Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:00-CV-2157-M
December 26, 2001
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the District Court's Order of Reference, filed October 10, 2001, the Defendants' Third Motion to Dismiss and Supporting Brief, filed October 1, 2001, is before this Court for hearing, if necessary, and for recommendation. Having carefully considered the applicable authorities and the pleadings now on file, the Court recommends that the motion be DENIED for the reasons set forth below.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The factual and procedural background is taken from Stevenson's Original Complaint, filed October 2, 2000; from Stevenon's Answers to Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire, filed December 14, 2000; from Stevenson's testimony at the December 13, 2001, hearing; and from the Defendants' Brief, filed October 1, 2001. All facts in these Findings are set forth as alleged by Stevenson. Because the Court must accept Stevenson's allegations as true for purposes of this motion, the Court does not indicate which facts, if any, are disputed by the Defendants. The facts are discussed in greater detail below.
Plaintiff Billy N. Stevenson (Stevenson) filed this pro se § 1983 civil rights action against three Hunt County Jail officials on October 2, 2000. The three Defendants are Sheriff Don Anderson (Anderson), Lieutenant Edward O. Snead (Snead), and Medical Officer Carol Lynn Brannon (Brannon). In his pleadings, Stevenson claims that all three Defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to humane conditions of confinement during two separate periods of incarceration at the Hunt County Jail. More specifically, Stevenson alleges that the Defendants denied him: (1) safe and sanitary showers and (2) medical care for serious health impairments caused by the unsafe and unsanitary showers.
Sneed was incorrectly named as "Sneed" in Stevenson's Original Complaint. Brannon was incorrectly named as "Miss Lynn" in Stevenson's Original Complaint. Brannon was also incorrectly named as "Brown" both in the Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's Original Complaint, filed May 22, 2001, and in this Court's Order of June 11, 2001.
Stevenson was incarcerated in the Hunt County Jail from July 11, 2000, to November 2, 2000, as a pretrial detainee. Stevenson was incarcerated in the Hunt County jail from February 20, 2001, to May 31, 2001, as a convicted prisoner.
On October 1, 2001, the Defendants filed this Third Motion to Dismiss after receiving Stevenson's Rule 7(a) Reply. In their motion, the Defendants contend that Stevenson has failed to allege sufficient facts to overcome the Defendants' qualified immunity. More specifically, all three Defendants argue that Stevenson has failed to allege, as is required to overcome qualified immunity, that they violated Stevenson's clearly established constitutional rights.
Stevenson filed his Rule 7(a) Reply on August 24, 2001, and he filed a supplement to his Rule 7(a) Reply on August 27, 2001. Stevenson did not serve the Defendants with copies of these documents; therefore, the Defendants successfully moved to file this Third Motion to Dismiss out of time. ( Ds' Br. at 2 n. 1.)
Due to the voluminous, handwritten filings by Stevenson, the Court held a hearing on December 13, 2001, to clarify the factual basis of Stevenson's claims and to hear the merits of the motion to dismiss. In seeking to clarify Stevenson's claims, the Court relied on the authority of Spears v. McCotter to "develop the actual nature of the complaint." Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). The Spears hearing "is in the nature of a motion for more definite statement" under Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 181-82 . Therefore, Stevenson's sworn statements during the Spears hearing "will be considered as part of his complaint." Gallagher v. McGinnis, 2001 WL 1345761 at 2 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 2001). While the Court does not base its recommendation on Stevenson's numerous extraneous filings, the Court notes that Stevenson's testimony in the Spears hearing substantiates the factual allegations contained in his extraneous filings.
Stevenson's extraneous filings include detailed journal entries regarding his medical care at the Hunt County Jail. The medical journal entries are a daily account of Stevenson's medical care during the period of February 20, 2001, to May 31, 2001. Stevenson did not serve these medical journal entries on the Defendants; therefore, the Court does not rely on them in determining the factual support for the claims against the Defendants.
Before analyzing the merits of the motion to dismiss, the Court first turns to detail the appropriate legal standards.
II. Legal Standards
The Court recognizes that the Defendants move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). However, on May 22, 2001, the Defendants filed their Answer to Plaintiff's Original Complaint, and, on May 29, 2001, the Defendants filed their First Amended Answer to Plaintiff's Original Complaint. Therefore, the Court construes the Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as a Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss.
A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is designed to provide a means of disposing of cases when the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be achieved by reference to the pleadings and any facts of which the court may take judicial notice. Hebert Abstract v. Touchstone Props., LTD, 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing 5A Wright Miller, Federal Practice Procedure § 1367 at 509-10 (1990)). Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only if material facts are not in dispute and questions of law are all that remain.
Rather, the Court bases its recommendation on Stevenson's Original Complaint, his answers to the Magistrate's Questionnaire, his Rule 7(a) Reply, his supplement to the Rule 7(a) Reply, and his testimony at the Spears hearing. Hebert Abstract, 914 F.2d at 76 (citing 5A Wright Miller, Federal Practice Procedure § 1367 at 510).
When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court views the well-plead facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 5A Wright Miller, Federal Practice Procedure § 1368 at 518-19. Where, as here, the parties have not yet conducted discovery, the court assumes the truth of the factual allegations in the complaint. Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998). The court does not accept legal conclusions or unreasonable factual inferences. 5A Wright Miller, Federal Practice Procedure § 1368 at 523-25.
Because Stevenson brings this suit under § 1983, the Court now turns to articulate the standards for stating a claim under § 1983.
B. Section 1983 Standards
Section 1983 states in pertinent part:
Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1994). In order to hold the county liable, the plaintiff must also show that an official policy or custom was a cause in fact of the deprivation of fights. Id .
The Court now turns to discuss the standards for overcoming the Defendants' defense of qualified immunity.
C. Qualified Immunity
The Supreme Court recently elaborated on the analysis a court must undertake when ruling on qualified immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001). The threshold inquiry is whether, when taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the alleged facts show that the official's conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. at 2156 . If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, the inquiry ends. Id .
If a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. Id . Defining the contours of the alleged constitutional right is vital to the inquiry, not in a general sense but in a particularized and relevant sense. Id.; see also Thompson, 245 F.3d at 457. The official is entitled to qualified immunity if the law did not put the official on notice that the conduct would be clearly unlawful. Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156-57. Under the second part of the analysis, the court must assess whether the official's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law. Id . at 2159-60 (concluding that petitioner officer was entitled to qualified immunity under the facts viewed in respondent's favor); Thompson, 245 F.3d at 457 (concluding that defendant sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity under the facts viewed in plaintiff's favor); Ikerd, 101 F.3d at 434 (concluding that defendant deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity under the facts viewed in plaintiff's favor).
The Court now turns to detail the legal standards for evaluating the specific constitutional violations alleged in this case.
D. Humane Conditions of Confinement
Jail officials must provide "humane conditions of confinement, ensuring that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, . . . medical care," and hygiene. Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 351-52 (5th Cir. 1999). The guarantee of "humane conditions of confinement" is found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for pretrial detainees and in the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment for convicted prisoners, Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996). For pretrial detainees, the proper legal standard depends on whether a claim challenges a "jail condition" or whether it alleges an "episodic act or omission." Id. at 645 . While "jail condition" cases are analyzed under the reasonable relationship test of Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979), "episodic" cases are analyzed under the deliberate indifference standard of Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). Id . For convicted prisoners, all "humane conditions of confinement" claims are analyzed under the Farmer deliberate indifference standard. Id. at 647; Palmer, 193 F.3d at 352. Therefore, as in the instant case, where the inmate is both a pretrial detainee and a convicted prisoner during relevant times in these claims, and where the inmate brings both a "jail condition" claim and an "episodic" claim, the Court must detail both the reasonable relationship test of Bell and the deliberate indifference standard of Farmer.
An "episodic" claim is one in which a "[state jail] official breache [s] his constitutional duty to tend to the basic human needs of persons in his charge." Hare, 74 F.3d at 645. A "jail condition" case, on the other hand, is one that challenges the "general conditions, practices, rules, or restrictions of pretrial confinement." Id. at 644 .
Stevenson's claim that the Defendants denied him safe and sanitary showers is a "jail condition" claim. Stevenson's claim that the Defendants denied him medical care is an "episodic" claim.
1. Bell Reasonable Relationship Test
The Due Process Clause "forbids punishment of a person held in custody awaiting trial but not yet adjudged guilty of any crime." Nerren v. Livingston Police Dep't., 86 F.3d 469, 474 (5th Cir. 1996). In determining whether a "jail condition" amounts to unconstitutional punishment of a pretrial detainee, a court must determine whether the condition "is reasonably related to a legitimate [,] nonpunitive governmental objective." Bell, 441 U.S. at 520. Where a condition is "arbitrary or purposeless, a court may permissibly infer that the purpose of the governmental action is [unconstitutional] punishment." Id. at 520-21 .
2. Farmer Deliberate Indifference Standard
"To be deliberately indifferent, a prison official must `know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]'" Hall v. Thomas, 190 F.3d 693, 697 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Therefore, "a prison official must have a `sufficiently culpable state of mind.'" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)). Furthermore, a prison "official's response [must] indicate that the official subjectively intended that harm occur." Thompson v. Upshur County, TX, 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001). For example, deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of a prisoner may be manifested by a prison official's delay or denial of access to medical care or intentional interference with treatment once prescribed. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). However, an allegation of negligence or malpractice does not state a medical care claim. Hall, 190 F.3d at 697 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105). "It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the [prohibited conduct]." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
The Court now turns to the merits of the case.
III. Factual Allegations Analysis A. Denial of Safe and Sanitary Showers 1. Factual Allegations
As noted above, all facts in these Findings are set forth as alleged by Stevenson in his Original Complaint, his answers to the Magistrate's Questionnaire, his Rule 7(a) Reply, his supplement to the Rule 7(a) Reply, and his testimony at the Spears hearing. Because the Court must accept Stevenson's allegations as true for purposes of this motion, the Court does not indicate which facts, if any, are disputed by the Defendants.
On August 2, 2000, Stevenson slipped in the Hunt County Jail shower, causing him to fall heavily on his tailbone and elbow. On August 18, 2000, the Physician's Assistant at the jail diagnosed Stevenson with a left groin hernia which had been caused by the fall. Stevenson had also developed a blood clot in his elbow, bleeding from his penis, and pain in his lower back. Stevenson had been healthy until the fall. Moreover, he was not the only inmate who had slipped and fallen in the jail shower.
The jail shower leaked to the extent that there was standing water on the floor at all times. While jail officials would occasionally give inmates a mop with which to remove the water, they had not acknowledged inmate requests for a mop during the few days prior to Stevenson's fall. Only one attempt at repairing the shower was made during Stevenson's two periods of incarceration, and that attempt, as observed by Stevenson, was made with the wrong tools and the wrong materials by another inmate.
Around August 8, 2000, Stevenson developed a severe case of athlete's foot, resulting from sludge backing up through the shower drain and touching his foot. This was not the only occurrence of sludge coming through the shower drain during Stevenson's two periods of incarceration, and jail officials did not pass out disinfectants or cleaners to sanitize the shower. Stevenson's athlete's foot progressed to the point that he could not wear shoes. His feet were badly swollen, and they discharged repugnant odors and fluids. Other inmates also developed itching feet.
Stevenson told all three Defendants about the unsafe and unsanitary shower conditions. Anderson told Stevenson that he would "get back to him on this." In October 2000, Snead and Stevenson talked about the shower conditions during a meeting in Snend's office. Finally, Brannon agreed to tell her supervisors about the shower conditions when Stevenson showed her the shower.
2. Analysis
The Defendants generally contend that Stevenson has failed to allege sufficient facts to show that they violated his clearly established constitutional right to safe and sanitary jail conditions. (Ds' Br. at 7.) More specifically, the Defendants argue that because Stevenson has not alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, he cannot overcome the Defendants' defense of qualified immunity. (Id.) Finally, the Defendants contend that Stevenson's "jail condition" claim amounts to a negligence claim. (Id. at 3.) The Court disagrees.
As mentioned above, the Bell reasonable relationship test is the appropriate standard for evaluating the "jail condition" claims of pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment. Stevenson has alleged that the shower always had standing water on the floor and that sludge occasionally backed up onto the floor through the shower drain. Furthermore, he has alleged that the shower was never properly repaired or cleaned during his periods of incarceration, even though he had told each of the Defendants about the shower conditions. Finally, Stevenson has alleged that he and other inmates had suffered harm due to the shower conditions. Therefore, Stevenson has alleged sufficient facts to show conditions which could not be reasonably related to a legitimate, nonpunitive governmental objective, Bell, 441 U.S. at 520. Where a condition is "arbitrary or purposeless, a court may permissibly infer that the purpose of the governmental action is [unconstitutional] punishment." Id. at 520-21 .
Once again, Stevenson was a pretrial detainee during his first period of incarceration at the Hunt County Jail from July 11, 2000, to November 2, 2000.
As mentioned above, the Farmer deliberate indifference standard is the appropriate standard for evaluating the "jail condition" claims of convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment. Stevenson has alleged facts that all three Defendants knew about the unsafe and unsanitary shower conditions. Furthermore, he has alleged that the shower was never properly repaired or cleaned during his periods of incarceration, even after the shower conditions caused his various health impairments. Finally, Stevenson has alleged not only that the shower conditions posed an excessive risk to his health or safety, but also that the shower conditions actually caused excessive harm to both his health and his safety. Stevenson, therefore, has alleged sufficient facts to show that the Defendancs "kn[elw of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]" Hall, 190 F.3d at 697 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Once again, Stevenson was a convicted prisoner during his second period of incarceration at the Hunt County Jail from February 20, 2001, to May 31, 2001.
The Court finds that Stevenson has alleged sufficient facts to state a violation of his clearly established constitutional right to safe and sanitary jail conditions against all three Defendants. As such, Stevenson has met his burden to overcome the Defendants' only argument with respect to qualified immunity. The Court notes, however, that this finding does not prevent the Defendants from ultimately being entitled to qualified immunity. Furthermore, the Court finds that Stevenson's allegations rise above mere negligence. Because the Defendants do not challenge this claim on any other grounds, the Defendants' motion to dismiss should be DENIED as to Stevenson's "jail condition" claim.
B. Denial of Medical Care 1. Factual Allegations
As mentioned above, on August 2, 2000, Stevenson suffered various injuries, including a hernia, when he slipped and fell on the jail shower floor. Around August 8, 2000, Stevenson developed a severe case of athlete's foot after sludge came through the shower drain and touched his foot.
On August 28, 2000, jailer Reba Bailey told Brannon, the medical officer, to take Stevenson to a podiatrist after she had seen the poor condition of his feet. Brannon had previously ignored Stevenson's requests to examine his feet for herself. The podiatrist diagnosed Stevenson with staff infection "just in time" and prescribed medication and foot soaks. Although the foot soaks were prescribed for twice a day, Stevenson only received a soak once every three days. Brannon was in charge of the foot soaks. As for his prescribed medication, Stevenson did not receive his prescribed daily amount because Brannon had not ordered it. By the time of Stevenson's second appointment with the podiatrist in October 2000, his feet had grown worse. Between his periods of incarceration, Stevenson's feet grew worse still because he had only been able to afford one visit to the emergency room. During his second period of incarceration, Stevenson saw the podiatrist one time, but he only received his prescribed treatments for four days before the treatments stopped. Brannon had been in charge of administering the treatments.
On September 11, 2000, the Physician's Assistant at the jail informed Stevenson and Brannon together that Stevenson would need a hernia operation and a foot specialist. Although informed that the hernia operation would be imminent, Stevenson never received the promised operation. During his first period of incarceration, Brannon arranged for Stevenson to see Dr. Shaw three times for his hernia. However, after the first couple of weeks, Brannon only sporadically administered the prescribed medication. Between his periods of incarceration, Stevenson did not see a doctor for his hernia. Although his hernia was still "bad" when he was re-incarcerated, he was not permitted to see a doctor for his hernia during his entire second period of incarceration. Stevenson claims that he is disabled because of the untreated hernia.
Stevenson informed both Anderson and Snead about the denial of medical care and about the extent of his medical needs. Anderson said that he would "get back to him on this." Snead said he would "do all he could."
2. Analysis
The Defendants generally contend that Stevenson has failed to allege sufficient facts to show that they violated his clearly established constitutional right to medical care, (Ds' Br. at 7.) More specifically, the Defendants contend that Stevenson has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that they were deliberately indifferent to Stevenson's medical needs. (Id. at 8.) Therefore, the Defendants argue that because Stevenson has not alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, he cannot overcome the Defendants' defense of qualified immunity. (Id. at 7.) The Court disagrees.
As noted above, the Farmer deliberate indifference standard is the appropriate standard for all denial of medical care claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Stevenson has alleged that Brannon knew about his medical needs and was in charge of providing them. For example, Stevenson has alleged that he has never received a promised hernia operation.
Furthermore, he has alleged that the only reason he was able to see a podiatrist in August 2000 was because a jailer had intervened and told Brannon to take him to the podiatrist. Even after seeing various doctors, however, Stevenson has alleged that Brannon failed to administer treatments in the amounts and intervals prescribed by the doctors. Finally, Stevenson has alleged that his condition diminished under Brannon's watch.
Stevenson has also alleged that he informed Anderson and Snead about the denial of medical care and about the extent of his medical needs. Furthermore, he has alleged that both Anderson and Snead promised some kind of action with respect to Stevenson's medical care. Therefore, Stevenson has alleged personal involvement by Anderson and Snead in the denial of medical care that allegedly continued until his last day of incarceration at the Hunt County Jail.
Accordingly, Stevenson has alleged sufficient facts to show that the Defendants "kn[e]w of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]" Hall, 190 F.3d at 697 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Therefore, Stevenson has alleged sufficient facts to state a violation of his clearly established constitutional right to medical care. As such, Stevenson has met his burden to overcome the Defendants' only argument with respect to qualified immunity. The Court notes, however, that this finding does not prevent the Defendants from ultimately being entitled to qualified immunity. Because the Defendants do not challenge this claim on any other grounds, the Defendants' motion to dismiss should be DENIED as to Stevenson's "episodic" medical care claim.
V. Recommendation
The Court RECOMMENDS that the Defendants' Third Motion to Dismiss be DENIED for the foregoing reasons.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of these findings, conclusions and recommendation on all parties by mailing a copy to each of them. Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1), any party who desires to object to these findings, conclusions and recommendation must file and serve written objections within ten (10) days after being served with a copy. A. party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions or recommendation to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusory or general objections. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation within ten days after being served with a copy shall bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted or adopted by the District Court, except on grounds of plain error. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) .