Opinion
2016 KA 0912
02-22-2017
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CORNELIUS WILSON
Hillar C. Moore, III District Attorney Cristopher J.M. Casler Assistant District Attorney Baton Rouge, LA Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee State of Louisiana Lieu T. Vo Clark Louisiana Appellate Project Mandeville, LA Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Cornelius Wilson
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION On Appeal from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana
No. 10-12-0480 Sec. I The Honorable Anthony J. Marabella, Jr., Judge Presiding Hillar C. Moore, III
District Attorney
Cristopher J.M. Casler
Assistant District Attorney
Baton Rouge, LA Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
State of Louisiana Lieu T. Vo Clark
Louisiana Appellate Project
Mandeville, LA Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Cornelius Wilson BEFORE: WELCH, CRAIN, AND HOLDRIDGE, JJ. HOLDRIDGE, J.
The defendant, Cornelius Wilson, was charged by bill of information with possession with intent to distribute oxycodone, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A) (count 1); possession with intent to distribute cocaine, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A) (count 2); possession with intent to distribute alprazolam, a violation of La. R.S. 40:969(A) (count 3). He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged on counts 1 and 2; on count 3, he was found guilty of the responsive offense of possession of alprazolam. See La. R.S. 40:969(A). The State subsequently filed a multiple offender bill, and the defendant was adjudicated a fourth-felony habitual offender. The trial court sentenced the defendant on each count to sixty years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The defendant now appeals, designating three counseled assignments of error and one pro se assignment of error. We affirm the convictions, habitual offender adjudications, and sentences.
The defendant had prior convictions for felony theft, forgery, and aggravated battery. --------
FACTS
At about 1:00 a.m. on August 24, 2012, Lieutenant Harold Williams, with the Baton Rouge Police Department, made contact with a confidential informant (CI) on Mayfair Drive in Baton Rouge. The CI informed him that he could purchase cocaine from "Bald Head Red" (later identified as the defendant). While monitored by Lieutenant Williams, the CI called the defendant and agreed to buy a half an ounce of cocaine for $750. They agreed to meet in the parking lot of the Microtel Hotel on Harding Boulevard. Lieutenant Williams contacted several members of the Narcotics Division and had them set up around the parking lot in unmarked units. At about 2:15 a.m., the defendant pulled into the hotel parking lot in a grey Jeep Grand Cherokee, as described by the CI. The defendant pulled up near a black Nissan Maxima. The CI had told the defendant he would be in the Maxima; instead, an undercover police officer was in the Maxima.
Ferrin Barton was with the defendant in the Jeep. The defendant handed Barton a clear plastic bag of crack cocaine and made her get out of the vehicle to make the exchange. Before any exchange took place, the defendant and Barton were apprehended by several police officers. Barton tried to hide the bag of cocaine in her pants; but when Sergeant Jeffrey Pittman, with the Baton Rouge Police Department, told her he saw what she did with the drugs, she turned over the cocaine to him.
Detective Richard McCloskey, with the Baton Rouge Police Department, approached the Cherokee to search it. The detective found two bags of pills in the driver's-side door. One bag contained eight alprazolam pills and the other bag contained twenty-eight oxycodone pills. The amount of crack cocaine seized was about 11.6 grams.
The defendant did not testify at trial.
COUNSELED ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
In his first counseled assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying the motions to suppress evidence. Specifically, since the trial court denied both the pro se and counseled motions to suppress evidence without a hearing, the defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in that it violated La. Code Crim. P. art. 703, which requires a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence.
On September 16, 2014, the defendant filed a pro se motion to suppress evidence, having used what appears to be a standardized form with blank lines to be filled in. The defendant filled in the blanks, indicating that evidence was seized at Microtel Inn in a rental vehicle. Oddly, the defendant did not indicate that drugs were seized, but instead provided a list (in his own handwriting) of items allegedly taken from the vehicle, or the hotel room, or his person; it is unclear which of these places in particular the defendant is referring to. In any event, he listed a Canon camera with lenses and accessories, a "Gold Diamond" pyramid emblem and chain, batteries, and currency. Following these insertions by the defendant is a boilerplate litany of Fourth Amendment violations that are vague and general and most having no specific connection to this case. For example, several paragraphs address a defective warrant, how the search warrant was illegally and unlawfully executed, how the magistrate had insufficient information to issue the warrant, or how the magistrate "failed to endorse the hour, date, and name of the officer to whom the warrant was delivered to for execution." The search (assuming there was a search) in the instant matter was warrantless.
On February 12, 2015, defense counsel, Bernard J. Blair, II, filed a motion to suppress evidence. The motion, in full, provided the following:
NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel or [sic] record, comes the defendant, CORNELIUS L. WILSON who protests that he has had his Constitutional Rights violated as are guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States of American [sic] and the Constitution of the State of Louisiana, in that the evidence sought to be used against him has been unlawfully and illegally obtained, and that the defendant moves that this evidence be suppressed in any criminal proceedings against the defendant for the following reasons, to-wit:
1. That the evidence to be used against the defendant whether physical or any form of statement or confession was not seized or obtained incidental to a valid arrest and,
2. That the evidence to be used against the defendant was seized or obtained without probable cause.
WHEREFORE, the defendant prays that this evidence sought to be used by the State of Louisiana in this matter or any other related matter be ordered, suppressed in its entirety by this Honorable Court and that the State, through its authorized representative, be prohibited from introducing same or making reference thereto during the trial of this case.
At this time (in February of 2015), Randy Trelles was attorney of record for the defendant. Blair had not enrolled as counsel at this point, but was nevertheless helping out Trelles and acting as the defendant's attorney, as evidenced by his (Blair's) filing of the motion to suppress evidence. See State v. Jones, 41,449 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/20/06) 940 So.2d 61, 74. Trelles did not file any motions to suppress.
At a pretrial hearing on February 20, 2015, Judge Anthony J. Marabella went through a list of outstanding motions and motions he had already denied to ensure that all outstanding motions had been resolved. Specifically, Judge Marabella stated, "Motion to suppress, a generic motion to suppress which alleged no facts whatsoever. That was denied." The judge addressed several other motions, then stated, "Motion to suppress. Motion to suppress evidence, which was generic. I am denying as well because it is just a generic motion."
At a pretrial status conference on March 11, 2015, Trelles withdrew as the attorney of record, and Blair took over the case, becoming sole counsel for the defendant. Judge Marabella moved the trial date to May 26, 2015, and told Blair that there would be a motions date (status conference) on March 19, 2015 to address any outstanding motions. The prosecutor, Dana Cummings, confirmed with Blair that he would inform her (Cummings) if he filed a motion that required witnesses, so that Cummings could be prepared for the hearing.
At a pretrial status conference on March 19, 2015, Blair was not present in court. The following exchange took place between Judge Marabella and Cummings:
Ms. Cummings: Bernard Blair enrolled. You told -- you gave Mr. Blair until today to file new motions if he wanted to file any, and you told him he didn't have to show if he did not file motions.
The Court: Have we heard from him at all?
Ms. Cummings: I have not.
The Court: I haven't seen any motions. Have you seen any?
Ms. Cummings: No. And I went online yesterday afternoon, and I didn't see that any new motions were filed.
The Court: All right. Let the record reflect that it is about eleven o'clock. We have not heard from Mr. Blair, nor is Mr. Blair present in court. I assume from my conversation and my record conversation with him the last time that he is satisfied with discovery. There are no other motions that he thought to be filed, and will be ready to proceed with pretrial and trial on the next dates.
Ms. Cummings: Yes, Sir.
The defendant was then brought before Judge Marabella, wherein the following exchange took place:
The Court: The only thing that is on the docket today is docket number 10-12-0480, which charges you with possession with intent to distribute oxycodone, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute alprazolam.
The Defendant: Yes, Sir.
The Court: Mr. Trelles is no longer your lawyer in that case. You hired Mr. Blair who came in who I suggested today's date to give him an opportunity to review all of the motions that were filed, and for him either to file motions, show up today and let me know if he wanted to file any more motions. No one has heard from him today. I have not received a phone call. He is not here. So I assume he is satisfied and he is ready to move forward on this case. Now, do you have anything else to add to that about the case that is set for trial?
The Defendant: No, sir.
About three weeks later on April 7, 2015, at a pretrial conference, the following relevant exchange took place:
Mr. Blair: I received the discovery from the State. I met with Mr. Trelles and I got a box full of stuff. I'm going through that now. I believe discovery has been satisfied. We have a March -- I mean -- May 26 trial date so, unless there's something else in my case, I'm ready to go.
