Opinion
C.A. No. 02A-05-010 WCC.
Submitted: May 28, 2003.
Decided: November 26, 2003.
Appeal from a decision of the Industrial Accident Board. Reversed.
Danielle K. Yearick, Esquire, Tybout, Redfearn Pell, Wilmington, DE 19899-2092. Attorney for Employer-Appellant.
Gary S. Nitsche, Esquire, and Gary W. Alderson, Esquire, Weik, Nitsche Dougherty, Wilmington, DE 19899. Attorneys for Employee-Appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After consideration of the State of Delaware's ("Appellant") appeal from the April 29, 2002 decision of the Industrial Accident Board ("Board") granting compensation based on injuries resulting from stress inflicted by and during the course of employment with the Division of Family Services of the Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families of the State of Delaware ("DSCYF" or "Employer") for the reasons set forth below, the Board's decision is reversed by the Court.
I. FACTS
Doris Stewart ("Claimant") has been working for the DSCYF for 21 years. Within her position, she is responsible for dealing with children who are emotionally and/or physically abused, and who must be taken out of risk and at times be removed from their parents. Over several months in the latter part of 2001, Claimant suffered a series of difficult personal events including a car accident, separation from her husband, the death of her stepson in October, surgery including a hysterectomy and ovarian removal in September with an associated fear of ovarian cancer.
On November 19, 2001, Claimant and other members of her office learned that a child in foster care, Sergio, had died of a seizure two days prior. The news of Sergio's death upset everyone in the office. In response to this, Claimant issued an e-mail concerning the child's death which contained the identities of the case workers who worked with Sergio, asked for prayer and comfort, and was distributed to people outside the Division. This email constituted a breach of the Employer's confidentiality policy.
Later that day, Claimant was called into a meeting with her Supervisor, Sara Mitchell, and the Regional Administrator, Shirley Roberts, to discuss confidentiality breaches she had committed earlier in the day when she distributed the e-mail, and to address Claimant's reasons for revealing such information. At this meeting, she was advised that some form of reprimand would be administered for the breach of policy. The following day, November 20, when Claimant awoke she had difficulty speaking (i.e. she had lost her voice). Her husband then set up an appointment with a doctor for the following day. The next day, November 21, she was upset and displayed various symptoms, including diarrhea and insomnia. She was initially treated by her family doctor, Dr. Kobeck, who removed her from work for job related stress on the initial visit. Dr. Kobeck then referred her to Dr. Barbara Belford. Dr. Belford, however, was unable to prescribe medication and Claimant subsequently was referred to another counselor, Dr. Weisberg. Claimant saw Dr. Weisberg on four occasions. Over this period, he attempted to put Claimant on medication, however this was later discontinued due to the adverse side effects suffered by the Claimant.
No action had taken place as of the time the hearing date.
Apparently as a result of this anxiety, she subsequently lost forty pounds.
Dr. Belford also referred Claimant to another counselor, Dr. Alvin Turner, but Claimant did not see this counselor.
On December 21, 2001, Claimant filed a Petition to Determine Compensation Due with the Board alleging that she developed a mental stress injury on November 19, 2001, which rendered her temporarily totally disabled as a result of her work. She sought payment for her medical expenses and compensation for total disability from November 19, 2001 until March 18, 2002, when she returned to work. Claimant alleged a series of work stresses were the significant cause of her disability. Specifically, she claimed (1) the inability to obtain office supplies, (2) the death of a foster child, and (3) a November 19, 2001 "disciplinary" meeting with her supervisors. A hearing was held on April 15, 2002 before a Workers' Compensation Hearing Officer, who held that Claimant had suffered a compensable psychiatric injury.
The parties stipulated that the matter could be heard and decided by a Workers' Compensation Hearing Officer, in accordance with 19 Del. C. § 2301B(a)(4). As such, the Hearing Officer stands in the position of the Board. See 19 Del. C. § 2301B.
During the hearing, evidence was accumulated as to possible causes, or "stressors" that eventually led to her depression. It was argued by Claimant's counsel that the November 19, 2001 meeting "triggered" Claimant's mental injury and disability. Employer argued that the work-related stressors were subjective and that Claimant's condition was due to an accumulation of events, the most traumatic of which were non-work-related. Among the witnesses for the Claimant were Jay Gilbert Weisberg, M.D., a psychiatrist, and the Claimant herself. Employer presented the testimony of its medical expert, Dr. Neil S. Kaye, as well as Robyn Parker, Vera Harris, Linda Wilson, Kim Niello, Shirley Roberts, and Sara Mitchell, co-workers and supervisors of Claimant. The testimony presented is summarized below.
Dr. Weisberg is incorrectly identified as "Dr. Whitesburg" in the IAB transcript.
Dr. Weisberg, a psychiatrist, testified on behalf of Claimant. He first saw Claimant on January 24, 2002. He stated that in addition to his own records and observations, he relied upon the records of Dr. Neil Kaye and Dr. Belford. Dr. Weisberg testified that Claimant suffered a job-related stress on November 19, 2001 and that Claimant had indicated to him that prior to that date, there were several stressors in both her personal and professional life (trans 13-14). Dr. Weisberg opined that Claimant took her job very seriously and that the death of Sergio was very upsetting to her. Dr. Weisberg found Claimant to be coherent but depressed, as reflected in her insomnia, weight loss, her trouble focusing, her low energy, as well as some psychomotor retardation. He subsequently diagnosed Claimant with major depression without any psychosis and initially prescribed medication, but he later discontinued this due to their side effects.
See Tr. at 7.
This same diagnosis had previously been made by Dr. Belford ( See Tr. at 16). Belford identified nine stressors in her life, five of which pertained to Claimant's work. Belford concluded that Claimant's depression was not completely caused by her employment, which Weisberg agreed to.
Dr. Weisberg testified that his examinations of Claimant revealed objective evidence of stress from the job, finding the Claimant's depression to be caused at least fifty percent by job-related stress, including problems resulting from the email and interpersonal interactions. When asked whether stress on the job was the trigger or the setting for her depression, he answered:
See id. at 19.
I believe that the stress on the job was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. If you look at the timing, the timing was the death of Sergio, the email, the meeting with the supervisor, and then on the 20th she woke up and didn't have a voice. So I believe that timing wise, that was the straw that broke the camel's back.
Id. at 20-21.
He clarified that it was certainly not the only issue, but that the timing of the disciplinary action and the loss of her voice was "pretty objective."
Id. at 31.
Dr. Weisberg further testified that he agreed that the accumulation of these events in her personal life, or any one of them individually, were significant enough to result in depression. He stated that he was aware that Dr. Kaye opined that Claimant's problems pre-existed the November 19, 2001 meeting. However, he disagreed with these findings and believed that typically if someone had preexisting problems, there would be some outward indications, of which he found none. Dr. Weisberg, however, stated that he was not aware that Claimant exhibited personality and behavior changes during the months prior to November 19, 2001.
See id. at 26, 29 and 31.
See Tr. at 8. He found that Claimant had no prior counseling or treatment, had minimal prior disciplinary action, and she had no major job problems. He opined that if Claimant had any type of personality problem, it was minor enough not to interfere with her daily performance at work. See id. at 8-9.
Several of Claimant's co-workers and supervisors testified on behalf of the Employer. The first was Robin Parker, a co-worker of Claimant's since 1996, who testified that working for DSCYF is stressful and that she thought that getting a disciplinary letter would be very stressful. She also stated that she recalled changes in Claimant's behavior in 2001, including personality changes and increased aggression, which was most noticeable following Claimant's September 2001 surgery.
Linda Wilson, Claimant's office manager, also testified that her job was stressful. See id. at 96.
Vera Harris, an investigation worker and co-worker of Claimant since July 2000, testified that she was one who received the email and had complained to Claimant's supervisor about receiving it. She stated that she noted a "couple of incidences" where Claimant's behavior had changed prior to the November 19th incident. She testified that Claimant suffered personality changes, became more argumentative and became more vocal regarding her religion, and she noticed changes in Claimant around the time when her stepson was killed. She further stated that she was not aware of any work-related events to explain Claimant's behavior changes.
Id. at 83.
Shirley Roberts is Claimant's Regional Administrator and has worked with her for 15-20 years. She stated that following the email distribution by Claimant, she was concerned with the breach of confidentiality because it disclosed confidential information and was distributed to people outside of the Division. She stated that she was present at the meeting with Claimant and told her at the meeting that sending the email was serious and that some type of disciplinary action would have to be taken. Therefore, she stated that Claimant had an expectation of some future disciplinary action.
See id. at 120.
Sara Mitchell, Claimant's supervisor, testified that she had never noticed that Claimant appeared to be depressed before she left work in November. She had worked with Claimant since 1983 and stated that she noticed changes in her personality beginning with her return from ovarian surgery in October. She noticed that Claimant was erratic, more aggressive, more argumentative, and religious.
See Tr. at 141-42.
