Opinion
Appellate Case No. 2012-211706 Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-027
01-22-2014
The State, Respondent, v. Dantae Stukes, Appellant.
George R. McElveen, III, of McElveen & McElveen, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Julie Kate Keeney, both of Columbia, for Respondent.
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Appeal From Greenville County
C. Victor Pyle, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
AFFIRMED
George R. McElveen, III, of McElveen & McElveen, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Julie Kate Keeney, both of Columbia, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Quarles, 261 S.C. 413, 417, 200 S.E.2d 384, 386 (1973) ("A motion to amend the date alleged in an indictment is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial [court], and the burden of showing an abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice is upon the party adversely affected by [its] ruling thereon."); State v. Means, 367 S.C. 374, 387, 626 S.E.2d 348, 356 (2006) ("[A] motion to amend an indictment should be granted when the proposed amendment does not change the nature of the offense or affect the sufficiency of the indictment."), abrogated on other grounds by Talley v. State, 371 S.C. 535, 640 S.E.2d 878 (2007); Morris v. State, 371 S.C. 278, 283, 639 S.E.2d 53, 56 (2006) ("The trial court's refusal of a motion for continuance in a criminal case will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the appellant."); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964) ("The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial [court], and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process . . . ."). AFFIRMED.
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.