The Court: Mr. Blair, Mr. Wilson files motions every day.
Mr. Blair: He had --
The Court: I have three more motions that he filed. Two of which have already been denied. If you'd like to talk to him for a second, you're welcome to; but I'm -- I'm ready to move on those motions today.
Mr. Blair: Are they in this case or his other cases?
The Court: This case -- uh - it's hard to know.
Mr. Blair: Okay.
The Court: He writes letters. He calls them motions, but I've looked at every one of them. He keeps filing motions saying we've never had hearings. We've had hearings on all of them. I frankly don't know
what to do about it except I'm going to continue to deny the motions because we're moving forward to -- to hearing. Are there any outstanding motions? Mr. Blair, I want you to [] speak to Mr. Wilson; and I want you to tell me today if there are any outstanding motions as they relate to docket 10-12-0480. That's the only one that you've enrolled on, as I understand it.
Mr. Blair: That's correct, Your Honor.
The Court: And, if there are any, I want to resolve them today. . . . He has additionally filed a motion to suppress alleging no facts whatsoever. I'm denying that based on Article 703. . . . He's filed something with the First Circuit. I'm willing to hear all of those things; but I, also, need them done in an orderly fashion so I can know exactly what they were to get rid of them. Every time he leaves, I get new motions and new filings that come through my office[.] . . . I believe I've ruled on every one of his motions; but, if I have not, let me know; and we'll have a hearing; and we'll rule on them.
It is not clear what motion to suppress is being referenced in the above-discourse of Judge Marabella regarding the continuous and repeated pro se filings of motions by the defendant. Since Judge Marabella, however, noted that it was a pro se motion filed by the defendant, and the only pro se motion to suppress filed by the defendant in the record before us was the motion filed on September 16, 2014, we assume the defendant filed his same pro se motion to suppress again. In any event, Blair did not object to the denial of any of the motions ruled on by Judge Marabella. Further, shortly after the above-mentioned colloquy, the following exchange took place:
The Court: I'd rather put everything on the record with Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Blair: I spoke to Mr. Wilson. He says he believes most of his motions were old motions, but we can't -- I can't determine whether or not they're all related to this case. I'm pretty sure that they don't. I'm going to go through those -- all of the materials that I have from Mr. Trelles and I'm pretty sure that everything is taken care of. I got -- I got a bunch stuff. If there's anything I don't have, I'm going to contact Ms. Cummings and I'll give you a phone call and be right back up, but I'm pretty sure we're straight. . . .
* * * * *
The Court: Mr. Wilson, you are satisfied today with all your motions?
Mr. Wilson: Yes, Sir.
The Court: I'm sorry?
Mr. Wilson: Yes, Sir.
On May 28, 2015, the third day of trial, after selection of the jury but prior to opening statements, Blair informed Judge Marabella that he had gone through the record again, out of an abundance of caution, and noted a court transcript wherein the judge had "denied a general suppression motion that wasn't specific to anything." Blair noted that he, himself, had filed "suppression motions" and, as such, he wanted to re-urge his motion to suppress. Blair explained that he just wanted to get that on the record, then informed the judge that "after we put on the entire trial I may reurge my motion to suppress." Judge Marabella responded that he would "certainly allow you to urge your motion to suppress during the course of the trial, and at the end of the trial if -- if you have grounds to have suppressed the evidence I will grant it."
On this same day of trial (May 28), during the prosecution's case-in-chief, Blair objected to the introduction into evidence of the oxycodone and alprazolam, and informed Judge Marabella, "We still have our general suppression motion going on and objection to any evidence that may be seized." At a sidebar conference, the following exchange then took place:
The Court: I have gone back and I have looked at all of the motions, and the only motion to suppress that was filed was denied because it wasn't specific. Now we are in the middle of a trial, you didn't talk about a motion to suppress until after the jury had been selected.
Mr. Blair: But I --
The Court: I have already denied your motion to suppress.
Mr. Blair: The motion that -- it was never heard.
The Court: It was denied because it was not specific.