Dr. Kaye examined and interviewed Claimant on March 5, 2002. He testified that he found that Claimant had numerous stressors in her life and opined that all of the events and stressors were cumulative in nature, but that the most serious of which were unrelated to her work environment. When Kaye examined Claimant, he found symptoms of depression, specifically signs of an anxiety disorder and a depressive disorder, which he diagnosed as somatoform disorder, conversion disorder and personality disorder. Kaye testified that there was no objective evidence that indicated that incidents at work were the substantive cause of Claimant's disability. Furthermore, he did not believe that she was totally disabled from her employment at any time between November 2001 and March 2002.
Following the hearing, the Hearing Officer found that Claimant was entitled to compensation as a result of the stress inflicted by her employment. The State subsequently appealed this decision. Following a review of the briefs, the Court requested supplemental briefing on issues not directly addressed in the initial briefing. This is the Court's decision on the State's appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from the Industrial Accident Board, the function of the Superior Court is to determine whether the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Court is not the trier of fact nor has the authority to weigh evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings and conclusions. Rather, this Court merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the Board's factual findings. Weighing the evidence and determining questions of credibility, which are implicit in factual findings, are functions reserved exclusively for the Board. For errors of law, this Court's review is de novo.
See Devine v. Advanced Power Control, Inc., 663 A.2d 1205, 1209 (Del.Super.Ct. 1995) (citing General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. 1960); Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66 (Del. 1965); General Motors Corp. v. Jarrell, 493 A.2d 978, 980 (Del.Super.Ct. 1985)).
See Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994).
See Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64 (Del. 1965).
See DEL. CODE ANN tit. 29, § 10142(d) (1997).
See Breeding v. Contractors-One-Inc., 549 A.2d 1102, 1106 (Del. 1988); Conner v. Wells Fargo, 1994 WL 682486 (Del.Super.Ct.).
See Stevens v. State, 802 A.2d 939, 944 (Del.Super.Ct. 2002) (citing State of Delaware v. Worsham, 638 A.2d 1104, 1106 (Del. 1994)).
III. DISCUSSION
A mental injury is compensable under the Delaware Worker's Compensation Act even when there has been no prior physical trauma, if the injury was the result of gradual stimuli rather than a sudden shock, and the job-related stress causing the injury was not unusual. For a claimant to be compensated for a mental injury which is gradually caused by stress, State v. Cephas requires that two standards must be established. First, a claimant must offer evidence demonstrating objectively that his or her work conditions were actually stressful. The stress causing the injury does not need to be unusual or extraordinary, but must be proven by objective evidence. Second, that such conditions were a substantial cause of claimant's disabling injury. This test focuses on the objectively provable impact of actual stress on the particular claimant, regardless of whether the claimant is more or less susceptible to mental disorders than the average person. The Court will now examine Appellant's contentions with these principles in mind.A. Objective Evidence of Stress
Appellant's first argument is that the Hearing Officer erred by finding objective evidence of a stressful event at work. They argue that "in reality" no disciplinary action ever took place, that a letter of reprimand was never issued, and that Claimant's job was never threatened during the meeting. They further assert that case law does not support the conclusion that a meeting with supervisors rises to the level of an objective stressor.
See Saleh, 1998 WL 733195, at *4.
Before addressing Appellant's arguments, the Court must first determine whether the disciplinary meeting is a "work condition" or "job-related duty" which allows for compensation under the Act or whether it is outside the scope of coverage. Title 19 Del. C. § 2304 of the Delaware Code provides that compensation is available whenever personal injury or death occurs "by accident arising out of and in the course of employment." These are distinct and separate requirements and are not synonymous. The term "arising out of" refers to the origin of the accident and its cause and relates to the character and quality of the accident with reference to the employment. Thus, "[i]t is sufficient if the injury arises from a situation which is an incident or has a reasonable relation to the employment, and that there be some causal connection between the injury and the employment." The term "in the course of employment" relates to the time, place and circumstances of the accident. This includes "those things that an employee may reasonably do or be expected to do within the time during which he is employed, and at a place where he may reasonably be during that time." "A causal relation must be shown between the injury and the employment and it must be shown that the injury arose out of the nature, conditions and obligations, by which the employment was a substantially contributing, but not necessarily the sole or proximate cause of the injury."
The Hearing Officer found that the assertions as to lack of supplies and the impact of Sergio's death, a child for which the Claimant was not responsible, were not objective findings warranting a disability claim. The Court agrees and will not address this finding further.
Dravo Corp. v. Strosnider, 45 A.2d 542, 544 (Del. 1945).
Id. at 544.
See id. at 543. Seinsoth v. Rumsey Electric Supply Co., 2001 WL 845661 (Del.Super.Ct.).
Id. at 543-44.
Lomascolo v. RAF Industries, 1994 WL 380989, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct.) (citing Dravo Corp., 45 A.2d at 544).
