Opinion
2012 KA 1534
03-22-2013
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. TYRONE QUINCY WILSON
Joseph L Waitz, Jr. District Attorney Ellen Daigle Doskey Dennis Elfert Assistant District Attorney Houma, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana Gwendolyn K. Brown Louisiana Appellate Project Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Tyrone Quincy Wilson
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the Thirty-Second Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Terrebonne
State of Louisiana
No. 602,650
Honorable John R. Walker, Judge Presiding
Joseph L Waitz, Jr.
District Attorney
Ellen Daigle Doskey
Dennis Elfert
Assistant District Attorney
Houma, Louisiana
Counsel for Appellee
State of Louisiana
Gwendolyn K. Brown
Louisiana Appellate Project
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Tyrone Quincy Wilson
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., McCLENDON, AND HIGGINBOTHAM, JJ.
McCLENDON , J.
Defendant, Tyrone Quincy Wilson, was charged by bill of information with unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:62.3. He entered a plea of not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. Defendant was sentenced to three years imprisonment at hard labor. He filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied. Defendant now appeals, designating two assignments of error. We affirm the conviction and sentence.
FACTS
On the afternoon of March 9, 2011, Kristyn King was with her fiance, Brody Naquin, and her two-year-old daughter at their home on Morningside Drive in Houma. Earlier that day, defendant, Kristyn's daughter's biological father, repeatedly called Kristyn to inform her that he was coming to get his daughter. Defendant had court-approved visitation rights to see his daughter. However, since on this particular day, a Wednesday, defendant had no authority to take custody of his daughter according to the consent agreement, Kristyn told defendant over the phone that he could not come pick up their daughter. Nevertheless, defendant arrived at Kristyn's home unannounced and knocked on the door. When Kristyn opened the door, defendant told her that he was there to get his baby and for Kristyn to get her. Kristyn told him "no" and when she started to shut the door, defendant stuck his foot between the door and the frame and pushed his way into her house. Kristyn ran to her daughter and picked her up. Defendant approached Kristyn and attempted to pull his daughter from Kristyn's arms. When he failed at this, defendant shoved Kristyn onto the sofa. Kristyn and Brody repeatedly yelled at defendant to leave their home, but he ignored them and insisted he be allowed to take his daughter. A few minutes later, Latia Williams, defendant's girlfriend who had been waiting outside in her car, entered Kristyn's home through the already open door. She observed the screaming and chaos and tried to get defendant to leave. Kristyn managed to get into the bedroom with her daughter and lock the door, while Brody stood in front of the door. Kristyn called 911. At this time, one of Brody's tattoo clients, who was coming to the house to get a tattoo, had driven up to the house. With the arrival of Brody's client and Latia's prodding, defendant, after having been there for about fifteen minutes, left Kristyn's home.
Kristyn and Brody married about three weeks later.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1 and 2
In these related assignments of error, defendant argues, respectively, that the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence and erred in denying the motion to reconsider sentence.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 20, of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive punishment. Although a sentence falls within statutory limits, it may be excessive. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). A sentence is considered constitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense or is nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Andrews, 94-0842 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/5/95), 655 So.2d 448, 454. The trial court has great discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory limits, and such a sentence will not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Holts, 525 So.2d 1241, 1245 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1988). Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth the factors for the trial court to consider when imposing sentence. While the entire checklist of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 need not be recited, the record must reflect the trial court adequately considered the criteria. State v. Brown, 02-2231 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/9/03), 849 So.2d 566, 569.
The articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has not been full compliance with Article 894.1. State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475, 478 (La. 1982). The trial court should review a defendant's personal history, his prior criminal record, the seriousness of the offense, the likelihood that he will commit another crime, and his potential for rehabilitation through correctional services other than confinement. State v. Jones, 398 So.2d 1049, 1051-52 (La. 1981). On appellate review of a sentence, the relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Thomas, 98-1144 (La. 10/9/98), 719 So.2d 49, 50 (per curiam).
In the instant matter, defendant, facing a maximum sentence of six years at hard labor, was sentenced to three years at hard labor. See LSA-R.S. 14:62.3B. Defendant argues in his brief that the trial court failed to give adequate consideration to the factors designated in LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. Specifically, defendant asserts that the trial court made no mention of any mitigating factors. We do not agree. The trial court's detailed, well-articulated reasons clearly indicate it considered Article 894.1 in arriving at an appropriate sentence:
In connection with the matter of State of Louisiana versus Tyrone Wilson, the Court listened to the testimony in this matter. Court is of the opinion that in connection with this proceeding a suspended sentence would not be appropriate given the defendant's past record; there was a previous aggravated battery charge for which he was convicted. There's been a short lapse of time that's occurred since that particular proceeding and this proceeding. Mr. Wilson has been before the Court on other not say numerous, but on other occasions concerning allegations that he has violated the law in some way, shape or form. One has been the aggravated battery which resulted in a conviction, which dealt with an individual being struck by a vehicle being driven by Mr. Wilson.
In this particular case, there was a custody dispute, however, the defendant forced his way into the home where the child was. Because of circumstances that resulted, he had no right to force his way into the home. And what he did, he put at risk everyone that was in that home. And it was fortunate that there was not a further altercation or fight between the defendant, the victim's boyfriend and the parties that were involved.
We had testimony from witnesses. The individual who was with Mr. Wilson trying to get him to leave the home, but she was not successful at first. And it was only after some period of time
after the arguing, Mr. Wilson grabbing the child, the haggling back and forth over the - or the custody dispute, the mother of the child going into her room and trying to call the police for assistance. It was quite a commotion and a disturbance inside the residence. It's these very types of situations and domestic disputes that end up resulting with individuals hurting each other and receiving great bodily harm.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court feels that a suspended sentence is not appropriate; it would lessen the seriousness of the charges in connection with this matter, because human life was endangered in the matter, because there was a minor child who was present.
While defendant cites two cases where lesser sentences were imposed on other defendants also convicted of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling, we find little value in making sentencing comparisons given the well-settled proposition that sentences must be individualized to the particular offender and the particular facts surrounding the offense committed. See State v. Thomas, 572 So.2d 681, 685 n.3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1990), writ denied. 604 So.2d 994 (La. 1992). Considering the trial court's careful review of the circumstances, the nature of the crime, and the fact that defendant was sentenced to only half of the maximum sentence allowable under the law, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. Accordingly, the sentence imposed by the trial court is not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense and, therefore, is not unconstitutionally excessive. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to reconsider sentence.
These assignments of error are without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction and sentence are hereby affirmed.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.