was "excessive and incurred due to their own actions"); see also Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21 (explaining that under Declaratory Judgment Act, "[u]nreasonable fees cannot be awarded, even if the court believed them just" and that additionally, trial court has discretion to conclude "that it is not equitable or just to award even reasonable and necessary fees"); R2 Restaurants, Inc. v. Mineola Community Bank, SSB, 561 S.W.3d 642, 660 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2018, pet. denied) ("A 'reasonable' attorney's fee is one that is not excessive or extreme, but rather moderate or fair."). On this record, we cannot conclude that the district court's decision to not award Sullivan the full $330,050 in attorney's fees that he requested and instead award him $25,000 constituted an abuse of discretion.
However, regarding Sullivan's attorney's fees in his action for breach of the CCRs, the district court had no discretion to deny him "reasonable" attorney's fees. Sullivan presented documentary evidence and testimony that he spent 112.10 hours on that claim, at the rate of $350.00 per hour, for a total amount of $39,235.00 in attorney's fees. The district court found that this amount was "properly allocated to the issue of the enforcement of the Restrictions of Sandy Oaks Ranches which allow for Attorney fees," but failed to determine what amount was reasonable and did not award Sullivan any attorney's fees for that claim. By statute and according to the CCRs, the district court was required to award Sullivan, the prevailing party, the amount of those fees that it found to be "reasonable." See Tex. Prop. Code § 5.006(a). Although this Court cannot determine that amount, we can conclude that the record does not support a finding that the amount is zero. See Buchanan, 572 S.W.3d at 751 ("As a factual matter, a zero award for attorney's fees is proper only if the evidence (1) failed to prove (a) that any attorney's services were provided, or (b) the value of the services provided; or (2) affirmatively showed that no attorney's services were needed or that any services provided were of no value."). We conclude that the district court erred by failing to award Sullivan reasonable attorney's fees for his claim that Stevenson breached the CCRs.
Paragraph 30 of the CCRs provides that a property owner who prosecutes a suit for a violation or attempted violation of the CCRs shall recover reasonable attorney's fees.
Finally, we address the award of appellate attorney's fees to Sullivan. His sole argument on this point is that "[t]he award of fees for appeal are simply unreasonably low, and not supported by the evidence." He fails to cite to any authority or provide any substantive analysis on this point, and we find it to be inadequately briefed. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).
We overrule in part and sustain in part Sullivan's third issue.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the portion of the district court's judgment failing to award reasonable attorney's fees to Sullivan for prevailing in his claim against Stevenson for breach of the CCRs and remand to the district court for a determination of the reasonable amount of the attorney's fees on that claim. In all other respects, we affirm the district court's judgment.
Affirmed in part, Reversed and Remanded in part.