(Emphasis original). See also, State v. Wallace, 321 So.2d 349 (La. 1975), (on rehearing); United States v. McHan, 101 F.3d 1027 (4th Cir. 1996); Roberson, supra; Irvine, supra; Turner, supra; Plummer, supra. Simply stated, statutory compulsion is necessary to trigger the protections of Kastigar and Murphy.
The Court held the district attorney's statement sufficiently advised defendant that the decision to testify was his and that the state would not compel his testimony. In State v. Wallace, 321 So.2d 349 (La. 1975), the defendant, an attorney, was subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury, and his testimony later was used by a state grand jury to indict him for conspiracy to commit public bribery. The trial court sustained defendant's motion to quash the indictment.
Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79, 84 S.Ct. at 1609-1610. The holding in Murphy was cited with approval in State v. Wallace, 321 So.2d 349, 357 (La. 1975) (on rehearing), wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court stated: But the prosecution may compel a witness to testify against himself only if it guarantees that his testimony will not be used against him in any judicial proceedings, except for perjury in giving such testimony; an immunity statute is constitutional only if its scope is coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination.
Nevertheless, this court historically has protected the privilege against self-incrimination of witnesses compelled to appear and testify before grand juries. See State v. Harrell, 228 La. 434, 82 So.2d 701 (La. 1955); State v. Wallace, 321 So.2d 349 (La. 1975). Even before the Miranda decision, this court recognized that a targeted person who is required to appear before a grand jury (performing its inquisitional role in the prosecution) should formally be advised of the privilege against self-incrimination. Absent a waiver of the privilege or a grant of immunity, this court treated the questioning of a potential defendant before a grand jury as an infringement of his privilege against self-incrimination.
The privilege against self-incrimination is personal to the defendant. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438, 95 L.Ed. 344 (1951); McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90, 26 S.Ct. 385, 50 L.Ed. 671 (1906); State v. Wallace, La., 321 So.2d 349 (1975). He may waive it, if he so desires, even contrary to the instructions of his attorney.
Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79, 84 S.Ct. at 1609-1610. The holding in Murphy was cited with approval in State v. Wallace, 321 So.2d 349, 357 (La. 1975) (on rehearing), wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court stated: But the prosecution may compel a witness to testify against himself only if it guarantees that his testimony will not be used against him in any judicial proceedings, except for perjury in giving such testimony; an immunity statute is constitutional only if its scope is coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination.