State v. Storlazzi

99 Citing cases

  1. State v. Slimskey

    257 Conn. 842 (Conn. 2001)   Cited 49 times
    Holding that the witness's testimony will be stricken if the witness refuses to consent to an in camera inspection of their records after defendant has made a sufficient preliminary showing and that the witness's testimony will also be stricken if the witness refuses to allow disclosure of records that are found to be "especially probative of the witness’ capacity to relate the truth or to observe, recollect and narrate relevant occurrences"

    II A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to cross-examine the state's witnesses, which may include impeaching or discrediting them by attempting to reveal to the jury the witnesses' biases, prejudices or ulterior motives, or facts bearing on the witnesses' reliability, credibility, or sense of perception. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); State v. Storlazzi, 191 Conn. 453, 457, 464 A.2d 829 (1983). Thus, in some instances, otherwise privileged records, like the ones in this case, must give way to a criminal defendant's constitutional right to reveal to the jury facts about a witness' mental condition that may reasonably affect that witness' credibility.

  2. In re Christopher G

    20 Conn. App. 101 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 11 times

    After the trial court has conducted an in camera inspection, our threshold of review is limited to examining whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to disclose the complainant's psychiatric records. State v. Kelly, 208 Conn. 365, 545 A.2d 1048 (1988); State v. Storlazzi, 191 Conn. 453, 464 A.2d 829 (1983). The record reveals sufficient facts from which the trial court could have determined that details as to the victim's fantasy were not relevant to impeach her credibility.

  3. State v. Apostle

    8 Conn. App. 216 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 57 times
    In Apostle, an emergency room physician who examined a victim of sexual assault shortly after the incident testified that, in his opinion, the intercourse between the defendant and the victim was nonconsensual.

    The issue of whether a trial court or a criminal defendant should be permitted to inspect confidential records of a state's witness to discover whether the records contain relevant impeaching evidence has recently received much scrutiny in our courts. See, e.g., In re Robert H., 199 Conn. 693, 509 A.2d 475 (1986); State v. Bruno, 197 Conn. 326, 497 A.2d 758 (1985), aff'd 1 Conn. App. 384, 473 A.2d 311 (1984); State v. Esposito, 192 Conn. 166, 471 A.2d 949 (1984); State v. Storlazzi, 191 Conn. 453, 464 A.2d 829 (1983).

  4. State v. Bruno

    1 Conn. App. 384 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 7 times

    State v. Toste, supra, however, held that, without a court order requiring a psychiatrist to examine a defendant any communications between a state psychiatric witness and the defendant were privileged under the statute, unless waived. State v. Storlazzi, 191 Conn. 453, 455-63, 464 A.2d 829 (1983), was the logical culmination of the holdings in the White and Toste cases. Another exception to the disclosure of psychiatric records was found to be present in General Statutes 52-146e.

  5. State v. Peeler

    271 Conn. 338 (Conn. 2004)   Cited 161 times
    Concluding that the State established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the disclosure and use of the defendant's mental health records would not "have had a tendency to influence the judgment of the jury" (quoting State v. Rolon , 257 Conn. 156, 777 A.2d 604, 617 (2001) )

    It is well established that "[a] criminal defendant has a constitutional right to cross-examine the state's witnesses, which may include impeaching or discrediting them by attempting to reveal to the jury the witnesses' biases, prejudices or ulterior motives, or facts bearing on the witnesses' reliability, credibility, or sense of perception. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19, 106 S. Ct. 292, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1985); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974); State v. Storlazzi, 191 Conn. 453, 457, 464 A.2d 829 (1983). Thus, in some instances, otherwise privileged records, like the ones in this case, must give way to a criminal defendant's constitutional right to reveal to the jury facts about a witness' mental condition that may reasonably affect that witness' credibility.

