Opinion
No. 1 CA-CR 19-0510
02-18-2021
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. ERIK WOODHOUSE, Appellant.
COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Michelle L. Hogan Counsel for Appellee Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix By Aaron J. Moskowitz Counsel for Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2018-154287-001
The Honorable Monica S. Garfinkel, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Michelle L. Hogan
Counsel for Appellee
Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix
By Aaron J. Moskowitz
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge David B. Gass and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.
WEINZWEIG, Judge:
¶1 Erik Woodhouse appeals his convictions and sentences. Because the record shows no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the jury's verdicts. State v. Paredes-Solano, 223 Ariz. 284, 286, ¶ 2 (App. 2009). Police officers arrested Woodhouse in November 2018 after watching him hit and attempt to kidnap his girlfriend. Officers searched Woodhouse incident to the arrest and found marijuana in his pocket. The State charged Woodhouse with unlawful imprisonment, possession of marijuana and assault.
¶3 Trial was set for April 2019, but jury selection did not begin until July 2019. At a recess in jury selection, an attorney on break from a different trial overheard two potential jurors talking outside the courtroom. The attorney shared his observations on the record:
Yes, Judge. I am on break on my own jury trial, and I was sitting alone when you guys all broke. About 10 feet away, I could overhear some jurors talking. One of the females was talking about [sic] she enjoys the process and respects it, and then another female juror [later identified as Juror 54] said, "Not me. I could tell right away he's guilty as sin. I can tell right from when they read the charges that he's guilty as can be." So I thought it was important to bring that to the Court's attention.
¶4 The trial judge interviewed and excused Juror 54, who conceded she was "more apt to think" a defendant was guilty because "if they're here, they're guilty." Earlier in the day, the judge dismissed Juror 33 after she raised similar sentiments. The judge also questioned the whole jury pool, confirming the remaining potential jurors could remain impartial, follow the law and render a verdict on the evidence presented at
trial. The judge confirmed no potential jurors "believe[d] that the defendant is guilty simply because he's been charged with a crime," emphasizing that Woodhouse was innocent at that moment because no evidence had been introduced. Defense counsel unsuccessfully moved for a new jury pool.
¶5 After trial, the jury found Woodhouse not guilty of assault, but guilty of unlawful imprisonment and possession of marijuana. Woodhouse timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, -4033(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶6 Woodhouse raises two arguments on appeal.
¶7 First, he argues the superior court erroneously denied his motion for a new jury pool. We review the court's decision for a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion and will affirm unless the "record affirmatively shows that such a fair and impartial jury was not secured." State v. Arnett, 119 Ariz. 38, 50 (1978); accord State v. Duke, 110 Ariz. 320, 323 (1974). Woodhouse must show objective indicia of prejudice in the selected jury panel. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988) ("Any claim that the jury was not impartial, therefore, must focus not on [a dismissed juror], but on the jurors who ultimately sat.").
¶8 The record here shows no abuse of discretion or objective indicia of prejudice. Juror 54 was dismissed. The court and defense counsel also questioned the remaining potential jurors to confirm they could be impartial and render an evidence-based verdict. And the jury demonstrated its understanding and acted based on that understanding when it acquitted Woodhouse on the assault charge. Woodhouse offers only speculation and guesswork to show prejudice, which is not sufficient. And reasonable evidence supports the court's decision. State v. Doolittle, 155 Ariz. 352, 356 (App. 1987) ("A reviewing court will not substitute its discretion for that of the trial court if there is any reasonable evidence to sustain the ruling below.").
¶9 Second, Woodhouse argues the superior court violated his due process rights by denying him a new jury pool, which "diminish[ed] the appearance of justice." Woodhouse did not raise this argument in the superior court. We thus review for fundamental error but find none. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 19 (2005). In the spirit of fairness and justice, the superior court dismissed Juror 54 and questioned the other potential jurors about impartiality and the presumption of innocence.
CONCLUSION
¶10 We affirm.