Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:99-CV-2876-D
June 26, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this removed action, defendant MCI WORLDCOM Communications, Inc. ("MCI") moves for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). For the reasons discussed below, the court grants the motion in part and denies it in part.
I
Plaintiff Staton Holdings, Inc., d/b/a Staton Wholesale ("Staton") alleges claims against MCI for negligence and gross negligence and willful misconduct. These causes of action arise from telephone service interruptions that occurred on October 25 and November 12, 1999. Staton maintains that these two incidents deprived it of profits and caused it unnecessarily to incur long distance charges.
On December 27, 1999 MCI moved to dismiss, contending that Staton's state-law claims were preempted by the Federal Communications Act of 1934 ("FCA"), 47 U.S.C. § 151-614, and the Filed-Tariff Doctrine. On January 19, 2000 the court granted the motion but permitted Staton to amend its complaint to allege claims under the FCA, consistent with the Filed-Tariff Doctrine. Staton filed its "first amended original petition" ("amended complaint") on February 29, 2000. MCI now moves for judgment on the pleadings.
II
MCI argues that Staton's attempt to state claims for negligence and gross negligence is preempted by the FCA and the Filed-Tariff Doctrine.
Section 203(a) of the FCA requires every common carrier to file with the Federal Communication Commission tariffs "showing all charges" and "showing the classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such charges." 47 U.S.C. § 203 (a); American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Central Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 221 (1998). The Filed-Tariff Doctrine essentially provides that when a claim alleges that the rate or tariff provisions regarding services provided by a common carrier are other than that contained in the carrier's public tariff on file with the appropriate regulatory body, the "filed tariff" provision applies for the services provided pursuant to the tariff. See Maislin Indus., US. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 126 (1990). This doctrine prevents a carrier from being placed in an untenable position if the agency and court disagree on what is the reasonable rate, so that the carrier could not abide both by the rate filed with the agency and with the court's determination.
Staton alleges in its amended complaint that "[d]efendant negligently interrupted service." Am. Compl. ¶ 4. It contends that "[MCI's) conduct rises to the level of gross negligence." Id. ¶ 8. MCI argues that Staton's claim is preempted by MCI's filed tariff The court agrees.
Sections B4.02 and B.15 of the tariff address MCI's liability for service interruptions. See D. Ex. A. To the extent that Staton is attempting to state a claim based on negligence or gross negligence, the court holds that Staton's claim is barred.
The court notes that MCI did not comply with N.D. Tex. Civ. R. 7. 1(i)(1) and 7.2(e) in briefing this motion. These rules took effect September 1, 1999 and therefore apply to this case, which was removed on December 20, 1999. Rule 7.1(i)(1) provides that "[a] party who relies on documentary (including an affidavit, declaration, deposition, answer to interrogatory, or admission) or non-documentary evidence to support or oppose a motion must include such evidence in an appendix." Rule 7.2(e) states that "[i]f a party's motion or response is accompanied by an appendix, the party's brief must include citations to each page of the appendix that supports each assertion that the party makes concerning any documentary or non-documentary evidence on which the party relies to support or oppose the motion." MCI neither filed an appendix nor cited the appendix in its brief Because these deficiencies did not interfere with the decisional process of the court, the court has considered the documents and briefing that MCI has submitted, Counsel are reminded, however, to comply with these rules in briefing any future motions in this case.
Although Staton alleges that MCI acted negligently, it appears principally to contend that MCI's actions constitute willful misconduct. See Am. Compl. ¶ 4. Furthermore, Staton explicitly asserts only a cause of action for willful misconduct under the section of its amended complaint entitled "Causes of Action." See id. ¶ 7.
III
Section B4.02 of the tariff states that "MCI's liability for willful misconduct, if established as a result of judicial or administrative proceedings, is not limited by this tariff." See D. Ex. A. MCI acknowledges that willful misconduct is an exception to the tariff, see D. Br. at 4, but maintains that Staton's willful misconduct cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, id at 5. MCI contends that Staton's allegations of service interruptions "do not rise to the level of `willful misconduct' and should be dismissed on the face of the pleadings." See D. B.R. at 5.
MCI relies on two cases to support its argument: Corporate Investigative Division v. ATT, 884 F. Supp. 220 (W.D. La. 1995), and Stand Buys Ltd v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 646 F. Supp. 36 (ED. Mich. 1986). MCI's reliance is misplaced. Both cases addressed motions for summary judgment, not motions for judgment on the pleadings. Applying the Rule 56 summary judgment standard, these courts held that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of showing the existence of a genuine issue regarding willful misconduct. See Corporate Investigative Div., 884 F. Supp. at 224; Stand Buys, 64 F. Supp at 39.
In the present case, however, the court must apply Rule 12(c) jurisprudence. "After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Rule 12(c). When ruling on such a motion, the court must regard allegations of fact in the complaint as true. Cash v. Commissioner, 580 F.2d 152, 154 (5th Cir. 1978). The court may enter judgment on the pleadings only if the material facts show that the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Greenberg v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 478 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1973). This standard is roughly equivalent to that applied on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1367 (1990); see also St. Paul Ins. Co. of Bellaire, Tex. v. AFIA Worldwide Ins. Co., 937 F.2d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1991). A Rule 12(c) motion is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts. Hebert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Props., Ltd, 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citing 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ARTHURR. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1367 (1990)). When considering such a motion, the court is required to assume that the allegations of fact presented by the opposing party are true, and to view the facts presented in the pleadings, and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Smith v. McMullen, 589 F. Supp. 642, 644 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
Having applied the Rule 12(c) standards to the allegations of Staton's amended complaint, the court is unable to say that MCI is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the pleadings of willful misconduct alone. The court therefore denies MCI's motion as to that claim.
* * *
MCI's motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted in part and denied in part.
SO ORDERED.