Mr. Blair: And, like I said, and I don't -- I mean -- I don't recall that -- I don't recall whether or not, you know, it was my motion, because we were talking about so many motions at that time. I don't ever recall that you said, now Mr. Blair, your motion is denied. You can't show to me where that says, Mr. Blair, your -- your non specific motion was denied.
Ms. Cummings: I mean, it is --
Mr. Blair: You see -- I am sorry, go ahead.
Ms. Cummings: Go ahead if you are not finished.
Mr. Blair: There is a whole -- I mean, we are talking about a whole bunch of different motions that were filed.
The Court: You never filed a specific motion to suppress any specific things. You filed a general motion to suppress that was denied based upon the fact that it does not -- not allow a[n] evidentiary hearing, because it didn't have specific facts to have one. There was never a specific motion to suppress filed. The only -- the first time I've heard about a motion to suppress evidence is after this jury is sworn.
Mr. Blair: The only thing I recall, Your Honor, is that -- is that your client has filed a bunch of different motions and a bunch of different attorneys and stuff and --
The Court: We had three different status conferences to determine what motions, if any, we needed to resolve. And everybody said and every time you came, Judge, we are done, we are ready. We are done. We are ready. And then after we swear in a jury you talk about a motion to suppress.
Mr. Blair: And I also said I am reurging my motion to suppress.
The Court: I'm going to deny it, and we can move forward, but you can note your record for the objection.
Despite this midtrial denial of a motion to suppress, and perhaps because of his earlier assurance to Blair that he would consider the grounds for a motion to suppress at the end of the trial. Judge Marabella took up the issue of the motion to suppress evidence at the end of Blair's case-in-chief. Judge Marabella stated in pertinent part:
I would like to put a few things on the record. I want to go back to the motion to suppress that initially was brought up on this morning. I have -- in reviewing everything looking at the totality of the circumstances this Court is convinced had a motion to suppress been filed properly and ruled upon this Court would have denied a motion to suppress any evidence that was seized as a result of the arrest. The police officers had information that they were going to a drug buy. They had information that the person was out making the drug deal and they found this person with drugs on them. I think that the exception is very clear that they believed that there were drugs in that car so they had every right to search that[.]
* * * * *
So I want to make the record very clear that had I had a motion to suppress the evidence in this case that is how I would have ruled.
We note initially that this issue is not properly before us. The motions to suppress evidence (one counseled and one pro se) were denied on February 20, 2015 because they were generic and failed to allege facts. Blair was present at this pretrial hearing. Louisiana Code of Criminal article 703(E)(1) provides in pertinent part that an "evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress shall be held only when the defendant alleges facts that would require the granting of relief." Trial courts are vested with great discretion when ruling on a motion to suppress. Consequently, the ruling of a trial judge on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Long, 2003-2592 (La. 9/9/04), 884 So.2d 1176, 1179, cert. denied, 544 U.S. 977, 125 S.Ct. 1860, 161 L.Ed.2d 728 (2005). We do not find Judge Marabella abused his discretion in denying the defendant an evidentiary hearing based on the motions to suppress evidence as having failed to comply with La. Code Crim. P. art. 703(E)(1). We agree that these motions contained boilerplate language unconnected to the actual case and did not allege any facts in support of the relief sought. Vague and general legal conclusions, urged in form motions, are inadequate to require the holding of such a hearing. State v. Thomas, 467 So.2d 883 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1985).
About three weeks later on March 11, 2015, when Blair became attorney of record for the defendant, he was granted extra time by Judge Marabella, as well as a continued trial date, to review the record he had inherited from prior defense counsel Trelles. Blair was given until March 19, 2015 (the next motions date), to file any motion he chose to. Blair not only did not file any new motions, he did not even attend this March 19 pretrial status conference. Subsequently, at a pretrial conference on April 7, 2015, Blair was again informed by Judge Marabella that the defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing for his pro se motion to suppress evidence because, under La. Code Crim. P. art. 703, the motion alleged no facts. Blair made no objection to this ruling. In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must state an objection contemporaneously with the occurrence of the alleged error, as well as the grounds for the objection. La. Code Crim. P. art. 841. It is well-established that a defendant is limited to the grounds for objection articulated at trial and a new basis for an objection may not be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Cooks, 97-0999 (La. 9/9/98), 720 So.2d 637, 644, cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1042, 119 S.Ct. 1342, 143 L.Ed.2d 505 (1999).
More importantly, the trial did not begin until May 26, 2015. Thus, from the April 7 denial of the motion to suppress until trial, Blair had seven weeks to cure any defects in the motions to suppress by supplementing them or by filing a new, proper motion. When we consider the February 20, 2015 date as the first time Blair was informed that the motions to suppress were defective, Blair had over three months to remedy the situation by filing a new motion to suppress. Blair, however, never filed any new or supplemental motions. We point out that Cummings, the prosecutor, correctly noted this when Blair, on the third day of trial, re-urged his motion to suppress:
Ms. Cummings: Your Honor, if we could just clarify motions that he filed were generic motions, that Mr. Blair filed were generic motions.
The Court: Okay.
Ms. Cummings: You found that he did not allege sufficient -- make it sufficient allegations you denied them.
The Court: Okay.
Ms. Cummings: So, you know, and at that point he was given more time to file motions and never filed any supplemental motions to suppress.
Despite this issue, therefore, not being properly before us, we nevertheless address the merits of the defendant's argument in brief since Judge Marabella concluded at the end of the trial that, had a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence been conducted, he would have denied the motion. The defendant argues that under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1723, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), the search of the vehicle was illegal. According to the defendant, while it is unclear what justification the police had to search the vehicle, both he and Barton were "out of the vehicle, in custody and being taken down to the narcotics office prior to the conducting of the warrantless search." The defendant suggests that after the police seized the cocaine from Barton's person, there "could be no reasonable belief that there was evidence of the crime in the vehicle when the police already had the evidence in their possession."
In Gant, 556 U.S. at 351, 129 S.Ct. at 1723, the Supreme Court held that the police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Despite the defendant's assertion, it is not clear where he and Barton were located when Detective McCloskey looked inside the vehicle. It is true that at some point the defendant and Barton were "taken down" to the police station. But Detective McCloskey testified at trial about what he observed just before searching the vehicle:
They were taking the vehicle down as I moved in. As I exited my vehicle every -- he was in custody, and the female was in custody. I mean, they were talking to them. They were both arrested for the cocaine and search incident to arrest Sergeant Williams or Lieutenant Williams now had me -- I began to search the vehicle.
Beyond this description, there is little else in the trial record regarding where the defendant and Barton were physically positioned at the time Detective McCloskey looked inside the vehicle. Nevertheless, even if the two subjects were not within reaching distance of the vehicle's passenger compartment at the moment the pills inside the vehicle were found, Detective McCloskey could have searched the vehicle for drugs based on a reasonable belief that the vehicle contained evidence of the offense of arrest. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 351, 129 S.Ct. at 1723. Having found cocaine on the person of Barton clearly did not preclude the reasonable assumption that more cocaine might be found in the vehicle. Detective Drew White, with the Baton Rouge Police Department, was told by the CI that he had gotten cocaine from the defendant in the past and that he would be able to get some again in the instant matter, specifically a half an ounce of cocaine for $750. (R. pp. 901-02). With this limited information, and a drug deal set to take place about 2:00 in the morning only a short time after the CI called the defendant, there would have been no way of knowing how much cocaine the defendant was carrying in the vehicle. A reasonable belief would have been to conclude the defendant was a drug dealer and that perhaps this 2:00 a.m. stop by the defendant was not his first or his last stop.
Moreover, the validity of the search incident to arrest notwithstanding, the testimony in this case strongly suggests the pills in this case were in plain view when Detective McCloskey approached the vehicle. According to Detective McCloskey, when he arrived at the scene, he was told to search the empty vehicle. He testified that as he approached the driver's side door of the vehicle, which he believed was open, he "saw the narcotics immediately" inside the door. The detective seized the pills.
Under the "plain view" doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object that has an incriminating nature which is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2307-08, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). A seizure is reasonable under the "plain view" doctrine if the officer has probable cause to believe the item seized was associated with criminal activity. State v. Bush, 2012-0720 (La. 6/1/12), 90 So.3d 395, 396 (per curiam). The pills seized by Detective McCloskey were not in a pill bottle, but were in a Ziploc bag. Accordingly, with the defendant having just been apprehended for driving with cocaine in his vehicle to an agreed-upon destination to sell to someone, Detective McCloskey had probable cause to believe that pills in a Ziploc bag inside that same vehicle were associated with criminal activity.
