Opinion
No. 2-325 / 01-1396.
Filed July 3, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mills County, J. C. IRVIN, Judge.
The State appeals the district court's suppression of chemical blood test results. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger and Charles N. Thoman, Assistant Attorneys General, and C. Kenneth Whitacre, County Attorney, for appellant.
Joseph J. Hrvol of Joseph J. Hrvol, P.C., Council Bluffs, for appellee.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
The State appeals the district court's suppression of a chemical blood test. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Background Facts and Proceedings . Gregory Stoppel was charged with homicide by vehicle, based upon an allegation he unintentionally caused the death of his wife, Kristy, by operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Stoppel moved to suppress chemical blood test results that indicated a blood alcohol level just under the legal limit. At the suppression hearing a deputy sheriff and a state trooper testified to a number of relevant facts.
The single-vehicle accident occurred late at night, on a dry, clear, largely straight but somewhat uneven roadway, with a narrow shoulder. Stoppel's truck had veered into a ditch, jumped a driveway, and run over a mail box. When Deputy Denise Jens arrived Stoppel was crying, stating he had killed his wife. Deputy Jens described Stoppel as "very emotional" and "weak in the knees." She stated he smelled of alcoholic beverages and that he admitted he had been drinking and heading home from a bar. She further stated his eyes were bloodshot, watery, and glassy. While she admitted this could have been due to the fact he had been crying, she noted his eyes remained glassy even after he stopped crying. Three open cans of beer were found in the truck after Stoppel was taken to the hospital, and the truck itself smelled of alcohol. Deputy Jens requested a state trooper be called to the hospital to invoke implied consent and obtain a specimen.
Trooper Jamey Dickson was contacted by dispatch and directed to obtain a blood specimen from the driver of a vehicle involved in a fatal accident. He was also informed the accident had involved alcohol. Trooper Dickson was at the hospital when Stoppel arrived, immobilized on a spine board and wearing a cervical collar. He stated Stoppel was highly emotional and crying, but that he calmed down after a few minutes. He also observed that Stoppel smelled of beer and that his eyes were bloodshot and watery. Like Deputy Jens, he admitted the state of Stoppel's eyes could have been due to the fact he had been crying.
Trooper Dickson observed Stoppel to be alert, understandable, polite, courteous, and capable of exercising good judgment. After giving Stoppel his Miranda warnings he administered a preliminary breath test (PBT). Trooper Dickson stated he could not recall the exact results of the PBT, but did recall that it indicated Stoppel was close to, but not over, the legal limit. Trooper Dickson then invoked implied consent, blood was drawn, and a blood alcohol level of .103 was returned, with a margin of error of .004.
In determining the police did not have reasonable grounds to believe Stoppel was operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit and thus could not lawfully invoke implied consent, the district court stated there was "no credible evidence that the Defendant tested close to the legal limit." It found Trooper Dickson had "no information concerning Defendant's behavior which would lead him to believe the Defendant was intoxicated," as no field sobriety tests were administered and as Stoppel's crying accounted for his bloodshot eyes. Focusing on Trooper Dickson's observations as to Stoppel's alert and coherent nature, the court found these observations "dispel any belief that a reasonable person would have" that Defendant was operating while intoxicated. The State sought and was granted discretionary review.
Scope of Review . Our review is for errors at law. State v. Owens, 418 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1988).
Reasonable Suspicion . As a prerequisite for invoking implied consent, the police must have reasonable grounds to believe a defendant was operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit. Iowa Code § 321J.6(1) (1999). Reasonable grounds are measured according to the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time implied consent is invoked. State v. Boleyn, 547 N.W.2d 202, 205 (Iowa 1996). Reasonable grounds exist when those facts would warrant a prudent person's belief that an offense has been committed. Munson v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 513 N.W.2d 722, 725 (Iowa 1994) (citation omitted).
The statute further requires the existence of at least one of seven other qualifying factors. Id. That secondary prong is undisputedly met in this case, as Stoppel was involved in a fatal accident. Id. at 321J.6(1)(b).
The facts to be considered in making this determination were not limited to those observed by Trooper Dickson, as he was alerted, via dispatch, of Deputy Jens's observations that alcohol had been involved in a fatal accident. Where there is at least some minimal communication as between officers, the shared or collective knowledge doctrine is applied. State v. Thornton, 300 N.W.2d 94, 97 (Iowa 1981). Accordingly, we presume Trooper Dickson shared the knowledge held by Deputy Jens. See Owens, 418 N.W.2d at 342 ("it is well established that when police officers are acting in concert, the knowledge of one is presumed shared by all"). The district court therefore was required to consider all of the factors surrounding the accident, including Stoppel's admission he had been drinking and had come from a bar, as well as the presence of the open containers. See also Pointer v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 546 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Iowa 1996) ("both direct and circumstantial evidence may be considered in determining whether reasonable grounds exist").
Moreover, the question for the court was not whether it found reasonable grounds to believe Stoppel was operating while intoxicated but whether, as an objective matter, see Crosser v. Iowa Dept. of Public Safety, 240 N.W.2d 682, 685 (1976), a prudent person would so find. While the court may have found Stoppel's bloodshot, watery, and glassy eyes were the result of crying, it cannot be said that no reasonably prudent person would take the same evidence as proof of intoxication, especially in light of the other evidence, including the odor of alcohol on or about Stoppel and his admission he had been drinking.
Since it is undisputed the blood specimen test yielded a bottom result of .99, we presume the court's statement that there was no credible evidence Stoppel tested close to the legal limit was a credibility finding regarding the PBT results. However, even if we presume the PBT results were not close to the limit,
[t]hat the test result was less than the legal limit does not automatically eliminate any reasonable grounds for believing [a defendant] was driving while intoxicated. If, as in this case, the preliminary results showed the presence of alcohol, a prudent person would be warranted in requesting a more accurate test.Owens, 418 N.W.2d at 343.
Given all the facts presented at the suppression hearing, it was error for the district court to rule that no prudent person would look at the facts within the officer's knowledge and formulate a reasonable belief that Stoppel was operating while intoxicated. We therefore reverse the district court's suppression ruling, and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.