Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County Super. Ct. No. 631964, Robert D. Monarch, Judge. (Retired judge of the Orange Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 6.)
Baker Law Group and John H. Baker for Defendant and Appellant.
Smith, Chapman & Campbell, Steven C. Smith and Mark T. Kearney for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
ARONSON, ACTING P. J.
Defendant Lawrence D. Stern appeals the trial court’s orders (a) denying his motion to enforce a settlement agreement, and (b) releasing funds Stern deposited with the court to satisfy a judgment entered in this case (OC Judgment) on the settlement agreement. Stern contends the settlement agreement required plaintiff Robert L. Jones to assign Stern a judgment Jones obtained in another case brought in Los Angeles County (LA Judgment) once Stern satisfied the OC Judgment. Jones, however, contends the settlement agreement required him to assign the LA Judgment only if Stern made specified payments in a timely manner. Because Stern failed to make timely payment, Jones asserts Stern’s full satisfaction of the judgment did not entitle him to assignment of the LA Judgment. Jones also argues the trial court had no jurisdiction over the matter.
We conclude the trial court properly denied Stern’s motion to enforce settlement, but erred in releasing the deposited funds to Jones. Stern’s payment of the OC Judgment after a third party fully satisfied the LA Judgment resulted in an improper double recovery for Jones. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order releasing the funds and remand with instructions the trial court order Jones to repay the funds improperly released, with interest at the legal rate.
I
Factual and Procedural Background
A. The LA and OC Judgments
Jones obtained the LA Judgment in Los Angeles County Superior Court against Claire E. Seipp (Seipp) and other defendants in the principal amount of $93,750, with interest of $10,156.25, and attorney fees of $6,960. After the LA judgment was entered against her, Seipp granted a trust deed to Stern, her brother, in certain real property she owned. In July 1990, Jones filed the present case, suing Stern and Seipp for fraud and conspiracy, alleging they participated in a fraudulent scheme to prevent Jones from collecting his judgment against Seipp through issuance of the trust deed. The complaint sought a declaration that the LA Judgment was superior to Stern’s interest in Seipp’s property and monetary damages, including punitive damages based on the fraud claims.
In September 1994, the parties in the present case stipulated to settlement in open court. The parties memorialized their agreement in the “Stipulation to Enter Judgment and Judgment” (Stipulation). The Stipulation declared Stern’s trust deed on Seipp’s property to be subordinate to the LA Judgment. It further provided that Seipp and Stern were to pay Jones $5,000 by September 12, 1994, monthly interest payments on the outstanding principal amount of $85,000, and a lump sum payment of either $75,000 if paid by December 10, 1994, or $85,000 if paid by September 10, 1999. The Stipulation provided that if Stern and Seipp paid the full amount due on or before the dates specified, Jones would request dismissal of the case and assign the LA Judgment to Stern. The Stipulation also provided that if defendants defaulted on any of its terms, Jones could move ex parte for entry of a judgment against both Stern and Seipp in the amount of the unpaid LA Judgment, including accrued interest, less any previous payments.
Stern and Seipp defaulted and Jones moved for entry of judgment, which resulted in entry of the OC Judgment in May 1996. The trial court entered the OC Judgment against Seipp and Stern, jointly and severally, in the amount of $176,914.57, with interest accruing.
B. Stern and Seipp’s Motion to Vacate and Substitute or Modify Judgment
In August 1996, Stern and Seipp filed a “Notice of Motion and Motion to Vacate Judgment and to Substitute Judgment or Alternative Motion to Modify Judgment.” They brought the motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, and asserted the parties never intended to make Stern a judgment debtor, but merely to subordinate his trust deed to the LA Judgment. The moving papers noted that Stern was not involved in the transaction leading to the LA Judgment, was not a party in that action, and was made a debtor in the OC Judgment only through a clerical error. The court denied the motion, and neither Stern nor Seipp appealed the decision.
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
C. Stern’s Separate Action
Almost nine years later, in April 2005, Stern filed a separate lawsuit against Jones, Seipp, and others seeking, inter alia, to set aside the OC Judgment. As in Stern’s previous motion, he alleged he was not a part of the transaction leading to the LA Judgment, and was added as a party in the present case only because he held a trust deed on Seipp’s property. After several months, Stern dismissed his separate action.
