Opinion
No. 99 Civ. 4313 (RWS).
January 10, 2001.
MEMO OPINION
Pro se plaintiff Jean Stephen ("Stephen") seeks reconsideration of this Court's previous ruling granting summary judgment to defendant Maximum Security, Inc. ("Maximum"). See Stephen v. Maximum Security. Inc., 99 Civ. 4313, 2000 WL 1774849 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2000). For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be denied.
The Parties, Prior Proceedings, And Facts
The parties are set forth in this Court's previous opinion, familiarity with which is presumed. See Stephen, 2000 WL 1774849. The prior proceedings and facts preceding the instant motion are also set forth in that opinion. See id.
Stephen requested reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment to Maximum by way of two letters of December 6, 2000. His letters were treated as a motion for reconsideration under Local Rule 6.3 and made returnable on December 27, 2000, at which time the matter was deemed fully submitted. Maximum did not file any submissions regarding the motion.
In one of Stephen's letters, he states that he has identified a witness who is a former employee of Maximum and who has knowledge of the facts of Stephen's termination, including, allegedly, that Stephen had permission to attend the religious conference after which absence he was fired. In the other letter, Stephen argues that absenteeism — the non-discriminatory reason asserted by Maximum for Stephen's firing — could not have been the real reason for his termination because he had absences and lateness before the conference but was not fired until after the conference.
Discussion A. The Standard Under Local Rule 6.3
Local Rule 6.3 provides in pertinent part: "There shall be served with the notice of motion a memorandum setting forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked." Thus, to be entitled to reargument and reconsideration, the movant must demonstrate that the Court overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion. See Ameritrust Co. Nat'l Ass'n v. Dew, 151 F.R.D. 237, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); East Coast Novelty Co. v. City of New York, 141 F.R.D. 245, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
Local Rule 6.3 is to be narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the court. In deciding a reconsideration and reargument motion, the Court must not allow a party to use the motion as a substitute for appealing from a final judgment. See Morser v. ATT Info. Sys., 715 F. Supp. 516, 517 (S.D.N Y 1989); Korwek v. Hunt, 649 F. Supp. 1547, 1548 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 827 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1987). Therefore, a party may not "advance new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the Court." Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Md., 768 F. Supp. 115, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The decision to grant or deny the motion is within the sound discretion of the district court. See Schaffer v. Soros, No. 92 Civ. 1233, 1994 WL 592891, at *1 (S.D.N Y Oct. 31, 1994)
Upon receiving such a motion, a court may do any of the following. First, the motion may be denied, thereby leaving the original decision unaltered. See Lehmuller v. Incorporated Village of Sag Harbor, 982 F. Supp. 132, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) Alternatively, "the Court can grant a motion to reargue for the limited purposes of considering the effect of an overlooked matter," and after doing so may affirm and/or clarify the original decision. Lehmuller, 982 F. Supp. at 135-36; see In re First American Corp., No. M8-85, 1998 WL 148421, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 1998), aff'd, 154 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1998); Violette v. Armonk Assocs. L.P., 823 F. Supp. 224, 226-27, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Brignoli v. Balch Hardy Scheinman. Inc., 735 F. Supp. 100, 102-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Finally, having granted a motion to reconsider, the Court may vacate the original decision. See Morin v. Trupin, 823 F. Supp. 201, 203 (S.D.N Y 1993); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Buffalo Reins. Co., 739 F. Supp. 209, 211-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
B. Reconsideration Is Not Warranted
Although Maximum has failed to oppose the instant motion, it is nonetheless incumbent upon this Court to determine whether Stephen has met the standard for reconsideration.
The Court disapproves of this failure on the part of Maximum.
The new witness allegedly identified by Stephen constitutes new evidence not previously presented to the Court. Reconsideration is not warranted on this basis. See Morse/Diesel, 768 F. Supp. at 116 (litigant may not "advance new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the Court). The Court is aware that Stephen is pro se, and that due consideration should be given to that fact. However, prior to deeming the summary judgment motion fully submitted, this Court provided Stephen with a "Notice to Pro Se Litigant Opposing Motion For Summary Judgment," pursuant to Local Rule 56.2, informing him of his obligations in opposing Maximum's motion. In addition, the Court subsequently granted him an extension of time to gather affidavits in support of his opposition. Thus, Stephen was put on notice as to his obligations to gather and present evidence and was granted the time needed to do so.
The issues surrounding Stephens' absenteeism, and whether there was evidence that this reason was pretextual, were previously put before and considered by the Court. Stephen raises no controlling matter which was overlooked, and is not entitled to reconsideration on this basis.
Conclusion
Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the motion will be denied.
It is so ordered.