Opinion
# 2012-039-296 Claim No. 115689
03-30-2012
STEENBUCK v. STATE OF NEW YORK
Synopsis
Following a bifurcated trial on the issue of liability, the Court finds that claimants failed to present sufficient prima facie proof to establish their cause of action for negligence. Claimants submitted no proof at trial that defendant was negligent in designing the intersection where the accident occurred and failed to establish that a dangerous condition present at the intersection was a proximate cause of the accident. Case information
UID: 2012-039-296 IN THE MATTER OF THE CLAIM OF BRADLEY STEENBUCK, an Claimant(s): incapacitated person, by WENDEL STEENBUCK & NANCY STEENBUCK, Guardians of his Person and/or Property Claimant short STEENBUCK name: Footnote (claimant name) : Defendant(s): STATE OF NEW YORK Footnote (defendant name) : Third-party claimant(s): Third-party defendant(s): Claim number(s): 115689 Motion number (s): Cross-motion number(s): Judge: James H. Ferreira Claimant's Law Offices of Alan J. Schwartz, P.C. attorney: By: Andre L. Ferenzo, Esq., Of Counsel Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman Defendant's Attorney General of the State of New York attorney: By: John M. Shields Assistant Attorney General Third-party defendant's attorney: Signature date: March 30, 2012 City: Albany Comments: Official citation: Appellate results: See also (multicaptioned case) Decision
This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on April 12, 2006 on County Route 111 (hereinafter CR 111) where it intersects with the North Service Road of the Long Island Expressway (hereinafter the Expressway) in Suffolk County, New York. Bradley Steenbuck sustained injuries when his motorcycle collided with an automobile operated by Stanley Sklarow, now deceased. Claimants Wendel and Nancy Steenbuck commenced this action seeking damages for the alleged negligence of the State in its "ownership, operation, maintenance, control and design" of the subject intersection and for its failure to erect a traffic light there (Claim ¶ 2).The claim essentially alleges that the intersection is dangerous because a driver making a left-hand turn from the North Service Road onto CR 111 is "unable to see traffic proceeding[] on CR 111 in a northbound direction" without proceeding into the intersection and that the State had notice of this dangerous condition (Claim ¶ 2).
Claimants commenced this action as the guardians of the person and/or property of Bradley Steenbuck, an incapacitated person.
A trial on the issue of liability was conducted on December 14 through December 15, 2011 at the New York State Court of Claims in Hauppauge, New York. Claimants offered the testimony of six witnesses: Mark Hervan, a Highway Maintenance Supervisor with the New York State Department of Transportation (hereinafter DOT); Karen Grenia, a Suffolk County police officer; Kirk Radomski, a witness to the accident; Wayne Ugolik, DOT's Director of Regional Transportation Planning and Program Management for Region 10 at the time of the accident; William Hillman, Chief Engineer with the Suffolk County Department of Public Works; and Lance Robson, a licensed professional engineer. Defendant did not offer any witness testimony. Numerous documentary and photographic exhibits were offered by the parties and received into evidence. The parties also submitted post-trial memoranda.
FACTS
The general mechanics of the accident are relatively undisputed. The accident occurred on the morning of Wednesday, April 12, 2006 at Exit 70 of the Expressway where the North Service Road - the exit ramp leading from the westbound portion of the Expressway - intersects with CR 111, which crosses over the Expressway at that exit. The portion of CR 111 that crosses over the Expressway is not flat; it ascends at a slight grade, crests and then descends at a slight grade. At the time of the accident, traffic entering CR 111 from the North Service Road was controlled by a stop sign located near the end of the exit ramp on the right hand side. The stop sign was about 15 feet back from the stop line or stop bar. No traffic light or signal was present at the intersection. At the time of the accident, the northbound portion of CR 111 had two traffic lanes - a through lane and a left-turning lane which were separated by a lane marked by stripes as an apparent median. Photographs taken at the scene on the day of the accident and the trial testimony establish that Sklarow was making a left-hand turn from the North Service Road to head southbound on CR 111 when his automobile was struck by a motorcycle operated by Steenbuck as it was proceeding in the northbound through lane on CR 111.
The Court denied defendant's request to admit a sworn statement that Sklarow gave to the police on the day of the accident.
