Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1464-13T3
07-17-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DARNELL WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Peter B. Meadow, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Robin A. Hamett, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Yannotti and Lihotz. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 02-12-4176 and Accusation No. 04-06-2328. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Peter B. Meadow, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Robin A. Hamett, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Darnell Williams appeals from an order entered by the Law Division dated May 20, 2013, which denied his petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). We affirm.
Defendant was charged under Indictment No. 02-12-4176 with second-degree sexual assault of an eight-year-old boy. He also was charged under Accusation No. 04-06-2328 with first-degree aggravated manslaughter of his mother, Antonia S. Williams. On June 9, 2004, defendant pled guilty to both charges. The State agreed to recommend a twenty-five-year prison sentence, with an 85% period of parole ineligibility, pursuant to the No Early Release Act ("NERA"), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, on the aggravated manslaughter conviction, and a concurrent ten-year custodial term, also subject to NERA, on the sexual-assault conviction.
At the plea hearing, defendant admitted that on May 24, 2002, he came into contact with the young boy. Defendant said he kissed the boy on the lips and fondled his genitalia. He stated that he had engaged in these actions because he wanted to teach the boy about sex. In addition, defendant admitted that on April 3, 2003, he shot and stabbed his mother, and she died as a result of the injuries he had inflicted.
On September 30, 2004, the court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea. Defendant later appealed his sentence. The appeal was heard on the court's excessive sentence oral argument calendar. R. 2:9-11. We affirmed the trial court's judgment. State v. Williams, No. A-1758-07 (App. Div. Feb. 5, 2009).
On September 26, 2012, defendant submitted a pro se letter to the trial court, which the court treated as a petition for PCR. The court appointed counsel to represent defendant. PCR counsel filed a brief in support of defendant's petition, which incorporated defendant's claim that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to adequately consider his "mental health issues" as a defense or as a mitigating factor at sentencing.
On May 17, 2013, the PCR court heard oral argument on the petition. The court found that the petition was barred by Rule 3:22-12(a), because it had not been filed within five years of the date of the judgment of conviction, and because defendant had not established grounds to relax the time bar. The court nevertheless considered defendant's claims and found that they were meritless. The court entered the May 17, 2013 order denying PCR. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT ONE
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AS TIME BARRED BECAUSE THERE WAS EXCUSABLE NEGLECT FOR THE FAILURE TO FILE WITHIN THE FIVE-YEAR TIME LIMIT AND EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT RELAXATION OF THE TIME BAR WHICH IS NECESSARY TO AVOID FUNDAMENTAL INJUSTICE.
POINT TWO
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S PETITION WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
We have considered defendant's arguments in light of the record and the applicable law. We conclude that defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). However, we add the following comments.
Rule 3:22-12(a) provides that, except in certain limited circumstances, a PCR petition must be filed no later than five years after entry of the judgment of conviction being challenged, "unless [the petition] alleges facts showing that the delay beyond said time was due to defendant's excusable neglect and that there is a reasonable probability that if the defendant's factual assertions were found to be true enforcement of the time bar would result in a fundamental injustice."
The time bar established by Rule 3:22-12(a) should only be relaxed in "exceptional circumstances." State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 580 (1992). In determining whether to relax the time bar, the court "should consider the extent and cause of the delay, the prejudice to the State, and the importance of the petitioner's claim in determining whether there has been an 'injustice' sufficient to relax the time limits." Ibid. The burden of justifying an untimely-filed petition "will increase with the extent of the delay." Ibid. In addition, the petitioner must "demonstrate a serious question about his or her guilt" and support the petition with factual evidence. Ibid.
Here, the PCR court correctly found that defendant's PCR petition was barred by Rule 3:22-12(a) and that he had not established grounds to relax the time bar. The court observed that the petition had been filed about three years after expiration of the five-year limitations period, and defendant did not provide specific reasons for this lengthy delay.
Defendant asserts that the time bar should have been relaxed due to his youth and lack of familiarity with the criminal justice system. However, defendant was sentenced when he was twenty-three years old. Moreover, while these were defendant's first convictions as an adult, he had five dispositions as a juvenile. His juvenile record included a two-year period of probation and a term at a juvenile justice facility.
The PCR court also found that defendant had not shown excusable neglect due to his mental-health problems. The court noted that, when defendant had entered his plea, those involved knew that defendant presented "mental health issues." The court observed that defendant had been evaluated by two mental health professionals, who determined that defendant was competent to proceed with his plea and there was no basis for a psychiatric defense. The court correctly determined that defendant had not shown sufficient reasons to relax the Rule 3:22-12(a) time bar.
As noted previously, the PCR court nevertheless considered defendant's claim that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel, and determined that defendant had not shown a basis for relief. A defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is considered under the standards enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).
In order to prevail on such a claim, a defendant first must show that his attorney's handling of the case "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. A defendant also must show that there exists a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698.
Furthermore, a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in connection with representation provided in connection with a plea. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384-85, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398, 406-07 (2012). Thus, a defendant must establish the "'reasonable probability'" that the result would have been different had his attorney provided proper advice. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1384, 182 L. Ed. 2d at 406-07 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 210 (1985)).
Here, defendant contends that his attorney was deficient because he failed to investigate sufficiently his "mental illness" and present a mental-health defense. As the PCR court noted, however, defendant's attorney had two doctors evaluate defendant and they determined that there was no basis for an insanity-based or diminished-capacity defense.
Moreover, defendant did not present an affidavit or certification from a qualified professional to support his claim that his attorney should have pursued these defenses. Thus, the PCR court correctly found that defendant failed to satisfy either the performance or prejudice prong of the Strickland test.
The PCR court also correctly determined that an evidentiary hearing was not required. A hearing on a PCR petition is required when a defendant presents a prima facie case for relief, the existing record is not sufficient to resolve the claims, and the court decides that a hearing is required. R. 3:22-10(b); see also State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354-55 (2013). In this case, the existing record was sufficient to resolve the claims. Moreover, as we have determined, defendant failed to present a prima facie case for relief. Thus, an evidentiary hearing was not required.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION