State v. Williams

Full title: STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee v. TRENTON M. WILLIAMS Defendant-Appellant

Court: COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

Date published: Apr 16, 2021

2021 Ohio 1340 (Ohio Ct. App. 2021)

Opinion

Appellate Case No. 28648

04-16-2021

STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee v. TRENTON M. WILLIAMS Defendant-Appellant

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR. by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Atty. Reg. No. 0069384, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor's Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee DAVID R. MILES, Atty. Reg. No. 0013841, 1160 Dayton-Yellow Springs Road, Fairborn, Ohio 45324 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

EPLEY, J.

Trial Court Case No. 2017-CR-3825/1 (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)

OPINION

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR. by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Atty. Reg. No. 0069384, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor's Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee DAVID R. MILES, Atty. Reg. No. 0013841, 1160 Dayton-Yellow Springs Road, Fairborn, Ohio 45324 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant EPLEY, J.

{¶ 1} Trenton M. Williams was convicted after a jury trial in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas of aggravated murder (while committing aggravated robbery) with a firearm specification, aggravated robbery with a firearm specification, aggravated burglary, and two counts of having weapons while under disability. Prior to trial, the court denied Williams's motion to suppress statements that he made to the police. After the trial but prior to sentencing, Williams challenged the presumption that he was required to register with the violent offender database. The court found that Williams was the principal offender and, at sentencing, imposed an aggregate sentence of 31 years to life in prison, ordered Williams to pay restitution and court costs, and advised him of his duty to register with the violent offender database upon his release from prison.

{¶ 2} Williams appeals from his conviction, claiming that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to the police, that his convictions (other than for having weapons while under disability) were based on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the court erred in imposing a sentence of life in prison with parole eligibility after 25 years for the aggravated murder, and that the court erred in determining that he was a principal offender for purposes of the violent offender database. For the following reasons, the trial court's judgment will be affirmed.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 3} At approximately 10:00 p.m. on November 28, 2017, Williams and three other individuals, including Trashune Young, went to the Dayton residence of Taelor Taylor to rob him. Taylor was fatally shot in the chest during the robbery. During the police investigation, detectives obtained infrared surveillance videos from Taylor's home and retrieved information from Taylor's cell phones. Information from one of Taylor's cell phones led detectives to Williams.

{¶ 4} On the morning of November 30, two days after the homicide, detectives located and arrested Williams. A patrol officer transported him to the Safety Building, the downtown Dayton police station. Prior to any questioning, Williams was informed of his Miranda rights, but he refused to sign the waiver of rights form. Nevertheless, Williams agreed to talk with the detectives.

{¶ 5} The morning interview on November 30 began in an interview room equipped with an audio-visual recording device. After approximately an hour, Williams suggested that he would be willing to identify an individual involved in the crime, but not in a room with recording capabilities. Although the detectives had previously informed Williams that they were required by law to record the interview, they moved him to a conference room without recording equipment and allowed him to smoke there. During the hour-long conversation in the conference room, one of the detectives recorded Williams's statements using his cell phone without Williams's knowledge, despite telling Williams that conversations in that room were not recorded. Williams provided the name of the individual who had used his phone and a potential alibi.

{¶ 6} Later that day, after the detectives investigated his alleged alibi, the detectives spoke with Williams for approximately 75 minutes. Prior to asking questions, the detectives again informed Williams of his Miranda rights and Williams again refused to sign the waiver of rights form. Williams agreed to talk, however, and made incriminating statements. After the second interview concluded, Williams was booked into jail.

{¶ 7} On December 3, 2017, Williams's girlfriend contacted the police and informed them that Williams wanted to talk further about the incident. A different detective retrieved Williams from the jail and again informed Williams of his Miranda rights. Williams again refused to sign a waiver form, but he was willing to speak. The interview lasted approximately 45 minutes, during which Williams provided additional information about the incident.

{¶ 8} On December 7, 2017, Williams was charged by complaint with two counts of aggravated murder, four counts of felony murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of felonious assault, and six counts of having weapons while under disability. Each of the charges, except those of having weapons while under disability, included a three-year firearm specification. Williams was indicted on those charges in June 2018.

{¶ 9} Williams subsequently moved to suppress the evidence against him. He argued that his warrantless arrest on November 30 had been unconstitutional and that the statements he made to the police had been the product of that unlawful arrest. He further argued that, regardless of the legality of his arrest, his statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). After the motion was filed, the State provided DVDs of Williams's video-recorded interviews with the police - the first portion of the November 30 morning interview, the November 30 afternoon interview, and the December 3 interview - and an audio-recording of the portion of the November 30 interview that occurred in the conference room. After receiving that discovery, Williams filed an additional motion to suppress, arguing that the audio-recorded interview on November 30 was recorded surreptitiously which, along with the detectives' other coercive conduct, rendered his statements involuntary.

{¶ 10} The trial court conducted a hearing on the motions to suppress on September 28 and October 4, 2018. On March 6, 2019, the trial court issued a lengthy decision, concluding that the law enforcement officers had had probable cause to arrest Williams, that Williams validly had waived his Miranda rights on November 30 and December 3, that his statements to the police had not been the result of coercive police conduct, and that his constitutional rights had not been violated. The trial court overruled the motions to suppress in their entirety.

{¶ 11} The matter proceeded to a jury trial on September 30, 2019. The State presented 11 witnesses and numerous exhibits, including surveillance video from Taylor's home. Williams testified on his own behalf and presented two additional witnesses. After deliberating, the jury found Williams guilty of each indicted offense and specification.

{¶ 12} Prior to sentencing, Williams filed a motion opposing his classification as a violent offender, and he requested a hearing to rebut the presumption that he must enroll in the violent offender database. The trial court conducted a hearing on November 18, 2019, and concluded that Williams had failed to rebut the presumption that he was a violent offender. The court reasoned that the surveillance video from the offense reflected that Williams, not Young, was armed at Taylor's house and supported a conclusion that Williams shot Taylor.

{¶ 13} At sentencing, the trial court merged the aggravated murder, murder, and felonious assault counts into a single aggravated murder count (Count 1), merged the two aggravated robbery counts into a single count (Count 8), and merged the two aggravated burglary counts into a single count (Count 10). The six charges of having weapons under disability were based on two different weapons and three different prior offenses, and those charges were merged into two counts, one for each weapon (Counts 13 and 17). Additionally, the court merged the three-year firearm specifications into the specifications for Counts 1 and 8.

{¶ 14} The court sentenced Williams to a mandatory term of life in prison with parole eligibility after 25 years for the aggravated murder, 11 years for the aggravated robbery, 11 years for the aggravated burglary, and 36 months for each count of having weapons while under disability, to be served concurrently. The court further imposed three years each for the two firearm specifications, to be served prior and consecutively to the other concurrent sentences. Williams's aggregate sentence was 31 years to life in prison. The court also ordered Williams to pay restitution and court costs.

{¶ 15} Williams appeals, raising five assignments of error.

II. Motion to Suppress Statements

{¶ 16} In his first assignment of error, Williams claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Williams does not, however, challenge the trial court's conclusions regarding the validity of his arrest or the voluntariness of his statements to detectives on December 3, 2017.

{¶ 17} In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court "assumes the role of the trier of fact, and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 592, 639 N.E.2d 498 (2d Dist.1994); State v. Knisley, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22897, 2010-Ohio-116, ¶ 30. Accordingly, when we review suppression decisions, we must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Retherford at 592. "Accepting those facts as true, we must independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether they meet the applicable legal standard." Id.

A. Suppression Hearing Evidence Regarding Williams's Interviews

{¶ 18} Four law enforcement officers testified during hearings on the motion to suppress: Detective Brad Daugherty of the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office, who was assigned to the Dayton Police Homicide Unit, Homicide Detectives Rod Roberts and Thomas Cope of the Dayton Police Department, and Dayton Police Officer Adam Sharp. The State offered video recordings of the first portion of the November 30 morning interview (State's Ex. 2), the November 30 afternoon interview (State's Ex. 3), and the December 3 interview (State's Ex. 4). It also offered the audio recording of the second portion of the November 30 morning interview (State's Ex. 1). In addition, the State presented the two waiver of rights forms as State's Exhibits 5 and 6. We have reviewed each of these exhibits. The evidence at the suppression hearing established the following facts.

{¶ 19} On the morning of November 30, detectives located and arrested Williams in the bedroom of a residence on West Sherry Drive. They asked for a patrol officer to transport Williams to the Safety Building. At 7:55 a.m., Officer Sharp was called to the Sherry Drive address, and he transported Williams, handcuffed, to the Safety Building. Officer Sharp testified that he did not know why he was transporting Williams, and he did not recall anything memorable occurring during the transport. Williams made no statements to Sharp while in the cruiser.

{¶ 20} The first recording begins at 10:00 a.m. on November 30, 2017. At 10:01 a.m., Detectives Roberts and Daugherty brought Williams into a rectangular interview room with audio-visual recording equipment. Roberts sat at a desk, Williams sat in a chair beside the desk, and Daugherty sat in a chair diagonally across the room from Williams. Both detectives were dressed in dress shirts, ties, and slacks and were unarmed. Williams was not handcuffed.

{¶ 21} Before asking any questions, Roberts obtained preliminary information from Williams, including Williams's birthdate, Social Security Number, address, and phone number. Roberts then informed Williams that he needed to review Williams's rights with him before they talked, and the detective asked Williams if he (Williams) had been read his Miranda rights before. Williams responded that he had. Roberts informed Williams that the interview would relate to the offenses of aggravated robbery and murder.

{¶ 22} Detective Roberts then reviewed Williams's Miranda rights using a "Pre-Interview Form." See State's Exs. 2 & 5. Roberts asked Williams to read the first right aloud, which Williams did. Williams said he understood that right, but he did not want to initial the form beside that paragraph. Roberts then read the remaining rights and inquired after each component whether Williams understood his rights; Williams expressed that he understood each one. At Roberts's request, Williams read the Waiver of Rights portion of the form out loud. Roberts confirmed that Williams understood the meaning of the term "coercion." Williams expressed his willingness to talk, but he refused to sign the Pre-Interview Form. Williams did not request an attorney.

{¶ 23} Williams spoke coherently, responded appropriately to questions, and did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Williams was 27 years old when the interview occurred, and he told Detective Roberts that he had received a GED while in prison for having weapons while under disability.

{¶ 24} For the next 20 minutes or so, Detective Roberts questioned Williams about his movements in the days surrounding the homicide. Williams, who lived in Columbus, indicated where and with whom he had been while in Dayton. Roberts asked Williams about his Facebook account, email accounts, and photos on his phone.

{¶ 25} At 10:24 a.m., Williams asked the detective, "What does this have to do with me?" Roberts responded that Williams was on the surveillance video from the homicide. The detectives then began to review with Williams the evidence that linked him to Taylor's death, including his cell phone location information, his Facebook account, his email address, a call from his cell phone to Taylor shortly before the homicide, and his apparent appearance on Taylor's surveillance video. Williams denied that he knew Taylor and that he was the individual shown on the surveillance video. The detectives challenged Williams's denial of his involvement with the homicide.

{¶ 26} Beginning around 10:30 a.m., the detectives began urging Williams to tell the truth, telling Williams that they would like to charge everybody and "this is your chance to help out the police and do the right thing." Detective Daugherty told Williams that they were trying to do right for Taylor's family, just like he hoped officers in Indiana investigating Williams's brother's death were trying to do for Williams's family. Williams continued to deny using the phone that called Taylor, having a gun, and being involved in the homicide.

{¶ 27} At 10:43 a.m., Detective Roberts asked Williams if he would take a DNA test. Williams initially agreed, but changed his mind after a DNA swab was brought into the interview room. At 10:49 a.m., in response to questioning from Daugherty, Williams asked if he could leave, to which Daugherty responded: "No, you cannot go. You're under arrest. For murder and aggravated robbery. And guess what. We'll eventually identify those other guys, OK? But if we don't, you can go down by yourself. It doesn't really matter to us." One minute later, Detective Daugherty told Williams:

You know how the game works. You know that when people help out, they get better deals, OK? Now, we can't offer you a deal because we are not the prosecutors, alright. But at the end of the day, we wanna know who else is involved. And we'll eventually get it. * * * But if we get them with your help, we can go to the prosecutor and the judge and say, hey look, Trent, he didn't mean it to go down this way. He helped us. OK? Trent helped us identify the others. He told us where they were at, told us whose car it was, where that car is right now, OK? That's stuff I can do, OK?

State's Ex. 2 at 10:50:34-10:50:51; 10:51:12-10:51:34.

{¶ 28} The detectives repeatedly asked Williams who had used his phone and encouraged Williams to tell them. At 10:56 a.m., Williams asked the detectives to turn off the recording equipment. The detectives explained that they were not allowed to turn it off, because they were required by law to record the interview. Williams continued speaking with the detectives.

{¶ 29} For the next five minutes, Williams and the detectives discussed what would happen if Williams provided a name. Williams asked, "If someone used my phone, what does that make me?" After further discussion, Detective Roberts again admonished Williams to tell the truth, stating: "Is you spending the next fifteen to twenty years of your life in prison better than you being labeled as you told? Is that bulls*** disrespect thing more important than you spending the next twenty years of your life in prison?" Id. at 11:02:57-11:03:14. Williams expressed concern that if he provided a name, that person would "lie on him." The detectives tried to reassure Williams that they would investigate any statements they were provided. Daugherty emphasized that "the first one to come to the table gets the help." Id. at 11:05:06.

{¶ 30} One minute later, Williams informed the detectives that he did not "want to talk no more" and would not talk where there was a recording. Id. at 11:06:51-11:07:08. When asked if he would talk in another room without recording equipment, Williams replied that he would talk, but someplace where he would be comfortable. Id. at 11:07:08-11:07:19. Williams noted that detectives get information from other people without recording them. Detective Daugherty told Williams that they are required to record interviews at the police station, but stated that if Williams "was willing to tell us who these other people are...." Id. at 11:08:15- 11:08:21.

{¶ 31} At that juncture, Williams asked for a cigarette. The detectives asked if he also wanted water, and Detective Daugherty left the interview room. Shortly thereafter, at 11:12 a.m., the detectives relocated Williams to a larger conference-type room with a window so that Williams could smoke. The conference room was not equipped with audio-visual recording equipment. Immediately after leaving the interview room, Daugherty instructed someone to close the door to the interview room "so he [Williams] knows it's not being recorded." Daugherty testified at the suppression hearing, however, that he used a recording application on his county-issued cell phone to create an audio-recording of the conversation.

{¶ 32} Williams asked the detectives if he could have help with his accommodations at the jail if he provided information. Daugherty responded that he could call over to the jail and make a suggestion, but they were not allowed to make any promises and could not guarantee that he would be placed in a particular cell. After Williams again raised the possibility of providing information, Daugherty reiterated that he could "talk to the prosecutor's office and the judge" about his cooperation. State's Ex. 1 at 4:45-4:50. Williams expressed concern about having to testify, and Daugherty indicated that it would depend on what other evidence was available against the suspects.

{¶ 33} Following additional discussion about Williams's cooperation, Detective Daugherty suggested that if Williams wanted to provide information about the other individuals involved with Taylor's homicide, Williams could write down that information so that he would not have to worry about the information being recorded, as if it were an "official statement." State's Ex. 1 at 7:45-7:48. Daugherty told Williams that he believed Williams was the person on the surveillance video. Daugherty emphasized that if the person was not Williams, then Williams should identify the people and the detectives would get them. Id. at 9:42. Williams and the detectives did not speak for several minutes.

{¶ 34} Williams expressed concern that whomever the detectives talked to could "say anything." Daugherty agreed that people could say anything, but he emphasized that there was a difference between being a suspect, a witness, or someone with minor involvement. When Williams said that someone with minor involvement would get the same punishment, Daugherty said that depended on the person's cooperation.

{¶ 35} Eventually Williams asked Detective Roberts what he (Roberts) would do in Williams's situation. Id. at 14:30. Roberts responded that he would rather give information and be able to see his daughter graduate high school and walk her down the aisle than to not see his daughter until she was in her thirties when he would be released from prison. Id. at 14:31-14:48. Detective Roberts also emphasized that if the "street code" was so important to Williams that he was willing to do 25 to life, then Roberts would end the interview and Williams would be booked into jail. Id. at 15:48- 16:01. Roberts told Williams that he had to decide what was important to him - if he did not want to be snitch, he could go to prison "forever." Not long after, when Williams contemplated whether to provide information, Roberts stated that "we're not going to do ring-around-the-rosy while you spend the next three hours deciding whether street code is more important to you than" your daughter. Id. at 17:33-17:40.

{¶ 36} Williams again stated that he was more concerned about what other suspects might say about him. Roberts repeated that they would investigate what they were told. Williams stated that he had partial names, but again wanted help with jail accommodations. Daugherty told Williams that he was willing to walk him over to the jail and talk to the sergeant, but he could not promise anything. Daugherty thought it likely that Williams could be placed in a pod, as Williams wanted.

{¶ 37} About 25 minutes into the audio-only discussion, Williams asked the detectives to get his phone and the video. Daugherty had Williams sit in the conference room and reassured him that the room did not have recording equipment and "we're not recording." State's Ex. 1 at 25:07-25:29. Not long after, Williams identified "Tre" as the person who used his phone, said that Tre's number was in his phone, and answered questions about his interactions with Tre.

{¶ 38} During the rest of this interview, Williams denied his involvement but expressed his belief that he was still going to prison. The detectives reiterated the benefits of Williams's cooperation and of telling the truth. Williams stated that his girlfriend, Chanel Caver, would substantiate that he was not involved. The detectives told Williams that they would go talk with her. Williams asked for a few phone numbers from his phone, which Daugherty provided to him.

{¶ 39} At approximately 12:15 p.m., Williams agreed to provide a DNA sample, and the three returned to the interview room where Williams did so. Daugherty also photographed Williams from several angles. State's Ex. 2, 12:13:16. After additional conversation about the individuals involved in the incident, the detectives left to investigate Williams's alleged alibi. See State's Ex. 1.

{¶ 40} Officer Sharp took Williams to a holding cell at the Safety Building and stayed with Williams for several hours. Williams's needs, such as restroom breaks and water, were met. Sharp did not ask Williams any questions, and Williams did not make any statements that Sharp could recall. At approximately 4:15 p.m., shortly before Sharp's shift ended, another officer assumed responsibility for Williams.

{¶ 41} Detectives Roberts and Daugherty resumed their interview with Williams at 4:43 p.m. State's Ex. 3. Roberts again reviewed Williams's Miranda rights with him, and Williams indicated that he understood each right. Williams reiterated his willingness to talk with the detectives.

{¶ 42} Detective Roberts told Williams that they had investigated the information he had provided, including talking to his girlfriend, Caver, for approximately 90 minutes. The detective discussed text messages between Caver and Williams showing that he was not with her. The detectives again admonished Williams to tell the truth. The detectives asked Williams if Taylor's DNA would be on the marijuana he had and if Williams's DNA would be on Taylor's clothes. Williams denied that DNA would incriminate him, and he claimed Caver was confused.

{¶ 43} The interview then became heated, with Detective Daugherty raising his voice. Williams acknowledged that he had told "white lies" because he was scared that he would spend the rest of his life in prison for something he did not do. The detectives asked Williams why he would not just tell the truth "when the stakes are so high." State's Ex. 3 at 17:00:57. When Williams did not respond to the question whether he had anything new to say, Daugherty told Williams he was going to be booked for murder, aggravated robbery, and having weapons under disability. Id. at 17:01:34- 17:01:38.

{¶ 44} After a bit more back and forth, Williams asked why he was not arrested from the beginning. Daugherty responded that they wanted to give him an opportunity to help himself. The detectives reiterated that if Williams told the truth and identified the other homicide suspects, the detectives would inform the prosecutor and judge that Williams had cooperated. Id. at 17:03:25-17:03:50. The detectives told Williams that his denials were "not going to work anymore" and that he needed to tell the truth so the detectives could get his accomplices. They emphasized that Williams would do "some time," but "it's how much time you're going to do is what it comes down to." Id. at 17:05. Williams then asked what the difference was between 15 and 25 years if he were to say anything else. Detectives Roberts and Daugherty responded:

A lot. How much you can do, you tell me? So, how old's your daughter? Eight? So, fifteen years means she's twenty-three, OK? Twenty-five years means she's thirty-three. That's a big difference. That might be a difference between you seeing your grandkids grow up or not. You been

to prison - you tell me what the difference in ten or fifteen years is. And nobody has said you will get that much if you cooperated. We don't know what you'd get. It all depends on your level of cooperation.

Id. at 17:05:50-17:06:29.

{¶ 45} Soon after, Daugherty suggested that Taylor may have had a gun and the shooting may have been in self-defense. Id. at 17:07:12-17:07:32. Roberts encouraged Williams to talk, particularly as the first person they were talking to. Roberts said that he would throw everybody under the bus if needed to save himself. When Williams responded that he would still do time if he identified others, Roberts agreed but emphasized that by cooperating he "might not do the rest of my life." Id. at 17:09:53-17:09:58.

{¶ 46} The detectives asked Williams what the plan had been regarding Taylor. After Roberts again described what the surveillance video portrayed, Williams protested that "y'all trying to really to get me to say some sh**." Id. at 17:12:15-17:12:33. Daugherty responded that they were trying to get the truth. Over the next eight minutes, which had several quieter moments, the detectives encouraged Williams to tell them what had happened. At 5:19 p.m., Daugherty told Williams that they would need to conclude the interview if Williams did not want to cooperate. The detectives asked if he had gone to Taylor's house to kill him or if the plan was only to rob him; they said that there was a "big difference" between planned and unplanned. Williams asked the detectives if they could book him in a day or two and give him time to get his affairs together. Roberts did not agree, responding they would be speaking with the prosecutor the next day and would tell the prosecutor then whether Williams had cooperated.

{¶ 47} At 5:25 p.m., after being reassured that the detectives would talk to the prosecutor about his cooperation, Williams began to give statements about the events surrounding Taylor's homicide, and he identified Tre as the shooter. After talking about the incident for approximately 12 minutes, Williams commented that it would not matter whether he had pulled the trigger. Roberts responded that it was not for them to decide. Williams stated that he hoped the detectives were telling him the truth when they said they could help him. At 5:43 p.m., another detective, Detective House, entered the interview room and told Williams that the surveillance video clearly showed that he had the gun. House encouraged Williams to tell the truth and then left the room. At 5:53 p.m., Williams said that he was telling the truth, and he repeated that he did not shoot and kill Taylor. The interview ended at 6:01 p.m., and Williams was taken to the Montgomery County Jail.

{¶ 48} On December 3, 2017, Detective Cope received a phone call from Caver relaying that Williams wanted to speak again with detectives. After communicating with Detectives Roberts and Daugherty, Cope brought Williams from the jail to the Safety Building. At 2:07 p.m., Detectives Cope and Zach Farkas placed Williams in a different interview room of similar size and furniture as the prior room. Cope was unarmed.

{¶ 49} Detective Cope began the interview by obtaining Williams's personal information and reviewing his Miranda rights. Cope read each of the rights, and Williams orally stated that he understood. Williams read the Waiver of Rights paragraph. Williams asked why the paragraph said that he did not want a lawyer, and Cope explained that it meant that he was waiving a lawyer for this interview only. Cope ensured that Williams understood the meaning of "coercion."

{¶ 50} During the discussion, Williams expressed that detectives had learned Tre's girlfriend's name from him and he wanted to know what type of help he was going to get. Cope recounted that he and Williams had discussed while walking from the jail the amount of time that Williams faced if he were the only person charged; the detective had calculated approximately 34 years to life. Williams asked if he could get "flat time" (i.e., a definite, non-life sentence) if he provided more information. Cope told Williams that the prosecutors, not the detectives, made plea agreements. Cope expressed that he did not think it was likely that the prosecutors would remove the life tail, because the video showed the he was the shooter. Cope further told Williams that his "goose is already cooked" and that he could only help himself by providing information about his accomplices. Williams provided more information about the shooting incident.

{¶ 51} After Williams expressed a preference for talking to Detective Daugherty, Detective Cope asked Detective Farkas to inquire whether Detective Daugherty could join the interview. Detective Farkas briefly left the room as Williams and Cope continued to talk. Williams acknowledged his involvement, but again denied that he was the shooter. At 2:38 p.m., Cope left the room, and Williams spoke with Farkas about how well he knew Tre. At 2:40 p.m., Farkas also left the room and Detective Daugherty entered. Williams immediately told Daugherty that he was worried that he was being accused of lying when he failed to identify Tre to other detectives; Williams explained that the photo did not look like Tre. Williams and Daugherty spoke for several additional minutes. The interview ended at 2:54 p.m.

B. Waiver of Miranda Rights

{¶ 52} On appeal, Williams claims that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and, consequently, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements.

{¶ 53} Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself. To ensure that this constitutional right is protected, statements resulting from custodial interrogations are admissible only after a showing that the procedural safeguards described in Miranda have been followed. State v. Earnest, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26646, 2015-Ohio-3913, ¶ 21. Miranda held that prior to questioning, a suspect "must be warned that he [or she] has a right to remain silent, that any statement he [or she] does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he [or she] has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." In re M.H., Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5485, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 18, quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.

{¶ 54} A suspect may effectively waive his or her Miranda rights only if the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. State v. Dailey, 53 Ohio St.3d 88, 91, 559 N.E.2d 459 (1990), citing Miranda at 444. Thus, a court may recognize the validity of a waiver of Miranda rights only if it finds that (1) "the relinquishment of the right[s] [was] voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception[,]" and (2) the person had "a full awareness of both the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon [them]." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986); State v. Marejka, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27662, 2018-Ohio-2570, ¶ 14. Courts examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a suspect has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her Miranda rights. State v. Clark, 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 261, 527 N.E.2d 844 (1988); State v. White, 2018-Ohio-3076, 118 N.E.3d 410, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 55} No express written or oral waiver of Miranda rights is required, and a suspect's refusal to sign a waiver is not dispositive of whether a waiver was voluntary. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); State v. Dillon, 2016-Ohio-1561, 63 N.E.3d 712, ¶ 59 (2d Dist.); State v. Bass, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-547, 2003-Ohio-1642, ¶ 66. "Instead, waiver can be inferred where a defendant proceeds to speak after being advised of his rights and indicating an understanding of them." Dillon at ¶ 59; see Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 388-389, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) ("a suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police"). This is true even if the suspect refuses to sign a waiver of rights form. Dillon at ¶ 59, citing State v. Davie, 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 320, 686 N.E.2d 245 (1997) and State v. Scott, 61 Ohio St.2d 155, 400 N.E.2d 375 (1980).

{¶ 56} Williams spoke with detectives on three separate occasions: twice on November 30 and once on December 3, 2017. At that time, Williams was 27 years old, had previously participated in police interviews where his Miranda rights had been read, and was familiar with the process. Williams had earned his GED in prison. Each of the interviews occurred in an interview room at the Safety Building with two detectives, neither of whom was in police uniform or armed. There was nothing coercive about the interview environment.

{¶ 57} Prior to each interview, a detective informed Williams of his Miranda rights using a Pre-Interview Form, separately reviewing each right with him. Williams acknowledged his understanding of each right. Williams read the waiver of rights portion of the form, and the detective consistently ensured that Williams understood the meaning of "coercion." During the December 3 interview, Williams asked Detective Cope to explain the portion regarding the waiver of his right to an attorney; Cope emphasized that the waiver said "at this time" and related to that particular interview, not to his case.

{¶ 58} Williams did not ask for an attorney or express any reticence about talking with the detectives. To the contrary, when Detective Roberts asked Williams to sign the waiver of rights form at beginning of the November 30 morning interview, Williams encouraged Detective Roberts to "talk to me." Additionally, Williams requested the December 3 interview. Although Williams refused to initial or sign the waiver of rights forms, the totality of circumstances demonstrated that Williams knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to each interview.

C. Voluntariness of Williams's Statements

{¶ 59} Williams further claims that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the statements he made to detectives on November 30, 2017. He argues that the detectives engaged in coercive police conduct by making improper inducements and falsely telling him that the second portion of his November 30 morning interview would not be recorded.

{¶ 60} Whether an individual knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his or her Miranda rights is a distinct issue from whether a statement was made voluntarily. State v. Eley, 77 Ohio St.3d 174, 178, 672 N.E.2d 640 (1996); State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27820, 2018-Ohio-4448, ¶ 32. Regardless of whether Miranda warnings were required and given, a defendant's statement may have been given involuntarily with the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus be subject to exclusion. State v. Kelly, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2004-CA-20, 2005-Ohio-305, ¶ 11; State v. Barker, 149 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-2708, 73 N.E.3d 365, ¶ 31 ("Constitutional principles of due process preclude the use of coerced confessions as fundamentally unfair, regardless of whether the confession is true or false.").

{¶ 61} A defendant's statements to police after a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the individual's Miranda rights are presumed to be voluntary. Brown at ¶ 33, citing Miranda. "The Miranda presumption applies to the conditions inherent in custodial interrogation that compel the suspect to confess. It does not extend to any actual coercion police might engage in, and the Due Process Clause continues to require an inquiry separate from custody considerations and compliance with Miranda regarding whether a suspect's will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding his confession." State v. Porter, 178 Ohio App.3d 304, 2008-Ohio-4627, 897 N.E.2d 1149, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.), citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000).

{¶ 62} "In deciding whether a defendant's confession is involuntarily induced, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement." State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus, overruled on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3147, 57 L.Ed.2d 1155 (1978). A defendant's statement to police is voluntary absent evidence that his or her will was overborne and his or her capacity for self-determination was critically impaired due to coercive police conduct. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987); State v. Otte, 74 Ohio St.3d 555, 562, 660 N.E.2d 711 (1996). "[T]he use of an inherently coercive tactic by police is a prerequisite to a finding of involuntariness." State v. Perez, 124 Ohio St.3d 122, 2009-Ohio-6179, 920 N.E.2d 104, ¶ 71, citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986).

{¶ 63} "Officers may discuss the advantages of telling the truth, advise suspects that cooperation will be considered, or even suggest that a court may be lenient with a truthful defendant." State v. Belton, 149 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-1581, 74 N.E.3d 319, ¶ 111; see State v. Ford, 158 Ohio St.3d 139, 2019-Ohio-4539, 140 N.E.3d 616, ¶ 198. "In addition, admonitions to tell the truth are considered neither threats nor promises and are permissible." State v. Stringham, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2002-CA-9, 2003-Ohio-1100, ¶ 16, citing State v. Loza, 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 67, 641 N.E.2d 1082 (1994). Moreover, it is not unduly coercive for a law-enforcement officer to mention potential punishments. See State v. Western, 2015-Ohio-627, 29 N.E.3d 245, ¶ 38 (2d Dist.). However, false promises of leniency and misrepresentations of potential punishments by the police are improper. State v. Jones, 2015-Ohio-4116, 43 N.E.3d 833, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 64} It is well established that police officers are not required to be entirely truthful with suspects, and lying to a suspect does not necessary constitute coercive police conduct. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969); Ford, 158 Ohio St.3d 139, 2019-Ohio-4539, 140 N.E.3d 616. As stated by the Ohio Supreme Court:

The tactic of lying to a suspect about the evidence is not in itself sufficient

to render a confession involuntary. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737-739, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (false statement that a codefendant had confessed did not make statement involuntary); Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1066, 1070 (6th Cir.1994) (false statements that defendant's fingerprints had been found at crime scene and that the victim and two witnesses had identified him did not render confession involuntary); [State v.] Bays, 87 Ohio St.3d [15,] 22-23, 716 N.E.2d 1126 [(1999)] (misleading defendant about the strength of the evidence against him did not make confession involuntary). However, the fact that the detectives misrepresented the evidence is a relevant factor in evaluating whether the totality of the circumstances renders the confession involuntary. Frazier at 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420.

Ford at ¶ 196.

{¶ 65} The Fourth District recently affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress when, after the defendant waived his Miranda rights, the investigating officers told the defendant that they were not gathering evidence or recording the interview when, in fact, they were. State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-5316, 162 N.E.3d 898 (4th Dist.). The appellate court concluded that the investigators did not use coercive police tactics during the interview. Id. at ¶ 20-27. The court's reasoning included that the defendant had been properly advised of his Miranda rights and had waived them, that he was 28 years old and had prior involvement with law enforcement, and that there was no evidence of physical deprivation, threats, improper treatment or other coercive tactics. Id. The court further reasoned that the statement that the conversation was "not evidence gathering" was made in the context of explaining that investigators already had substantial recorded evidence of the defendant's drug trafficking activities, and that he had been advised that anything he said could be used against him. Id.

{¶ 66} In general, the State has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's confession was given voluntarily. State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15, 381 N.E.2d 195 (1978); Barker, 149 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-2708, 73 N.E.3d 365, at ¶ 32, citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972).

{¶ 67} Williams asserts that the detectives engaged in several coercive police practices, warranting the suppression of his November 30 statements. He argues that the interviews were confrontational, that the detectives repeatedly misled him to believe that it would be helpful to him if he provided information, that the detectives lied about whether the conversation in the conference room was being recorded, and that the detective emphasized the lengthy sentence he would receive if he did not cooperate.

{¶ 68} Considering the totality of the circumstances, we cannot conclude that Williams's statements were made involuntarily. Williams was 27 years old when the interviews occurred. He had prior experience with the criminal justice system, including a prior prison sentence, and had voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Williams was not handcuffed during the November 30 interviews. During the second portion of the morning interview, Daugherty provided Williams a cigarette when he requested one and allowed him to smoke, even though smoking in the building was prohibited. Neither detective made any threatening actions toward Williams, and although the tone of the interviews became confrontational at times, the videos reflect that Williams was not intimidated or frightened by the detectives.

{¶ 69} Throughout the November 30 interviews, Detectives Roberts and Daugherty encouraged Williams to tell the truth, stating that they would tell the prosecutor and the judge that he had cooperated. Conversely, the detectives told Williams that they would tell the prosecutor that he had lied and not cooperated if he failed to tell them the truth about what had occurred. The detectives also suggested that he might receive a lesser sentence if he cooperated and that Williams would see his young daughter again sooner. The detectives' statements to Williams constituted permissible admonishments to tell the truth and suggestions that his cooperation could be helpful to his case. The detectives made neither promises of leniency nor misrepresentations of the law.

{¶ 70} During the second part of the morning interview, Williams asked for assistance with his housing at the jail. Detective Daugherty, a member of the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office, which also runs the Montgomery County Jail, stated that he would be willing to walk Williams to the jail and speak with the jail sergeant. However, Daugherty repeatedly told Williams that he could not guarantee any particular placement for Williams within the jail. Daugherty's offer to talk to jail personnel on Williams's behalf was neither improper nor coercive.

{¶ 71} In its decision denying Williams's motion to suppress, the trial court found "particularly troubling" Daugherty's repeated assurances that the second portion of the November 30 interview, which occurred in the conference room, was not being recorded. The trial court stated, "This can be viewed as nothing other than trickery as Det. Daugherty immediately informed Williams after leaving the interview room that the larger room had no recording capability and made a show to close the door of the interview room so that Williams knew this second part of the interview was not being recorded, though this portion was indeed audio recorded by Det. Daugherty on a county cell phone." The trial court concluded, however, that "such trickery does not per se render the statements involuntary and is but one factor bearing upon voluntariness."

{¶ 72} We share the trial court's concerns about Daugherty's reassurances regarding the lack of recording devices in the conference room, particularly when the presence of recording devices in the interview room was a significant factor in Williams's reticence to speak about others who were involved in the homicide. Nevertheless, we agree with the trial court that, viewing the totality of the circumstances, Daugherty's false reassurances did not render Williams's subsequent November 30 statements involuntary. As in Smith, 2020-Ohio-5316, 162 N.E.3d 898 (4th Dist.), where the investigators falsely told the defendant that the interview was not being recorded and was not for the purpose of evidence gathering, the detective's statements were insufficient to overbear Williams's will.

{¶ 73} Williams's first assignment of error is overruled.

III. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶ 74} In his second and third assignments of error, Williams claims that his convictions for aggravated murder, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery were based on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the evidence.

A. Evidence Presented at Trial

{¶ 75} The evidence at trial established the following facts.

{¶ 76} At 9:58 p.m. on November 28, 2017, Taelor Taylor, who was known to sell marijuana, received a call on his flip cell phone from 937-***-7615, a number later associated with Williams's phone. Soon after, Williams, Young, and two other individuals drove to Taylor's home at 20 North Trenton Street in Dayton, arriving at 10:09 p.m. While the four sat outside in an SUV, Taylor and someone using Williams's phone had three short phone conversations.

{¶ 77} At 10:14 p.m., Young exited the SUV and walked to Taylor's front porch. Surveillance video of the front yard and street showed Young counting money as he approached the porch and went up the stairs. Approximately a minute later, Williams exited the SUV and hurried to the house in a semi-crouched position holding a dark object, which detectives later identified as a revolver. Within seconds, a third individual wearing a mask exited the SUV. The driver remained in the vehicle.

{¶ 78} The shooting itself was not captured on video. However, the video showed that at 10:16 p.m., Williams appeared to lower something to the ground around the location of the front steps. Around the same time, the individual in the mask rushed into the yard and hit the unseen object with a large rifle while Williams appeared to try to stop him. Although it is difficult to see, detectives testified that they saw the rifle discharge on the video. The person in the mask then ran into the house while Williams waited outside. After a few more seconds, both Young and the person in the mask ran out of the house. The three returned to the SUV and drove away, taking money and drugs.

{¶ 79} At approximately 10:30 p.m., Darnell Maiden, a relative of Taylor, came to Taylor's home to drop off some wings from the restaurant where Maiden worked. The two had spoken earlier in the evening, and Taylor was expecting him. When Maiden arrived, he saw Taylor lying face-down on the front steps. Maiden called out to Taylor, but Taylor was unresponsive. Maiden also observed that Taylor's front door was slightly ajar and the lights were on inside. Maiden called 911.

{¶ 80} Medics arrived within a few minutes and evaluated Taylor. They declared him deceased at the scene. Officer Andrew Lane and his partner were the first police officers to arrive. At that point, Taylor was lying on his back, and Officer Lane could see a gunshot wound to his chest. The officer also observed a rifle casing on the steps next to him. Lane and his partner entered the home to check for other victims; no other individuals were found. Lane saw, however, that the living room had been ransacked, with overturned furniture and other items knocked to the floor. The officer also saw a video monitor for a surveillance system with displays for four cameras.

{¶ 81} Homicide detectives were called to the scene, and an investigation began. At 10:40 p.m., Officer Ronald Christoffers, an evidence technician, was dispatched to Taylor's residence. He photographed the scene and collected the rifle casing, bags with marijuana, a digital scale, and other items. Detective Sean Copley, who performs video and audio forensics, came to Taylor's residence to collect the surveillance system.

{¶ 82} Taylor's autopsy, conducted on November 29, determined that Taylor died from a single gunshot wound below his left breast. According to the chief deputy coroner, the bullet travelled "basically straight front to back" through his heart and aorta and stopped by his eighth vertebra. The wound was not survivable, and Taylor could have lived for approximately 30 seconds following the shooting. The chief deputy coroner observed soot in the entrance wound and outlines of the muzzle, the front sight, and an object immediately below the muzzle, which indicated that the muzzle of the gun had been held against Taylor's body when the gun was fired. The chief deputy coroner also found a faint bruise on the right side of Taylor's nose and evidence that he had suffered a "major blow" above his right ear.

{¶ 83} Additional homicide detectives assisted with the investigation starting the morning of November 29. After reviewing the surveillance video, Detective Daugherty returned to Taylor's home and learned that Taylor had a flip cell phone, which the detectives could not locate. Daugherty did an "exigent circumstances" request to obtain Taylor's cell phone records and, after receiving them, saw that Taylor had received calls from 937-***-7615 shortly before the homicide - those were the only times that the phone number appeared on Taylor's phone records. After researching the phone number, Daugherty learned that the number was associated with the TextNow app, which masks the caller's actual phone number. TextNow, however, provided the caller's IP address and had an email address for the individual who downloaded the app.

{¶ 84} Once Daugherty obtained the email address that was used to set up TextNow, he entered the email address into Facebook's search feature and discovered Williams's Facebook page. Daugherty compared the photos on Williams's Facebook account with images from the surveillance video. After an additional investigation, Daugherty learned Williams's cell phone number, and he requested location data from T-Mobile, the phone's carrier.

{¶ 85} On the morning of November 30, detectives located Williams at the home of his friend, James Glasper. Detectives Daugherty and David House arrested Williams at Glasper's home and had him transported to the Safety Building. Glasper gave the detectives permission to search the bedroom where Williams was found. Detective House located a Ruger SR9 9mm semi-automatic handgun under a mattress and a black LG cell phone. Patrick McLaughlin, firearm examiner at the Miami Valley Regional Crime Lab, testified that he tested the Ruger and it was operable.

{¶ 86} Detectives obtained a search warrant for Williams's LG cell phone, and they took the phone to Detective Isaiah Keller of the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office to extract the data. Williams's phone contained photographs taken at 9:22 p.m. on November 28 of a rifle similar to the one shown on the surveillance video.

{¶ 87} Detectives Daugherty and Roberts interviewed Williams on November 30, and at Williams's request, Detective Cope spoke with Williams on December 3, 2017. Portions of the video-recordings from those interviews were played for the jury. During the first interview with Williams on November 30, Williams did not admit to being at 20 North Trenton, and he claimed to have been with Chanel Caver. The detectives left to investigate Williams's claimed alibi. Detective House testified that Williams's cell phone records showed that Williams was in the area of 20 North Trenton when the homicide occurred. House further testified that Caver showed detectives text messages between her and Williams, which reflected that she was upset that Williams had left her at her house.

{¶ 88} Williams stated during later interviews that it was Young's idea to go to Taylor's house, that Young had called Taylor with his (Williams's) phone, and that Young first approached Taylor's front door. Williams told detectives that when Taylor came out, Young shot him. Williams admitted to laying Taylor down and staying outside while others went into Taylor's home. Williams said during an interview that he received about $500 for his participation.

{¶ 89} Several detectives testified about the weapons involved on November 28-30, 2017. Detective House stated that it was "pretty readily apparent" from the surveillance video that Williams had a hammerless revolver at the scene of Taylor's murder. House indicated that the presence of only one shell casing at the scene supported the conclusion that Williams used a revolver, which does not eject its casing. McLaughlin further testified that the bullet recovered from Taylor and the casing at the scene (a 7.62 by 39 caliber rifle casing) were different sizes. McLaughlin also opined that the Ruger did not fire the bullet recovered from Taylor's body.

{¶ 90} In addition to discussing his December 3 interview with Williams, Detective Cope identified at trial three certified judgment entries of Williams's prior convictions in Montgomery County - Case No. 2012-CR-1887/1, Case No. 2012-CR-2490, and Case No. 2012-CR-3170 - each of which involved a conviction for burglary, a felony of the third degree. Cope indicated that the identifying information on the judgment entries matched the information provided by Williams at the December 3 interview.

{¶ 91} Williams testified on his own behalf. He described his upbringing and several traumatic experiences he had had. As a teenager, while living in Virginia, he witnessed his best friend's murder and subsequently went to live with his aunt and uncle in Kettering, Ohio. When he was 18, he began living on his own. Williams indicated that he stole and sold drugs to make money, and he purchased his first gun when he was 20 years old. Williams had been to prison twice.

{¶ 92} With respect to the events of November 28, 2017, Williams testified that he was heading to Columbus from Indianapolis when he stopped by Dayton to visit with Caver. While at Caver's home, he received a call from a friend, known as White Boy, asking him to participate in a robbery. White Boy told Williams about guns that he just obtained, and Williams asked him to bring them to Caver's. White Boy, Young and another man came to Caver's home with a large rifle and 9mm and .40 caliber semi-automatic handguns. Williams took a photograph of the "big gun." Williams denied that he had a gun. White Boy and his friends left Caver's house to go to the store, then returned. They were still talking about robbing Taylor.

{¶ 93} Williams testified that when a group left to rob Taylor, he decided to go with them. Williams stated that the plan was to "go get money," not to kill anyone, but Young and White Boy gave him a gun, a small 9mm. Williams testified that Young also had a firearm. Williams, Young, a person named Willie (the person seen wearing the mask), and an unknown person drove to Taylor's home. According to Williams, White Boy remained at Caver's home.

{¶ 94} Once outside Taylor's home, Young asked Williams to borrow his phone, and Young used Williams's phone to call Taylor. Young then approached Taylor's home. Williams admitted that the video showed him running up to the house after Young, but he stated that he was holding a 9mm handgun, not a revolver. Williams testified that Taylor then came to the door with a small baggie of marijuana, at which time Young pulled out his gun. Young "kind of force [Taylor] back a little bit" and Taylor "kind of resisted." Williams testified that Young then shot Taylor. Taylor fell forward into Williams's arms, and Williams laid him on the front steps. When Willie ran up, Williams tried to stop him from hitting Taylor. Williams denied directing anyone to kill Taylor or to go into his home.

{¶ 95} The group went back to Caver's home after the robbery/homicide, and they divided the marijuana and money they had taken. Williams returned his gun to Young and White Boy. Williams left and eventually went to Glasper's home. Williams testified that he had gotten the Ruger from a friend before going to Glasper's home.

{¶ 96} Williams acknowledged that he lied to the police during his initial interview on November 30, but he testified that he was truthful when he denied shooting Taylor. On cross-examination, Williams stated that he knew that he was not allowed to have a gun, but he repeatedly had one anyway. Williams admitted that he had had the Ruger found in Glasper's bedroom and had tried to hide it. Williams also admitted again that the plan was to rob Taylor and that he and the others went armed to Taylor's home. He denied personally going into Taylor's home, taking money and drugs, and shooting Taylor.

{¶ 97} Two of Williams's relatives - Marcus McDaniel and Melitta Cherry - testified on his behalf. Neither had personal knowledge of the events of November 28, 2017. McDaniel testified that he and his wife (Williams's aunt) allowed Williams to live with them beginning in 2007 or 2008, when Williams was approximately 16 years old, after one of Williams's friends was murdered in Virginia, where Williams then lived. McDaniel described Williams as "more of a peacemaker" who tried to make sure "everyone is in peace at the house and within the family." Williams left when he was 18 years old. McDaniel testified that he was independent and was "very dedicated to try to do music." On cross-examination, McDaniel indicated that he knew Williams was involved with the courts when he (Williams) came to live with them. McDaniel was unaware of Williams's burglary convictions and did not know that Williams carried a gun. McDaniel did know, however, that Williams had been to prison.

{¶ 98} Cherry, another aunt, testified that she previously had worked as a prison guard at Indiana State Prison. She testified that Williams lived with her from September 2017, when he was released from prison, until his incarceration in this case. She stated that Williams had earned his GED in prison and had arranged employment as a landscaper upon his release. During Williams's brief stay with her, Williams acted as a mentor to Cherry's young sons and was helpful. Williams was not violent, and Cherry did not know him to carry a gun, although she knew of his history of having firearms. Cherry stated on cross-examination that she was not aware that Williams admitted to having a gun related to this offense.

B. Standards of Review for Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶ 99} "A sufficiency of the evidence argument disputes whether the State has presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go to the jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of law." State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22581, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 10, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). The relevant inquiry is whether any rational finder of fact, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430, 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997). A guilty verdict will not be disturbed on appeal unless "reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact." Id.

{¶ 100} In contrast, "[a] weight of the evidence argument challenges the believability of the evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence is more believable or persuasive." (Citation omitted.) Wilson at ¶ 12; see Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 19. When reviewing an argument challenging the weight of the evidence, an appellate court may not substitute its view for that of the trier of fact. Rather, we review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

{¶ 101} Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses at trial, we must defer to the factfinder's decisions whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses. State v. Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 476684, *4 (Aug. 22, 1997). The fact that the evidence is subject to different interpretations does not render the conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence. Wilson at ¶ 14. A judgment of conviction should be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence only in exceptional circumstances. Martin at 175.

{¶ 102} "The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively different." Thompkins at 386. However, where an appellate court determines that a conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, the conviction is necessarily based on legally sufficient evidence. State v. McLoughlin, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2017-CA-22, 2018-Ohio-2426, ¶ 8; State v. Million, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24744, 2012-Ohio-1774, ¶ 23.

C. Aggravated Murder

{¶ 103} On appeal, Williams claims that the State failed to present evidence that he acted with a purpose to kill, and thus the evidence at trial did not support his conviction for aggravated murder.

{¶ 104} Williams was convicted of aggravated murder (while committing aggravated robbery), in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B). That statute provides:

No person shall purposely cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy while committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit, kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated robbery, robbery, aggravated burglary, burglary, trespass in a habitation when a person is present or likely to be present, terrorism, or escape.

R.C. 2903.01(B).

{¶ 105} A person acts purposely "when it is the person's specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender's specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature." R.C. 2901.22(A). "The issue is what appellant intended to do at the time he committed the fatal acts[.]" State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 82, 656 N.E.2d 643 (1995).

{¶ 106} "Culpable mental states are frequently demonstrated through circumstantial evidence." State v. Hypes, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2018-CA-110, 2019-Ohio-4096, ¶ 21, quoting State v. Fox, 2018-Ohio-501, 106 N.E.3d 224, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.). Circumstantial evidence has the same probative value as direct evidence. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 272, 574 N.E.2d 482 (1991), citing State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 529 N.E.2d 1236 (1988); State v. St. John, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27988, 2019-Ohio-650, ¶ 49. In some cases, "circumstantial evidence may be more certain, satisfying, and persuasive than direct evidence." State v. Jackson, 57 Ohio St.3d 29, 38, 565 N.E.2d 549 (1991).

{¶ 107} A defendant's state of mind may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances. State v. Murphy, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27802, 2018-Ohio-3506, ¶ 16. A jury may infer purpose to cause death when a defendant inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in a manner that appears to be calculated to kill. State v. Du, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2010-CA-27, 2011-Ohio-6306, ¶ 15, citing State v. Stallings, 89 Ohio St.3d 208, 291, 731 N.E.2d 159 (2000).

{¶ 108} Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence established that Williams and three others drove to Taylor's residence to rob him. Williams and the man in a mask (Willie) both were armed with firearms when they exited the SUV and approached Taylor's home. Williams rushed to the porch of Taylor's home - in semi-crouched position and with a hammerless revolver in his right hand - approximately a minute after Young walked up to the porch. Within the next 40 seconds, Williams shot Taylor below his left breast. The gun had been held directly against Taylor's chest, and the bullet traveled "basically straight front to back" through Taylor's heart and aorta. The wound was not survivable, and death occurred quickly. After Williams laid Taylor on the steps, he put his gun in his pocket and stood looking down at Williams. Williams's actions at Taylor's residence, the nature of the gunshot wound, and the manner in which Taylor was shot supported a reasonable conclusion that Williams purposefully caused Taylor's death. Williams's conviction for aggravated murder was based on sufficient evidence.

{¶ 109} Williams denied in police interviews that he had shot and killed Taylor, and at trial, he again denied shooting Taylor. Williams testified that Young had a gun and was the shooter. Nevertheless, upon review of the evidence at trial, particularly the surveillance video, the jury could have reasonably rejected Williams's version of events. Williams's conviction for aggravated murder was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

D. Aggravated Robbery

{¶ 110} Williams argues that his conviction for aggravated robbery also should be reversed, because the State failed to prove the requisite criminal intent. He again emphasizes that his intent was to rob Taylor, not to inflict or attempt to inflict serious physical harm.

{¶ 111} Williams was convicted of Count 8 of the indictment, which alleged aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(3). R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) provides that "[n]o person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense, shall do any of the following: * * * (3) Inflict, or attempt to inflict, serious physical harm on another."

{¶ 112} The Ohio Supreme Court addressed the mental state for aggravated robbery under R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) in State v. Horner, 126 Ohio St.3d 466, 2010-Ohio-3830, 935 N.E.2d 26. Horner noted that "R.C. 2911.01(A) includes the element of attempting or committing a theft offense, which incorporates all the elements of theft, including its mental state." Id. at ¶ 49. Reviewing the various provisions in R.C. 2911.01, the supreme court concluded that, "[b]y choosing language in R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) that makes it a crime to merely inflict or attempt to inflict serious physical harm, as opposed to requiring a purpose or intent to injure," the Ohio legislature had "indicated its purpose to impose strict liability" for violating R.C. 2911.01(A)(3). Id. at ¶ 51.

{¶ 113} Williams admitted, both to detectives during the police investigation and at trial, that he went to Taylor's home with the intention of robbing him. Williams's accomplices entered the house and took drugs and money, of which Williams received a share. During the robbery, Taylor was shot and killed. The State was not required to prove that Williams intended to inflict or attempt to inflict serious physical harm to Taylor. The evidence at trial satisfied each of the elements of aggravated robbery. Williams's conviction for aggravated robbery was based on sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

E. Aggravated Burglary

{¶ 114} Williams further claims that the evidence at trial failed to support his conviction for aggravated burglary, in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(2). R.C. 2911.11(A)(2) provides:

(A) No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or separately occupied portion of an occupied structure, when another person other than an accomplice of the offender is present, with purpose to commit in the structure or in the separately secured or separately occupied portion of the structure any criminal offense, if any of the following apply:

* * * *

(2) The offender has a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control.

Williams argues that he never entered Taylor's residence, i.e., he did not trespass in an occupied structure, and that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of the requisite mens rea.

{¶ 115} Construing the evidence at trial in the State's favor, the evidence establishes that the group, including Williams, went to Taylor's home with the purpose of robbing him, a criminal offense. Both Young and the person in the mask went into Taylor's home and stole items, and the group used deadly force to do so. Williams and the person in the mask had firearms that were visible on the surveillance video. The State's evidence was sufficient to prove that Williams's accomplices trespassed by force in Taylor's home, an occupied structure, with the purpose of committing a theft offense and that they had deadly weapons on their persons during the offense.

{¶ 116} Williams emphasizes that he did not enter Taylor's home. However, R.C. 2923.03, the complicity statute, extends criminal liability to those who "aid or abet another in committing the offense" while "acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense." See R.C. 2923.03(A)(2). The complicity statute further provides that "[w]hoever violates this section is guilty of complicity in the commission of an offense, and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal offender." R.C. 2923.03(F). The State may charge complicity in terms of the complicity statute or in terms of the principal offense (aggravated burglary, in this case). See State v. Hand, 107 Ohio St.3d 378, 2006-Ohio-18, 840 N.E.2d 151, ¶ 181; State v. Portis, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28677, 2021-Ohio-608, ¶ 48. "Thus, a defendant charged with an offense may be convicted of that offense upon proof that he was complicit in its commission, even though the indictment is 'stated * * * in terms of the principal offense' and does not mention complicity." State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 251, 752 N.E.2d 940 (2002).

{¶ 117} Regardless of whether Williams entered Taylor's home, the evidence at trial demonstrated that he was complicit in the aggravated burglary committed by his accomplices. Again, the State's evidence showed that Williams went with his accomplices to Taylor's home with the intention of robbing him. Williams actively participated in the incident, rushing up to Taylor's porch with a gun in his hand. Taylor was shot, Williams laid him on the steps, and then Williams waited outside while two of his accomplices ransacked and stole items from Taylor's home. The group left together. Upon review of the evidence at trial, Williams's conviction for aggravated burglary was based on sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 118} Williams's second and third assignments of error are overruled.

IV. Prison Sentence for Aggravated Murder

{¶ 119} In his fourth assignment of error, Williams claims that "the trial court erred in sentencing [him] to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after twenty-five years." He argues that his co-defendant, Trashune Young, received an aggregate definite sentence of 18 years in prison for offenses relating to Taylor's murder, and that his (Williams's) sentence is disproportionate to Young's sentence. Williams asks that we modify his sentence to life in prison with parole eligibility after 20 years.

{¶ 120} At the outset, Williams acknowledges that his appeal from his sentence may be precluded by R.C. 2953.08(D)(3). Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(3), "[a] sentence imposed for aggravated murder or murder pursuant to sections 2929.02 to 2929.06 of the Revised Code is not subject to review under this section." (Williams was sentenced pursuant to R.C. 2929.03.) However, the scope of the preclusive language in R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) is limited to the bases of appeal described in R.C. 2953.08, and sentences imposed for aggravated murder or murder may still be appealed under other sections of the Revised Code. State v. Patrick, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6803, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 17. In its appellate brief, the State does not challenge Williams's ability to raise the disparity between his and Young's sentences. Accordingly, we will assume, for the sake of argument, that Williams's claim is properly before us.

{¶ 121} A trial court is not required to sentence co-defendants equally, particularly where there are "significant factual differences" between the co-defendants. State v. Anderson, 151 Ohio St.3d 212, 2017-Ohio-5656, 87 N.E.3d 1203, ¶ 23-25. To prevail on a claim of disproportionality, a defendant must establish that he or she and the co-defendant are similarly situated with regard to sentencing. State v. McGail, 2015-Ohio-5384, 55 N.E.3d 513, ¶ 66 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 122} In McGail, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and a firearm specification. The charges stemmed from an armed home invasion committed by McGail, Jason Sowers, and Brendon Terrel, during which Sowers shot and killed the resident. McGail received an aggregate sentence of 24 years to life in prison. As part of his appeal from his conviction, McGail claimed that his sentence was disproportionate to those received by Sowers and Terrel; Sowers, the admitted shooter, received an aggregate sentence of 18 years to life and Terrel, the lookout, received an aggregate 14-year prison term. We rejected McGail's argument, concluding that neither Sowers nor Terrel was similarly situated to McGail with regarding to sentencing. We reasoned:

* * * As part of his plea agreement, Sowers pled guilty to the same offenses as McGail, admitting guilt and agreeing to testify for the State against McGail. Sowers' admission of guilt and cooperation with the State

in its prosecution of McGail adequately explain the shorter sentence he received and distinguish his situation from McGail's. As for Terrel, he pled guilty only to aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and a firearm specification. He also testified for the State in its prosecution of McGail. Again, his admission of guilt, cooperation with the State, and the absence of a murder conviction in his case adequately explain the shorter sentence he received and distinguish his situation from McGail's. "A sentence that is appropriate for a particular criminal offense may be mitigated in recognition of a defendant's choice to waive a constitutional right and cooperate with the authorities[.]" State v. Smith, 2d Dist. Clark No. 08-CA-37, 2009-Ohio-1041, ¶ 16; see also State v. Dawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21768, 2007-Ohio-5172, ¶ 23 ("Though a court may not impose a harsher sentence than it otherwise would have imposed when the defendant elects to exercise his constitutional right to a trial, the court may impose a more lenient sentence than it otherwise would have when a defendant enters a plea of guilty or no contest[.]"). That is what occurred here.

McGail at ¶ 31.

{¶ 123} According to the judgment entry in Young's case, Young pled guilty to an amended charge of involuntary manslaughter, a felony of the first degree, with a three-year firearm specification; aggravated robbery (deadly weapon), a felony of the first degree, with a three-year firearm specification; and having weapons while under disability. The trial court imposed nine years for involuntary manslaughter and three years for aggravated robbery, to be served consecutively, and three years for having weapons while under disability, to be served concurrently. The court also imposed three years for each firearm specification, to be served prior and consecutively to the definite sentences. Young's aggregate sentence was 18 years in prison. See State v. Young, Montgomery C.P. No. 2017 CR 3825/2; Def.'s Ex. A (not admitted at trial).

{¶ 124} In contrast, Williams went to trial on 18 offenses, including aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and having weapons while under disability, plus firearm specifications. The jury found him guilty of each offense and specification. Williams received an aggregate sentence of 31 years to life in prison for aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and two counts of having weapons while under disability, plus two three-year firearm specifications.

{¶ 125} As in McGail, Young's admission of guilt and the absence of an aggravated murder conviction distinguished his situation from Williams's. Moreover, although Williams claims that Young planned the robbery and was the shooter, the evidence at trial supported a conclusion that Williams, not Young, shot Taylor. This fact, plus Williams's prior incarceration and history of rules infractions at the institution, further supported Williams's lengthier sentence.

{¶ 126} Williams's fourth assignment of error is overruled.

V. Principal Offender for Violent Offender Database

{¶ 127} In his fifth assignment of error, Williams claims that the trial court erred in determining him to be the principal offender for purpose of enrollment in the violent offender database (VOD).

{¶ 128} Senate Bill 231, known as Sierah's Law, established a statewide violent offender database, along with the legal presumption that offenders convicted of certain violent crimes must enroll in the database for a period of 10 years following their release from prison. See R.C. 2903.41 through R.C. 2903.43 (effective Mar. 20, 2019); State v. Irvin, 2020-Ohio-4847, 160 N.E.3d 388, ¶ 30 (2d Dist.). For purposes of Williams's case, the term "violent offender" includes a "person who on or after the effective date of this section is convicted of or pleads guilty to" aggravated murder. R.C. 2903.41(A)(1)(a).

{¶ 129} The presumption that a person classified as a violent offender must enroll in the violent offender database is rebuttable. R.C. 2903.42(A)(1). To rebut the presumption, Williams first was required to file a motion with the trial court, prior to or at sentencing, asserting that he was not the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder and requesting that the court not require him to enroll in the violent offender database and not have all VOD duties with respect to that offense. R.C. 2903.42(A)(2)(a). Williams bore the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder. R.C. 2903.42(A)(4).

{¶ 130} If the violent offender proves that he or she was not the principal offender, the court must "continue the hearing for the purpose of determining whether the offender, notwithstanding the rebuttal of the presumption, should be required to enroll in the violent offender database and have all VOD duties with respect to that offense." R.C. 2903.42(A)(4)(a).

{¶ 131} On October 22, 2019, Williams requested a hearing on the presumption that he must enroll in the violent offender database. The court conducted a hearing on the motion on November 18, 2019.

{¶ 132} Williams offered two exhibits, both from Young's criminal case related to Taylor's murder: (1) the plea form for having weapons while under disability and (2) the court's finding of guilt on involuntary manslaughter, which was charged by bill of information. Williams also testified at the hearing, repeating that he was present for the offense and that he had a firearm, but denying that he shot Taylor. Williams again stated that the plan was to rob Taylor. Williams acknowledged that he had a prior conviction for burglary, but he did not have a gun when committing that offense. He also testified that his past convictions for having weapons while under disability did not stem from using a gun in the commission of another offense. Williams stated that he was shot when he was 21 years old and he began carrying a gun soon after.

{¶ 133} The State did not present any testimony at the hearing. Instead, the prosecutor asked the court to consider the testimony and exhibits presented at trial, including Williams's admissions to having three prior convictions each for burglary and having weapons while under disability, Williams's role in the events of November 28, 2017, and the surveillance video. Williams's counsel had no objection.

{¶ 134} A few days later, the trial court issued a written decision finding that Williams did not meet his burden to prove that he was not the principal offender of the aggravated murder and murder offenses. The court reasoned:

Williams testified that he did not shoot Taelor Taylor ("Taelor"), but rather that his co-defendant, Trashune Young ("Young"), shot Taelor. Williams explained that Young used his own gun to shoot Taelor and did not use Williams's gun. However, in the surveillance video, which was admitted

into evidence at the jury trial, Young is never seen holding a gun and there is no bulge anywhere on his person that would indicate he has a gun hidden on his person. Williams, though, is seen holding a gun while going to the house, while exiting the house, and while standing near Taelor's body, which falls shortly after Williams enters the porch. In considering all of the evidence, particularly the evidence from the surveillance video, the Court does not find Williams to be credible.

{¶ 135} The trial court's conclusion is supported by the record. The fact that Young entered a negotiated plea to involuntary manslaughter did not preclude the trial court from concluding that Williams was the principal offender in the aggravated murder.

{¶ 136} As a final matter, Williams notes that the events in this case occurred on November 28, 2017, prior to the violent offender statutes' March 20, 2019 effective date. His appellate brief indicates that Ohio appellate districts have reached different conclusions as to whether retroactive application of the violent offender database statutes violates the Retroactivity Clause in Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution. The Ohio Supreme Court has found that a conflict exists between judgments of the Fifth and Twelfth Districts and has accepted this issue for appeal. See 7/01/2020 Case Announcements, 2020-Ohio-3473 (finding State v. Hubbard, 2020-Ohio-856, 146 N.E.3d 594 (12th Dist.) to be in conflict with State v. Jarvis, 2020-Ohio-1127, 152 N.E.3d 1225 (5th Dist.)).

{¶ 137} "As a general rule, a constitutional argument not raised in the trial court is 'waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.' " State v. Barnes, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28613, 2020-Ohio-4150, ¶ 31, quoting State v. Brewer, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26153, 2015-Ohio-693, ¶ 36. Nevertheless, reviewing courts have discretion to consider a waived constitutional challenge to a statute "where the rights and interests involved may warrant it." State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 16, quoting In re M.D., 38 Ohio St.3d 149, 527 N.E.2d 286 (1988), syllabus; State v. Ropp, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2018-CA-44, 2020-Ohio-824, ¶ 61.

{¶ 138} Williams did not raise a constitutional challenge to the violent offender database statutes in the trial court. However, in the exercise of our discretion, we find it appropriate to address Williams's retroactivity argument.

{¶ 139} The Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution prohibits the Ohio legislature from passing retroactive laws and protects vested rights from new legislative encroachments. Bielat v. Bielat, 87 Ohio St.3d 350, 352, 721 N.E.2d 28 (2000). "The retroactivity clause nullifies those new laws that 'reach back and create new burdens, new duties, new obligations, or new liabilities not existing at the time [the statute becomes effective].' " Id. at 352-353, quoting Miller v. Hixson, 64 Ohio St. 39, 51, 59 N.E. 749 (1901). However, not all retroactive laws are forbidden. Id. at 353; In re Forfeiture of Property of Astin, 2018-Ohio-1723, 111 N.E.3d 894, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 140} The Ohio Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test for determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally retroactive. The first step is to determine whether the Ohio legislature expressly intended the statute to apply retroactively. Bielat at 353. Unless expressly made retroactive, a statute has prospective application. R.C. 1.48. See also Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 105, 522 N.E.2d 489 (1988). If the legislature expressly intended the statute to apply retroactively, the second step is to determine whether the statute is substantive, as opposed to merely remedial. Bielat at 353. A statute that both applies retroactively and is substantive violates the Retroactivity Clause. Id.

{¶ 141} By its express language, the violent offender statutes apply to individuals who were convicted of certain offenses prior to the effective date of the statute. We conclude, as have other Ohio appellate districts, that the Ohio legislature expressly intended for the statutes to apply retroactively. See, e.g., Jarvis, 2020-Ohio-1127, 152 N.E.3d 1225, at ¶ 19-20; State v. Morgan, 2020-Ohio-3955, 156 N.E.3d 989, ¶ 19-21 (9th Dist.).

{¶ 142} The First, Sixth, Ninth, and Twelfth Districts have concluded that the violent offender statutes are remedial in nature and therefore constitutional. See State v. Rike, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190401, 2020-Ohio-4690; State v. Lamb, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1177, 2021-Ohio-87; Morgan; Hubbard, 2020-Ohio-856, 146 N.E.3d 593. As stated in Hubbard, "The violent-offender enrollment statutes do not increase the punishment for the specified violent offenses of aggravated murder, murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, or abduction as a second-degree felony. Rather, classification as a violent offender and enrollment into the violent offender database 'is a collateral consequence of the offender's criminal acts rather than a form of punishment per se.' " Hubbard at ¶ 32, quoting State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110. ¶ 34.

{¶ 143} In reaching this conclusion, other appellate districts have compared the violent offender database statutes with the provisions of sex offender registration statutes, R.C. Chapter 2950, and the arson-offender registration requirements set forth in R.C. 2909.13, R.C. 2909.14, and R.C. 2909.15. After careful consideration, we similarly conclude that the VOD statutes are akin to the registration requirements under the arson-offender registration statutes, which have been found to be remedial in nature, and are not as onerous as those under the Adam Walsh Act, which have been found to be punitive. See Rike; Lamb; Morgan; and Hubbard; see also State v. Jackson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-393, 2020-Ohio-4115, ¶ 8 (stating that the VOD registration requirements were "much more akin" to Megan's Law than to the Adam Walsh Act, but concluding that the constitutional issue was not ripe for review).

{¶ 144} Addressing a challenge to the violent offender database statutes as violative of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, we also previously noted:

As pointed out by the Twelfth District Court of Appeals in Hubbard, the requirements for violent offenders are even less onerous than those for sex offenders. First, the court noted that a sex offender cannot challenge his or her classification, while a violent offender may present evidence to rebut the presumption of enrollment. Id. at ¶ 34. Next, a violent offender need not register as often as a sex offender. Hubbard at ¶ 35. And, while a sex offender may have to register in multiple counties, a violent offender need register only in his or her county of residence. Id. Further, sex offenders have residence restrictions that are not applicable to violent offenders. Id.

Irvin, 2020-Ohio-4847, 160 N.E.3d 388, ¶ 33, appeal allowed, 161 Ohio St.3d 1416, 2021-Ohio-120, 161 N.E.3d 711. Upon review of the requirements imposed by the VOD statutes, we conclude that those statutes are remedial in nature and are not unconstitutionally retroactive.

{¶ 145} Williams's fifth assignment of error is overruled.

VI. Conclusion

{¶ 146} The trial court's judgment will be affirmed. TUCKER, P.J. and HALL, J., concur. Copies sent to: Mathias H. Heck, Jr.
Andrew T. French
David R. Miles
Hon. Michael W. Krumholtz