Based on all of the foregoing, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress evidence. Accordingly, this counseled assignment of error is without merit.
COUNSELED ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 2 and 3
In these related counseled assignments of error, the defendant argues, respectively, the trial court erred in denying the motion to reconsider sentence; and that his sixty-year sentence as a habitual offender is unconstitutionally excessive.
The defendant was sentenced on October 27, 2015. There was no oral motion made to reconsider the sentence. The defendant filed a pro se motion to reconsider sentence on February 24, 2016. On June 27, 2016, the trial court denied this pro se motion as untimely. The trial court specifically stated in its order that "because it has been more than thirty days since sentencing, the Court is without authority to reconsider sentence."
The defendant filed a writ of mandamus, seeking to compel the district court to act on his pro se motion to reconsider sentence on November 21, 2015. The defendant points out this issue in footnote one of his brief. This court denied the writ of mandamus, noting that the Clerk of Court of East Baton Rouge Parish had no record of receiving the defendant's pro se motion to reconsider sentence. See State v. Wilson, 2015-1922 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1/25/16) (unpublished writ action). (R. p. 230). When the defendant again filed a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to act on his pro se motion to reconsider sentence, this court determined that the only pro se motion to reconsider sentence was filed on February 26, 2016, and that the trial court had denied the motion on June 27, 2016. This court, thus, denied the writ of mandamus as moot. See State v. Wilson, 2016-0700 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/29/16) (unpublished writ action).
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 881.1(A)(1) requires a defendant or the State to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence within thirty days of sentencing unless the trial court sets a longer period of time at the time of sentencing. At the sentencing hearing on October 27, 2015, the trial court sentenced the defendant to three sixty-year concurrent sentences as a habitual offender and then informed the defendant he had thirty days "from today's date to file a motion to reconsider this sentence." There was no extension of time granted to file the motion to reconsider sentence. The defendant did not file his pro se motion until almost four months after being sentenced, and there are no other motions to reconsider sentence (counseled or pro se) in the record before us. Since the defendant failed to comply with La. Code Crim. P. art. 881.1, he is precluded from raising on appeal any claim of excessiveness of sentence(s). See La. Code Crim. P. art. 881.1(E). See State v. Duncan, 94-1563 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/15/95), 667 So.2d 1141, 1143 (en banc per curiam).
These counseled assignments of error are without merit.
PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In this pro se assignment of error, there is no clear indication by the defendant of what issue or issues he intends to raise and address. With little cohesion, there is a disjointed, confusion throughout the pro se brief. For example, the defendant states: "The theory behind the state's case circumvents even the most atrocious act of 'informative information.' When relied on, can cripple volumes of information implicit or explicit, or conveys any information to the government."
The defendant appears to have entitled the heading to his argument as "Denial of his Sixth Amendment right." He then cites Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and notes that a defendant has a right to confront those who bear testimony against him. Following this, the defendant states, "Right to face accuser, Police committing perjury (CI no danger), in consisting statements." It appears, thus, the defendant may be suggesting that his not having the opportunity to cross-examine the confidential informant, who did not testify at trial, violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. Accordingly, we will address this issue.
At trial, during the State's entire case-in-chief, defense counsel made no Crawford or hearsay objections regarding the identity of the confidential informant or what the informant told the detectives. Particularly, there were no Crawford or hearsay objections by defense counsel during the direct examination of Lieutenant Williams and Detective Drew White, with the Baton Rouge Police Department, both of whom testified about what the confidential informant had told them about the defendant and how he would be able to get drugs from the defendant.
No contemporaneous objection was made at trial regarding a confrontation issue. An irregularity or error cannot be complained of after the verdict unless it was objected to at the time of the occurrence. Accordingly, this argument was not properly preserved for appellate review. State ex rel. L.W., 2009-1898 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/11/10), 40 So.3d 1220, 1227, writ denied, 2010-1642 (La. 9/3/10), 44 So.3d 708. See La. Code Evid. art. 103(A)(1); La. Code Crim. P. art. 841(A).
This pro se assignment of error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, for all of the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the defendant's convictions, habitual offender adjudications, and sentences.
CONVICTIONS, HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATIONS, AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.