D. Stern’s Motion to Vacate Renewal of Judgment
While Stern’s separate action was pending, in November 2005, Stern filed a “Motion to Vacate the Renewal of Judgment.” The motion to vacate asserted Jones failed to follow proper procedure in renewing the OC Judgment, and that the OC judgment was the result of fraud and breach of fiduciary duties by Stern’s attorney. Stern’s motion also argued: “JONES has a judgment in the L.A. case against Seipp, Packard, and Southwest. JONES also has a judgment in this case –– for the same debt litigated in the L.A. Case –– against Seipp and STERN. It was improper for JONES to obtain a duplicate money judgment in the present case when the action for money owed to JONES had already been litigated in the L.A. Superior Court.” The trial court denied Stern’s motion to vacate, and Stern did not appeal the decision.
E. Seipp’s Motion to Set Aside Judgment
In or about April 2006, Seipp filed a “Motion to Set Aside Judgment Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 473.” Seipp argued in the motion that the OC Judgment provides Jones a double recovery based on a single breach of contract claim. The motion represented that Seipp was willing and able to pay the LA Judgment in full, and therefore requested the court set aside the OC Judgment. The court denied the motion.
F. Stern’s Deposit and Motion to Enforce Settlement
In September 2006, Stern filed an “Ex Parte Application for Leave to Deposit Monies with Court in Satisfaction of Judgment,” based on section 685.030. At the ex parte hearing, Jones objected to the deposit of funds as unnecessary because Stern could pay the funds directly to him. Stern did not disclose at that time any intention of challenging the OC Judgment or fighting release of the funds. The court granted the application, and Stern deposited $394,772.80 with the court, representing the full amount of the OC Judgment, including the accrued interest.
Section 685.030 provides, in pertinent part: “(b) If a money judgment is satisfied in full other than pursuant to a writ under this title, interest ceases to accrue on the date the judgment is satisfied in full. [¶] (c) If a money judgment is partially satisfied pursuant to a writ under this title or is otherwise partially satisfied, interest ceases to accrue as to the part satisfied on the date the part is satisfied. [¶] (d) For the purposes of subdivisions (b) and (c), the date a money judgment is satisfied in full or in part is the earliest of the following times: [¶] (1) The date satisfaction is actually received by the judgment creditor [¶] (2) The date satisfaction is tendered to the judgment creditor or deposited in court for the judgment creditor. [¶] (3) The date of any other performance that has the effect of satisfaction.”
Shortly thereafter, Stern filed his “Motion of Defendant Stern to Enforce Terms of Stipulation for Judgment,” invoking section 664.6 and requesting the court to order Jones to assign the LA Judgment to Stern. Just two days later, Jones filed his “Ex Parte Application for Order to Release funds Deposited with the Court to Judgment Creditor.” While the motions were pending, the attorney-in-fact for Seipp satisfied the LA Judgment with a payment of $387,170.92. The trial court denied Stern’s motion, and granted Jones’s application to release the funds. Stern now appeals these rulings.
II
Discussion
A. Although Lacking in Jurisdiction to Alter the Terms of the OC Judgment, the Trial Court Has Jurisdiction to Consider Matters Pertaining to the OC Judgment’s Satisfaction
Stern moved to enforce the terms of the Stipulation under section 664.6, which expressly provides for the settlement court to retain jurisdiction, as follows: “If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.” An express reservation of jurisdiction allows the court to ensure the judgment accomplishes its objectives and to handle collateral issues not embraced in the judgment. (See Central & West Basin Water Replenishment Dist. v. Southern Calif. Water Co. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 891, 903.) A review of the record here, however, reveals that neither the parties nor the court said anything about a reservation of jurisdiction in the on-the-record settlement or the Stipulation. Thus, the court lacked jurisdiction to proceed under section 664.6.
Stern, however, contends the trial court had jurisdiction to amend the judgment because it contained a clerical error. “‘A court of general jurisdiction has the power, after final judgment, and regardless of lapse of time, to correct clerical errors or misprisions in its records, whether made by the clerk, counsel or the court itself, so that the records will conform to and speak the truth. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Ames v. Paley (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 668, 672.) The Legislature recognized the trial court’s jurisdiction to correct clerical errors in section 473, subdivision (d), which provides: “The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.”
Stern asserts the OC Judgment contains a clerical error because it does not require assignment of the LA Judgment after the OC Judgment is satisfied. As Jones correctly notes, however, the scope of a court’s jurisdiction to correct errors in a judgment after its entry is limited. “‘The general rule is that once a judgment has been entered, the trial court loses its unrestricted power to change that judgment. The court does retain power to correct clerical errors in a judgment which has been entered. However, it may not amend such a judgment to substantially modify it or materially alter the rights of the parties under its authority to correct clerical error . . . .’” (Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1237.) Here, the OC Judgment is consistent with both the Stipulation and the settlement placed on the record because both provide for assignment of the LA Judgment only if Stern and Seipp timely make the specified payments. The OC Judgment’s failure to require assignment of the LA Judgment after its satisfaction is therefore not a “clerical error.”
Although the trial court lacked jurisdiction to alter the OC Judgment, the court retained jurisdiction to issue orders concerning the enforcement and satisfaction of the judgment. (See, e.g., §§ 714.030, 724.050, subds. (d) & (e).) Thus, to the extent the relief Stern seeks concerns the enforcement or satisfaction of the OC Judgment, the trial court has jurisdiction to act upon it.
B. Jones May Not Recover Twice for the Same Damages
Stern contends the trial court’s release of the deposited funds to Jones after Seipp fully satisfied the LA Judgment resulted in Jones receiving an improper double payment. We agree.
“An injured person is entitled to only one satisfaction of judgment for a single harm, and full payment of a judgment by one tortfeasor discharges all others who may be liable for the same injury. This rule, designed to prevent double recovery and never-ending litigation by dissatisfied claimants, applies whether a single judgment has been obtained against joint or concurrent tortfeasors, whether separate judgments of equivalent or disparate amounts have been obtained against tortfeasors, or whether no other judgment has been obtained against other tortfeasors.” (Fletcher v. California Portland Cement Co. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 97, 99, italics added (Fletcher); McCall v. Four Star Music Co. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1399); Milicevich v. Sacramento Medical Center (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 997, 1001 (Milicevich).) “The single satisfaction rule is not based upon the effect of the judgment itself, which, in any event, does not preclude pursuit of joint or concurrent tortfeasors. [Citations.] [Fn. omitted.] . . . [Citations.] [Fn. omitted.] ‘[This] rule is equitable in its nature, and . . . its purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment.’ [Citation.]” (Milicevich, at pp. 1002-1003.) “It is equally the rule where fewer than all of the joint tortfeasors satisfy less than the entire judgment, such satisfaction will not relieve the remaining tortfeasors of their obligation under the judgment. Stated otherwise, ‘partial satisfaction has the effect of a discharge pro tanto.’ [Citations.] ‘Pro tanto’ means ‘for so much.’ [Citation.]” (McCall, at p. 1399, original italics.)
There is an important caveat to the foregoing. “Whether there is in fact a double recovery cannot be determined unless the damages which measure the full recovery for the injury have been litigated on their merits. In Fletcher and the authority upon which it relies [fn. omitted], the judgments were predicated upon litigation which adjudicated the full amount of plaintiff’s damages. When the judgment which has been satisfied is predicated upon such an adjudication the logic of discharge is clear. Plaintiff is only entitled to a single recovery of full compensatory damages for a single injury. But this reasoning loses its force if the magnitude of damage has not been established in the antecedent litigation.” (Milicevich, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1003-1004 [holding a judgment entered after acceptance of an offer to compromise under section 998 not adjudication on the merits].)
Because the LA Judgment arose from adjudication on the merits, the rule against double recovery applies here. The LA and OC Judgments represent a single harm. Indeed, the OC Judgment did not arise from any alleged act of Stern, but from the acts of the defendants in the LA case. Specifically, the parties’ Stipulation did not call for entry of a judgment in any particular amount, but for “an entry of judgment . . . in the amount of the unpaid judgment previously entered against Southwest Securities, Claire Seipp and John Packard in the Los Angeles Superior Court case . . . .” Thus, the very structure of the Stipulation leaves no room for question that the OC Judgment seeks money for the damages Jones proved in the LA case. Although Jones argues at length about the attorney fees expended in connection with the present case, these fees are not compensable as damages. More important, however, this purported harm is nowhere reflected in the OC Judgment. Even the $75,000 and $85,000 amounts in the Stipulation are not tied to harm alleged in the present action, but are connected to the LA Judgment because timely payment would have required an assignment of the LA Judgment to Stern. Consequently, both the LA and OC Judgments seek recovery for a single harm, the amount of which was determined at trial in the LA Action. That Jones obtained a second judgment seeking recompense for this same harm does not alter this reality. Accordingly, the third party’s full payment of the LA Judgment also satisfied the OC Judgment, and the trial court erred in releasing the funds Stern deposited with the court.
III
Disposition
The trial court’s denial of Stern’s motion to enforce the stipulation for settlement is affirmed. The trial court’s order releasing the funds Stern deposited into the court is reversed. On remand, the trial court shall order Jones to repay the released funds to Stern, with interest accruing at the legal rate from the date of release, and take such further action as may be requested and appropriate under section 724.050. Stern is entitled to his costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: FYBEL, J., IKOLA, J.