Opinion
1:04CV2420.
February 8, 2006
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION
The plaintiff, Carl Steadman ("Steadman") filed a complaint against defendant Board of Trustees, Plan Administrator, Local No. 436 Health, Welfare and Pension Fund, alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). (Doc. 22, second amended complaint, ¶ 21.) ERISA provides that a civil action may be brought by "a participant or beneficiary" to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his employee benefits plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
The complaint alleges that the defendant Board of Trustees is the Plan Administrator of a Welfare Fund ("Welfare Fund") and a Pension Fund ("Pension Fund"), sponsored by Teamsters Local 436. (Doc. 22, ¶¶ 5-6.) It is further alleged that Steadman was a participant in the Fund during the years 1998 to 2003. Id. at ¶¶ 15-16.
More properly, "Excavating Building Material and Construction Drivers Local Union No. 436," affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America.
The Pension Fund adopted a Retirement Plan as of Dec. 26, 1961, which was amended and restated on Jan. 1, 2001. (Doc. 33, Defendant's Exhibit ("DX") A, Pension Plan.) The Welfare Fund adopted a Plan Document, which was restated effective Jan. 1, 1992. (Doc. 33, DX B, Welfare Plan.)
In February 2003, Steadman applied for "permanent and total disability" benefits from the Pension Fund. (Doc. 37, Joint Exhibit ("JX") 6.) The defendant denied Steadman's application for disability benefits, stating that he was not a participant at the time when he became disabled. (Doc. 22, ¶¶ 17-19; see doc. 37, JX 10.) Steadman contends that he was a participant and is entitled to disability benefits under the Pension Fund and Welfare Fund plans. Id. at ¶ 26.
On May 21, 2004, Steadman requested a copy of the summary plan description and plan document. Id. at ¶ 20, 28. He alleges that he did not receive copies of the summary plan description until Nov. 8, 2004. Thus, Steadman alleges that he is entitled to damages under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1). Id. at ¶¶ 29-31.
The defendants have moved for summary judgment. (Doc. 32.)
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court must first determine the proper standard of review. The Sixth Circuit has held that a motion for summary judgment is an inappropriate vehicle for resolving a claim for ERISA benefits. Wilkins v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 609, 619 (6th Cir. 1998). Accord, University Hosp. of Cleveland v. Emerson Elec. Co., 202 F.3d 839, 845 n. 2 (6th Cir. 2000); Andrus v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 368 F.Supp.2d 829, 832 (N.D. Ohio 2005). The defendants' motion shall be considered as a motion for judgment on the administrative record. See, e.g., Andrus, 368 F.Supp.2d at 830; Serbin v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 79 F.Supp.2d 864, 867 (N.D. Ohio 2000).When reviewing a denial of benefits pursuant to an ERISA plan, the court reviews only evidence contained in the administrative record. Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 385 F.3d 654, 660 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Wilkins, 150 F.3d at 619); Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive Disability Protection Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 982 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing cases). The court "may consider the parties' arguments concerning the proper analysis of the evidentiary materials contained in the administrative record," but may not consider any evidence outside the administrative record. Wilkins, 150 F.3d at 619. See generally Bass v. TRW Employee Welfare Benefits Trust, No. 02-5768, 2004 WL 103001 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 2004) (court may consider benefits plan itself). Thus, the court does not consider materials typically offered in summary judgment motion practice, such as depositions, affidavits, or similar materials. University Hospitals, 202 F.3d at 845 n. 2.
The court considers evidence outside of the administrative record "only if that evidence is offered in support of a procedural challenge to the administrator's decision, such as an alleged lack of due process." Wilkins, 150 F.3d at 619;Andrus, 368 F.Supp.2d at 832. Steadman does not press a procedural challenge.
In evaluating an administrator's interpretation of a plan governed by ERISA, the court applies a de novo standard "unless the plan gives the administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." Gismondi v. United Tech. Corp., 408 F.3d 295, 298 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Firestone Tire Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)). If the plan gives such discretionary authority, the court reviews the administrator's decision to deny benefits using "the highly deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of review." Gismondi, 408 F.3d at 298 (citing Killian v. Healthsource Provident Adm'rs, Inc., 152 F.3d 514, 520 (6th Cir. 1998)); Darland v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 317 F.3d 516, 527 (6th Cir. 2003).
