Opinion
2022 KA 0501
11-04-2022
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. DANA DESHUN WILLIAMS
Scott M. Perrilloux District Attorney Richard D. McShan Zachary Daniels Assistant District Attorneys Greensburg, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana Gwendolyn Brown Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant -Appellant Dana Deshun Williams
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the Twenty-First Judicial District Court Parish of St. Helena, State of Louisiana Number 22922, Division B Honorable Charlotte Hughes Foster, Judge Scott M.
Scott M. Perrilloux District Attorney Richard D. McShan Zachary Daniels Assistant District Attorneys Greensburg, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana
Gwendolyn Brown Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant -Appellant Dana Deshun Williams
BEFORE: THERIOT, CHUTZ, AND HESTER, JJ.
CHUTZ, J.
The defendant, Dana Deshun Williams, was charged by grand jury indictment with first degree murder (count one), a violation of La. R.S. 14:30; first degree feticide (count two), a violation of La. R.S. 14:32.6(A)(1); and attempted first degree murder (count three), a violation of La. R.S. 14:30 and La. R.S. 14:27. He pled not guilty on each count. After a trial by jury, he was found guilty as charged on each count. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on count one; fifteen years imprisonment at hard labor on count two; and fifty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on count three. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to reconsider sentence. The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the constitutionality of the sentences imposed on counts two and three. For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences.
The State did not seek the death penalty in this case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 30, 2017, Lieutenant Adrian Martin of the St. Helena Parish Sheriffs Office was dispatched to 208 Pistol Womack Lane in Greensburg in response to a reported shooting. Upon his arrival, Lieutenant Martin saw a gray Toyota Camry with multiple bullet holes on the driver's side and a female occupant slumped over in the passenger seat. The female, later identified as Angelica H. Leray, showed no signs of life. After securing the scene, Lieutenant Martin summoned detectives to the scene.
Cynthia Womack Torrence ("Ms. Cynthia") lived in the house at 208 Pistol Womack Lane and was home at the time of the shooting. At trial, Ms. Cynthia testified that prior to the shooting, shortly before 8:00 p.m., her son, Delvecio Torrence (Torrence), told her he was leaving to go pick up his girlfriend, Leray, who got off from work at 8:00 p.m. Leray worked at Hatfield's Country Store, located five to ten minutes away from the Torrence residence. At some point after Torrence left, Ms. Cynthia heard a commotion outside followed by the sound of a horn blowing. She, along with her niece, ran to the front porch and saw Torrence, who told her, "We just got shot."
Leray was pregnant at the time of the shooting. When Ms. Cynthia made it to the car, Torrence told her, "Save Angelica and the baby." She checked Leray for a pulse and determined that she did not have a pulse. She told Torrence, "Baby, she's gone." She transported Torrence to the hospital while her niece called 911 and waited for Emergency Medical Services. Ms. Cynthia further testified that she asked Torrence who shot him, and he told her it was "Angelica's babys [sic] daddy." She indicated that Torrence was hysterical, crying, and bleeding as she transported him to the hospital.
Torrence testified that prior to the shooting, when he arrived at Hatfield's, he noticed a car emerge from a nearby carwash and pull up to the store. He added, "but I ain't thinking nothing of it." After Leray exited the store and entered Torrence's vehicle, Torrence proceeded to drive back to his mother's residence. Torrence testified that the vehicle that he previously noticed "took off in front of [them]" while they were on Highway 43. Because the driver of the vehicle was driving slowly with his headlights off, Torrence drove around him. After Torrence turned onto Pistol Womack Lane, Leray alerted him that the vehicle they had passed earlier had pulled up next to the side of Torrence's car. As Torrence looked over to the other vehicle, he "seen a gun fire" and "noticed somebody with some long dreads." Torrence identified the person in court as the defendant. Torrence stated that the defendant was Leray's husband and the unborn baby's father.
Torrence was struck once, on his left side, while Leray was struck multiple times. Torrence confirmed that the shooting occurred quickly and that he did not initially realize he had been shot. Torrence testified that he bumped the back of the defendant's car, as he unsuccessfully tried to block him from leaving. Torrence testified that Leray looked over at him and said, "Baby, you're shot." Torrence further testified that Leray stated, "I'm about to die ... Dana done this." Those were Leray's last words, according to Torrence. Torrence then pulled into his mother's driveway and told her that he and Leray had been shot. Torrence remembered speaking to detectives after his mother transported him to the hospital and confirmed that he told them the defendant committed the shooting.
While Torrence did not know the defendant at the time, he testified that Leray had shown him pictures of the defendant prior to the shooting. He confirmed that he had no doubt that the defendant was the person who shot him and Leray.
Detective Laurie Sibley of the St. Helena Parish Sheriffs Office responded to the hospital and testified at trial that Torrence immediately identified the defendant as the shooter. A warrant was then obtained for the defendant's arrest, and the defendant turned himself in the next day. Detective Sibley also attended Leray's autopsy, performed by Dr. Dana Troxclair. The autopsy revealed Leray suffered three gunshot wounds, including a gunshot wound to her upper back that went through her left lung (where a projectile was recovered) and a gunshot wound to her left lower chest that also hit her left lung and her heart. A deformed projectile was recovered from the left ventricle of her heart. The third bullet wound was to the victim's left thigh, where another deformed projectile was recovered. Detective Sibley observed as the fully developed, unborn fetus was extracted from Leray's womb. Dr. Troxclair specified that it was a male fetus at an estimated gestational age of twenty-four weeks or second trimester. The fetus did not sustain any gunshot wounds but suffered exsanguination due to loss of blood.
