Opinion
C/A 6:23-cv-05102-DCC-KFM
02-02-2024
Philip Scott Steele, Plaintiff, v. Scotty Bodiford, Ronald Hollister, Defendants.[1]
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald, United States Magistrate Judge Greenville, South Carolina.
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on October 12, 2023 (doc. 1). By order filed December 1, 2023, the plaintiff was informed that his complaint was subject to summary dismissal because it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that he could attempt to cure the defects identified in his complaint by filing an amended complaint (doc. 16). The plaintiff was informed that if he failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise cure the deficiencies outlined in the order, his case would be recommended for dismissal (id. at 13-14). On December 11, 2023, the plaintiff's amended complaint was entered on the docket (doc. 18). The amended complaint contained new allegations, so on January 16, 2024, a second order regarding amendment was issued informing the plaintiff that his amended complaint was subject to dismissal as drafted and providing him with time to file a second amended complaint and correct the deficiencies noted in the order (doc. 21). The plaintiff was informed that if he failed to file a second amended complaint or cure the deficiencies outlined in the order, the case would be recommended for dismissal (id. at 11-12). Upon review of the plaintiff's second amended complaint, the undersigned recommends that this matter be summarily dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
This is a § 1983 action filed by the plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Greenville County Detention Center (“the Detention Center”), seeking damages from the defendants (doc. 26). The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has been charged in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions with two counts of first degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor and three counts of third degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. See Greenville County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/ Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter the plaintiff's name and 2021A2320603124, 2021A2320603125, 2021A2320603126, 2021A2320603127, 2021A2320603128) (last visited February 1,2024).
See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants, who are the director and jail administrator at the Detention Center, have violated his rights (doc. 26 at 2-3, 4). He contends that the defendants are responsible for the management, administration, regulations, procedures, policies, and rules within the Detention Center and are therefore responsible for the violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights (id. at 7). The plaintiff alleges that his First Amendment rights have been violated because his grievances and kiosk requests have been denied (id.). The plaintiff also alleges that he has been blocked from filing future grievances or requests (id.). The plaintiff also contends that the defendants have denied him outside recreation time, locked him in his cell for up to thirteen hours a day, and that he has been subject to strip searches for illegal contraband (id. at 8-10). He also contends that he is limited to one personal visit per day (id. at 9). He also contends that he has been discriminated against because his pending charges involve sex crimes against children and he has been placed with other detainees who have similar pending charges, so other detainees can identify them, which jeopardizes his safety (id. at 5, 9). The plaintiff's alleged injuries include being harassed and abused as well as emotional distress and damage to his reputation, dignity, and family relations (id. at 11). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages and to have the defendants resign (id.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even though the plaintiff has prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. However, the plaintiff's second amended complaint is subject to summary dismissal. As an initial matter, the plaintiff claims involving strip searches at the Detention Center are subject to dismissal in this action because the plaintiff seeks relief with respect to that claim in another case. See Steele v. Ayer, C/A No. 6:23-cv-05651-DCC-KFM (D.S.C.) (pending).
No Personal Allegations
The plaintiff's claims against the defendants in this action are subject to dismissal because the plaintiff's second amended complaint makes no personal allegations of wrongdoing against them. Although the plaintiff's allegations must be liberally construed, the plaintiff must provide more than general and conclusory statements to allege a plausible claim for relief. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1022 (1995); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (noting that liability under § 1983 “requires personal involvement”). Moreover, as recently reiterated by the Fourth Circuit, general, conclusory, and collective allegations against groups of defendants fail to allege a plausible claim. See Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 125 (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 2023) (recognizing that the plaintiff's complaint failed to meet the plausibility standard when it did not set forth who the defendants were beyond being employees where he was incarcerated or in what capacity the defendants interacted with the plaintiff). As such, because the plaintiff's allegations against the defendants are limited and general and fail to show any personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations, they are subject to summary dismissal. See, e.g., Collins v. Clarke, C/A No. 7:22-cv-00406, 2023 WL 4109773, at *3 (W.D. Va. June 21, 2023) (noting the plaintiff's allegations that the defendants were responsible for certain prison policies and were “‘made aware'” of the plaintiff's complaints were insufficient to state a claim against those defendants).
