Opinion
(AC 16560)
SYLLABUS
Following oral argument in this court on the appeal from his robbery conviction, the defendant filed a motion for permission to file a supplemental brief to challenge certain jury instructions in light of a recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Because this court is bound by the decisions of the state Supreme Court, which has consistently approved the jury instruction sought to be challenged and because, therefore, that issue would not affect the decision here, the defendant's motion was denied.
Considered January 28, 1998
Officially released February 9, 1998
February 9, 1998, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Information charging the defendant, in the first part, with two counts of the crime of robbery in the first degree and, in the second part, with being a persistent dangerous felony offender, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield and tried to the jury before Maiocco, J.; verdict of guilty; thereafter, the court found that the defendant was a persistent dangerous felony offender and rendered judgment on the verdict, from which the defendant appealed to this court; thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for permission to file a supplemental brief. Motion denied.
Mark Rademacher, assistant public defender, in support of the motion.
OPINION
The defendant has filed a motion for permission to file a supplemental brief in this pending case in light of United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1997). We deny the defendant's motion.
In Doyle, the defendants appealed from a judgment of conviction, arguing that the District Court committed reversible error when it instructed the jury that the reasonable doubt standard and the presumption of innocence were rules "designed to protect the innocent and not the guilty." Id., 533. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the defendants and held that such a jury charge "incorrectly states both the reasonable doubt standard and the presumption of innocence." Id., 538.
In light of the decision in Doyle, the defendant in the present case now seeks to file a supplemental brief. More specifically, the defendant now seeks to challenge the trial court's jury instructions, which contained a provision identical to the provision challenged in Doyle.
Our Supreme Court has consistently approved jury instructions that provide that the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard are rules of law "designed to protect the innocent and not the guilty." See, e.g., State v. Stanley, 223 Conn. 674, 695-96, 613 A.2d 788 (1992); State v. Thomas, 214 Conn. 118, 119-20, 570 A.2d 1123 (1990). Because we are bound by the decisions of our Supreme Court; State v. Vas, 44 Conn. App. 70, 78, 687 A.2d 1295, cert. denied, 240 Conn. 910, 689 A.2d 474 (1997); and not the decisions of the United States Courts of Appeal; see State v. Sebastian, 243 Conn. 115, 139, 701 A.2d 13 (1997); the issue that the defendant seeks to brief would not affect our decision in this case.