Opinion
2 CA-CR 2024-0009-PR
05-16-2024
The State of Arizona, Respondent, v. David Dwayne Watson, Petitioner.
Law Office of Paul S. Banales, Marana By Paul S. Banales Counsel for Petitioner
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Pima County No. CR20151542001 The Honorable Cynthia T. Kuhn, Judge
Law Office of Paul S. Banales, Marana By Paul S. Banales Counsel for Petitioner
Presiding Judge Brearcliffe authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Eckerstrom and Judge Kelly concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BREARCLIFFE, PRESIDING JUDGE
¶1 Petitioner David Watson seeks review of the trial court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. "We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief absent a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Ainsworth, 250 Ariz. 457, ¶ 1 (App. 2021) (quoting State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶ 4 (App. 2007)). Watson has not sustained his burden of establishing such abuse here.
¶2 Watson was charged in 2015 with the murder of his former wife, alleged to have occurred in August 2000, and the subsequent murder of his former wife's mother and her friend, alleged to have happened in May 2003. Watson's first jury trial ended in a mistrial, when the jurors were unable to reach a verdict. After a second trial, he was convicted of second-degree murder and two counts of first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of release for twenty-five years on each count of first-degree murder and sixteen years' imprisonment on the second-degree murder count, all to be served consecutively. This court affirmed the convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. Watson, No. 2 CA-CR 2017-0171 (Ariz. App. Oct. 31, 2019) (mem. decision).
¶3 Our supreme court granted in part his subsequent petition for review, vacating portions of our decision relating to claims of prosecutorial misconduct Watson had raised on appeal. The court directed us "to reconsider the prosecutorial misconduct issue" in light of its decision in State v. Vargas, 249 Ariz. 186 (2020). We did so and again affirmed Watson's convictions and sentences. State v. Watson, No. 2 CA-CR 2017-0171, ¶ 15 (Ariz. App. Jan. 22, 2021) (mem. decision).
¶4 Watson initiated a proceeding for post-conviction relief, arguing in his petition that he had received ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. He argued trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to reassert before or during his second trial a motion to sever the charges related to the 2000 murder of his former wife from those arising from the 2003 murders. He further maintained that appellate counsel had been ineffective in failing to raise the denial of the motion to sever on appeal. The trial court summarily denied relief.
¶5 On review, Watson argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying relief, asserting that because "the ruling denying severance was not a sure thing," "any reasonably competent attorney would have renewed the motion to sever." And he maintains appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the claim on appeal because "even with fundamental error" review it "was a much stronger . . . argument than others selected" by counsel.
¶6 "To state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards and that this deficiency prejudiced the defendant." State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, ¶ 21 (2006); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Kolmann, 239 Ariz. 157, ¶ 9 (2016). "To establish deficient performance, a defendant must show that his counsel's assistance was not reasonable under prevailing professional norms, 'considering all the circumstances.'" Kolmann, 239 Ariz. 157, ¶ 9 (quoting Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 273 (2014)). "To establish prejudice, a defendant must 'show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Id. (quoting Hinton, 571 U.S. at 273).
¶7 In a thorough, well-reasoned minute entry, the trial court determined Watson had not established either that counsel's performance had been deficient or that he had been prejudiced by any alleged failure. We cannot say the court abused its discretion in so concluding or in denying Watson's petition for post-conviction relief. The court clearly identified the claims Watson had raised and resolved them correctly in its minute entry, which we adopt. See State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274 (App. 1993) (when trial court has correctly ruled on issues raised "in a fashion that will allow any court in the future to understand the resolution[, n]o useful purpose would be served by this court rehashing the trial court's correct ruling in a written decision").
¶8 We grant the petition for review, but deny relief.