To the extent the plaintiff's second amended complaint can be construed as seeking damages based upon supervisory liability against the defendants, his claims are also subject to summary dismissal because the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior are generally not applicable to § 1983 suits. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability” (emphasis in original)). Indeed, to allege a plausible claim requires a showing that the supervisor (1) had actual or constructive knowledge that his/her subordinates engaged in conduct posing a pervasive or unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) the supervisor's response to the knowledge was “so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices;” and (3) an affirmative causal link between the inaction by the supervisor and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Green v. Beck, 539 Fed.Appx. 78, 80 (4th Cir. 2013). Here, beyond conclusory allegations that the defendants are responsible for anything that happens in the Detention Center, the plaintiff has not alleged how the defendants were aware of the complained-of conditions or alleged a causal link between any knowledge these defendants may have of the complained-of conditions and the plaintiff's alleged injuries. As such, the plaintiff's second amended complaint fails to state a supervisory liability claim against the defendants. See Ford v. Stirling, C/A No. 2:17-02390-MGL, 2017 WL 4803648, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2017); London v. Maier, C/A No. 0:10-00434-RBH, 2010 WL 1428832, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2010).
Access to Grievance Process Claim
In addition to the foregoing, to the extent the plaintiff alleges that his rights have been violated because he has been denied access to the Detention Center's grievance process (doc. 26 at 7), his claim is subject to dismissal. “[I]t is well settled that inmates have no federal constitutional right to have any inmate grievance system in operation at the place where they are incarcerated.” Rivera v. Leonard, C/A No. 5:15-GV-G1191-DCN, 2016 WL 3364905, at *4 (D.S.C. June 17, 2016), aff'd, 672 Fed.Appx. 262 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied583 U.S. 845 (2017). Further, because “inmate grievance procedures are not constitutionally required in state prison systems, the failure to follow grievance procedures does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” Doans v. Rice, 831 F.2d 1057, 1987 WL 38813 (4th Cir. 1987) (unpublished table decision). As such, the plaintiff's claim that he has been denied access to the grievance process at the Detention Center is subject to summary dismissal.
Conditions of Confinement Claims
The plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims are also subject to summary dismissal. The plaintiff's complained-of conditions include being in a dorm with other individuals charged with sex crimes, that he has been denied outdoor recreation time from June/July 2023 to the end of the year, that he has been locked down 13 hours a day, and that he has limited access to visitation (doc. 26 at 8-10). At all relevant times herein, the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee; thus, his claims are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment (which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement claims for individuals convicted of crimes). See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1983). In any event, “[the] due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner.” Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). Recently, the Fourth Circuit held in a published decision that pretrial detainees could state a Fourteenth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious risk of harm on a purely objective basis that the challenged action is not related to a legitimate non-punitive governmental purpose or is excessive in relation to that purpose. Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 611 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015)).
Here, the plaintiff's complained-of conditions, being jailed with other individuals who have similar pending charges, that he has been denied outdoor recreation time, has limited access to visitation, and has been locked down 13 hours a day at times (see doc. 26), do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. See Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298) (noting that the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and only deprivations which deny the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to provide the basis of a § 1983 claim); Thompson v. Brown, C/A No. 3:11-cv-318-TMC-JRM, 2011 WL 6012592, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Nov. 8, 2011) (rejecting conditions of confinement claim where the plaintiff claimed “his mattress and blanket were confiscated for six days, he was not allowed to have any toilet tissue for six days, his clothes were taken away from him for six days, his cell was cold, he had no running water in his cell, and he was forced to sleep on a steel cot for six days”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 6012550 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2011). For example, courts have found that being denied outdoor recreation for a few months -as alleged in this action - does not rise to the level of a serious deprivation to state a constitutional claim. See Collins v. Williams, C/A No. 6:18-cv-01491-RMG, 2019 WL 4751718, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2019); see also Snyder v. W. Reg' Jail Auth., C/A No. 3:18-cv-01433, 2019 WL 6523198, at *13 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 4, 2019) (noting that “[i]n this case, Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied any recreation opportunities or confined to his cell at all times. Therefore, he fails to state a deprivation of his constitutional rights.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 6521989 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 3, 2019). Further, the plaintiff is not constitutionally entitled to unlimited visitation. See Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989) (finding no liberty interest in canteen, telephone, or visitation privileges). Moreover, to the extent the plaintiff seeks the resignation of the defendants as relief in this action (doc. 26 at 11), the plaintiff seeks relief this court cannot grant because “federal courts do not sit to supervise state prisons.” See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976). As such, the plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims are also subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
By order issued January 16, 2024, the plaintiff was given an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his amended complaint and further warned that if he failed to file a second amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, his case would be forwarded to the district court with a recommendation that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment. Despite filing a second amended complaint, the plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies identified in the order dated January 16, 2024 (doc. 21). Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action without further leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 791 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).