Kirk Radomski, a fact witness, testified that he was proceeding northbound on CR 111 and Steenbuck's motorcycle was "a couple car lengths" in front of him.It was a clear, dry day, and traffic was not busy. Radomski testified that he was traveling about 45 to 50 miles per hour, and estimated that claimant was traveling around the same speed. Radomski lost sight of the motorcycle "for a split second" as it crested the hill over the Expressway. When he crested the hill, Radomski observed that the motorcycle had hit Sklarow's automobile on its driver's side. The automobile was about 5 to 10 feet into the intersection, and Steenbuck had been ejected from the motorcycle and thrown to the passenger side of the car. Radomski testified that he was very familiar with this intersection and that, in his own experience, he was not able to see traffic coming over the Expressway from the left when he was stopped at the stop sign. In order to see oncoming traffic, he would have to "crawl out" over the stop line.
Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the audio recording of the trial.
Mark Hervan, a DOT highway maintenance supervisor, testified that the State owned and maintained the westbound exit ramp, or service road, leading from the Expressway to CR 111. He affirmed that the State's maintenance of the ramp included snowplowing, mowing the grass and repairing guardrails. Hervan testified that he did not know who installed the stop sign at this intersection but he guessed that it would have been Suffolk County. Hervan further testified that, at some point after the accident, the stop sign was removed and the County put a traffic signal at this intersection. Hervan did not know who removed the stop sign but believed that it was Suffolk County. On cross-examination, Hervan testified that the County maintains - and did at the time of the accident - the subject intersection. He also testified as to his belief that the State did not maintain the stop sign there.
Wayne Ugolik, now retired, was DOT's Director of Regional Transportation Planning and Program Management for Region 10, which included Suffolk County, at the time of the accident. He testified that he was not familiar with this particular intersection but he would assume that the State constructed the ramp and that the maintenance responsibilities with respect to the ramp would lie with the Suffolk County Department of Public Works or with the County itself because it intersected CR 111. According to Ugolik, "that's usually the way it's done". He also testified that, in a typical case, it would be the County's responsibility to install traffic control devices at the intersection. Ugolik testified that the plans would delineate who had maintenance responsibilities with regard to the ramp and the intersection. Ugolik affirmed that a traffic safety study had been done with respect to this intersection, although he was not directly involved in it. It was his understanding that the safety issues regarding this intersection had to do with Friday and Sunday traffic volume there.
William Hillman, Chief Engineer with the Suffolk County Department of Public Works, testified that Suffolk County owns CR 111 but the State owns the areas in the vicinity of the Expressway, as well as the service roads and the overpass itself, including the portion of CR 111 that makes up the overpass. He testified that the County maintains those roadways, including the road and the sidewalks over the overpass. He affirmed that the County maintains the stop sign and the stop line, although he did not know who installed them. Hillman testified that the County installed a traffic signal at this intersection in May 2007. The County paid for it and neither gave DOT notice of the installation nor obtained DOT's approval for the project. Hillman affirmed that prior to the installation of the traffic light, there had been accidents at this intersection, although he was not aware of their frequency. He acknowledged that the County had received letters from citizens complaining about the intersection. According to Hillman, the "primary concern" was high traffic volumes at the intersection during the summer on Friday and Sunday evenings when beachgoers are traveling to and from the Hamptons. In particular, on Friday evenings, there was heavy traffic proceeding from the eastbound portion of the Expressway to go southbound on CR 111 and, on Sunday evenings, there was heavy traffic proceeding from northbound CR 111 to go westbound on the Expressway. He testified that roadway operates very differently in the non-summer months. Suffolk County initiated a discussion with DOT to resolve this traffic issue. The County and the State had initial discussions about making the intersection into a cloverleaf, but the County subsequently unilaterally determined that the problem could be solved by installing a traffic signal.
DISCUSSION
As a threshold matter, much of the parties' trial presentation focused on the issue of which entity - the State or the County - owns and/or maintains this intersection. It is well-settled that the State has a nondelegable duty to adequately design, construct and maintain its roadways in a reasonably safe condition (see Friedman v State of New York, 67 NY2d 271, 286 [1986]; Bottalico v State of New York, 59 NY2d 302, 305 [1983]; Campbell v City of Glen Cove, 19 AD3d 632, 634 [2005], lv denied 8 NY3d 814 [2007]). "This includes the duty to design, install, operate, and maintain traffic control devices, to regulate, warn, and guide vehicular traffic at intersections under the State's ownership and control" (Daub v State of New York, 17 Misc 3d 1121 [A] [2007]; see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1681 [a]; Wood v State of New York, 112 AD2d 612, 614 [1985]). It follows, however, that the State cannot be held liable for the negligent design of a roadway or intersection that it does not own or control (see Ernest v Red Cr. Cent. School Dist., 93 NY2d 664, 675 [1999]; Mudgett v Long Is. R.R., 81 AD3d 612, 613 [2011]) and additionally "cannot be held liable for the failure to maintain in a reasonably safe condition a road it does not own or control unless it affirmatively undertakes such a duty" (Carlo v Town of E. Fishkill, 19 AD3d 442, 442 [2005]; see Ernest v Red Cr. Cent. School Dist., 93 NY2d at 675; Horn v Town of Clarkstown, 46 AD3d 621, 622 [2007]).
The Court received conflicting evidence on the issue of which entity bears the responsibility to "maintain" this intersection, or which entity has "maintenance jurisdiction" over it. Regardless, with regard to ownership and/or control, it is clear from the evidence that the Expressway - including the North Service Road - is a State-owned roadway that is part of the Federal interstate highway system and that CR 111 is owned by Suffolk County. The Court did not receive any direct evidence, such as a deed or other documentary evidence, establishing which entity - the State or the County - owns the intersection where the accident occurred. However, Hillman testified credibly that the State owns the overpass itself and that portion of CR 111 that crosses over and makes up the overpass structure, including the intersection where the accident happened. In addition, among the documentary evidence received by the Court are portions of DOT record plans pertaining to the construction of the portion of the Expressway that includes the North Service Road, the overpass and this intersection (Claimants' Exhibit 22; Defendant's Exhibits A and B). These plans establish that the State contracted for the construction of the subject intersection. The plans also appear to allocate maintenance jurisdiction over some parts of the Expressway system to Suffolk County or the Town of Brookhaven pursuant to Highway Law § 10 (25) (see e.g. Matter of Town of Erwin v State of New York, 80 AD3d 979, 980 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 712 [2011]).The Court finds that these plans, which were admitted into evidence without objection, are indicia of the State's ownership of the intersection. Also indicia of ownership and/or control of the subject intersection is a copy of a DOT order for the installation of stop signs on Expressway "service roads at their intersection with CR 111" (Claimants' Exhibit 21) (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1621 [a] [1]; 1681 [a]). Based upon the above, the Court finds that a preponderance of the credible evidence establishes that the State owns and/or controls the subject intersection, such that it may be liable for damages arising from the negligent design of, or a dangerous condition on, the road, irrespective of whether it has allocated some or all maintenance responsibilities to the County.
Highway Law § 10 (25), among other things, grants the Commissioner of DOT the power to construct overpasses across highways and provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ny portion of intersecting highway, road or street upon which such work is completed shall, if not determined by the commissioner of transportation to be a part of the state highway system, be maintained by the municipality or the municipalities in which such frontage, marginal or service road or such portion of intersecting highway, road or street is located."
The Court takes no position on the issue of whether the County assumed or undertook a duty to maintain the intersection where the accident occurred (see e.g. Cain v Pappalardo, 225 AD2d 1005, 1006-1007 [1996]).
Even so, after weighing the evidence proffered at trial, including the exhibits received into evidence and the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, the Court finds that claimants have not proven their claim against defendant by a preponderance of the credible evidence. Initially, to the extent that the claim alleges that the State was negligent in designing this intersection, claimants submitted no proof on this issue at trial. Specifically, the Court received no evidence about the engineering and design decisions that went into the construction of this intersection, including no evidence as to when this intersection was built, what design standards applied at that time and whether the design violated those standards (see e.g. Schwartz v New York State Thruway Auth., 61 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1984]; Fan Guan v State of New York, 55 AD3d 782, 784 [2008]; Guzov v State of New York, 48 AD3d 751, 752 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 710 [2008]; Vizzini v State of New York, 278 AD2d 562, 563 [2000]). As such, the Court dismisses the claim to the extent that it alleges negligent design.
Because claimants failed to offer any evidence supporting their allegation of negligent design, the Court need not consider defendant's argument that its highway planning decisions regarding this intersection are entitled to qualified immunity (see e.g. Friedman v State of New York, 67 NY2d at 283-284; Weiss v Fote, 7 NY2d 579, 589 [1960]).
