Opinion
No. 1 CA-CR 14-0236
02-17-2015
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellant, v. LUIS RICHARD VALDENEGRO, Appellee.
COUNSEL Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix By Amanda M. Parker Counsel for Appellant Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix By Mikel Steinfeld Counsel for Appellee
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2013-437706-001
The Honorable Warren J. Granville, Judge
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED COUNSEL Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix
By Amanda M. Parker
Counsel for Appellant
Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix
By Mikel Steinfeld
Counsel for Appellee
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge John C. Gemmill and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined. KESSLER, Judge:
¶1 The State appeals from the trial court's grant of Luis Valdenegro's motion to suppress evidence of a gun seized without a warrant by Phoenix Police Officer TG from a Nissan Altima ("the vehicle") that Officer TG had reason to believe was involved in a "beer run" at a Circle K. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the trial court's decision on the admissibility of the gun.
The State argued in its brief that the evidence of ammunition, found in the center console of the vehicle, was admissible as fruit of an inventory search by police. Because we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the ammunition was not found as a result of a proper inventory search, we affirm the court's decision to suppress evidence of the ammunition.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Based on the "beer run" investigation, the State charged Valdenegro with misconduct involving a weapon as a prohibited possessor, a Class 4 felony. Valdenegro filed a motion to suppress evidence of the gun based on the fact that it was obtained as the result of an illegal, warrantless search of the vehicle and, thus, "fruit of the poisonous tree." The State responded that the evidence was lawfully obtained because: (1) Valdenegro was a parolee who had a reduced expectation of privacy, and (2) Officer TG observed the weapon in "plain view" through the window of the vehicle.
¶3 At the evidentiary hearing concerning the motion, the trial court heard testimony solely from Officer TG. Officer TG testified that, on the day in question, he responded to a shoplifting call at the Circle K where on-site security had detained a female suspect. When he arrived, he contacted the female suspect and security guards. He also watched a video of the shoplifting. The security guards informed Officer TG that they believed the female suspect had arrived in a silver Nissan Altima but that the vehicle backed up and left when they went outside to contact the driver, preventing them from getting the license plate number. The driver of the vehicle never entered the Circle K.
¶4 Officer TG transported the female suspect to her mobile home in his patrol car. As Officer TG approached the female suspect's residence, he saw Valdenegro exit the driver's side of a silver Nissan Altima that Officer TG believed matched the description of the vehicle used in "the beer run" at the Circle K. The female suspect in the patrol car "connected the two" when she stated, upon seeing Valdenegro, "that was the guy that drove me there, but don't say anything."
¶5 Valdenegro approached Officer TG, stating that he was looking for the female suspect and that he was "baby-sitting her children" inside her mobile home. When asked for his name and identification, Valdenegro gave Officer TG a name and date of birth but said he had no license or identification on him. Officer TG executed a Terry frisk and placed Valdenegro in handcuffs. Valdenegro remained standing outside the patrol car. A backup officer arrived, and Officer TG ran an MVD database check on the information Valdenegro had given him. After examining the MVD photograph on the computer, the officers determined that Valdenegro had given them false information.
¶6 Officer TG then went to "inspect the vehicle" to obtain and run the VIN and plate information and to "look for evidence of a beer run." The vehicle was parked in the driveway of the female suspect's home, approximately 25 feet from Officer TG's patrol vehicle. When Officer TG got to the vehicle, the front windows were down and the doors were unlocked. It was dark out, and he shined his flashlight through an open window into the interior of the car where he immediately observed, in plain view, an open alcohol container and a gun. Officer TG stated that he opened the driver's side door and "immediately" seized the gun, placed it in a property bag to secure it, and returned to his patrol vehicle. Officer TG testified that he seized the gun because it was "sitting out in the open in an unlocked vehicle with the windows down, more like a safety thing" and "anybody could walk by and take it."
¶7 Officer TG decided not to have the vehicle towed because it was not blocking a roadway or in a place where it needed to be moved for public safety reasons. Instead, he used the car keys he took from Valdenegro to secure the vehicle in the female suspect's driveway, where Valdenegro had parked it. Before securing the vehicle, Officer TG testified that he did an "inventory search" for valuables in the vehicle, in accordance with Phoenix Police Department protocol. That protocol calls for police to inventory a vehicle that is left and not towed for "anything . . . of high value" in order to "prevent any kind of liability on the department." In the course of the search, Officer TG located ammunition in the center console of the vehicle. Officer TG conceded that he never wrote down or memorialized the results of his inventory search and could not recall whether there were items other than the ammunition in the vehicle.
