Opinion
Civil Action No. 13-773 ABJ/DAR
06-11-2014
FLORITA STATON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Florita Staton brings this action in her own right and on behalf of her minor child, D.S., seeking attorneys' fees that they incurred in administrative proceedings conducted pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. Complaint (Document No. 1). This action was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for full case management. Referral to Magistrate Judge Order (Document No. 3). Pending for consideration by the undersigned are Plaintiff[s'] Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 11) and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 13). Upon consideration of the motions, the memoranda in support thereof and opposition thereto, the attached exhibits, and the entire record herein, the undersigned will recommend that the court grant Plaintiffs' motion in part and deny Defendant's motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Florita Staton is the parent of Plaintiff D.S., a student residing in the District of Columbia. Complaint ¶ 2. On October 16, 2012, Plaintiffs, through counsel, filed an administrative due process complaint alleging that District of Columbia Public Schools ("DCPS") denied D.S. a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") by failing to comply with the IDEA's requirements for the evaluation of a student suspected of having a disability, and by failing to evaluate D.S. in all areas of suspected disability, despite Plaintiff Staton's "numerous requests." Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 1 at 4-6.
On November 14, 2012, DCPS sent Plaintiffs a written settlement offer, through which it proposed that the parties, in order to resolve Plaintiffs' due process complaint, agree to terms which included:
a. DCPS will conduct a Comprehensive Psychological, Speech and Language, Occupational Therapy, and an Adaptive Vineland Evaluation.Defendant's Motion, Exhibit 3. Plaintiffs did not accept the offer, and the parties proceeded to a due process hearing on January 11, 2013. Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 2 at 2.
b. Within thirty business days of the final completed DCPS evaluation, DCPS will convene an eligibility meeting to review DCPS evaluations, and discuss eligibility.
c. If student is found eligible, DCPS will convene an IEP meeting within twenty business days of the eligibility meeting, to discuss IEP.
d. Within ten business days of the IEP meeting, if necessary, DCPS will convene a location of services meeting, to discuss location of services.
e. DCPS will fund 30 hours of tutoring.
The hearing officer consolidated Plaintiffs' allegations into one issue - whether "DCPS fail[ed] to evaluate [D.S.] (a) pursuant to [IDEA requirements for identifying students with disabilities] from November 1, 2010 forward, and (b) despite numerous requests from Parent[.]" Id. The hearing officer concluded that DCPS failed "to conduct an initial evaluation of [D.S.] during [the 2011-2012 school year] to determine whether and to what extent, [she] may require special education and related services to access the general education curriculum" and that this failure constituted a denial of FAPE. Id. at 6. The hearing officer further found that "DCPS further denied [D.S.] a FAPE by failing, in response to [Plaintiff Staton's] February 2011 request for testing, to conduct an initial evaluation of [D.S.] . . . ." Id. The hearing officer thus ordered that DCPS provide Plaintiffs "with funding for independent comprehensive psychological and speech/language evaluations," and further ordered that:
[w]ithin 10 school days of receipt of the independent evaluation reports, DCPS shall convene an IEP meeting for [D.S.] to (1) review the evaluation data, (2) provide funding for clinical, adaptive, occupational therapy, vision and/or hearing evaluations if recommended by the independent evaluator(s), (3) determine [D.S.'s] eligibility for special education and/or related services, and (4) if appropriate, develop an IEP for [D.S.] and assign an appropriate school for implementation of the IEP.Id. at 7.
Throughout the administrative proceedings, Plaintiffs were represented by the Law Offices of Carolyn Houck. See Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 1 at 1; Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 3. Following the hearing officer's determination, Plaintiffs submitted an invoice to DCPS seeking attorneys' fees pursuant to the IDEA. Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 3. Plaintiffs sought $23,881.50 for fees incurred from October 2, 2012 through April 30, 2013. Id. Plaintiffs' counsel billed at an hourly rate of $435. Id. Defendant did not pay, and Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking the entire amount. See Complaint ¶ 9.
Plaintiffs did not seek costs. See Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 3 at 1 (omitting any sum for "Total Attorney Costs").
The undersigned notes that Plaintiffs request $23,881, rather than $23,881.50, in their Complaint. See Complaint ¶ 9.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Plaintiffs seek an award of $23,881.50 for attorneys' fees incurred while pursuing their administrative due process complaint, contending that the hearing officer's determination rendered them prevailing parties. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff[s'] Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs' Memorandum") (Document No. 11-1) at 4. Plaintiffs contend that the reasonableness of their attorneys' hourly rate is supported by their experience and the prevailing market rate in the District of Columbia, as set forth in the Laffey matrix. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiffs further contend that the detailed invoice that they submitted demonstrates the reasonableness of the hours billed, and submit that the invoice "represent[s] a fraction of the actual time spent on the case[]." Id. at 7.
See supra note 2.
The Laffey matrix is "a schedule of charges based on years of experience developed in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021 [] (1985)." Covington v. Dist. of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (footnote omitted). The Civil Division of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia updates and maintains a Laffey matrix, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/divisions/Laffey_Matrix 2014.pdf.
Defendant, in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion and in support of its cross-motion, first contends that the hourly rate sought by Plaintiffs' counsel is unreasonable. Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Memorandum") (Document Nos. 12, 13) at 2. Defendant posits that because "Plaintiffs failed to substantiate, or even allege" the complexity of the claims presented in the underlying administrative matter, the court should apply three-quarters of Laffey matrix rates for fees incurred in this court. Id. at 7-8 (emphasis omitted). Defendant challenges counsel for Plaintiffs' respective years of experience, and submits that the court should calculate rates based on their years of federal litigation experience. Id. at 7 n.2, 8. For fees incurred at the administrative level, Defendant contends that the court should apply the $90 rate established by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for appointed attorneys in family court, some of whom "provid[e] representation in special education matters." Id. at 7-8. With respect to the number of hours billed, Defendant contends that the fees incurred after November 14, 2012 are precluded by the statutory provision that disallows attorneys' fees for work performed after a written settlement offer is rejected, where the relief obtained is ultimately "not more favorable" than the settlement offer. Id. at 9-10.
In response, Plaintiffs contend that the court should award their requested hourly rate because the administrative proceedings "were complex, not routine," because some members of this court have found the Laffey rates "presumptively reasonable," and because rates established by the Superior Court are "not relevant" to these proceedings. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs' Reply") (Document Nos. 14, 15) at 3-6. Plaintiffs further contend that Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the relief obtained by Plaintiffs was "not more favorable" than the settlement offer, and that Defendant has failed to meet that burden. Id. at 11-13.
Defendant maintains that the requested hourly rates are unreasonable, and notes that Plaintiffs failed to address the cases in which "judges in this court have ordered 3/4 of the Laffey rate or less for work completed in IDEA cases similar to the routine administrative litigation underlying this lawsuit." Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Reply") (Document No. 17) at 2. Defendant contends that it has met its burden of demonstrating that the hearing officer's determination was not more favorable than the Defendant's November 14, 2012 settlement offer. Id. at 5.
APPLICABLE STANDARDS
Summary Judgment
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine if the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Whether a fact is material is determined based on whether it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id.
The party seeking summary judgment must identify "those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 256 (internal quotation marks omitted). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party]." Id. at 252. The court will view the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Request for Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to the IDEA
In actions for attorneys' fees that are brought pursuant to the IDEA, "the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs" to the prevailing party. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). In evaluating such a request for attorneys' fees, the court must first determine "whether the party seeking attorney's fees is the prevailing party," and if so, the court must then evaluate whether the requested fees are reasonable. Jackson v. Dist. of Columbia, 696 F. Supp. 2d 97, 101 (D.D.C. 2010) (citations omitted).
The "most useful starting point" for the determination of a reasonable award is generally "the number of hours reasonably expended" multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). The party requesting fees bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the hours expended, and "may satisfy this burden by submitting an invoice that is sufficiently detailed to permit the District Court to make an independent determination whether or not the hours claimed are justified." Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The party requesting fees "also bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the hourly rate sought," and in doing so, "must submit evidence on at least three fronts: the attorneys' billing practices; the attorneys' skill, experience, and reputation; and the prevailing market rates in the relevant community." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing In re North, 59 F.3d 184, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Covington v. Dist. of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). If the party requesting fees satisfies its burdens, "there is a presumption that the number of hours billed and the hourly rates are reasonable," and "the burden then shifts to the [opposing party] to rebut" this presumption. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting another source) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs aver that they are prevailing parties eligible for reasonable attorneys' fees under the IDEA. Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 4; Plaintiffs' Reply at 2. Defendant does not dispute Plaintiffs' status as prevailing parties, but challenges the reasonableness of their counsel's hourly rate and the provision of fees for certain billed hours.
Reasonableness of Hourly Rate
Plaintiffs seek fees at an hourly rate of $435 for the work that their attorneys, Carolyn Houck and Michelle Kotler, performed during the administrative proceedings. See Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 3. Plaintiffs contend that the 2012-2013 Laffey matrix rate for an attorney with 11 to 19 years of experience - $445 per hour - is the applicable prevailing market rate, and note that their rate is lower. See Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 6 ¶ 8; Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 8.
Defendant submits that different rates should be applied for the work performed in this "Federal action" and for the work performed on "the administrative case." Defendant's Memorandum at 8. Although Plaintiffs' complaint includes a general request for "attorney[s'] fees and costs incurred by virtue of the instant lawsuit," Complaint at 3, the undersigned observes that the invoice submitted only bills for work performed at the administrative level, see Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 3; thus, discussion of the rate applicable to work performed in this action is premature.
With respect to the rate for work performed during the administrative proceedings, the undersigned has already rejected Defendant's argument that the proper hourly rate is $90 in accordance with D.C. Code provisions and an administrative order of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. See Clay v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 09-1612, 2014 WL 322017, at *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2014) (citing Eley v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 11-309, 2013 WL 6092502, at *12 n.9 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2013)) (noting that the court in Eley found the same argument "so conclusory as to be spurious"). Defendant offers no new argument or authority in support of its position.
The statute provides that fees "shall be based on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services furnished." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). Judges of this court have adopted varying approaches to determining the prevailing market rate for attorneys' fees in IDEA actions. "While some judges of this court have applied the full Laffey rates in IDEA cases, others, including the undersigned, have applied a rate equal to three-fourths of the Laffey matrix rate . . . where the underlying administrative proceedings did not involve particularly complex matters." Haywood v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 12-1722, 2013 WL 5211437, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2013) (citations omitted); see A.B. by Holmes-Ramsey v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 10-1283, 2014 WL 346058, at *8 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2014) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that "some courts in this district have reduced the Laffey matrix by 25% in IDEA cases," but others "ha[ve] rejected the suggestion that IDEA administrative litigation is categorically less complex than other forms of litigation, and reaffirm[ed] that IDEA cases are sufficiently complex to allow application of the Laffey Matrix.").
In response to Defendant's contention that the administrative proceedings were not sufficiently complex to warrant full Laffey rates, Plaintiffs represent that their "counsel was required to have knowledge of the psychological and academic issues involved in the minor Plaintiff's disabilities, understand the procedural rules and substantive legal issues, and have the ability to present all of this information in a cohesive and logical manner." Plaintiffs' Reply at 4.
Although Plaintiffs appear to maintain that full Laffey rates are reasonable, they request that they be awarded their counsel's "billing rate of $435/hour or, in the alternative, [] 75% of $445/hour." Plaintiffs' Reply at 22.
While the preparation described by Plaintiffs' counsel obviously is important and necessary, it is integral to all IDEA proceedings, and Plaintiffs have not described any complexity specific to their case. See Gardill v. Dist. of Columbia, 930 F. Supp. 2d 35, 43 (D.D.C. 2013) (applying three-quarters of the Laffey rates where "the plaintiffs [] neither argued nor provided evidence that the underlying IDEA litigation presented any novel legal issues or difficult complexities," but awarding full Laffey rates for two matters for which the plaintiffs had demonstrated that the "cases were sufficiently complex"). The hearing officer considered one issue, and the administrative hearing was limited to nine exhibits, testimony from five witnesses, and written closing statements. See Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 2 at 2, 8; cf. A.B., 2014 WL 346058, at *8 (awarding the full Laffey rate for "over two years of complex litigation, both at the administrative and the federal level" where the plaintiffs challenged two hearing officer decisions and claimed violations of four federal statutes, briefed dispositive motions, and participated in oral argument before this court); Clay, 2014 WL 322017, at *6 (awarding the plaintiffs' requested rate for proceedings in this court after noting that majority of the litigation occurred in federal court and that the parties had briefed three dispositive motions); Young v. Dist. of Columbia, 893 F. Supp. 2d 125, 131-32 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding the administrative proceedings "sufficiently complex to warrant the application of the full Laffey rates" where the case involved 48 exhibits, two prehearing conferences, briefing of a dispositive motion, and a six-hour administrative hearing at which six witnesses, including an expert witness, testified).
"The prevailing market rate provides merely a starting point for determining the reasonableness of a billing rate . . . . The fee applicant should also submit evidence, including affidavits, regarding her counsel's general billing practices, skill, experience and reputation." Baker v. Dist. of Columbia Pub. Sch., 815 F. Supp. 2d 102, 114 (D.D.C. 2011) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Plaintiffs have not described their counsel's billing practices; instead, they state that their "counsel's billing practice has consistently been detailed and recorded in either the billing software program 'Timeslips' or, most recently, the software provided by DCPS." Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 5; see Haywood, 2013 WL 5211437, at *7 (citing Santamaria v. Dist. of Columbia, 875 F. Supp. 2d 12, 21 (D.D.C. 2012)) (applying rates equal to three-fourths of the Laffey rates for the same counsel where plaintiffs did not describe "complexities in their proceedings" or provide evidence of counsel's actual billing practices); see also Clay, 2014 WL 322017, at *6 n.5 (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs submitted evidence of their counsel's "skill, experience, and reputation" through declarations of their counsel and another practitioner. Ms. Houck has been practicing in this area of the law since 1997, when she was admitted to the Maryland bar. Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 6 ¶¶ 2-3. She was admitted to the District of Columbia bar in 1998. Id. ¶ 1. Plaintiffs submit a declaration of attorney Kimberly Glassman, who also practices in this area of the law, attesting to Ms. Houck's skill and reputation. See Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 9 ¶ 3. Ms. Kotler has been practicing in this area of the law since 2001, when she was admitted to the Maryland bar. Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 7 ¶¶ 9, 11. Ms. Kotler was admitted to the District of Columbia bar in 2012. Defendant's Motion, Exhibit 2.
Defendant calculates counsel's respective years of experience based on their "Federal litigation experience," and thus argues that Ms. Kotler's rate should be based on the prevailing rate for an attorney with one to three years of experience. Defendant's Memorandum at 7 n.2, 8; see Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 7 ¶ 13 ("I was moved into U.S. District Courts for the Districts of Maryland and the District of Columbia within the past year."). Considering this same argument in another case involving a request for attorneys' fees pursuant to the IDEA, the undersigned observed that the Laffey matrix "explains that '[t]he column headed 'Experience' refers to the years following the attorney's graduation from law school'" and that "[j]udges of this court have followed that method of calculation, or have calculated years of experience based on the date of the attorney's bar admission or years of legal experience." Clay, 2014 WL 322017, at *5 (citations omitted). Accordingly, based on their declarations, the undersigned finds that Plaintiffs correctly utilize the rate for attorneys with 11 to 19 years of experience. See Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 6 ¶¶ 2-3; Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 7 ¶¶ 9, 11.
As Plaintiffs note, see Plaintiffs' Reply at 7, the undersigned has previously found that Ms. Kotler falls "within the category of 11 to 19 years of experience." See Haywood, 2013 WL 5211437, at *8. --------
For all of the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the court apply an hourly rate of $333.75, equal to seventy-five percent of the 2012-2013 Laffey rate for an attorney with 11 to 19 years of experience, for both Ms. Houck and Ms. Kotler.
Hours Billed After Defendant's November 14 , 2012 Offer of Settlement
Defendant objects to the hours billed after November 14, 2012, the date of its settlement offer, contending that fees for these hours are precluded by the statute. "The IDEA prohibits an award of fees 'for services performed subsequent to the time of a written offer of settlement to a parent,' under certain time restrictions, if 'the relief finally obtained by the parents is not more favorable to the parents than the offer of settlement.'" Clay, 2014 WL 322017, at *4 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)). The statute provides an exception for "a parent who is the prevailing party and who was substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer." § 1415(i)(3)(E).
The parties do not dispute that Defendant made a timely offer, in accordance with § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)(I), or that Plaintiffs did not accept the offer within ten days, see § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)(II); rather, they dispute whether the relief ultimately awarded by the hearing officer was "not more favorable" to Plaintiffs than Defendant's November 14, 2012 offer, see § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)(III). Unlike Defendant's offer, which provided that DCPS would conduct evaluations of D.S., see Defendant's Motion, Exhibit 3 at 2, the hearing officer ordered DCPS to fund independent evaluations, see Plaintifs' Motion, Exhibit 2 at 7. Indeed, Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiffs "clearly prefer[ed] to have the option of choosing their own evaluators." Defendant's Reply at 5 (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs explain that they proceeded to a hearing to secure "precisely" this preference, given Defendant's past failures to evaluate D.S. and the ability to select evaluators that could "answer specific referral questions and make specific recommendations for services, goals, and accommodations . . . ." Plaintiffs' Reply at 15.
Moreover, Defendant's offer provided for 30 days after the evaluations to determine D.S.' eligibility for special education services, then an additional 20 days in which to conduct an IEP meeting, and an additional 10 days thereafter to discuss location of services. Defendant's Motion, Exhibit 3 at 2. In contrast, the hearing officer ordered Defendant to accomplish all of those determinations "[w]ithin 10 school days of receipt of the independent evaluation reports." Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 2 at 7.
The undersigned thus finds that Plaintiffs received more favorable relief than was offered by Defendant, given the hearing officer's order that DCPS provide public funding for independent evaluators and expedite the timeline for its subsequent determinations, and thus, are not statutorily precluded from seeking fees incurred after Defendant's November 14, 2012 settlement offer. Having so concluded, the undersigned does not address Plaintiffs' alternate argument, see Plaintiffs' Reply at 17-21, that the settlement offer was less favorable because it did not provide for attorneys' fees.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing findings, it is, this 11th day of June, 2014,
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 11) be GRANTED IN PART; and it is
FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 13) be DENIED; and it is
FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the court award attorneys' fees for all of the hours billed at an hourly rate of $333.75.
/s/_________
DEBORAH A. ROBINSON
United States Magistrate Judge
Within fourteen days, any party may file written objections to this report and recommendation. The objections shall specifically identify the portions of the findings and recommendations to which objection is made and the basis of each such objection. In the absence of timely objections, further review of issues addressed herein may be deemed waived.