There have been two lower court opinions in this case. The class action determination was denied in Goldman v. First National Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587 (N.D.Ill. 1972). The statute of limitations decision is reported at 392 F. Supp. 214 (N.D.Ill. 1975).
It cannot realistically be contended that treble damages sought here by over 365 persons are ancillary or appurtenant to injunctive relief. See, e. g., Eisen v. Carlisle Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564. (2d Cir. 1968); Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, 55 F.R.D. 26, 29 n. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Graybeal v. American Savings Loan Association, 59 F.R.D. 7 (D.D.C. 1973); Goldman v. First National Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587, 592-93 (N.D.Ill. 1972); Bahan v. Southern Bell Telephone Telegraph Co., 55 F.R.D. 478, 480-81 (W.D.La. 1972); Alsup v. Montgomery Ward Co., 57 F.R.D. 89 (N.D.Cal. 1972); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F.R.D. 124, 133 (E.D.Pa. 1973). Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966).
In view of the court's disposition of this motion on other grounds a direct ruling on adequacy is unnecessary. Cf. Goldman v. First Natl. Bank of Chicago, 56 F.R.D. 587, 589 (N.D.Ill.1972). Next the court must satisfy itslef that the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are present.
Since this action is for money damages, the class action may not be maintained under Rule 23(b)(1)(A). Rodriguez v. Family Publications Service, (C.D.Cal.1972) 57 F.R.D. 189, 192 and cases therein cited; Goldman v. First National Bank of Chicago, (N.D.Ill.E.D.1972) 56 F.R.D. 587, and cases therein cited. 9.
See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 101. Following this reasoning, Judge Bauer found subsection (b)(1)(B) inapplicable in Goldman v. First National Bank of Chicago, 56 F.R.D. 587 (N.D.Ill., filed September 22, 1972). In Mullen plaintiff has also invoked Rule 23(b)(2) on the ground that appropriate relief in this case may take the form of an injunction.
The Second, Third and Sixth Circuits have, however, considered various aspects of this question. In Goldman v. First National Bank of Chicago, 56 F.R.D. 587 (N.D.Ill. 1972), defendant questioned the ability of plaintiff to act as class representative on the grounds that plaintiff was also acting as attorney of record. Then District Judge Bauer without ruling on the question noted the following language from Shields v. Valley National Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448 (N.Ariz. 1972):
Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D.Ga. 1971); Ratner v. Chem. Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Gerlach v. Allstate Co., 338 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.Fla. 1972); Rogers v. Coburn Fin. Corp., 54 F.R.D. 417 (N.D.Ga. 1972), modifying 53 F.R.D. 182 (N.D.Ga. 1971); Kenney v. Landis Financial Group, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 939 (N.D.Iowa 1972); Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448 (D.Ariz. 1971); Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134 (D.Kan. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1973); Roesel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, Civ. No. 15376 (N.D.Ga., May 25, 1972); Grubb v. Dollar Loan Co., Civ. Nos. 15550, 15976 (N.D.Ga., May 25, 1972); Shields v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442 (D.Ariz. 1972); Greer v. Sears, Roebuck Co., Civ. No. 72-80 (S.D.W.Va., July 3, 1972); Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 104 (E.D.Wis. 1972); Boggs v. Alto Trailer Sales, Inc., Civ. No. 71-1271 (E.D.La., Aug. 7, 1972); Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., Civ. No. 70-C-1827 (N.D.Ill., Sept. 20, 1972); Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587 (N.D.Ill. 1972); Johnson v. Austin Furniture, Inc., Civ. No. 72-C-724 (N.D.Ill., Oct. 10, 1972); Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 548 (N.D.Ill. 1972), modifying 329 F. Supp. 936 (N.D.Ill. 1971); Rodriquez v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 57 F.R.D. 189 (C.D.Cal. 1972); Alsup v. Montgomery Ward Co., 57 F.R.D. 89 (N.D.Cal. 1972); Mullen v. Montgomery Ward Co., Inc., 57 F.R.D. 89 (N.D.Cal. 1972); Kroll v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 357 (N.D.Ill. 1972); Hunter v. Gross Bros. Furniture Inc., Civ. No. C-71-2443 (N.D.Cal., Dec. 20, 1972); Winston v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, Civ. No. 71-1986 (E.D.La., Feb. 9, 1973); Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 59 F.R.D. 602 (N.D.Ill. 1973); Roth v. Community Nat'l Bank, Civ. No. C-72-1031 (N.D.Ohio, Mar. 13, 1973); Lindig v. City Nat'l Bank, 59 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.Ohio 1973); Coleman v. City Fin. Co., Inc., Civ. No. 72-685-K (D.Md., Mar. 27, 1973); Hollis v. Tucker, Civ. No. 72-735-K (D.Md., Mar. 27, 1973); Graybeal v. American Sav. Loan Ass'n, 59 F.
The clear trend of authority for actions alleging a violation of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, commonly known as the "Truth-in-Lending Act", 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. and Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 et seq., promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board, holds that class actions are inappropriate. See e. g., Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 56 F.R.D. 587 (N.D.Ill., 1972); Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 548 (N.D.Ill., 1972); Shields v. First Nat'l Bank of Arizona, 56 F.R.D. 442 (D.Ariz., 1972); Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., of Milwaukee, Wisc., 56 F.R.D. 104 (E.D.Wis., 1972); Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134 (D.Kan., 1972) aff'd 474 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1973); Kenney v. Landis Financial Group, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 939 (N.D.Iowa, 1972); Gerlach v. Allstate Insurance Co., 338 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.Fla. 1972); Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). No opinion is expressed here regarding the effect, if any, the filing of these actions may have on the applicable limitation period.
Gerlach v. Allstate Insurance Co., 338 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.Fla. 1972). Goldman v. The First National Bank of Chicago. (N.D.Ill. 1972), 56 F.R.D. 587 (N.D.Ill. 1972). Grubb v. Dollar Loan Co., Civil Actions Nos. 15550, 15976 (N.D.Ga., filed May 26, 1972).
However, the application of the doctrine of stare decisis is the only possible effect of a ruling in favor of Plaintiff; however, stare decisis alone is not a reason to grant certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 405-07 (1986); Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 56 F.R.D. 587, 591 (N.D. Ill. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 532 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1976). Because class members are not provided notice or an opportunity to opt out of a class certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the rule is interpreted narrowly.