Opinion
A24-0091
07-31-2024
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Daniel Paul Wateski, Appellant.
Olmsted County District Court File No. 55-CR-18-3463
Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Schmidt, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Jon Schmidt Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In this appeal from an order revoking probation, appellant Daniel Paul Wateski argues the district court abused its discretion by revoking probation when it determined that his violation for failing to complete treatment was intentional and inexcusable.
2. Wateski had been on probation since 2018. One condition of Wateski's probation required him to complete any recommended treatment programming.
3. Wateski successfully completed the Olmsted County Drug Court Program in early 2020. But Wateski violated his probation in February 2022 by failing to remain sober. Wateski then violated his probation three more times in 2022. After Wateski's fourth probation violation, in November 2022, the district court required Wateski to successfully complete a chemical-dependency treatment program and to comply with all after-care recommendations.
4. The violation that the district court used to revoke probation occurred in August 2023 for failure to notify his probation officer of a change of address, failure to complete treatment, and leaving the state without the approval of his probation officer. Wateski successfully completed chemical-dependency treatment in March 2023, but relapsed shortly after. He was admitted to a relapse-prevention group in April 2023, but was unsuccessfully discharged in July 2023 because he required a higher level of care. Wateski had been residing at a treatment home in Rochester, but probation discovered in June 2023 that the treatment home had discharged Wateski after he left the program without permission.
5. Given the new alleged violations, corrections recommended that Wateski's sentence be executed, and that he be committed to the Commissioner of Corrections for a period of 115 months. Wateski denied the violations and the district court held a contested hearing in October 2023.
6. Wateski's probation officer testified at the hearing, noting that Wateski missed a probation meeting in June 2023. After the missed meeting, the probation officer learned that Wateski had been discharged from the Rochester treatment home after leaving against staff advice. The probation officer had no contact with Wateski until he appeared in court after being arrested on his probation-violation warrant.
7. The probation officer also learned that Wateski had been arrested in South Dakota and Wisconsin. Although Wateski was supposed to report to a facility with a higher level of care after being unsuccessfully discharged from the relapse-prevention group in June 2023, Wateski had not followed through. No probation officer spoke with Wateski about, or directed him to engage in, a higher level of care, and no probation officer had any conversation with the relapse-prevention group about Wateski attending a higher level of care.
8. In addition, the relapse-prevention group had referred Wateski to a facility in South Dakota. But Wateski never spoke to, or received permission from, his probation officer to leave the State of Minnesota. Considering Wateski was subject to a travel restriction as a condition of his probation, Wateski's actions of leaving Minnesota constituted an additional violation.
9. Wateski testified at the contested hearing and admitted that he did not have permission from his probation officer to attend treatment in South Dakota and that he made no attempt to contact his probation officer to obtain permission. Wateski testified that, after being discharged from the relapse-prevention group, he unsuccessfully attempted to get into a different treatment facility. Wateski admitted, however, that the South Dakota treatment facility had a bed available for him. Wateski acknowledged that he was arrested near the middle of South Dakota, but the treatment facility was located near the western edge of the state. Wateski also admitted that he never went to the South Dakota treatment facility.
10. The district court noted the "huge gap" in time between when Wateski was discharged from the relapse-prevention group and his arrest in South Dakota. The court asked for clarification regarding what Wateski was doing during that period. Wateski candidly conceded that during the time between his discharge and arrest he was "using" with his wife. Wateski also testified that he knew he was supposed to get into treatment but that he was using methamphetamine daily before he left for South Dakota on July 15.
11. The district court found that, after Wateski's prior violation, the court had ordered him to "go directly to treatment" and "complete treatment and aftercare." The district court noted that Wateski did enter treatment but was unsuccessfully discharged and referred to a higher-care facility. The court further found that Wateski never did enter the higher-care facility.
12. The district court concluded that:
[Wateski] did not cooperate with completing treatment as ordered by [the district court] ....He acknowledges that he was to complete inpatient treatment, and he has not provided any sort of excuse that would justify his failure to comply with the obligation to complete treatment and aftercare. His testimony is not credible for the reasons articulate[d] by the [court]. He has not complied-or did not comply with the condition to complete treatment and aftercare, not only the general provision contained within the sentencing order, the original sentencing order which controls, but also [the district court's] directive from the November 29, 2022 revocation hearing. The State has met its burden of proof. [Wateski] did not comply with this condition of probation. His failure to do so was intentional and inexcusable.
