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State v. Taylor

Court of Appeals of Iowa
May 31, 2002
No. 2-323 / 01-1338 (Iowa Ct. App. May. 31, 2002)

Opinion

No. 2-323 / 01-1338.

Filed May 31, 2002.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joel D. Novak, Judge.

Conrad Taylor appeals his conviction of second-degree theft. AFFIRMED.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Nan Horvat and Michelle Chenoweth, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.

Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Hecht, JJ.


Conrad Taylor appeals his conviction of second-degree theft in violation of Iowa Code sections 714.1(1) and 714.2(2) (1999). Taylor argues that because his stipulation to a trial on the minutes and an adjudication of guilt was tantamount to a guilty plea, the district court violated his due process rights by failing to conduct a colloquy pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)( b) (formerly rule 8(2)(b)).

Constitutional issues are reviewed de novo in light of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001).

Due process requires the court engage in a colloquy pursuant to rule 2.8(2)( b) to ensure that a guilty plea is knowingly and voluntarily made. State v. Sayre, 566 N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 1997). A bench trial on a stipulated factual record, however, differs from a guilty plea proceeding in that no matter how overwhelming the evidence of guilt, the decision of whether to convict remains with the fact finder. State v. Everett, 372 N.W.2d 235, 237 (Iowa 1985). In light of this distinction, due process does not require the court to undertake a guilty plea colloquy prior to accepting a stipulated factual record. Id. Where the guilty plea colloquy is not undertaken and the appellate court is unable to ascertain from the record whether a defendant pled guilty or stipulated to a bench trial on the minutes, the judgment will be reversed and remanded to allow the defendant to plead anew. Sayre, 566 N.W.2d at 196; see also State v. Nikkel, 597 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Iowa 1999).

Contrary to Taylor's assertions, upon our de novo review of the record we conclude the proceeding was a bench trial on the minutes rather than a guilty plea. Despite the contradictory terminology utilized throughout, it is clear that Taylor intended to waive a jury trial, stipulate to the minutes of testimony and the police report, and have the court evaluate this evidence for the purpose of determining his guilt. Likewise, the court reviewed the evidence in the record, found it sufficient to find Taylor guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and entered a subsequent verdict of guilty. The defendant's acknowledgement that there was sufficient evidence in the record by which a jury could find him guilty was not made as an admission of guilt, but to explain why he was accepting the State's offer to drop a second count of second-degree theft and the habitual offender enhancement in exchange for his agreement to a trial on the minutes. Any confusion as to the nature of this proceeding caused by this acknowledgement was immediately clarified by the court when it reminded the parties that they were engaging in a bench trial, not a guilty plea proceeding.

The district court decision is accordingly affirmed in its entirety.

AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

State v. Taylor

Court of Appeals of Iowa
May 31, 2002
No. 2-323 / 01-1338 (Iowa Ct. App. May. 31, 2002)
Case details for

State v. Taylor

Case Details

Full title:STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CONRAD EUGENE TAYLOR…

Court:Court of Appeals of Iowa

Date published: May 31, 2002

Citations

No. 2-323 / 01-1338 (Iowa Ct. App. May. 31, 2002)