In other words, even if the superior court has statutory concurrent jurisdiction over a matter, it lacks any jurisdiction over matters first taken up by the juvenile court. State v. Sullivan, 516 S.E.2d 539, 540 (Ga.Ct.App. 1999). A "proper transfer" is a transfer occurring according to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2. That statute requires that the juvenile court conduct a transfer hearing prior to transferring matters in its jurisdiction.
`"What the judge orally declares is no judgment until it has been put in writing and entered as such."' [Cit.]" State v. Sullivan, 237 Ga. App. 677, 678 ( 516 S.E.2d 539) (1999) (involving "[t]he oral declaration of [a] juvenile judge"). Furthermore, "[t]he filing with the clerk of a judgment, signed by the judge, constitutes the entry of the judgment, and, unless the court otherwise directs, no judgment shall be effective for any purpose until the entry of the same. . . ."
However, when looked at in context of a court order, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "enter" is to file the order with the clerk. See Titelman v. Stedman , 277 Ga. 460, 461, 591 S.E.2d 774 (2003) ("the filing with the clerk of a judgment, signed by the judge, constitutes the entry of the judgment, and, unless the court otherwise directs, no judgment shall be effective for any purpose until the entry of the same....") (punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied) (citing OCGA § 9-11-5 (6) ); State v. Sullivan , 237 Ga. App. 677, 678, 516 S.E.2d 539 (1999) ("What the judge orally declares is no judgment until it has been put in writing and entered as such. And until [a transfer] order is signed by the judge (and is filed) it is ineffective for any purpose.")
” State v. Sullivan, 237 Ga.App. 677, 678, 516 S.E.2d 539 (1999) (citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted)..Id. at n. 1, 516 S.E.2d 539;Franklin v. State, 227 Ga.App. 30, 31, n. 1, 488 S.E.2d 109 (1997).
Because the superior court lacked jurisdiction to enter its judgment on Hill's guilty plea, his claim under OCGA § 17-7-50.1 was not waived and the judgment of conviction on his plea should be vacated. Cf. State v. Sullivan, 237 Ga. App. 677 ( 516 SE2d 539) (1999) (indictment properly quashed when jurisdiction not in superior court due to delayed entry of transfer order). The State, citing no case law, contends that the 180 days should be counted from the date of transfer to the superior court rather than the date of detention. It argues that, as Hill's crime was not within the jurisdiction of the superior court until the juvenile court entered its transfer order, it therefore had 180 days from the date of transfer to obtain an indictment.
` [Cit.]" State v. Sullivan, 237 Ga.App. 677, 678 ( 516 SE2d 539) (1999) (involving "(t)he oral declaration of (a) juvenile judge"). Furthermore, "(t)he filing with the clerk of a judgment, signed by the judge, constitutes the entry of the judgment, and, unless the court otherwise directs, no judgment shall be effective for any purpose until the entry of the same. . . ."
Thus the Supreme Court's decision in Griffin does not require a different result in this case. The holding in State v. Sullivan, 237 Ga. App. 677 ( 516 SE2d 539) (1999), which Roberts cites as support for his argument that the State lacked jurisdiction to bring the second indictment, also clearly does not apply here. As in Griffin, Sullivan involves competing jurisdictions, this time the superior and juvenile courts.