Detective Sibley further obtained relevant surveillance footage from the carwash and the washateria across from Hatfield's, Detective Sibley testified regarding her observations from the footage. Detective Sibley observed a gray vehicle pulled into the carwash, with a visible license plate attached. She further observed the vehicle being driven to the back of the carwash, backed into a bay, and the driver exiting the vehicle, where he removed the license plate from the vehicle. Minutes later, the driver reentered the vehicle and proceeded to exit the carwash without a license plate on the vehicle. The driver then pulled into Hatfield's parking lot and pulled out as Torrence and Leray exited the parking lot in their vehicle.
The defendant's cousin, Talisha Causey, testified at trial that she allowed the defendant to use her vehicle, a gray Nissan Sentra, on the day of the shooting, though he did not tell her where he was going. In the middle of the night, the defendant called her and left a message telling her that some kids were throwing rocks at her car and had broken the passenger window. Causey further testified that the defendant did not, to her knowledge, return the car that night, noting she saw it the next morning. When she saw her car the next morning, she noticed that the rear bumper had been damaged. Causey was later contacted by law enforcement and complied with their request to bring the vehicle to the St. Tammany Parish Sheriffs Office (STPSO) to be photographed and searched. Special Agent Jason Dammon worked for the STPSO at the time of the offense and was present when Causey's vehicle was searched and photographed. A pistol, a spent casing, and a box of .9-millimeter bullets were recovered. The shattered front passenger window and damaged rear bumper were photographed.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The defendant presents a combined argument for his four assignments of error. He argues that the trial court imposed excessive sentences on counts two and three, first degree feticide and attempted first degree murder, consisting of the maximum terms of imprisonment allowed by law (assignments of error numbers one and two). He further argues that the trial court failed to adequately consider the factors designated in La. Code Crim. P. art. 894.1 (assignment of error number three). He notes that the trial court gave "no reason whatsoever" when it imposed the discretionary sentences at issue. He further notes that the trial court did not order a presentence investigation report. Thus, he contends that the trial court was ill-informed of his background. Noting that the State did not inquire about any criminal history, the defendant contends the record only shows that he was "apparently, a first offender" and provides no other information about his background. He also argues that the record does not provide a "logical basis" or explanation for the alleged offenses, such as jealousy or animosity. Finally, based on the above, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider sentence (assignment of error number four).
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of excessive punishment. Although a sentence may be within statutory limits, it may violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment and is subject to appellate review. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979); State v. Honea, 2018-0018 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/21/18), 268 So.3d 1117, 1120, writ not considered, 2019-00598 (La. 8/12/19), 279 So.3d 915. A sentence is constitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense or is nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Hurst, 99-2868 (La.App. 1st Cir. 10/3/00), 797 So.2d 75, 83, writ denied, 2000-3053 (La. 10/5/01), 798 So.2d 962.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth the factors for the district court to consider when imposing sentence. While the entire checklist of Article 894.1 need not be recited, the record must reflect that the district court adequately considered the criteria. In light of the criteria expressed by Article 894.1, a review for individual excessiveness should consider the circumstances of the crime and the trial court's stated reasons and factual basis for its sentencing decision. State v. Brown, 2002-2231 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/9/03), 849 So.2d 566, 569. Remand is unnecessary when a sufficient factual basis for the sentence is shown. State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475, 478 (La. 1982); State v. Graham, 2002-1492 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2/14/03), 845 So.2d 416, 422.
Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:32.6(B), whoever commits the crime of first degree feticide shall be imprisoned for up to fifteen years at hard labor. Pursuant to La R.S. 14:30(C)(2) and La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a), whoever commits the crime of attempted first degree murder shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Thus, as noted by the defendant on appeal, the trial court imposed maximum terms of imprisonment on counts two and three. Maximum sentences may be imposed only for the most serious offenses and the worst offenders, or when the offender poses an unusual risk to the public safety due to his past conduct of repeated criminality. State v. Looney, 2018-1416 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2/28/19), 274 So.3d 685, 689, writ denied, 2019-00735 (La. 10/15/19), 280 So.3d 600.
Herein, prior to imposing the sentences, the trial court presided over the trial. The trial court heard testimony regarding the autopsy of Leray and the horrendous death of her unborn child. Specifically, evidence presented at trial included testimony and photographs depicting the deceased, fully developed baby removed from the deceased victim. Detective Sibley, who witnessed the autopsy, including the extraction of the deceased, unborn baby, stated, "I'll never forget it." While Torrence survived being shot, the trial court also heard his testimony about witnessing the murder of Leray and her unborn baby. Finally, we note that the trial court heard the testimony of Leray's mother, Tiffany Anthony, who lost her daughter and unborn grandson due to the defendant's senseless actions. Ms. Anthony testified that Leray had just turned twenty-years old when she was murdered, had just finished school to become a medical assistant, and was very excited about becoming a mother. Ms. Anthony further testified that she was excited to be a grandmother.
Considering the brutal nature of the shooting in this case, for which the record shows no expression of remorse by the defendant, we find no abuse of discretion in the imposition of maximum sentences. We find that the instant case involves the most serious offenses and the defendant is one of the worst offenders. The sentences imposed herein are supported by an adequate factual basis. The sentences are not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offenses or shocking to the sense of conscience and, thus, are not constitutionally excessive. We find no error in the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to reconsider sentence. The defendant's assignments of error are without merit.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.