Under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, the court will uphold a benefit determination if it is "rational in light of the plan's provisions." Gismondi, 408 F.3d at 298 (quoting Yeager v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1996)); Darland, 317 F.3d at 527. "When it is possible to offer a reasoned explanation, based on the evidence, for a particular outcome, that outcome is not arbitrary or capricious." Id. (quoting Davis v. Kentucky Finance Cos. Ret. Plan, 887 F.2d 689, 693 (6th Cir. 1989),cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990)).
The court must determine "not which side we believe is right, but whether the insurer had substantial evidentiary grounds for a reasonable decision in its favor." Gannon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 211, 216 (1st Cir. 2004). The court must accept the administrator's rational interpretation of the plan "even in the face of an equally rational interpretation offered by the participants." Gismondi, 408 F.3d at 298 (citing Morgan v. SKF USA, Inc., 385 F.3d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 2904 (2005)).
II. ADMINISTRATOR'S AUTHORITY UNDER PLAN PROVISIONS
The Administrator of the Pension Plan is named as "The Board of Trustees." (Doc. 33, DX A, Pension Plan, § 1.1(c).). The defendants point to the following Pension Plan provisions:
The Administrator shall have total and complete discretion to interpret the Plan and to determine all questions arising in the administration, interpretation and application of the Plan, including the power to construe and interpret the Plan; to decide all questions relating to an individual's eligibility to participate in the Plan and/or eligibility for benefits and the amounts thereof; to have fact finder discretionary authority to decide all facts relevant to the determination of eligibility for benefits or participation . . .
(Doc. 32, at 6-7; DX A, § 11.2.).
The Administrator of the Welfare Plan is named as "Gary A. Boncella" of Teamsters Local Union No. 436. (DX B, Art. I, § 6.) Under the terms of the Welfare Plan, the "Administrator" is:
. . . any person duly designated by the Trustees pursuant to the Trust Agreement to perform any and all necessary and proper duties incident to the administration of the Fund, including in scope, but not limited to, the hiring of personnel, professional or otherwise, to achieve the objective of the Fund.
(DX B, Art. III, § 1. See also Art. I, § 5.) The Welfare Plan also provides that:
Only the Trustees have complete authority to interpret the provisions of the Plan as now stated or amended hereafter. Any question about the Plan, or disputes about eligibility for any amount of benefits, shall be resolved by the Board of Trustees, unless such authority has been otherwise delegated herein. No Employer, Union, or individual Trustee is authorized to interpret the provisions of the Plan. Any interpretation of the Plan made by the Board of Trustees or its designee shall be final and binding on all parties, subject to the Covered Person's or beneficiary's right to legal action.
(DX B, Art. VIII, § 18.)
The provisions of the two plans establish that the defendants, as designated plan administrators, are granted "discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." Thus, the court will review the decision to deny benefits using "the highly deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of review." Gismondi, 408 F.3d at 298.
III. DENIAL OF BENEFITS
The evidence in the administrative record demonstrates the following. In the summer of 1999, Steadman Trucking filed an "Employer Information Form" with Local 436, stating that the owner of Steadman Trucking was AnnMarie Steadman (hereinafter "AnnMarie"), the plaintiff's then-wife. (Doc. 37, JX 1.) Steadman Trucking also agreed to abide by the contractual terms and conditions of Local 436's labor rates and fringe benefits. (Doc. 37, JX 2.)
Carl and AnnMarie Steadman separated in early 2002, and their divorce became final in the spring of 2003. His ex-wife is now known as AnnMarie Ropos. (Doc. 33, DX E, Steadman dep., at 24-25; doc. 32, DX F, Ropos dep., at 4-5. See also Doc. 37, JX 8, judgment entry for divorce, dated April 9, 2003.)
On February 22, 2003, Steadman applied for "permanent and total disability" benefits from the Pension Fund. In his application, he stated that he intended to retire effective Feb. 15, 2003. (Doc. 37, JX 6, at 1.) In support of his application, Steadman submitted an attending physician's statement, and he also underwent an independent medical evaluation. Id. at 3-8.
On May 27, 2003, Steadman also submitted a claim to the Welfare Fund for "medical/time loss benefits," for the period beginning Feb. 14, 2003, through the date of the claim. (Doc. 37, JX 6, at 9-10.)
In processing Steadman's claim for disability retirement benefits, the Pension Fund asked AnnMarie Steadman, as owner of Steadman Trucking, to confirm that Steadman's last day worked was Feb. 14, 2003. (Doc. 37, JX 7, at 3.)
In response, AnnMarie called Local 436, which memorialized the conversation as follows:
Spoke w/owner (Ann Marie) regarding verification form of last day worked. Mrs. Steadman says she has no idea what Mbr [member?] has been doing. She has not signed any forms related to W/P since 12/14/01. She also indicated that she did not sign his S/B form either.
(Doc. 37, JX 7, at 4.) Subsequently, on June 3, 2003, AnnMarie sent the following note to Chris [Chambers] at Local 436:
Received your memo. In answer, I have had no acknowlegement [ sic] of anything relating to and/or regarding Carl Steadman Trucking since December of 2001. I reviewed my files, the last contribution form was signed and completed by me for the month of November 2001 in December of 2001.
During our finalization of our divorce, I was shocked to hear he had sold Carl Steadman Trucking without my knowlege [ sic] in February of 2003. Please feel free to call me if anything further needs to be resolved.
In his deposition, Boncella identifies "Chris" as Chris Chambers. (Doc. 32, DX D, Boncella dep., at 11-13; see also doc. 32, DX F, Ropos dep., at 19.)
(Doc. 37, JX 7, at 6.)
Boncella sent Steadman a letter on July 8, 2003, advising him that his claims for temporary disability benefits under the Welfare Fund plan, and for a disability pension under the Pension Fund plan, were being denied. The letter reads as follows:
The Trustees of the Local 436 Benefits Funds have learned that the contributions [which] were made to the Welfare and Pension [Funds] on your behalf since December, 2001 [were] in violation of the Welfare and Pension Fund Plan documents. The Welfare and Pension Fund Plans provide that a participant shall not include any self-employed person, sole proprietor or partner with the exceptions of a so-called owner-operator that contracts with an employer making contributions on his or her behalf and the self-employed person, sole-proprietor or partner that makes contributions for at least one other Participant. In violation of these provisions, you have made contributions to the Welfare and Pension Funds on your behalf since December, 2001.
Based on evidence reviewed by the Trustees, it is evident that Steadman Trucking never made contributions on behalf of any driver other than you. In addition, because your wife has not had anything to do with Steadman Trucking since December, 2001, you have been making contributions to the Funds on your own behalf which is prohibited by both Funds. Therefore, the Funds are taking the following actions:
1. Terminating your eligibility for benefits under the Welfare Fund effective June 30, 2003 (contributions made on a member's behalf can be used for eligibility regardless of his status. Reinstatement will be subject to conditions in item 3, below.)
2. Providing you with the opportunity to elect COBRA continuation coverage effective July 1, 2003.
3. Refunding any Welfare contributions made for December, 2001 and later but only after you (1) chose COBRA continuation coverage and pay for the required premiums through the current date, or (2) reimburse the Welfare Fund for any and all payments made on your behalf for medical, dental, prescription or other claims. This "COBRA Notice" will be provided in a separate letter.
4. Refunding any Pension contributions made for December, 2001 and later and adjust your pension credited service accordingly.
5. Denying your application for a disability pension. This will also be done in a separate letter.
6. Denying your claim for a temporary disability benefit under the Welfare Fund plan of benefits.
(Doc. 37, JX 10, at 1-2.)
Shortly thereafter, Boncella sent a second letter, dated July 17, 2003, to Steadman, which read, in part:
A Pension Fund participant must meet four criteria to qualify for a disability pension:
1. The member must have fifteen years of credited service;
2. The member suffers for a total disability that prevents him from performing his normal job functions for a period of six months;
3. The disability causes the member's retirement from Local 436 employment; and
4. The disability is determined to be permanent.
Building Materials Drivers Pension Fund Plan Restatement of January 1, 1989 ("Pension Plan"), Section 5.4.
You have 16.3 years of credited service through November 2001 and meet the first criteria.
The documents you have provided and the review of those documents and the physician evaluation establish that you are totally disabled. Therefore you meet the second and fourth criteria.
However, you do not meet the third requirement for a total and permanent disability pension benefit.
The Trustees of the Local 436 Pension Fund have learned that the contributions [which] were made to the Pension Fund on your behalf since December, 2001 [were] in violation of the Pension Fund Plan document. The Pension Fund Plan provide[s] that a participant shall not include any self-employed person, sole proprietor or partner with the exception of a so-called owner-operator that contracts with an employer making contributions on his or her behalf and the self-employed person, sole-proprietor or partner that makes contributions for at least one other Participant. In violation of these provisions, you have made contributions to the Welfare and Pension Funds on your behalf since December, 2001.
You do not meet these requirements because your disability commenced after November 2001. As of December, 2001 you were not working at Local 436 employment. Therefore, the disability did not cause you to retire from Local 436 employment. You left 436 employment effective November 30, 2001.
Therefore because you do not meet the requirements for permanent and total disability pension benefit your application must be denied.
(Doc. 37, JX 10, at 3-4.) The letter goes on to advise Steadman of his appeal rights under ERISA.
Steadman submitted a "Request for Claims Review" [appeal] on Sept. 11, 2003. (Doc. 37, JX 11.) He stated that, since December 2001, "nothing changed internally in the business operations of Steadman Trucking or in the relationship between Steadman Trucking and Local 436 during the entire period in question of August, 1999 (the start-up date of Steadman Trucking) through February, 2003." Id. at 3. The letter stated further:
During this time period Steadman Trucking made consecutive and continuing monthly payments to Local 436 in accordance with the requirements mandated by the Health and Welfare Fund. Furthermore, during this time period, Local 436 accepted these payments and at no time did they return, refund or otherwise void them. By their acceptance and negotiation of these payments, Local 436 acquiesced to the relationship between Steadman Trucking and Local 436 thereby establishing continuing healthcare coverage.
I am not certain as to how you derived that illegal contributions were being made given the above circumstances as outlined in paragraph three above.
(Doc. 37, JX 11, at 3-4.)
The Claims Review Board held a hearing on Steadman's appeal on Oct. 29, 2003, and advised him of their decision upholding the denial of benefits, on Feb. 29, 2004. (Doc. 37, JX 12, 13, 16.) The letter reiterated the four criteria required to qualify for a disability pension, and noted that Steadman met the first, second and fourth criteria. (JX 16.) However, the Claims Review Board found that he did not qualify under the third factor:
The information you provided does not change the facts that the original denial was based on. That is, since December, 2001 (or at the latest, February, 2002), contributions were made to the Pension Fund on your behalf in violation of the Pension Fund Plan document that provides that a participant shall not include any self-employed person, sole proprietor or partner with the exception of a so-called owner-operator that contracts with an employer making contributions on his or her behalf and the self-employed person, sole proprietor or partner that makes contributions for at least one other Participant. In violation of these provisions, you have made contributions to the Welfare and Pension Funds on your own behalf since December, 2001. The fact that you may have signed some checks payable to the Funds prior to that date does not change the decision. Your company was represented to the Funds not as a sole proprietorship, but within the requirements of the owner-operator situation described above, a business entity with you as the employee, not as the owner and all contributions were accepted under that representation. Therefore, your status as a 436 participant ceased in December, 2001.
Since your disability commenced in 2003, your disability did not cause the cessation of your 436 employment.
Therefore because you do not meet the requirements for permanent and total disability pension benefit your application must remain denied.
(Doc. 37, JX 16, at 2.)
IV. ARGUMENTS CONCERNING PROPER ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD
The defendants point out that the Welfare Plan states that "[a]ll Contributions to the Fund shall be made only by Employers on the behalf of their Participants." (Doc. 32, at 8, quoting doc. 33, DX B, Welfare Plan, at 3, Art. I, § 7.)
The Welfare Plan defines "Employer" as "employers of Participants for whom the Union is the collective bargaining representative." (DX B, Welfare Plan, at 22, Art. III, § 9.) Further, "[t]he term `Employer' shall not include a self-employed person, sole proprietor or partner unless the self-employed person, sole proprietor or partner makes Contributions for at least one other Participant." Id. at 23.
The Welfare Plan's definition of "Participant" reads as follows:
. . . all employees who are (i) employed by Employers and (ii) eligible for benefits under the terms and provisions of the Plan. However, in no event shall the term "Participant" include any self-employed person, sole proprietor or partner, with the exceptions of (i) the so-called "owner-operator" that contracts with an Employer making Contributions on his/her behalf and (iii) [ sic] the self-employed person, sole proprietor or partner that makes Contributions for at least one other Participant.
(DX B, Welfare Plan, at 25, Art. III, § 15.)
The Pension Plan requires the following to qualify for a Disability Retirement Benefit:
A Participant who completes fifteen (15) Years of Credited Service whose Retirement occurs on account of his incurring a Permanent and Total Disability while employed by an Employer shall, upon application therefor on forms prescribed by the Trustees, be eligible for a Total Disability Benefit.
(Doc. 33, DX A, Pension Plan, at 6-1, Art. 6, § 6.4.)
The defendants cite to Section 6.2; however, the correct section number is 6.4. See doc. 32, at 8.
The definitions in the Pension Plan are less precise, and less restrictive, than those in the Welfare Plan. Under the Pension Plan, an "Employee" is defined as, inter alia, a person "[e]mployed by an Employer under the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement entered into between an Employer or its representative and the Union and on whose behalf payments are made to the Pension Fund by the Employer." (DX A, Pension Plan, at 1-5, Art. 1, § 1.1(t).)
An "Employer" is defined as "[a]ny association or employer which has duly executed a collective bargaining agreement with the Union requiring a contribution to the Pension Fund which satisfies the requirements for participation as established by the Trustees." Id. at § 1.1(u).
The defendants argue that their interpretation of the term "employee" is neither arbitrary nor capricious. (Doc. 32, at 7.) Boncella construed the Plan provisions to find that if Steadman were the sole participant, and there were no other persons involved in the company, then his participation in the Funds would be a violation of the Plan provisions and ERISA. Id. at 9-10.
While the Welfare Plan sets out relatively clear guidelines for determining who is a "participant" under that Plan, the provisions of the Pension Plan do not supply such clear guidance. Steadman was applying for, and denied, "a Disability Retirement Benefit" under the Pension Plan. To qualify for such a benefit, essentially, a participant must be an employee who is employed by an employer.
The defendants argue that their interpretation of the Plan accords with ERISA requirements. (Doc. 32, at 9-11.) They point to ERISA's definition of an "employee" as "any individual employed by an employer," and an "employer" as "any person acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer." Id. at 10, quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) and (6).
As pointed out by the Supreme Court, such definitions are "uninformative" and unhelpful. Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (hereinafter, "Yates"). "ERISA's nominal definition of `employee' as `any individual employed by an employer,' is completely circular and explains nothing." Id. (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992)). Nonetheless, the administrator had convincing support for his rational interpretation of the plan.
The defendants contend that "someone other than the employee must have some involvement in the management of the company for it to be an employer." (Doc. 32, at 11.) The Supreme Court has ruled that the working owner of a business can qualify as a "participant" in a pension plan covered by ERISA. The Court held:
If the plan covers one or more employees other than the business owner and his or her spouse, the working owner may participate on equal terms with other plan participants. Such a working owner, in common with other employees, qualifies for the protections ERISA affords plan participants and is governed by the rights and remedies ERISA specifies. Yates, 541 U.S. at 6 (emphasis added). The Court specifically rejected the position, taken by the Sixth Circuit in Fugarino v. Hartford Life Accident Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 966 (1993), and other cases, "that a business owner may rank only as an `employer' and not also as an 'employee' for purposes of ERISA-sheltered plan participation." Id. at 6, 11.
However, importantly, the Court clarified that any plan that has as its only participant a sole owner (and possibly spouse), is a "plan without employees," and thus does not qualify for ERISA coverage. See, e.g., Yates, 541 U.S. at 21; Meiszner v. Suburban Bank Trust Co., 397 F.Supp.2d 952, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (citing Yates). In contrast, a plan that includes at least one employee in addition to the sole owner will be covered.Id.