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The crux of claimants' negligence claim against defendant is that Steenbuck's injuries were caused by a dangerous condition or conditions at this intersection. The State, however, is not an insurer of the safety of its roadways and the mere happening of an accident does not render the State liable (see Tomassi v Town of Union, 46 NY2d 91, 97 [1978]; Schmidt v State of New York, 21 Misc 3d 1114 [A] [2005], affd 39 AD3d 1237 [2007]). "[S]o long as a highway may be said to be reasonably safe for people who obey the rules of the road, the duty imposed upon the municipality is satisfied" (Tomassi v Town of Union, 46 NY2d at 97). In order to recover, claimants must show that the State either created a dangerous condition, or had actual or constructive notice of it, and failed to take reasonable measures to correct it (Brooks v New York State Thruway Auth., 73 AD2d 767, 768 [1979], affd 51 NY2d 892 [1980]; Dispenza v State of New York, 28 Misc 3d 1205 [A] [2010]; see also Brown v State of New York, 79 AD3d 1579, 1582 [2010]). In addition, no liability will attach unless the ascribed negligence of the State is a proximate cause of the accident (see Johnson v State of New York, 27 AD3d 1061, 1062 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 711 [2006]; Ring v State of New York, 270 AD2d 788, 789 [2000]; Travalino v State of New York, 203 AD2d 276, 277 [1994]). " 'Where the facts proven show that there are several possible causes of an injury, for one or more of which the defendant was not responsible, and it is just as reasonable and probable that the injury was the result of one cause as the other, plaintiff cannot have a recovery, since he has failed to prove that the negligence of the defendant caused the injury' " (Bernstein v City of New York, 69 NY2d 1020, 1021-1022 [1987], quoting Ingersoll v Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 278 NY 1, 7 [1938]; see White v State of New York, 41 AD3d 1071, 1073 [2007]).
The Court concludes that claimants have failed to make out a prima facie case of negligence against the State because they have failed to establish that a dangerous condition present at this intersection was a proximate cause of the accident. The Court received little probative evidence as to causation. Other than testimony from Radomski - who did not witness the actual collision - no first-hand account of the accident was proffered at trial, and the Court received no testimony from a witness with knowledge as to what Sklarow did immediately prior to the collision. The Court cannot discern from the evidence, for example, whether Sklarow stopped at the stop sign, whether he looked to his left before entering the intersection and whether he was alert at the time of the collision. The Court is also unable to discern from the evidence whether, for example, Steenbuck was operating his motorcycle within the applicable speed limit at the time of the accident. Although Radomski estimated that Steenbuck was going about 45 to 50 miles per hour, there was no direct evidence presented as to what the speed limit was on CR 111 at the time of the accident, and photographs taken on the day of the accident show a speed limit sign just beyond the collision point on CR 111 which states that the speed limit is 30 miles per hour (Claimants' Exhibits 5 and 6).
The Court finds that the testimony of claimants' expert witness, Lance Robson, with respect to causation was conclusory and speculative and accords it little weight. Robson, a licensed professional civil engineer, generated an engineer's report based upon his review of the police accident report, photographs of the collision scene, DOT and Suffolk County documents, the examinations before trial of Hervan and Ugolik and his own visit to the accident scene in 2010, where he made observations and took measurements. He estimated, based upon his experience in crash reconstruction and his examination of the photographs, including his observations of a blood spot and a skid mark on the concrete in those photographs, that the speed of the motorcycle at the start of its skid was "within the speed limit of 45 miles an hour". However, Robson provided no basis for his statement that the speed limit on CR 111 was 45 miles per hour at the time of the accident and acknowledged that his conclusion was based upon his own estimations and not a physical examination of the evidence. Robson also testified that there was no physical evidence suggesting that Sklarow did not stop before entering the intersection. This testimony is also speculative and does little to convince the Court that Sklarow, in fact, stopped at the stop sign before this accident occurred.
Robson opined that the accident was caused, in part, by the inadequate sight distance available to Sklarow. He explained that corner sight distance is the distance that a person can see along the road that he or she is entering when turning onto a through road. When he visited the accident location, he measured the corner sight distance in this intersection by viewing a certain spot in the distance and then pacing it off. Using this method, he determined that the sight distance of a vehicle stopped at the stop line where it was at the time of the collision was 480 feet; the restriction of visibility was due to the curve of the road over the interstate. At 10 feet back from the stop line, the sight distance was 260 feet; at that point, the restriction of visibility was due to a guardrail alongside CR 111. According to Robson, the sight distance of 480 feet from the stop line is less than the standard provided in the NYS highway design manual, which provides, for a design speed of 43 miles per hour, the corner sight distance for crossing three lanes should be 557 feet and that, for a design speed of 50 miles per hour, corner sight distance for crossing three lanes should be 628 feet. Robson testified that, if Sklarow had pulled all the way forward, the maximum he could see was 480 feet. Robson testified that, in his opinion, this was "grossly substandard". He also concluded that a traffic signal was warranted based upon the significant traffic volume at the intersection and opined that the accident would not have occurred if there had been a traffic signal present. Robson opined that the accident was caused by two dangerous conditions at the intersection - the limited sight distance and the high volume of traffic - and that Steenbuck's speed was not a cause.
Robson's conclusion that the accident was caused by significant traffic volume at the intersection is contradicted by the evidence presented at trial. Radomski, who came upon the accident just seconds after it occurred, testified that traffic was not busy at the time of the collision. Moreover, although claimants submitted ample evidence of high traffic volumes at this interchange on Friday and Sunday evenings during the summer months, this accident occurred on a Wednesday morning in April, not during the peak travel times during the summer that were cited as causing the traffic issues. Thus, the Court finds that, contrary to Robson's conclusion, traffic volume was not a factor in this accident. In addition, Robson's determination that the accident would not have occurred if there had been a traffic light present is wholly conclusory and speculative. To be sure, the evidence established that signalization of the intersection was warranted to eliminate or control traffic issues that arose on weekends in the summer. However, no evidence was presented that a traffic light was warranted because of the particular circumstances presented here - a left-turn collision that occurred when traffic was not busy - and, given the absence of any evidence of what Sklarow did prior to the collision, it would be speculative to find that Sklarow would have stopped at a traffic light had one been present.
The Court also gives little weight to Robson's conclusions with regard to the sight distance available at the intersection. Robson went to the accident site over four years after it occurred and affirmed that the interchange had changed significantly since the time of the accident - it had been signalized, the location of the stop bar had changed, and the layout of the northbound lanes had changed. Although Robson testified that the stop sign was still there and he could see where the stop bar had been located at the time of the accident, the Court questions his testimony that the stop sign was still at the intersection after it had been signalized. Moreover, Robson acknowledged that he did not use any instruments in making his measurements at the scene. In any event, Robson's calculations were based upon a "design speed" of 43 and 50 miles per hour, and, as noted above, there is no probative evidence in the record establishing what the speed limit of CR 111 was at the time of the accident. Notably, on cross-examination, Robson acknowledged that, on a 30 mile-per-hour road, the sight distance required would be less than what he calculated. There also is no evidence that the particular design manual that Robson relied upon was in effect at the time when this intersection was constructed.
Additionally, the other evidence before the Court contradicts Robson's finding that the sight distance available to drivers making a left turn at this intersection was inadequate. Even crediting Robson's calculations, it is undisputed that Sklarow could see, at a minimum, 480 feet of CR 111 looking left if he had pulled all the way forward, and there was no evidence of an obstruction at or near the intersection that would have prevented Sklarow from seeing Steenbuck's vehicle until it was nearly upon Sklarow's vehicle. Indeed, Radomski's testimony established that a driver proceeding with caution into the intersection would be able to see oncoming traffic. The Court also received into evidence a photograph taken on the day of the accident from the perspective of a driver making a left-hand turn onto CR 111 from the North Service Road (Claimants' Exhibit 8). This photograph confirms that, although sight distance at the intersection may have been limited by the curve in the road, it was not entirely obstructed.
The Court therefore concludes that claimants have failed to establish that a dangerous condition such as the limited sight distance available at this intersection - or any other alleged negligence on the part of defendant - was a proximate cause of this accident. It is just as likely that some factor other than the negligence of defendant, such as the negligence of one or both drivers, caused this accident (see Johnson v State of New York, 27 AD3d at 1062-1063).
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that claimants have not proven their claim by a preponderance of the credible evidence, and this claim is dismissed in its entirety. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
March 30, 2012
Albany, New York
James H. Ferreira
Judge of the Court of Claims