Opinion
No. CV 09-6005856-S
October 20, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE
On December 1, 2009, the plaintiff, the State of Connecticut, acting through the Commissioner of Administrative Services, filed this three-count complaint against the defendants, Christopher Withington ("Withington") and Dawn Cowan ("the defendants") in which the plaintiff alleges the following facts. At some point prior to the litigation, the state provided public assistance to Withington through the aid to families with dependent children program, in the amount of $51,980.95 as well as $49,638.58 in assistance and services through the Department of Children and Families. On June 20, 2005, Withington's father passed away, leaving Withington as the sole beneficiary of the decedent's estate. On August 7, 2006, Withington filed a final account under oath in the West Haven Probate Court, which stated the inheritance amount was $197,077.88. The State claims that 50% of this inheritance is due to the State under General Statutes § 17b-94(b), which provides that the State has a statutory lien on Withington's inheritance, "for 50% of the assets of the estate payable . . ."
I
In counts one and two, respectively, the State alleges claims against Withington and Cowan for conversion and unjust enrichment because 50% of the inheritance, or $98,538.94, was the legal property of the plaintiff and defendants wrongly transferred or converted the funds to their own use. Count three alleges a claim against Withington for breach of fiduciary duty because he violated this duty as executor of the estate by converting the inheritance funds without paying the statutory lien amount.
On March 17, 2010, Cowan filed an answer, in which she denied owing the State any money, and asserted three special defenses and on May 11, 2010, the third special defense was revised stating that the State failed to comply with General Statutes § 45a-355 by failing to present the claim before "the deadline," and thus the lien was never perfected pursuant to § 17b-94(b).
On June 15, 2010, Withington filed an amended answer and special defenses, in which he admits that he received state public assistance in the amount of $3,726.22, and owes only that amount to the state. The first special defense alleges that the State's claim was untimely under § 17b-94(a) and § 45a-355. The second special defense alleges that, under § 17b-94(b), the state cannot recover funds paid to a parent of a beneficiary, because subsection (b) only allows the state to recover benefits paid directly to beneficiaries, and does not provide that parents are responsible for state aid given to their children. The last page of the answer and special defenses states some legal conclusions but essentially asserts that the State's claims were filed late.
On July 13, 2010, the State filed this amended motion to strike (1) the three special defenses and prayer for relief in Withington's amended answer on the grounds that they are legally insufficient and (2) Cowan's revised third special defense on the ground that it is legally insufficient.
II
With respect to Withington's first and third special defenses, plaintiff argues that General Statutes § 17b-94(a) does not apply to the State's lien on Withington's inheritance because subsection (a) only applies to judgments or settlements received by beneficiaries from causes of actions, not a beneficiary's inheritance. Since subsection (a) is not applicable to this case, the State argues it is not constrained by the time requirements provided in subsection (a), and therefore defendants' reliance on subsection (a) is legally insufficient. The State argues that § 45a-355 is equally inapplicable and legally insufficient because that statute only applies to claims against the estate itself, not to claims against a beneficiary in receipt of an inheritance, and the plaintiff's claim in the present case is against Withington's assets from the inheritance, not the decedent's estate, and therefore the reliance on § 45a-355 is legally insufficient.
It is concluded that the plain wording of the statute supports the State's argument.
CT Page 20136
III
The State argues that the court should strike Withington's second special defense under the basic principles of statutory construction, because § 17b-94(b) clearly applies to parents of beneficiaries, rendering Withington responsible for state aid received by his children. The State asserts that when reading §§ 17b-93 and 17b-94, it is clear that the legislature intended for § 17b-94(b) to apply to both direct beneficiaries and parents of beneficiaries because § 17b-93 specifically states that parents of beneficiaries are liable to repay that aid, subject to the provisions in § 17b-94, and it is immaterial that the language in subsection (b) does not mirror the language in subsection (a). Withington's claims otherwise are not valid because when reading the state aid reimbursement statutes together, the legislature's intent was clear to allow the state to recover funds it has paid for public assistance.IV
With respect to her third special defense Cowan argues that the State has not complied with the time requirements in § 45a-355 and thus has not perfected its lien under § 17b-94(b) because it failed to file proof of its claim in a timely manner, mirroring the similar argument advanced by Withington. She further argues that § 45a-355 applies because it "affords protection to any creditor or beneficiary who received money."
Withington's amended first special defense and Cowan's revised third special defense allege that the State is barred from recovering the lien because it failed to give timely notice under § 45a-355. This argument is legally insufficient because § 45a-355 does not apply to statutory liens against beneficiaries; it applies to claims made on an estate. See Vandale v. State, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 09-5010398. Further, § 17b-94(a) does not apply to this case because the State's claim is not a claim against the decedent's estate.
V
Withington's amended second special defense disputes that the State may assert a lien on him based on benefits received by his children and asserts that § 17b-94(b) does not apply to parents of children who receive state benefits. Withington asserts that (1) he paid all child support ordered by the court, (2) his minor children received state benefits, (3) the state benefits were paid directly to the mothers of the children and not to him, (4) the complaint fails to distinguish between the benefits he received and the benefits received by his children, and (5) the language of the statute, § 17b-94(b), does not allow for a lien against a parent of a beneficiary. This special defense apprises the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried and the allegations, if proved, would support a defense to the State's cause of action, and this appears to be legally sufficient.
VI
The State also argues that the court should strike Withington's prayer for relief because "no cause of action was set forth or alleged in the amended answer and special defense upon which a prayer for relief could be based." Withington does not address this argument in his objection to the motion to strike or memorandum.
Practice Book § 10-39 authorizes a claim for relief to be stricken "only if the relief sought could not be legally awarded." Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 325, 709, A.2d 1089 (1998). Furthermore, in order to have a prayer for relief, there must be a complaint. See Scozzafava v. American States Insurance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. 324367 (January 8, 1997, Moraghan, J.) [ 18 Conn. L. Rptr. 495] ("The motion to strike a prayer for relief should be granted if the prayer for relief does not correspond to allegations of the complaint").
There is no counterclaim and there cannot be a prayer for relief by defendant.
Motion to strike first and third special defenses and prayer for relief filed by Withington is granted.
Motion to strike second special defense filed by Withington is denied.
Motion to strike third special defense filed by Cowan is granted.