State v. Villegas

15 Citing cases

  1. State v. Lewis

    541 P.3d 1051 (Wash. Ct. App. 2024)

    RCW 9.94A.525(3). ¶22 Interpreting a former version of this provision, Division One of this court held in State v. Villegas , 72 Wash. App. 34, 40, 863 P.2d 560 (1993), that "out-of-state convictions" includes "all non-Washington convictions, including federal convictions." At the time, the provision did not include any reference to federal convictions; it read, "Out-of-state convictions for offenses shall be classified according to the comparable offense definitions and sentences provided by Washington law."

  2. State v. Morley

    134 Wn. 2d 588 (Wash. 1998)   Cited 183 times
    Holding that courts could count a general court martial as a prior conviction for sentencing purposes, despite the fact that military courts did not provide various constitutional protections, including the requirement for a unanimous verdict

    See RCW 9.94A.360(1); RCW 9.94A.030(27)(a)(ii); see also State v. Villegas, 72 Wn. App. 34, 36, 863 P.2d 560 (1993) ("The offender score is based on prior criminal history, RCW 9.94A.030(12), and is calculated pursuant to RCW 9.94A.360."). Criminal history is defined as "the list of a defendant's prior convictions, whether in this state, in federal court, or elsewhere."

  3. State v. Jordan

    158 Wn. App. 297 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 13 times

    Acosta, 101 Wn.2d at 616.Morley, 134 Wn.2d at 602 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Villegas, 72 Wn. App. 34, 38-39, 863 P.2d 560 (1993)); RCW 9.94A.525. ¶9 The second foundation for Jordan's argument is that the comparability of a foreign conviction depends in part on whether defenses available in Washington were available in the state of conviction.

  4. State v. Keller

    98 Wn. App. 381 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 18 times

    In re Post Sentencing Review of Charles, 135 Wn.2d 239, 245, 955 P.2d 798 (1998) (holding that the application of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), including its sentencing provisions, is a question of law that is reviewed de novo). State v. Villegas, 72 Wn. App. 34, 37, 863 P.2d 560 (1993), review denied, 124 Wn.2d 1002 (1994). State v. Young, 125 Wn.2d 688, 694, 888 P.2d 142 (1995).

  5. State v. Jordan

    180 Wn. 2d 456 (Wash. 2014)   Cited 27 times
    Indicating that Article I, Section 3 has been treated as coextensive with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

    ¶ 13 We have repeatedly recognized that the legislature purposefully created the SRA scheme broadly in order to “ ‘ensure that defendants with equivalent prior convictions are treated “the same way, regardless of whether their prior convictions were incurred in Washington or elsewhere.” ’ ” State v. Morley, 134 Wash.2d 588, 602, 952 P.2d 167 (1998) (quoting State v. Villegas, 72 Wash.App. 34, 38–39, 863 P.2d 560 (1993) (quoting State v. Weiand, 66 Wash.App. 29, 34, 831 P.2d 749 (1992))). The SRA instructs that “[o]ut-of-state convictions for offenses shall be classified according to the comparable offense definitions and sentences provided by Washington law.”

  6. Pers. Restraint of Lavery

    154 Wn. 2d 249 (Wash. 2005)   Cited 173 times
    Holding that "the elements of the out of state crime must be compared to the elements of a Washington criminal statute in effect when the foreign crime was committed"

    Defendants with equivalent prior convictions are to be treated the same way, regardless of where their convictions occurred. State v. Villegas, 72 Wn. App. 34, 38-39, 863 P.2d 560 (1993).

  7. State v. Kenny

    No. 38710-1-III (Wash. Ct. App. Jun. 1, 2023)

    "The purpose of the offender score statute 'is to ensure that defendants with equivalent prior convictions are treated the same way, regardless of whether their prior convictions were incurred in Washington or elsewhere.'" Id. at 602 (quoting State v. Villegas, 72 Wn.App. 34, 38-39, 863 P.2d 560 (1993)).

  8. State v. Markovich

    492 P.3d 206 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 31 times
    Excluding as speculative defense expert's opinions about possible effects of concussion on a substance-induced brain-functioning issue, where expert was permitted to testify about effects of intoxication

    This statute exists " ‘to ensure that defendants with equivalent prior convictions are treated the same way, regardless of whether their prior convictions were incurred in Washington or elsewhere.’ " State v. Morley, 134 Wash.2d 588, 602, 952 P.2d 167 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Villegas, 72 Wash. App. 34, 38–39, 863 P.2d 560 (1993) ). We review the trial court's comparability analysis in calculating an offender score de novo.

  9. State v. Crocker

    196 Wn. App. 730 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 4 times

    Our Supreme Court held that the military court-martial should be included, and noted that "[t]he purpose of the offender score statute 'is to ensure that defendants with equivalent prior convictions are treated the same way, regardless of whether their prior convictions were incurred in Washington or elsewhere.' " 134 Wash.2d at 602, 952 P.2d 167 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Villegas , 72 Wash.App. 34, 38–39, 863 P.2d 560 (1993) ).

  10. State v. Munoz-Rivera

    190 Wn. App. 870 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 63 times
    In Munoz-Rivera, Munoz-Rivera was charged with second degree assault of his live-in girlfriend and aggravated second degree assault of her daughter.

    Chapter 10.99 RCW should be construed as a whole without placing undue emphasis on individual provisions of the statute. State v. Villegas, 72 Wash.App. 34, 38–39, 863 P.2d 560(1993). ¶ 25 RCW 10.99.040(2)(a) authorizes a court to enter a no-contact order when a person is charged with a crime involving domestic violence.