Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2554-14T2
04-21-2016
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MELVIN TRAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
Melvin Travis, appellant pro se. Fredric M. Knapp, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Paula Jordao, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Alvarez and Haas. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Municipal Appeal No. 14-037-G. Melvin Travis, appellant pro se. Fredric M. Knapp, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Paula Jordao, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Following a trial de novo in the Law Division, the trial judge found defendant Melvin Travis guilty of leaving the scene of an accident, N.J.S.A. 39:4-129(b); careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97; failure to maintain lane, N.J.S.A. 39:4-88; and failure to keep right, N.J.S.A. 39:4-82. Following his conviction, the trial judge suspended defendant's driver's license for six months and imposed appropriate fines and assessments on the charge of leaving the scene of an accident. The judge merged the failure to maintain lane and failure to keep right charges into the charge of careless driving, and imposed an additional fine and assessment.
On appeal, defendant contends that the evidence did not support the trial court's decision. He also argues for the first time that the State did not respond to his attorney's request for discovery. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that these arguments are without merit, and we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Robert Gilson in his comprehensive written opinion dated December 4, 2014.
Contrary to Rule 2:6-2(a)(5), defendant's pro se appellate brief did not include appropriate point headings. --------
The facts and procedural history of this case are set forth at length in Judge Gilson's opinion and need not be repeated here in the same level of detail. At approximately 11:30 p.m. on December 25, 2013, the State's witness, Scott McDonald, was driving southbound on Schooley's Mountain Road, when he saw a car on the side of the road flashing its high beams. The car had gone through a guardrail and was resting against the base of the mountain. McDonald saw "skid marks . . . on the surface of the road that were still steaming."
McDonald stopped and got out of his car to assist the driver of the other vehicle. McDonald asked the driver, who was later identified as defendant, if he was hurt. Defendant said he was not hurt, but had been drinking and had fallen asleep at the wheel. Defendant asked McDonald to give him a ride down the mountain, but McDonald refused. When McDonald went back to his car to get a flashlight, defendant fled the scene on foot.
Officer Scott Myers was on patrol that night and came upon the scene as McDonald was calling 9-1-1 to report the accident. Myers saw that defendant's car "was on the southbound side of the road, but was facing northbound." McDonald gave Officer Myers defendant's description, and the officer realized he had passed defendant walking along the road as he approached the scene. Officer Myers drove back to see if he could find defendant, but he was unable to locate him.
Officer Myers returned to the scene and saw that defendant's car had crashed through the guardrail and was still on top of it. One of the car's tires was flat. A tow truck had to be called to get the car off the guardrail. Sergeant Jeffrey Almer, who was the second officer to report to the scene, corroborated Officer Myers' description of the accident scene.
At approximately 2:45 a.m. on December 26, 2013, defendant called the police station and spoke to Officer Myers. Defendant told Officer Myers that he had crashed as a result of a flat tire, that he had started walking home when his wife picked him up, and that they had gone to a friend's home to spend the night.
At the municipal court trial, defendant claimed that he had two glasses of wine that evening around 5:00 p.m. during a family gathering at a friend's house. Defendant drove his family home around 9:00 p.m. Later that night, defendant's wife realized they left their child's pacifier and bottle at their friend's home. At 10:30 p.m., defendant left his house and drove back to his friend's home. On the way, defendant claimed his car swerved, perhaps on ice, and slid off the road.
Defendant denied hitting or damaging the guardrail. He testified that the guardrail had been damaged for over a year. Defendant claimed that his car only sustained a flat tire in the accident.
Defendant testified that he called his wife to come pick him up but, because it would take her some time to get the baby ready, he decided to walk down the mountain toward his home. Defendant acknowledged that McDonald arrived before he left the scene. However, because McDonald allegedly refused to help him, defendant locked his car and walked away. Defendant denied telling McDonald that he had been drinking and had fallen asleep at the wheel.
Defendant's wife testified that she picked defendant up as he was walking home from the accident. They then drove to their friend's house, and spent the night there. Defendant's friend testified that defendant did not appear to be intoxicated that night and that the guardrail had "been damaged for quite some time."
The municipal court judge made detailed findings concerning the credibility of the witnesses. The judge found that defendant's "version of the events . . [did] not make sense, [did] not have the ring of truth to it and, in fact, border[ed] on being somewhat preposterous. . . ." The judge continued:
During the course of the trial[,] I listened carefully to the substance of the testimony offered by the witnesses and had the opportunity to observe their demeanor on the witness stand.
As noted, the witnesses for the State appeared to testify in a complete, concise, and credible manner. Although Mr. McDonald did not[] appreciate the art of cross-examination by [defendant's attorney], I found the witness' testimony to be credible despite some inconsistencies and the same is true of the testimony offered by the police witnesses.
Mr. McDonald had no ax to grind, no association good or bad with the police department or with the defendant which made his testimony that much more powerful and
persuasive. I simply cannot say the same for the defendant and the defense witnesses.
As indicated, the[ir] testimony did not make sense to the [c]ourt, their versions of the facts did not ring true[,] and the testimony although consistent with one another lacked credibility.
Based upon these findings, the municipal court judge found defendant guilty of the charges involved in this appeal. Following his de novo review, Judge Gilson agreed with the municipal court judge's credibility findings and found that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant drove his car carelessly, failed to maintain his lane, crossed over to the other side of the road, crashed his car through a guardrail, and then left the scene of the accident. This appeal followed.
"We begin our review with the well-settled proposition that appellate courts should give deference to the factual findings of the trial court." State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 166 (2015) (citing State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71 (1999)). When the Law Division conducts a trial de novo on the record developed in the municipal court, our appellate review is limited. State v. Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J. Super. 624, 639 (App. Div. 2005).
The Law Division judge was bound to give "due, although not necessarily controlling, regard to the opportunity of a [municipal
court judge] to judge the credibility of the witnesses." . . . Our review is limited to determining whether there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the findings of the Law Division judge, not the municipal court.
[Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 157 (1964)).]
Because the Law Division judge is not in a position to judge the credibility of witnesses, he or she should defer to the credibility findings of the municipal court judge. Ibid. (citing Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 474). Furthermore, when the Law Division agrees with the municipal court, the two-court rule must be considered. "Under the two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of fact and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error." Reece, supra, 222 N.J. at 166 (quoting Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 474).
Having considered defendant's contentions concerning the sufficiency of the evidence in light of the record and the applicable legal principles, we discern no basis to disturb the findings and conclusions contained in Judge Gilson's thoughtful written opinion. His analysis of the issues, including his deference to the municipal court judge's detailed credibility findings, was comprehensive and correct.
Defendant's other contention, raised for the first time on appeal, that the State failed to provide adequate discovery to his attorney is without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). There is simply nothing in the record to suggest that the State withheld any discovery from defense counsel. Moreover, we decline to consider issues that are not properly raised before the trial court, unless the jurisdiction of the court is implicated or the matter concerns an issue of great public importance. Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 226-27 (2014) (citing Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)). Neither situation exists here.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION