Summary
finding appeal timely where notice of appeal was faxed to clerk on appeal deadline but was not file-stamped until five days later
Summary of this case from State v. AllenOpinion
No. 3-906 / 03-0831.
Filed January 14, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des MoinesCounty, Cynthia Danielson, Judge.
Christopher Todd appeals the sentence imposed by the district court following his guilty plea to possession of an offensive weapon. AFFIRMED.
Eric Parrish of Parrish, Kruidenier, Moss, Dunn, Boles, Gribble Cook, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick Jackson, County Attorney, and Mona Clarkson, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Christopher Todd appeals the sentence imposed by the district court following his guilty plea to possession of an offensive weapon. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On April 26, 2002, Christopher Todd was charged with possession of explosive or incendiary materials or device with the intent to commit a public offense. In September 2002, the State amended the trial information to include a charge of possession of an offensive weapon. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Todd pled guilty to possession of an offensive weapon, and the State withdrew the first charge. On April 22, 2003, the district court sentenced Todd to a suspended sentence of not more than five years and ordered probation for not less than two nor more than five years. Todd appeals, alleging the district court considered impermissible factors when it sentenced him.
II. Error Preservation.
The State contends Todd's appeal is not timely. The record indicates his notice of appeal was faxed to the clerk of the district court on May 22, 2003, exactly thirty days after the district court imposed final judgment. However, the original notice of appeal is not file-stamped until May 27, thirty-five days after the final judgment. The State contends the faxed notice of appeal is insufficient to preserve this appeal. We will assume, without deciding, that Todd's notice of appeal was timely and will address the merits of his appeal.
III. Standard of Review.
We will not overturn Todd's sentence unless the district court abused its discretion or there was a defect in the sentencing procedure, such as the consideration of impermissible factors. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. Id. We review a sentencing court's exercise of discretion by reviewing its statement of reasons on the record for imposing a particular sentence. See State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 714 (Iowa 1995); Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)( d).
IV. Discussion.
Todd contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for a deferred judgment and imposing a suspended sentence and probation. Todd argues that Iowa Code section 907.5 (2001) requires the district court to file a written statement of its reasons for imposing a suspended sentence and that, because the district court failed to file this written statement, we must assume the district court considered impermissible factors when it sentenced Todd.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)( d) requires that the sentencing court state the reasons for imposing a particular sentence on the record. In addition, Iowa Code section 907.5 requires the sentencing court, when deferring judgment, deferring sentence, or suspending sentence, to "file a specific written statement of its reasons for and the facts supporting its decision" to suspend sentence and its decision on the length of probation.
In its judgment entry, the district court stated, "based upon the reasons dictated into the record by the Court, the Court concludes that the following sentence and terms and conditions of probation are appropriate. . . ." Todd does not contend that the reasons stated by the district court at the sentencing hearing were insufficient or indicate the district court relied on impermissible factors. Instead, Todd argues that the district court's incorporation by reference of these oral statements does not comply with the "specific written statement" requirement of section 907.5.
"The decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor." Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724. The reasons articulated by the district court at the sentencing hearing were detailed, thoughtful, and extensive. Section 907.5 does not explicitly preclude incorporation by reference of reasons previously stated on the record. We think it most likely that the legislature included the written statement requirement in section 907.5 to protect the public from improvidently imposed deferred or suspended sentences and to ensure adequate appellate review. The district court's incorporation by reference of the reasons previously stated on the record accomplished those goals. Accordingly, we conclude the district court complied with section 907.5 and did not abuse its discretion.