Opinion
I.D. No. 9803018202B.
Submitted: September 2, 2008.
Decided: September 19, 2008.
UPON CONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANT'S SIXTH PRO SE MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF.
SUMMARILY DISMISSEDThis 19th day of September, 2008, it appears to the Court that:
1. On August 19, 1999, a jury convicted David M. Williams ("Williams") of two counts of Attempted Burglary in the Second Degree, Possession of Burglar's Tools, and Criminal Mischief. Based upon his prior criminal history, Williams was declared a habitual offender. On October 8, 1999, Williams was sentenced pursuant to the habitual offenders statute to twelve years of Level V incarceration. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Williams's convictions on appeal.
See 11 Del. C. §§ 825(1), 828(1), 811(a)(1).
Docket 11; see 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).
Docket 10.
Williams v. State, 2000 WL 975057 (Del. May 30, 2000).
2. Williams filed this, his sixth pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief, on September 2, 2008. The instant motion contains the following statements, asserted as grounds for relief: (1) that the "prosecutor states he should have filed 4214 in different case number"; (2) that there was a "[p]rejudicial error of amendment" because "production of sentence worksheet replaces motion 4214a"; and (3) that a "motion before judge cannot be changed by prothonotary." In addition, the motion cites to Superior Court Criminal Rule 32 and to § 4214 of the habitual offenders statute. No further factual or explanatory information appears in the motion.
See Docket 70.
3. Before addressing the substantive merits of any claim for postconviction relief, the Court must determine whether the defendant has satisfied the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). In order to protect the procedural integrity of Delaware's rules, the Court will not consider the merits of a postconviction claim that fails any of Rule 61's procedural requirements. In such cases, the Court may summarily dismiss the defendant's claim "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief."
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). See also Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991); State v. Mayfield, 2003 WL 21267422, at *2 (Del.Super. June 2, 2003).
State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790951, at *3 (Del.Super. Dec. 28, 1995) (citing Younger, 580 A.2d at 554).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4).
4. Rule 61(i) establishes four procedural bars to motions for postconviction relief: (1) the motion must be filed within three years of a final judgment of conviction; (2) any grounds for relief which were not asserted previously in any prior postconviction proceeding are barred; (3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules; and (4) any basis for relief must not have been formerly adjudicated in any proceeding. However, a defect under Rule 61(i)(1), (2), or (3) will not bar a movant's "claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or . . . a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity, or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction." In addition, the procedural bars of (2) and (4) may be overcome if "reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice."
The motion must be filed within three years if the final order of conviction occurred before July 1, 2005, and within one year if the final order of conviction occurred on or after July 1, 2005. See Rule 61, annot. Effect of amendments.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
5. The Court can discern no comprehensible grounds for relief stated in Williams's motion. Moreover, the motion is procedurally barred under Rule 61, as it was filed more than three years after Williams's convictions became final and asserts or attempts to assert bases for relief not raised at trial or on direct appeal. Nothing in Williams's motion suggests a miscarriage of justice warranting consideration of the merits of his motion despite these procedural bars.
6. Finally, the Court notes that this is Williams's twelfth motion seeking to reduce, modify, or vacate his sentence or seeking postconviction relief, and that all eleven previous motions have been denied. As this Court emphasized in its order summarily denying Williams's previous motion for postconviction relief, repetitive motions for relief will not receive consideration. 7. Because Williams's motion does not present any comprehensible claims, and because any claims present would be procedurally barred, it plainly appears to the Court that he is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, his Motion for Postconviction Relief is hereby SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
See Docket 65, at 2.