Insofar as Boncella as administrator interpreted the Pension Plan to find that "someone other than the employee must have some involvement in the management of the company" for Steadman Trucking to qualify as an ERISA "employer," and thus for Steadman to qualify as an "employee" employed by an ERISA employer, the court finds that this is a rational interpretation of the plan's provisions in light of the governing law.
The evidence in the administrative record supports a finding that Steadman Trucking in 2003 did not include any other "employees" other than Steadman. See, e.g., doc. 37, JX 1, 6, 14-16. In fact, there is no indication that Steadman Trucking ever employed anyone other than Carl Steadman. See doc. 37, JX 15 (record of contributions to Fund). Steadman, acting under the name of Steadman Trucking, was not qualified to participate in an ERISA protected plan during the time period at issue.
The defendants have offered "a reasoned explanation, based on the evidence," for the denial of benefits. Gismondi, 408 F.3d at 298. The court cannot find that the administrator's decision was arbitrary or capricious.
V. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
The second amended complaint pleads two causes of action: 1) recovery of benefits, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); and 2) an information request penalty, under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1).See generally doc. 22, ¶¶ 21, 31. The complaint does not plead equitable estoppel. Nonetheless, the parties' memoranda raise the doctrine of equitable estoppel as a basis for relief. See, e.g. doc. 32, at 14 ("Plaintiff seems to be suggesting that he is entitled to some form of equitable relief").
Steadman contends that a claim based on equitable estoppel is not preempted by ERISA. (Doc. 34, at 7.) He identifies a dispute as to "whether there was conduct or language by the Pension Fund that amounted to a representation of material fact." Id. at 9.
The defendants argue that equitable estoppel is inapplicable, because ERISA plans must be based upon a written instrument, and estoppel principles cannot be used to effect an oral modification of an ERISA plan. (Doc. 32, at 14, and doc. 36, at 4.) See, e.g., Doe v. Blue Cross Blue Shield United of Wisc., 112 F.3d 869, 875-876 (7th Cir. 1997); Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1300 (6th Cir. 1991).
The Sixth Circuit has held that equitable estoppel may be a viable theory in cases involving ERISA welfare plans. Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 403 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 923 (1998) (citingArmistead, 944 F.2d at 1298). However, estoppel cannot be the basis for obtaining oral modification of a multi-employer ERISA pension plan. Slye v. Central States SE and SW Areas Health Welfare Fund, No. C2-95-1245, 1997 WL 683122, at *6-7 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 1997) (citing Armistead and Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956 (11th Cir. 1986)). The reasoning is that permitting oral modifications of pension plans would undermine the security of pension rights. Armistead, 944 F.2d at 1299.
Steadman does not raise the estoppel argument in relation to the denial of his health and welfare benefits. See doc. 34, at 9 (referencing conduct by Pension Fund).
In fact, Steadman appears to have abandoned any claim relating to the denial of his welfare benefits claim, which receives only a passing mention in the complaint. See doc. 22, at ¶ 26 (alleged entitlement to health benefits); compare doc. 22, at ¶ 18 (application for disability pension), and ¶ 22 (requirements under Pension Plan), doc. 34, at 4 (application for disability denied by Pension Fund).
For two reasons, then, Steadman's claim for benefits cannot be favorably adjudicated under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. First, and most importantly, Steadman does not plead the claim in his amended complaint, and second, the theory is unavailable in an action concerning an ERISA pension plan.
VI. INFORMATION REQUEST PENALTY
As mentioned earlier, the amended complaint presses a claim for an "information request penalty," under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1).See doc. 22, ¶¶ 27-31. The defendant's motion for summary judgment does not address this claim. See generally doc. 32; doc. 34, at 10. Thus, the court makes no ruling on the merits of the claim.VII. SUMMARY
The motion for judgment on the administrative record (doc. 32) is granted, as regards the claim for a recovery of ERISA benefits, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The defendants have offered "a reasoned explanation, based on the evidence," for the denial of benefits. The court cannot find that the administrator's decision was arbitrary or capricious. Thus, the court will uphold the administrator's determination.
IT IS SO ORDERED.