¶8 Because Valdenegro persisted in refusing to identify himself, Officer TG transported him to be fingerprinted, resulting in his true identity being revealed. At that point, Officer TG learned that Valdenegro had a warrant out for his arrest and was a prohibited possessor. Additionally, Officer TG ran the vehicle's license plate and learned that the registered owner lived at an address several blocks from the trailer park where the female suspect resided. When Officer TG contacted the owner of the vehicle, she informed him that Valdenegro had permission to drive her vehicle but that she did not know it was at the trailer park. An hour or two after Valdenegro's arrest, Officer TG drove the registered owner to retrieve the vehicle. When Officer TG asked her if she was the owner of the gun, she said she was not and that there should not be any weapons or ammunition in her car.
¶9 At the conclusion of Officer TG's testimony, the trial court stated that it did not need to hear argument and granted Valdenegro's motion to suppress. It first found that Officer TG's "plain view search of the vehicle" was lawful because "there was probable cause to believe that the vehicle and its driver were connected to the beer run." However, the court rejected the inference that Officer TG had permissibly seized the gun either for safety reasons or based on a lawful inventory search. It held that the "plain view seizure" of the weapon was unlawful because "there was no connection of the gun to the beer run." The court also suppressed the ammunition because it found that the subsequent search of the vehicle was "not a proper inventory search."
¶10 The State filed a motion to reconsider arguing the gun was properly seized pursuant to the community caretaker doctrine. The trial court rejected that argument as well, finding that the doctrine did not apply based on State v. Mendoza-Ruiz, 225 Ariz. 473, 240 P.3d 1235 (App. 2010). The court granted the State's motion to dismiss without prejudice, and this timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
¶11 The State claims that the trial court erred by granting Valdenegro's motion to suppress the gun. It contends that the trial court erroneously concluded that the gun was inadmissible because it was not properly seized for either officer safety or community caretaker reasons or because it would have been inevitably discovered pursuant to the Phoenix Police Department inventory search procedures. We agree that the gun was properly seized based on community caretaker considerations and reverse and remand on that basis.
¶12 We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 284, 908 P.2d 1062, 1069 (1996) (citation omitted). The court's ruling is reviewed based solely on the evidence presented during the suppression hearing. Id. We defer to the court's factual determinations if they are supported by any reasonable evidence. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Burke, 204 Ariz. 251, 254, ¶ 10, 63 P.3d 282, 285 (2003). To the extent the court's ultimate ruling is a conclusion of law, we review de novo. State v. Zamora, 220 Ariz. 63, 67, ¶ 7, 202 P.3d 528, 532 (App. 2009).
¶13 First, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that Officer TG's initial "plain view search" of the vehicle was proper because he had probable cause to believe that the vehicle was involved in the "beer run." See State v. Villarreal, 23 Ariz. App. 9, 10, 529 P.2d 1218, 1219 (1975) (concluding that observation of plain view contents made by shining a flashlight into car is not an unconstitutional search). Even if the State was not permitted to introduce the gun itself, there would be nothing preventing Officer TG from testifying to its presence at trial. While moving the gun may have constituted a separate "search" apart from the initial authorized "plain view" search, it does not negate the validity of that initial search based on probable cause as the court found. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987) (finding distinction, for Fourth Amendment purposes, between looking at an object in plain view and "moving it even a few inches"). The remaining question is whether the seizure of the weapon was permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
¶14 The United States and Arizona Constitutions prohibit all unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8. Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment "subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); State v. Dean, 206 Ariz. 158, 161, ¶ 8, 76 P.3d 429, 432 (2003). The community caretaker doctrine allows the admission of evidence discovered without a warrant when law enforcement engages in community caretaker functions that are "totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence," but aimed at promoting public safety. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973); State v. Organ, 225 Ariz. 43, 46, ¶ 12, 234 P.3d 611, 614 (App. 2010).
As we noted in Mendoza-Ruiz, courts are divided on whether actions taken as part of a community caretaker function constitute a search at all because there was no investigatory purpose or are an exception to the warrant/probable cause requirement. 225 Ariz. at 475-76, ¶ 10, 240 P.3d at 1237-38. We conclude the community caretaker function operates as an exception to the warrant requirement because it is premised on the totality of circumstances presenting an objectively reasonable basis to search to prevent a danger or assist a person in distress regardless of any possible subjective law enforcement concerns. See State v. Kramer, 759 N.W.2d 598, 608, ¶ 30 (2009) (holding that "the 'totally divorced' language from Cady does not mean that if the police officer has any subjective law enforcement concerns, he cannot be engaging in a valid community caretaker function. Rather . . . in a community caretaker context, when under the totality of the circumstances an objectively reasonable basis for the community caretaker function is shown, that determination is not negated by the officer's subjective law enforcement concerns").
