RCW 9.94A.525(3). ¶22 Interpreting a former version of this provision, Division One of this court held in State v. Villegas , 72 Wash. App. 34, 40, 863 P.2d 560 (1993), that "out-of-state convictions" includes "all non-Washington convictions, including federal convictions." At the time, the provision did not include any reference to federal convictions; it read, "Out-of-state convictions for offenses shall be classified according to the comparable offense definitions and sentences provided by Washington law."
See RCW 9.94A.360(1); RCW 9.94A.030(27)(a)(ii); see also State v. Villegas, 72 Wn. App. 34, 36, 863 P.2d 560 (1993) ("The offender score is based on prior criminal history, RCW 9.94A.030(12), and is calculated pursuant to RCW 9.94A.360."). Criminal history is defined as "the list of a defendant's prior convictions, whether in this state, in federal court, or elsewhere."
Acosta, 101 Wn.2d at 616.Morley, 134 Wn.2d at 602 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Villegas, 72 Wn. App. 34, 38-39, 863 P.2d 560 (1993)); RCW 9.94A.525. ¶9 The second foundation for Jordan's argument is that the comparability of a foreign conviction depends in part on whether defenses available in Washington were available in the state of conviction.
In re Post Sentencing Review of Charles, 135 Wn.2d 239, 245, 955 P.2d 798 (1998) (holding that the application of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), including its sentencing provisions, is a question of law that is reviewed de novo). State v. Villegas, 72 Wn. App. 34, 37, 863 P.2d 560 (1993), review denied, 124 Wn.2d 1002 (1994). State v. Young, 125 Wn.2d 688, 694, 888 P.2d 142 (1995).
¶ 13 We have repeatedly recognized that the legislature purposefully created the SRA scheme broadly in order to “ ‘ensure that defendants with equivalent prior convictions are treated “the same way, regardless of whether their prior convictions were incurred in Washington or elsewhere.” ’ ” State v. Morley, 134 Wash.2d 588, 602, 952 P.2d 167 (1998) (quoting State v. Villegas, 72 Wash.App. 34, 38–39, 863 P.2d 560 (1993) (quoting State v. Weiand, 66 Wash.App. 29, 34, 831 P.2d 749 (1992))). The SRA instructs that “[o]ut-of-state convictions for offenses shall be classified according to the comparable offense definitions and sentences provided by Washington law.”
Defendants with equivalent prior convictions are to be treated the same way, regardless of where their convictions occurred. State v. Villegas, 72 Wn. App. 34, 38-39, 863 P.2d 560 (1993).
"The purpose of the offender score statute 'is to ensure that defendants with equivalent prior convictions are treated the same way, regardless of whether their prior convictions were incurred in Washington or elsewhere.'" Id. at 602 (quoting State v. Villegas, 72 Wn.App. 34, 38-39, 863 P.2d 560 (1993)).
This statute exists " ‘to ensure that defendants with equivalent prior convictions are treated the same way, regardless of whether their prior convictions were incurred in Washington or elsewhere.’ " State v. Morley, 134 Wash.2d 588, 602, 952 P.2d 167 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Villegas, 72 Wash. App. 34, 38–39, 863 P.2d 560 (1993) ). We review the trial court's comparability analysis in calculating an offender score de novo.
Our Supreme Court held that the military court-martial should be included, and noted that "[t]he purpose of the offender score statute 'is to ensure that defendants with equivalent prior convictions are treated the same way, regardless of whether their prior convictions were incurred in Washington or elsewhere.' " 134 Wash.2d at 602, 952 P.2d 167 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Villegas , 72 Wash.App. 34, 38–39, 863 P.2d 560 (1993) ).
Chapter 10.99 RCW should be construed as a whole without placing undue emphasis on individual provisions of the statute. State v. Villegas, 72 Wash.App. 34, 38–39, 863 P.2d 560(1993). ¶ 25 RCW 10.99.040(2)(a) authorizes a court to enter a no-contact order when a person is charged with a crime involving domestic violence.