Opinion
Case No. 20020023-CA.
FILED February 21, 2003. (Not For Official Publication)
Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable Michael K. Burton.
Catherine E. Lilly and Michael A. Peterson, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Joanne C. Slotnik, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Thorne.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
We affirm the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences. This court will reverse a trial court's sentencing decision only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. See State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989). "A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing when, among other things, it fails to consider all legally relevant factors." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ¶ 8, 40 P.3d 626 (quotations and citations omitted).
Trial courts are authorized to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1999). Under subsection 76-3-401(4), the trial court must "consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences."
Section 76-3-401 was amended, effective July 1, 2002. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (Supp. 2002). However, because the sentencing hearing took place in 2001, the 1999 statute is applicable.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(5), a court may impose consecutive sentences when multiple offenses arise out of a single criminal episode. See id.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences because it did not give "adequate weight" to his good character and rehabilitative prospects, but instead focused on the seriousness of his crimes and his drug use. There is no statutory requirement that a trial court give equal weight to the various factors it considers when making a sentencing decision. See State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) (upholding consecutive terms, stating "trial court did not abuse its discretion by placing more emphasis on punishing defendant rather than rehabilitating him"). Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has "recognized that sentencing reflects the personal judgment of the court." Helms, 2002 UT 12 at ¶ 14. Because all factors need not be given equal weight and sentencing is a personal judgment of the trial court, Defendant's argument that adequate weight was not given to specific factors fails.
Defendant argues his relatively young age, twenty-two at the time of the offenses, should be a mitigating factor. In State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993), the sixteen-year-old defendant's "extreme youth" was discussed as a mitigating factor. Id. at 1302. Later, in State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454 (Utah Ct.App. 1993), we found that "Strunk stands only for the proposition that young age . . . may be a mitigating factor." Id. at 457 (emphasis added). Therefore, while Defendant's age may be considered, it is not determinative.
This court must "defer to the trial court's judgment absent a showing by defendant that the trial court failed to consider the appropriate factors." Id. at ¶ 15. In this case, the record shows that the trial court considered the appropriate factors, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) and case law, by considering Defendant's lengthy criminal history, his potential and aspirations in prison, the seriousness of his offenses, his drug use, victim impact letters and statements, and letters written on his behalf. Further, the court considered the Adult Probation and Parole Presentence Report's recommendation that Defendant's sentences run consecutively. Thus, we affirm.
WE CONCUR: Russell W. Bench, Judge, and William A. Thorne Jr., Judge.