Opinion
WD86198
10-22-2024
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. COLTON STOCK, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CLAY COUNTY THE HONORABLE SHANE T. ALEXANDER, JUDGE
BEFORE: THOMAS N. CHAPMAN, PRESIDING JUDGE, LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JUDGE, AND ALOK AHUJA, JUDGE
LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JUDGE
Colton Stock appeals his convictions and sentences for felony tampering with physical evidence and abandoning a corpse. He contends the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and the court erroneously instructed the jury on both crimes. Stock also argues the circuit court violated his right against self-incrimination, violated his right to due process by failing to question him about his ability to assist in his defense and/or continue the trial after he missed a dose of his mental health medication, and exceeded its statutory authority in entering a monetary judgment against him in favor of the Crime Victims' Compensation Fund. For reasons explained herein, we affirm, in part, and reverse and remand, in part.
Factual and Procedural History
Stock met Victim in March or April 2019 when Victim walked into Stock's backyard. Stock had been having problems with trespassers on his property, so he initially told Victim to leave. After Stock learned Victim was profoundly deaf, he felt sorry for Victim. Stock and Victim became "drinking buddies," as Stock invited Victim over on multiple occasions over the next several weeks to drink beer with him. On one occasion, Stock bought a Taurus .38-caliber revolver and ammunition from Victim.
At the end of April or beginning of May 2019, Victim came over to Stock's home to watch television and drink beer. Victim asked Stock for a ride, but Stock told him he had drunk too many beers to drive. Victim suggested Stock smoke methamphetamine to "sober up," but Stock declined. When Stock refused Victim's second request for a ride, Victim got angry, picked up a baseball bat, hit Stock's television and smashed Stock's piggy bank with the bat, and took the television off its wall mount. Victim's behavior scared Stock because he had never seen Victim act aggressively, and Victim was taller and approximately 100 pounds heavier than Stock. Stock calmed Victim down, then gave Victim a ride. After this incident, Stock felt like Victim was a threat because Victim knew where he lived, Victim was using drugs, and Victim acted aggressively towards him. When Stock returned to his home, he looked for the Taurus revolver he had purchased from Victim but could not find it. He did not report the gun stolen.
On May 3, 2019, around11:00 p.m., Stock was walking up the stairs from his basement when he heard someone breaking into his house through the back door. He saw Victim inside his house. Victim was wearing gloves and carrying the Taurus revolver that Stock had bought from him. Believing Victim was there to either rob or kill him, Stock charged at Victim. A struggle ensued. At one point, Victim slid on a cat's water bowl that was on the floor, which caused him to drop the gun. Stock grabbed the gun. Victim leaned toward Stock. Stock backed up, raised the gun, and fired two shots at Victim.
After firing the shots, Stock went into his bathroom and shut the door. He believed police would be on their way to investigate because shots were fired. Stock waited in his bathroom for two hours because he was scared. He did not have his phone with him.
Stock eventually left the bathroom and looked for Victim. He found Victim lying on the kitchen floor in a pool of blood. After determining Victim was dead, Stock went back into his bathroom, grabbed a can of shaving cream, and sprayed shaving cream over the window on his back door, covering it. He went downstairs to get a tarp, which he used to cover Victim's body. Stock then took a 30-minute shower to get Victim's blood off of him. After showering, Stock cleaned up Victim's blood in the kitchen. He dragged Victim's body into the den and cleaned up the blood that was in front of the refrigerator. Stock decided he was going to have to move Victim's body, and the only way he could do it was "to make [Victim] lighter." He went downstairs to his basement, retrieved a handsaw, put the handsaw on victim's arm, and began sawing back and forth, without much effect.
The next morning, Stock had a preplanned date with a woman. He decided to take his date to Home Depot, where he bought a reciprocating saw. Stock took his date to her house, returned home alone, and used the reciprocating saw to remove Victim's head, arms, and legs. He put Victim's head, arms, and legs in two trash bags. He then put Victim's torso on the tarp and dragged it through the house and downstairs to his basement. Stock cleaned the area where he had dismembered Victim. He put the trash bags containing Victim's body parts in the trunk of his car. Later that night, Stock drove to an unknown location, dug a hole, and buried Victim's head, arms, and legs. Stock determined Victim's torso was still too heavy for him to move out of the house, so he decided he was going to purchase a van with a ramp so he could "drag him up into the back of the van."
The next day, May 5, 2019, Stock was unable to buy a van so he decided to put lighter fluid on Victim's torso, while it was in his basement, and ignite it because he did not want it to be found. He also set fire to a piece of carpet and to the reciprocating saw and saw blade he had used to dismember Victim. According to Stock, he immediately realized setting the fire was "stupid" and attempted to extinguish the fire with water before going outside.
Once outside, Stock saw police officers at his home. Stock's aunt, who lived next door, had asked her husband to contact the police after she heard gunshots and saw someone running out of Stock's house earlier that day. The police officers saw smoke coming from Stock's house and called the fire department. Stock appeared "pretty fidgety" and "nervous" when he gave the officers the keys to search his house. He told them he had been involved in a "traumatic experience, a fight for his life." Stock volunteered to the officers that he had invited an unknown homeless man into his house to help him out and that, at some point while he and the homeless man were in the living room of his house, the homeless man pulled out a firearm. Stock said that, after a struggle, he was able to get the firearm from the homeless man and fire a single shot at the homeless man in self-defense. He did not say what caused the fire in his home.
As firefighters were putting out the fire in Stock's basement, they found Victim's burned torso. The police arrested Stock. The autopsy of Victim's torso showed a gunshot wound on the inside of his thigh and another gunshot wound in the back of Victim's shoulder. The medical examiner testified that, based on the portions of Victim's body which were available for examination, Victim's cause of death was the gunshot wound to the back. The bullet recovered from Victim's torso was fired from the Taurus revolver recovered from Stock's home.
Stock was charged with first-degree murder and a corresponding count of armed criminal action, abandonment of a corpse, and felony tampering with physical evidence. A jury trial was held. Stock testified he shot Victim in self-defense and admitted he dismembered Victim's body, buried Victim's head, arms, and legs, and burned Victim's torso. The jury acquitted Stock of first-degree murder and armed criminal action but found him guilty of abandonment of a corpse and felony tampering with physical evidence. Pursuant to the jury's recommendation, the court sentenced Stock to four years in prison on each count and imposed a fine of $10,000 for each count. The court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. The court also ordered Stock to pay $46 to the Crime Victims' Compensation Fund. Stock appeals.
At the State's request, the jury was also instructed on second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and first- and second-degree involuntary manslaughter. The jury did not find Stock guilty of any of these lesser-included offenses.
Standards of Review
We review the evidence presented in a criminal trial in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 600, 607 (Mo. banc 2009). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider "whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational factfinder to find each of the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Russell, 656 S.W.3d 265, 282 (Mo. App. 2022) (citation omitted). We accept as true all evidence and inferences favorable to the verdict and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. Id. We recognize the factfinder, which in this case was a jury, determined the reliability, credibility, and weight of the witnesses' testimony, and the jury had the authority to believe all, some, or none of a witness's testimony. State v. Ware, 447 S.W.3d 224, 227 (Mo. App. 2014).
We may review unpreserved issues only for plain error, which requires a finding that the circuit court's error resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d at 607. In reviewing for plain error, we first determine whether the claim of error "facially establishes substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Not all prejudicial error is plain error. Id. "Plain errors are those which are evident, obvious, and clear." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If we find plain error, we then determine "whether the claimed error resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice." Id. at 607-08 (citation omitted).
Analysis
Tampering with Physical Evidence - Points I, II, and III
In his first three points, Stock challenges his conviction for felony tampering with physical evidence. Section 575.100.1(1) provides a person commits the offense of tampering with physical evidence if he "[a]lters, destroys, suppresses or conceals any record, document or thing with purpose to impair its verity, legibility, or availability in any official proceeding or investigation." The offense is a class A misdemeanor, unless the person impairs or obstructs the prosecution or defense of a felony, in which case it is a class E felony. § 575.100.2.
All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2016, as updated through the 2018 Cumulative Supplement, unless otherwise indicated.
In Point I, Stock contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for this offense. In the context of this case, the elements of the felony offense of tampering with physical evidence were: Stock altered Victim's body by cutting off his head, arms, and legs; with purpose to impair its availability in the investigation into Victim's death; and Stock's actions resulted in the impairment or obstruction of the prosecution for first-degree murder or the lesser-included homicide offenses. See Russell, 656 S.W.3d at 282.
Stock contests only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the last element. He argues the murder prosecution was not impaired because the evidence recovered at his home and the autopsy findings on Victim's torso were consistent with the State's theory of the case that Stock killed Victim by shooting him with the Taurus revolver found in Stock's home. Stock notes the autopsy of Victim's torso found one gunshot wound on the inside of his thigh and another in his back, which caused Victim's death, and the bullet recovered from Victim's back was fired from the Taurus revolver. Stock insists there was no evidence presented that the recovery of the rest of Victim's body would have made a stronger case against him for Victim's death. We disagree.
Stock's defense theory was that he shot and killed Victim in self-defense. He testified he was scared of Victim because, among other things, Victim was wearing gloves, and he could not "think of any reason somebody would have gloves, a gun and break in my back door that is any reason but bad." Explaining why he felt his life was in jeopardy, Stock testified, "When I seen (sic) him and the way I told you I saw him, with the gloves and the gun, I thought I was in for it." Crime scene technicians did not recover any gloves from Stock's house, however. When asked on cross-examination what color Victim's gloves were, Stock said he did not know. In fact, Stock testified he could not recall whether the gloves were still on Victim's hands when he was sawing off Victim's arms. When asked where Victim's gloves were, Stock said he did not know, but added, "I assume they're probably with him." Confirmation that Victim was not wearing gloves when Stock killed him could have aided in refuting Stock's claim that Victim was in the home to harm Stock, which was relevant to whether Stock had reasonable grounds to believe deadly force was necessary.
Additionally, Victim's intact body would have shown if Victim suffered any additional wounds, gunshot or otherwise, that could have been relevant to both the selfdefense claim and the deliberation element of murder. Indeed, the medical examiner who autopsied Victim's torso testified he could not rule out any trauma to the parts of Victim's body that were missing. The medical examiner testified he could not tell if Victim was shot in the head or if Victim's throat was cut. The medical examiner said only that the gunshot wound to Victim's back was "significant," and, "based on what I have, this is the best cause of death for this decedent." (Emphasis added.)
The State presented sufficient evidence that Stock's alteration of Victim's body impaired the prosecution of a felony as required by Section 575.100.2. Victim's head, arms, and legs, which Stock went to great lengths to saw off and conceal, were "highly relevant" to the charge against him. See Russell, 656 S.W.3d at 283. Victim's intact body "almost certainly would have yielded more in depth and insightful information" regarding all of the circumstances surrounding the shooting than Victim's burned torso alone did. See id. Point I is denied.
In Points II and III, Stock contends the circuit court erred in submitting the verdict director for felony tampering with physical evidence. Stock concedes he did not object to the submission of this instruction at trial and, therefore, requests plain error review of both points. "Instructional error seldom rises to the level of plain error." State v. Hendricks, 619 S.W.3d 171, 179 (Mo. App. 2021) (citation omitted). "In the context of instructional error, reversible plain error results when the trial court has so misdirected or failed to instruct the jury that it is apparent to the appellate court that the instructional error affected the jury's verdict." State v. White, 92 S.W.3d 183, 192 (Mo. App. 2002) (citation omitted).
In Point II, Stock contends the circuit court erred in submitting the verdict director for felony tampering with physical evidence because it omitted the element that his conduct resulted in the impairment of his prosecution for first-degree murder. Stock concedes he did not object to the submission of this instruction at trial and, therefore, requests plain error review.
"A verdict-directing instruction must contain each element of the offense charged and must require the jury to find every fact necessary to constitute essential elements of the offense charged." State v. Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d 801, 811 (Mo. banc 2016) (citation omitted). A verdict director that "relieves the State of its burden of proving each and every element of the crime and allows the State to obtain a conviction without the jury deliberating on and determining any contested elements of that crime" violates the defendant's right to due process. Id. (citation omitted). "Plain error exists when an instruction omits an essential element and the evidence establishing the omitted element was seriously disputed." Id. (citation omitted). Stated another way, "an instruction rises to the level of plain error if the evidence in the case fails to establish the existence of the omitted element beyond serious dispute." State v. Neal, 328 S.W.3d 374, 383 (Mo. App. 2010) (citation omitted).
There is no MAI-CR jury instruction for the offense of tampering with physical evidence; thus, the State based its instruction on MAI-CR 4th 404.02. The Notes on Use provide that MAI-CR 4th 404.02 is to be used in situations where no instruction for the specific offense exists. MAI-CR 4th 404.02, Notes on Use 2. The instruction "must contain all of the essential elements of the offense." Id. at Note 12. The determination as to whether an instruction based on MAI-CR 4th 404.02 is proper requires "a careful reading of the appropriate statute[ ]" defining the offense and an "examination of the charge against the defendant." Id. The State's instruction read, in pertinent part:
As to Count IV, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt[:]
First, that between May 3, 2019 and May 5, 2019, in the State of Missouri, the defendant altered the body of [Victim] by cutting off his head, arms, and legs, and partially burned the torso, and
Second, that at the time defendant knowingly did this to impair the investigation into the death of [Victim],
then you will find the defendant guilty under Count IV of tampering with physical evidence.
As discussed supra, for tampering with physical evidence to constitute a class E felony instead of a class A misdemeanor, the tampering must have also resulted in the impairment or obstruction of a prosecution or defense of a felony. § 575.100.2. This was an essential element of the crime, and the failure to include this element in the instruction was erroneous. See State v. Patterson, 489 S.W.3d 907, 912-13 (Mo. App. 2016).
It does not require reversal, however, because this element was not seriously disputed at trial. While the State argued the effect of Stock's removal and alteration of Victim's body parts on both the self-defense claim and the murder charge during its closing argument, Stock's closing argument focused entirely on the murder charge and his actions before the shooting. Stock did not discuss or dispute the existence of any of the elements of the felony tampering with physical evidence charge. Because this element was not seriously disputed, no plain error requiring reversal occurred. Point II is denied.
In Point III, Stock contends the circuit court erred in submitting the verdict director for felony tampering with physical evidence because the verdict director allowed the jury to convict on the basis that Stock acted "knowingly" rather than "purposely." Stock did not object to the verdict director on this basis and seeks plain error review of this instructional error.
The offense of tampering with physical evidence requires the tampering be done "with purpose to impair" the evidence's availability in an investigation. § 575.100.1(1). The verdict director required the jury to find only that Stock "knowingly" altered Victim's body to impair the investigation into Victim's death. "Purposely" is a higher culpable mental state than "knowingly." See State v. Osborn, 504 S.W.3d 865, 878 (Mo. App. 2016). Submitting an instruction that lowered the culpable mental state the jury was required to find was erroneous. See State v. Ludwig, 18 S.W.3d 139, 143 (Mo. App. 2000).
Again, this instructional error does not require reversal. Stock testified in great detail what was going through his mind in the hours and days after he killed Victim and before he was arrested. In recounting his thoughts, he repeatedly admitted to the jury that his purpose for altering Victim's body was to get rid of the evidence against him. Stock testified that, immediately after he killed Victim, his "state of mind is that an overzealous prosecutor . . ., no matter what happens, man, this can ruin my life." He waited an hour after he confirmed Victim was dead, then was in the shower for "about 30 minutes," and, because he had "seen CSI: Las Vegas," he assumed "that the people that come are going to know that that body had been there for an hour and a half." Stock continued:
Arguably, paragraph "Second" adequately addressed the requirement that the defendant act purposely when it required the jury to find that Stock dismembered Victim's body "to impair the investigation" into Victim's death. One of the meanings of the word "to" is similar to the phrase "in order to": "used as a function word to indicate purpose, intention, tendency, result, or end." To, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://merriamwebster.com/dictionary/to (last visited October 1, 2024).
So why did I wait? It's been a long time....I've modified the scene already. I [put shaving cream on] the windows. What am I doing there? I brought up a tarp and covered the body. I felt at this moment that I was past a point of return[.] . . . I was in a bad spot. I was up a creek without a paddle. And that's what I thought.
After he cleaned up all of Victim's blood, Stock thought of calling the police but then said to himself, "Man, if I was too late after I waited, if I was too late after I had done the minor modifications, well, what are the police going to think now that I cleaned up the kitchen?" Stock admitted that, after he dragged Victim's body into his den, he "knew" he "was in real trouble because . . . this ain't television. This is not a movie." After he was unsuccessful in sawing off Victim's arm with a handsaw, Stock once again thought about calling the police, but changed his mind:
I thought about calling the police again, but, I mean, if it was too late after I waited, too late after I showered, too late after I cleaned up the blood, too late after I moved the body, what are the police going to think when I have now cut into a man? I mean, there ain't no option there. There is no way that I'm going to convince this man that I didn't do something wrong.
Deciding he needed to make Victim's body "lighter" so he could dispose of it easier, Stock bought the reciprocating saw, used it to dismember Victim, buried the trash bags containing Victim's head, arms, and legs, and decided to burn Victim's torso.
When questioned on cross-examination about why he did all of this, Stock testified, "I didn't want to be prosecuted for something that was not my fault." He also told the jury, "I did the thing that I thought was best for me," which "was to destroy as much evidence as possible." We agree with the State that Stock's "entire testimony was geared around an admission and concession that he destroyed evidence for the purpose of avoiding a murder prosecution, including his recitation of all the evidence supporting such a prosecution." Because we do not believe the instruction's use of the word "knowingly" instead of "purposely" had any effect on the jury's verdict, we find no manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice occurred. Point III is denied.
Abandonment of a Corpse - Points IV, V, and VI
In his next three points, Stock challenges his conviction for abandonment of a corpse. Section 194.425.1 provides "[a] person commits the crime of abandonment of a corpse if that person abandons, disposes, deserts or leaves a corpse without properly reporting the location of the body to the proper law enforcement officials in that county." This statute codifies the "universal understanding" expressed in common law "that proper treatment of dead bodies is necessary to a civilized society." State v. Bratina, 73 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Mo. banc 2002). It also reflects the "common understanding" reinforced by science that "proper disposition of human remains is necessary to maintaining public health." Id.
In Point IV, Stock contends the evidence was insufficient to show he disposed of Victim's corpse because he still had control over Victim's torso, as it was too heavy for him to move out of his house. He argues Section 194.425 does not allow for a conviction for disposing of only parts of a corpse.
The State charged him with disposing of "parts of the corpse" of Victim at an unknown location. The State did not charge Stock with disposing of Victim's torso by burning it in his basement.
The concept of abandonment in Section 194.425.1 "clearly is based upon a person having an interest in, or duty with respect to, the body." Bratina, 73 S.W.3d at 627. The dictionary definition that has been applied to "abandon" is "'to cease to assert or exercise an interest, right or title to esp. with the intent of never again resuming or reasserting it' or to 'forsake or desert esp. in spite of an allegiance, duty, or responsibility.'" Id. (citation omitted). The statute uses the words "abandon, disposes, deserts, or leaves" to describe abandonment. Id. "The first three of these words contain the concept that the person has a relationship or duty with respect to the body. To dispose of something implies that one has possession of it." Id. The dictionary definitions that have been applied to "disposes" in Section 194.425.1 are "discards" and "gets rid of." Scroggs v. State, 655 S.W.3d 210, 220 (Mo. App. 2022) (citation omitted); State v. Jones, 172 S.W.3d 448, 455 (Mo. App. 2005), overruled on other grounds by State v. Claycomb, 470 S.W.3d 358 (Mo. banc 2015) (citations omitted). The dictionary definition of a "corpse" is "a dead body especially of a human being."
Corpse, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://merriamwebster.com/dictionary/corpse (last visited October 1, 2024).
Here, Stock had possession of Victim's dead body after killing Victim. By his own repeated admissions at trial, he fully intended to get Victim's dead body out of his possession by any means possible instead of reporting the location of the dead body to the proper authorities. It is undisputed Stock discarded or got rid of Victim's head, arms, and legs by removing them from Victim's torso, putting them in trash bags, and burying them. A reasonable juror could conclude that burying Victim's head and all four of his extremities in an unknown location constituted the disposal of a "dead body." The evidence was sufficient to convict Stock of abandoning a corpse under Section 194.425.1. Point IV is denied.
In Point V, Stock argues the circuit court plainly erred in entering a conviction and sentence for abandonment of a corpse under Section 194.425 because it violated his rights to due process and against self-incrimination. He argues the State cannot use a criminal statute to require someone to report a crime where doing so reasonably could lead to that individual's own prosecution; specifically, reporting the location of Victim's corpse to the police would have implicated him in the offense of tampering with physical evidence and would have been inculpatory evidence for the homicide case against him.
Stock makes the assertion that Section 194.425 is unconstitutional as applied to him for the first time on appeal. "Constitutional issues are waived unless raised at the earliest possible opportunity consistent with orderly procedure." Hollis v. Blevins, 926 S.W.2d 683, 683 (Mo. banc 1996); State v. Gonzalez, 253 S.W.3d 86, 88 (Mo. App. 2008). The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional challenge to the application of the charging statute is by a pretrial motion to quash the indictment. See Gonzalez, 522 S.W.3d at 88. "The failure to challenge the constitutionality of a statute at the earliest opportunity waives the issue." State v. Cerna, 522 S.W.3d 373, 382 (Mo. App. 2017).
Stock was aware on August 6, 2019, that he was charged with abandoning a corpse in violation of Section 194.425, along with first-degree murder, armed criminal action, and tampering with physical evidence. It could hardly have been a surprise when, four years later, he was tried and convicted of that offense. See Hollis, 926 S.W.2d at 684. "An attack on the constitutionality of a statute is of such dignity and importance that the record touching such issues should be fully developed and not raised as an afterthought in a post-trial motion or on appeal." Id. (citation omitted). See also Cerna, 522 S.W.3d at 383; McGathey v. Davis, 281 S.W.3d 312, 318 (Mo. App. 2009). Stock waived this constitutional claim by not raising it at the earliest possible opportunity. Point V is denied.
In Point VI, Stock claims the verdict director for abandonment of a corpse was plainly erroneous. The verdict director was based on MAI-CR 4th 432.10, which is the pattern instruction for the crime of abandonment of a corpse. Instead of referring to Victim's "corpse," however, it referred to "parts of the corpse of [Victim]." Thus, the verdict director read, in pertinent part:
As to Count III, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that between May 3, 2019 and May 5, 2019, in the State of Missouri, the defendant disposed of parts of the corpse of [Victim] at an unknown location, and
Second, that at the time defendant disposed of parts of the corpse of [Victim], defendant was aware that he was dead, and
Third, that at the time defendant disposed of parts of the corpse, defendant had possession of the corpse of [Victim] at defendant's home, and
Fourth, that at the time defendant disposed of parts of the corpse, defendant did so without properly reporting the location of the body to the proper law enforcement officials, and
Fifth, that with respect to the facts and conduct submitted in this instruction, defendant acted knowingly,
then you will find the defendant guilty under Count III of abandonment of a corpse.
Rule 28.02(c) provides that, when an MAI-CR instruction is available, the circuit court is required to use it. White, 92 S.W.3d at 189. The failure to do so is error, and "the prejudicial effect is to be judicially determined." Id. (citing Rule 28.02(f)). Given that both the statute defining the offense of abandonment of a corpse and the applicable MAI-CR required the jury to find Stock disposed of a "corpse," the modification of the instruction allowing the jury to convict Stock if it found that he disposed of "parts of the corpse" was clear, obvious, and evident error. Id. at 192.
The evidence showed Stock did not dispose of Victim's torso at an unknown location. Although we believe the evidence that Stock disposed of Victim's head and all four extremities at an unknown location was sufficient to find that he disposed of a dead body and, therefore, was sufficient to convict him of abandonment of a corpse, this court cannot say that a reasonable jury would have unanimously determined this element when it was not properly submitted in the instruction. See Neal, 328 S.W.3d at 383. The modification of the verdict director to allow the jury to convict if it found Stock disposed of only "parts of the corpse" rather than the "corpse" resulted in manifest injustice and a miscarriage of justice. We reverse Stock's conviction for felony abandonment of a corpse and remand for a new trial on that count. Point VI is granted.
Missed Dose of Mental Health Medication - Point VII
In Point VII, Stock contends the court erred in failing to question him about his ability to assist in his defense and/or to continue the trial after he missed a dose of his mental health medication. On the first day of trial, Stock missed his morning dose of the prescribed mental health medication Zoloft because the medication was in Jackson County, where he was previously detained, and the trial was in Clay County. Defense counsel informed the court Stock had been on the drug "for a substantial period of time," and missing a dose "does cause me some concerns." The court ordered the bailiff to ensure Stock be given his medicine as prescribed. After a brief recess during which defense counsel was able to speak with Stock, defense counsel advised the court that Stock was concerned "he may not be able to assist in the trial," which caused defense counsel "a lot of concern." The court responded, "having just inquired of [Stock] myself a moment ago, I think he's just fine right now. And he will get his medication as soon as it can be obtained." Defense counsel replied, "Thank you."
The court then proceeded with voir dire, the State's opening statement, and the testimony of the State's first three witnesses. Stock argues the court's failure to question him about his inability to assist in his own defense and/or to continue the trial when the issue of his missing a dose of Zoloft was brought to the court's attention violated his right to due process and constituted an abuse of discretion.
"No person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or her or to assist in his or her own defense shall be tried, convicted or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as the incapacity endures." § 552.020.1. A defendant is competent to stand trial if he has "'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and has a 'rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'" State v. Driskill, 459 S.W.3d 412, 423 (Mo. banc 2015) (quoting Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 183 (Mo. banc 2009)). "Whenever any judge has reasonable cause to believe that the accused lacks mental fitness to proceed, the judge shall," either on its own motion or on the motion of one of the parties, order the accused examined. § 552.020.2. "[T]o necessitate a sua sponte order for a competency hearing, there must be some information, evidence, or observation that triggers the statutory requirement of 'reasonable cause.'" State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.3d 753, 763 (Mo. banc 1996).
Here, defense counsel did not ask the court to conduct a competency hearing and did not ask for a continuance. Instead, defense counsel merely stated that he and Stock had "concerns" about Stock's ability to proceed without his morning dose of Zoloft. The court could consider defense counsel's observations and statements regarding Stock's mental state, but counsel's observations and statements alone did not provide reasonable cause to believe Stock lacked mental fitness to proceed. State v. Smith, 389 S.W.3d 194, 206 (Mo. App. 2012). Defense counsel's vague statement about unspecified "concerns" was clearly insufficient to provide reasonable cause, particularly in light of the court's determination, based upon its own inquiry of Stock, that he was "just fine." In the absence of any evidence from Stock as to his mental state, the circuit court was entitled to rely on its own personal observations in determining Stock's competency. State v. Williams, 247 S.W.3d 144, 148 (Mo. App. 2008). Point VII is denied.
Crime Victims' Compensation Fund - Point VIII
In Point VIII, Stock contends the circuit court plainly erred in entering a $46 judgment against him for the Crime Victims' Compensation Fund ("the Fund"). He argues the statute does not authorize such judgments for his class E felony convictions.
Section 595.045, the statute creating the Fund, provides, in relevant part:
[T]he court shall enter a judgment in favor of the state of Missouri, payable to the crime victims' compensation fund, of sixty-eight dollars upon a plea of guilty or a finding of guilt for a class A or B felony; forty-six dollars upon a plea of guilty or finding of guilt for a class C or D felony; and ten dollars upon a plea of guilty or a finding of guilt for any misdemeanor under Missouri law [with specified exceptions not relevant here].
§ 595.045.8. At the time of the statute's October 1, 1981 effective date, and at the time of the statute's most recent amendment in 2009, the class E felony did not exist.
Herron v. State, 728 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Mo. App. 1987).
In 2014, the legislature amended the Criminal Code to create class E as a new class of felonies, effective January 1, 2017. § 557.016.1. Several class D felonies, including tampering with physical evidence if the actor impairs or obstructs the prosecution or defense of a felony and abandonment of a corpse, were reclassified as class E felonies. Compare §§ 575.100.2 and 194.425.2, RSMo 2008, with §§ 575.100.2 and 194.425.2. Because Section 595.045.8 does not provide for judgments in favor of the Fund against defendants convicted of class E felonies, Stock asserts the $46 judgment in his case was unauthorized.
The "primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue." State ex rel. T.J. v. Cundiff, 632 S.W.3d 353, 357 (Mo. banc 2021) (citation omitted). The plain language of Section 595.045.8 does not mention class E felonies or the proper amount to collect from defendants convicted of class E felonies. "It is presumed that the General Assembly legislates with knowledge of existing laws." Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660, 667 (Mo. banc 2010). Thus, we must presume the legislature was aware of Section 595.045.8 when it amended the Criminal Code to create class E felonies. See id. at 668. The legislature's decision to create a lower class of felonies than class D felonies indicates that it did not intend to subject those convicted of class E felonies to the same punishment and consequences-which would include payment to the Crime Victims' Compensation Fund-as those convicted of class D felonies.
Even if we were to accept the State's argument that the legislature "apparently did not notice, and failed to address" the potential impact of the 2014 Criminal Code amendments on Section 595.045.8, we "cannot supply what the legislature has omitted from controlling statutes." Id. "[C]ourts cannot transcend the limits of their constitutional powers and engage in judicial legislation supplying omissions and remedying defects in matters delegated to a coordinate branch of our tripartite government." Bd. of Educ. of City of St. Louis v. State, 47 S.W.3d 366, 371 (Mo. banc 2001).
Because Section 595.045.8 does not provide for judgments against defendants convicted of class E felonies, the circuit court plainly erred in entering a $46 judgment against Stock for the Fund. We remand this issue to the circuit court with directions to vacate the $46 judgment against Stock. Point VIII is granted.
Conclusion
We reverse Stock's conviction and sentence for abandonment of a corpse and remand for a new trial on that count. On remand, the court is also directed to vacate the $46 judgment against Stock for the Crime Victims' Compensation Fund. We affirm the remainder of the judgment in all other respects.
All Concur.