Opinion
No. 1-956 / 01-0386.
Filed February 20, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, LEONARD D. LYBBERT, Judge.
Defendant appeals the judgment and sentence entered upon his guilty plea to two counts of third-degree sexual abuse. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Robert Ranschau, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Joel Dalrymple, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and EISENHAUER, JJ.
James Woelfel appeals the judgment and sentence entered following his guilty plea to two counts of third-degree sexual abuse, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.4(2)(c)(4) (1999). Woelfel claims the district court erred in overruling his motion in arrest of judgment. He also claims his counsel was ineffective.
Scope of Review . We review a ruling on a motion in arrest of judgment for an abuse of discretion. State v Speed, 573 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Iowa 1998). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed de novo considering the totality of the circumstances. State v. Risdal, 404 N.W.2d 130, 131 (Iowa 1987).
Motion in Arrest of Judgment . Woelfel claims his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily and therefore the trial court should have granted his motion in arrest of judgment. In support of his claim, Woelfel presented testimony by Charles Smith, a clinical psychologist who counseled Woelfel from 1971 to 1985. While conceding Woelfel was much more articulate and in control since his school days, Smith stated Woelfel suffered from a learning disability which made it difficult for him to integrate and interpret reality in stressful situations. Woelfel asserted his disorder rendered his plea invalid, as he agreed to the plea offer on the morning of the scheduled trial only to escape the immediate pressures of having to go forward with the trial. Smith concluded that Woelfel probably knew what he was pleading to, but did not understand the consequences of his plea.
We agree with the district court that the record does not bear out Woelfel's assertions. To the contrary, the record demonstrates the plea proceeding was conducted according to the guideline set forth in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure. 8(2)(b) and Woelfel's subsequent reflection on his plea failed to undermine its validity. Speed, 573 N.W.2d at 597.
As the trial court stated in its ruling:
[T]here is no authority for the proposition that a plea of guilty must be set aside if the defendant experiences some sort of emotional stress because of the imminent start of a trial. Indeed, it would probably be unusual if a defendant did not experience an emotional condition in that situation. Further, the court would ordinarily have no way of knowing or determining the emotional state of a pleading defendant facing immediate trial.
We agree with the trial court and affirm.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel . Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be raised at the first possible opportunity. See Osborn v. State, 573 N.W.2d 917, 923 (Iowa 1998) ("If error is first spotted at the appellate level it is still important that it be raised at the earliest opportunity."). Following the entry of the guilty plea, and prior to sentencing, new counsel was appointed to represent Woelfel to pursue his motion in arrest of judgment. New counsel did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the motion in arrest of judgment, although Woelfel expressed during the hearing his dissatisfaction in several regards with his earlier counsel. The trial court did not rule on those alleged deficiencies. Woelfel now asserts that should we find a failure to preserve error, such failure amounts to ineffective assistance of his counsel representing him in the post trial hearing.
In order to succeed on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective, Woelfel must show that but for the claimed errors of counsel in allowing him to plead guilty, Woelfel would have insisted on going to trial and there is a reasonable probability that he would have been acquitted. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203, 210 (1985). Both Woelfel and trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion in arrest of judgment. We have reviewed the transcript and find no indication counsel breached an essential duty such that prejudice to Woelfel resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 699 (1984).
AFFIRMED.