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¶15 "The appropriate standard under the community caretaker exception is one of reasonableness." Organ, 225 Ariz. at 47, ¶ 15, 234 P.3d at 615. Thus, "[g]iven the known facts, . . . [would] a prudent and reasonable officer have perceived a need to act in the proper discharge of his or her community caretaking functions?" Id.; see also Mendoza-Ruiz, 225 Ariz. at 475, ¶ 8, 240 P.3d at 1237 ("the appropriateness of its exercise is reasonableness"). To determine whether an officer acted reasonably, due weight must be given to the "reasonable inferences" the officer is "entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience." Organ, 225 Ariz. at 47, ¶ 15, 234 P.3d at 615. Thus, the officer must be able to "point to specific and articulable facts" that led him to conclude his action was necessary and may not rely simply on "unparticularized suspicions or 'hunches.'" Id.
¶16 The trial court considered the community caretaker function as a reason for seizing the gun, but restrictively interpreted Mendoza-Ruiz to justify such a seizure only in high crime areas. In reaching its decision, the court found the fact that the vehicle was "parked in front of the house its authorized user lived in" did not present circumstance and public safety concerns similar to those found convincing in Mendoza-Ruiz. In Mendoza-Ruiz, the officer entered the cab of a pickup to remove a gun that was "clearly visible from outside the cab of the vehicle." 225 Ariz. at 476, ¶ 12, 240 P.3d at 1238. This Court found that the officer acted out of a "legitimate concern for public safety," noting her testimony that the truck was parked near a restaurant and nightclub, and the restaurant was the location of "high crime, shootings, [and] aggravated assaults." Id.
¶17 While we understand the trial court's concerns given the context of Mendoza-Ruiz, we conclude the court read Mendoza-Ruiz too restrictively. It is true that the location of the truck in a high crime area in that case presented more compelling reasons for the seizure. However, nothing in Mendoza-Ruiz limits the application of the community caretaker function to visible weapons in a car on a public street in a high crime area. Rather, the function has to be more flexible to permit the police to perform their broad community caretaker functions provided that there are reasonable objective facts supporting such function. Here the testimony was that the vehicle was parked in a residential driveway in a cul-de-sac in a mobile home park. It is uncontested that the gun was readily visible on the floorboard of the driver's side of the vehicle. Although Officer TG needed to shine a flashlight into the interior to see the weapon that night, that would not have been the case in the daylight. It is also uncontested that two young children resided at the home where the car was parked and at least one adult who lived there was a suspect in a crime and Valdenegro, who was now in custody, was supposed to be babysitting the children. Furthermore, when Officer TG seized the weapon he suspected that the vehicle was involved in a crime but did not know to whom either the vehicle or its contents belonged.
¶18 Based on the undisputed facts known to Officer TG at the time he seized the weapon, the community caretaker function applied to his conduct. It was reasonable for him to believe that he needed to seize the weapon to protect the public from having the gun fall into "untrained or perhaps malicious hands," despite the fact that the vehicle was legally parked. Id. at 476, ¶ 11, 240 P.3d at 1238 (citation omitted). Nor does the fact that the public arguably could have been protected by less intrusive means, by itself, render the search unreasonable. Cady, 413 U.S. at 447. Simply closing the windows and locking the doors would still have left the gun visible to anyone looking inside the vehicle and would, thus, not safeguard against the possibility that someone would break in and take it. See id. at 443 (finding it reasonable for officers to seize a revolver locked in the trunk of a car to protect the public from its falling into malicious or untrained hands). Adding further weight to the inference that Officer TG acted in a community caretaker capacity is the fact that at the time of the seizure, he had no reason to believe that Valdenegro was a prohibited possessor. See Id. (finding community caretaker purpose supported by fact that officer ignorant of murder at time weapon seized).
¶19 We appreciate the trial court's concerns that an officer should not be free to "look through the window of legally parked cars in any neighborhood and then enter and seize any item that they deem might pose a danger." However, the facts presented here are different than those triggering the court's concerns. As we note above, the weapon on the floorboard was clearly visible through the window, the vehicle was parked in the driveway of at least one known suspect of a crime, and young children were present at the house where the vehicle was parked. Under these circumstances, a "prudent and reasonable officer" could perceive the need to act in proper discharge of his community caretaker function to retrieve the weapon and secure it, as Officer TG did. Mendoza-Ruiz, 225 Ariz. at 475, ¶ 8, 240 P.3d at 1237.
CONCLUSION
¶20 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order suppressing the gun, affirm the order suppressing the ammunition, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.