13. The district court found that Wateski left the Rochester treatment home without alerting his probation officer and that Wateski was arrested in Wisconsin, but noted that "those two violations in and of themselves" were not why the court executed his sentence. Instead, the district court found that the "most serious" violation was Wateski's failure to report to a higher-care facility.
14. The district court revoked Wateski's probation and executed his 115-month sentence. Wateski appeals the revocation of his probation.
15. "The [district] court has broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). A district court abuses its discretion if its findings of fact are unsupported by the record or if it improperly applies the law. See Honke v. Honke, 960 N.W.2d 261, 265 (Minn. 2021). We defer to the district court's credibility determinations. State v. Losh, 694 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Minn.App. 2005), aff'd, 721 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 2006).
16. "The purpose of probation is rehabilitation and revocation should be used only as a last resort when treatment has failed." Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. Courts must balance the probationer's interest in freedom and the state's interest in insuring his rehabilitation and public safety. Id. Before probation can be revoked, the district court must designate the specific condition that was violated, find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable, and find that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. Id.
17. Wateski only challenges the district court's finding that the violation was intentional or inexcusable. Wateski asserts that the state did not meet its burden to provethat his violation for not entering treatment was inexcusable because he was unable to attend treatment in South Dakota without an express travel permit from probation.
Wateski asserts that respondent State of Minnesota had to prove that the violation was both intentional and inexcusable. But that argument runs afoul of the relevant caselaw. See, e.g., Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250 (providing that a district court must determine whether a probationer's violation was "intentional or inexcusable" (emphasis added)); see also State v. Davis, No. A20-0448, 2021 WL 416410, at *5 (Minn.App. Feb. 8, 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 28, 2021); State v. Jackson, No. A20-0782, 2021 WL 21437, at *2 (Minn.App. Jan. 4, 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 2021). This court recently rejected a similar argument. State v. Coley, No. A23-1170, 2024 WL 1987640, at *3 (Minn.App. May 6, 2024) (providing that "because the two parts of the second factor are stated in the disjunctive, the district court is not required to find that a violation is both intentional and inexcusable"). These nonprecedential cases are persuasive to the resolution of Wateski's argument on this issue. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
Wateski also presents arguments regarding the burden of proof as it relates to the Austin factors. However, Wateski conflates the state's burden to prove a violation by clear and convincing evidence, State v. Cottew, 746 N.W.2d 632, 636 (Minn. 2008) (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 3), with the findings a district court must make in revoking probation. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. The state has no burden of proof regarding the Austin factors because they are simply findings the district court must make in revoking probation. The state bears the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the violation occurred. Cottew, 746 N.W.2d at 636 . If the state satisfies that burden, the district court then applies the Austin factors by finding the specific condition or conditions that were violated, whether the violation was intentional or inexcusable, and whether the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. The state is not required to meet an additional burden after proving the violation occurred.
18. In his brief, Wateski concedes that his violation was intentional. The district court's finding that the violation was intentional is also supported by the record because testimony revealed that Wateski knew he was referred to the treatment program in South Dakota but never went to the South Dakota treatment facility and, instead, used controlled substances on a daily basis. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Wateski's violation was intentional. We could affirm on this basis alone, but we will also address Wateski's argument that the violation was excusable.
19. Wateski also argues that his failure to attend treatment at the South Dakota treatment facility was “excusable” because of the “conflict” between the referral to the South Dakota facility and the travel restriction that required him to obtain permission from probation before leaving the state. But the district court found-and Wateski admitted-that Wateski did not make any attempts to contact his probation officer to obtain permission to attend treatment in South Dakota. Wateski could have attended treatment in South Dakota; he simply needed to obtain permission from his probation officer before leaving the state to do so. But Wateski never sought that permission. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Wateski's violation was inexcusable.
20. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Wateski's violation was both intentional and inexcusable, the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Wateski's probation.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order revoking Wateski's probation is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.