  6. State v. Francis

    267 Conn. 162 (Conn. 2003)   Cited 24 times

    "We recently have reiterated that [a]ccess to confidential records should be left to the discretion of the trial court which is better able to assess the probative value of such evidence as it relates to the particular case before it . . . and to weigh that value against the interest in confidentiality of the records. . . . State v. Slimskey, 257 Conn. 842, 856, 779 A.2d 723 (2001). . . . Once the trial court has made its inspection, the court's determination of a defendant's access to the witness' records lies in the court's sound discretion, which we will not disturb unless abused. . . . [Id.] On appeal, the appellate tribunal reviews the confidential records to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that no information contained therein is especially probative of the victim's ability to know and correctly relate the truth so as to justify breaching their confidentiality in disclosing them to the defendant. State v. Storlazzi, 191 Conn. 453, 460, 464 A.2d 829 (1983). We are mindful that the restriction of a defendant's access to a witness' confidential records implicates the defendant's constitutional right to impeach and discredit state witnesses. . . . State v. Bruno, 236 Conn. 514, 532, 673 A.2d 1117 (1996).

  7. Douglas v. State

    527 P.3d 291 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023)   Cited 2 times

    We note that, to the extent possible, the court's disclosure order should be tailored to the time periods that are directly relevant to this case — i.e. , the time period around the original incident and the time period before trial. See State v. Storlazzi , 191 Conn. 453, 464 A.2d 829, 833 (1983) (holding that defendant should be granted access to records bearing on "the mental unsoundness of a witness (i.e., relating to a trait importing in itself a defective power of observation, recollection or communication), at or around the time of trial or of the occurrence about which he is to testify" (quoting State v. Piskorski , 177 Conn. 677, 419 A.2d 866, 895 (1979) )). Additional records should only be disclosed if the records from the relevant time periods cannot be understood without them.

  8. State v. Castillo

    998 A.2d 177 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010)   Cited 10 times
    In State v. Castillo, 121 Conn.App. 699, 712, 998 A.2d 177, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 929, 998 A.2d 1196, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1094, 131 S.Ct. 803, 178 L. Ed. 2d 537 (2010), we declined to review the defendant's claim that the court improperly charged the jury with regard to the two witness rule contained in General Statutes § 54–83, which provides in relevant part that "[n]o person may be convicted of any crime punishable by death... without the testimony of at least two witnesses, or that which is equivalent thereto.

    "The use of the word must in such an instruction has passed scrutiny in our Supreme Court. See State v. Storlazzi, 191 Conn. 453, 466 n. 9, 464 A.2d 829 (1983); Crawford v. Warden, 189 Conn. 374, 382 n. 2, 456 A.2d 312 (1983). While the court did not consider this exact issue, it did hold that [t]he instructions, read in their entirety, did not direct or advise the jury how to decide the matter.

  9. State v. Wright

    114 Conn. App. 448 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 12 times
    Reviewing claim despite failure to mention Golding because “the defendant has provided a record adequate for review and has sufficiently demonstrated, by discussion of relevant authority, that his claim ... implicates his sixth amendment right to confront witnesses and his fourteenth amendment due process right to obtain exculpatory evidence”

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Storlazzi, 191 Conn. 453, 461, 464 A.2d 829 (1983). Consequently, "[a]fter performing an in camera inspection, the trial court is required to release only information that is material and favorable to the defense."

  10. State v. Santiago

    552 A.2d 438 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 21 times
    In Santiago, a member of the jury postverdict communicated to defense counsel and the clerk of the court that one of the other jurors had used the term "spic" in reference to the defendant, who was Hispanic.

    The use of the word "must" in such an instruction has passed scrutiny in our Supreme Court. See State v. Storlazzi, 191 Conn. 453, 466 n. 9, 464 A.2d 829 (1983); Crawford v. Warden, 189 Conn. 374, 382 n. 2, 456 A.2d 312 (1983). While the court did not consider this exact issue, it did hold that "[t]he instructions, read in their entirety, did not direct or advise the jury how to decide the matter . . . ."