Opinion
2012 CA 2076
06-07-2013
CATINA LOUISE STEFANIK v. BRUCE WOODFORD BEAM
Richard Ducote Pittsburgh, PA Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Catrina Louise Stefanik James E. Moorman III Laura Caviness Cocus Covington, LA Counsel for Defendant-Appellee Bruce Beam
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
NUMBER 2009-17379, DIV. K, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY
STATE OF LOUISIANA
HONORABLE MARY DEVEREAUX, JUDGE
Richard Ducote
Pittsburgh, PA
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant
Catrina Louise Stefanik
James E. Moorman III
Laura Caviness Cocus
Covington, LA
Counsel for Defendant-Appellee
Bruce Beam
BEFORE: KUHN, PETTIGREW, AND McDONALD, JJ.
Disposition: AMENDED AND, AS AMENDED, AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.
KUHN, J.
Plaintiff-appellant, Catina Louise Stefanik, appeals the trial court's judgment finding her in contempt of court for violating a consent judgment she entered into with defendant-appellee, Bruce Woodford Beam. As amended, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
The parties are the divorced parents of two daughters. On December 21, 2010, the trial court signed a consent judgment, which resolved the issues pending from pleadings requesting custody and child support relief.
Beam filed a rule for contempt on February 4, 2011, averring that Stefanik had violated provisions of the consent judgment by sending a copy of two custody evaluators' reports to four of Beam's relatives for the purpose of harassing him.
A peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action filed by Stefanik was denied by the trial, and this court denied Stefanik's writ seeking review of that ruling. See Stefanik v. Beam, 2011-0913 (La App. 1st Cir. 8/1/11) (an unpublished writ action).
After a hearing conducted on two separate days, the trial court adjudged Stefanik guilty of contempt; sentenced her to fifteen days in jail, which was deferred; imposed a fine of $2,000.00 payable to the judicial expense fund; and awarded Beam attorney's fees of $2,500.00. Stefanik appeals.
The trial court initially found that although Stefanik had violated the provisions of the consent decree relative to visitation that Beam had averred supported an additional basis for contempt she had a justifiable excuse and, therefore, concluded she was not in contempt. Beam has not challenged this ruling by the trial court.
DISCUSSION
Contempt of court is defined in La. C.C.P. art. 221 as "any act or omission tending to obstruct or interfere with the orderly administration of justice, or to impair the dignity of the court or respect for its authority." There are two types of contempt. A direct contempt is one committed in the immediate view and presence of the court and of which it has personal knowledge. La. C.C.P. art. 222. A constructive contempt of court is any contempt other than a direct one, including willful disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, mandate, writ, or process of the court. La. C.C.P. art. 224(2).
To find a person guilty of constructive contempt, it is necessary to find that she violated the order of the court intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse. The trial court is vested with great discretion in determining whether a party should be held in contempt of court, and its decision will be reversed only when the appellate court discerns a clear abuse of that great discretion. Charter School of Pine Grove, Inc. v. St Helena Parish School Bd., 2007-2238 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/19/09), 9 So.3d 209, 224. While it is true that the trial court's ultimate decision to hold a party in contempt of court is subject to review under the abuse of discretion standard, the trial court's predicate factual determinations are reviewed under the manifest error standard in the case of a civil contempt. Boyd v. Boyd, 2010-1369 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/11/11), 57 So.3d 1169, 1178.
The alleged provision of the consent judgment that Beam averred Stefanik violated states, "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that neither [Stefanik] nor [Beam] shall harass the other directly or through third parties." In concluding that Stefanik violated this provision of the judgment, the trial court stated:
[Stefanik]... contumaciously disobeyed the order regarding harassment.
The Court finds that ... there was beyond a reasonable doubt
evidence that she sent the evaluation reports which ... had language that I would consider harassing if somebody sent it out about me. I'm considering it harassing language that was only sent for the purpose of harassment.
The Court finds that there is no way that you can put into an injunction against harassment every possible act of harassment that could be encompassed by the court order, and, therefore, finds that it is harassment.
On appeal, as before the trial court, counsel for Stefanik maintains that the provisions of the consent judgment do not expressly state that Stefanik was prohibited from sending the evaluators' report to Beam's relatives and, therefore, she did not violate a direct order of the court. But it is undisputed that the December 21, 2010 consent judgment prohibited each party from harassing the other "directly or through third parties." The predicate that makes up the ultimate determination of whether a party harassed the other is dependent upon factual determinations, which are subject to the manifest error standard of review.
Thus, the issue to be resolved by a reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the factfinder's conclusion was a reasonable one. Reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review. The reviewing court must always keep in mind that if the trial court or jury's findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse. Stobart v. State, Dep't of Tramp, and Dev., 617 So.2d 880, 882-83 (La. 1993).
At the hearing, Beam introduced into evidence four packets of information. Beam identified the handwriting on each envelope and the green sheet of paper attached to at least three of the packets as belonging to Stefanik. During the hearing, Beam opened a sealed packet that had been addressed to his parents. In addition to the green sheet of paper with the handwritten notation, each packet contained a copy of the over-200-page psychological custody evaluation conducted on Beam and Stefanik in conjunction with custody matters. The evaluators' reports included his personal psychological profile as well as allegations levied by Stefanik against Beam of mistreatment of the parties' children. Additionally, medical information about Beam that he did not want disseminated to his family was included in the evaluations. Beam stated that he felt embarrassed, humiliated, and vilified when he learned that the information had been sent directly to his family. It was, according to Beam, "like my ... inner privacy was just displayed for ... no particular reason."
One of the packets had been sent to a family friend. She delivered the packet that she had received to Beam without the outside envelope.
A reasonable factual basis exists to support the trial court's conclusion that Stefanik had violated the order prohibiting her from harassing Beam. Beam identified the handwriting on the envelope and the green sheet attached to the documents. Stefanik provided no valid explanation for having mailed the documents. And Beam explained that the private nature of the contents, which had been directly targeted to his family members, caused him embarrassment and humiliation. The trial court's factual predicate is not manifestly erroneous.
Additionally, we note this evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. See State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
Stefanik contends that imposition of contempt for having sent the evaluators' report to Beam's family members constitutes an abridgement of her right to free speech. But the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is not an absolute right. It is a relative right that may be modified in its interplay with the rights of others, and it may be waived by the party for whose benefit it was intended. Certainly, one who has been a party to a proceeding wherein a consent decree has been entered and who has been a party to that consent is in no position to claim that such a decree restricts her freedom of speech. She has waived her right and given her consent to its limitations within the scope of that decree. In re George F. Nord Bldg. Corp., 129 F.2d 173, 176 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied sub nom. Kausal v. 79th & Escanaba Corp., 317 U.S. 670, 63 S.Ct. 75, 87 L.Ed. 538 (1942).
We feel impelled to note that throughout the trial of this rule, and again before this court, appellant's attorney has proffered specious arguments that have had the obvious result of delaying resolution of litigation with attendant consequences borne by the parties. Attorneys should be mindful that their role as counselors require that they advise clients on legal matters. Our ethical prohibition of fostering litigation applies to the role of counsel.
Although we have found no error in the trial court's determination that Stefanik was in constructive contempt of court for having violated the December 21, 2010 consent judgment, we have determined an error with the imposition of the fine and the award of attorney's fees. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 920.
La. R.S. 13:4611, setting forth the punishment that a court may impose on a person adjudged guilty of contempt of court, see La. C.C.P. art. 227, states in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided for by law:
(1) The supreme court, the courts of appeal, the district courts, family courts, juvenile courts and the city courts may punish a person adjudged guilty of a contempt of court therein, as follows...
(b) For disobeying or resisting a lawful restraining order, or preliminary or permanent injunction, by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both.
In this case, that portion of the trial court's punishment ordered Stefanik to pay a fine in the amount of $2,000.00. But the statutory maximum that may be imposed is $1,000.00. Accordingly, we amend the judgment to reduce the fine that Stefanik is ordered to pay to the judicial expense fund to $1,000.00.
Under Louisiana law, attorney's fees are not allowed except where authorized by statute or by contract. Smith v. Albrecht, 2006-2072 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/8/07), 965 So.2d 879, 882. La. R.S. 13:4611 does not authorize payment of attorney's fees in this case. See Joseph v. Entergy, 2007-0688 (La. App. 4th Cir. 12/5/07), 972 So.2d 1230, 1237 (relying in part on Kelly v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury, 449 So.2d 568, 571 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 450 So.2d 959 (La. 1984)). Thus, we reverse that portion of the judgment that ordered Stefanik to pay $2,500.00 in attorney's fees.
Because the trial court did not adjudge Stefanik guilty of having violated the visitation order, an award of attorney's fees under La. R.S. 13:4611(1)(e)(iv) is not supported by the record.
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DECREE
For these reasons, the portion of the judgment that orders Stefanik to pay a fine is amended to order payment of $1,000.00; and the portion of the judgment that orders Stefanik to pay $2,500.00 in attorney's fees is reversed. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. Appeal costs are assessed against Catina Louise Stefanik.
AMENDED AND, AS AMENDED, AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.