Decisions of the Delaware Courts applying the Cephas standard have used various wording to describe when the accident has derived from a claimant's employment. However, one constant has been that the injury has resulted from an activity related to the employment itself or to the conditions associated with that position. Considering the circumstances here, the Court finds that a disciplinary meeting with one's supervisors, resulting from violating an employer's code of conduct does in fact qualify as a "work condition" for purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act. Intrinsically related to one's employment is the possibility that if an employee violates a rule or makes a mistake in general, that employee runs the risk of being called into a disciplinary meeting with his or her supervisors. These meetings are generally not optional and are thus required for the employee as a requisite part of the job. Furthermore, in the scenario here, the meeting focused on the employee's performance of her job and occurred on the Employer's premises.
This can be distinguished from this Court's previous ruling that injury occurring in the act of "horseplay" while at work is outside the course of employment for purposes of the Act. These cases held that an employee's injury while engaging in horseplay does not arise out of or within the course of their employment as the employer's rules prohibited horseplay on the work site. Therefore, the injury incurred while acting in contravention to the safety rules precludes recovery under the Act. Here, Claimant violated Employer's rules regarding confidentiality, which resulted in her being called into the disciplinary meeting. However, unlike the horseplay case, her injury did not result from breaching this rule. Rather, her injury allegedly occurred from the stresses related to the disciplinary meeting. Consequently, the Court cannot find that her injury occurred outside the course of employment.
Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, the Court finds that substantial evidence existed. Here, the Hearing Officer found that the incident surrounding the email, where claimant was called into a meeting with her superior and regional supervisor and told that she had violated the confidentiality policy and that a disciplinary action would occur sometime in the future, constituted an objectively stressful condition at work. The Court must agree with the Hearing Officer that this meeting was an objectively stressful condition. As stated by the Cephas Court, the stress does not need to be unusual or extraordinary and as testified by at least one of Claimant's coworkers, being called into a disciplinary meeting and being told that action would be taken would be stressful. Furthermore, the Court must agree with the Hearing Officer that the meeting is undeniably related to work as it was a direct result of a violation of work place policy. As such, the Court finds substantial evidence to exist to support the Hearing Officer's decision as to this issue.
See General Motors v. Guy, 1991 WL 190491, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct.).
The Court recognizes that its holding today could open an undesirable avenue for unwarranted claims of disability whenever one is disciplined for a job related performance. The Board should be cautioned that this is not the intent of the Court and any claims which appear to be focused around a disciplinary proceeding should be viewed with great caution and a reasonable amount of pessimism. While concerned, the Court also believes that the primary obstacle to such fraudulent claims lies in the obtainment of reliable expert testimony that must be provided to establish the claim. It is the Board's determination of the reliability and credibility of this testimony that must act as the gatekeeper to prevent frivolous claims and not a blanket prohibition.
Of course, the State is also free to pursue a legislative fix to its concern surrounding disciplinary proceedings.
B. Substantial Cause of Mental Disability
Appellant's next argument is that the Hearing Officer erred in finding that the single objective event, the November 19, 2001 disciplinary meeting, was a substantial cause of Claimant's psychological illness and total disability. The Cephas court held that the "substantial cause" test is appropriate where the claimant's mental injury was not the result of a specific trauma, but rather due to gradual and ordinary job-related stress. As noted by the Court, this is distinguished from the "but for" test, which is applicable when there is a specific, identifiable work-related accident.
See Cephas at 27.
After reviewing the record presented to the Hearing Officer, it is shocking to the Court that one could reasonably and logically conclude that the disciplinary meeting was a substantial cause of the Claimant's depression justifying the disability claim. In the months leading up to the November 19, 2001 disciplinary meeting, the Claimant had been involved in a serious automobile accident, had separated from her husband, had to deal with the death of her stepson, had surgery that included a hysterectomy and the removal of her ovaries and a fear that she would develop ovarian cancer. It is not surprising that the Claimant's difficult personal life made her a walking time bomb awaiting an event that would put her over the edge and "trigger" the depression condition. There is no real dispute that the disciplinary meeting became that triggering event and as appropriately described by Dr. Weisberg was "the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back." It is because this disciplinary meeting acted as a catalyst for the depression that Dr. Weisberg concludes it played a "major" role in causing this condition. From a medical standpoint, the Court cannot quarrel with Dr. Weisberg's conclusion, but in a legal context what is actually being stated by the Claimant's doctor is that "but for" the disciplinary meeting, the depression would not have occurred or at least would not have occurred at that point in time. It appears to the Court that when Dr. Weisberg references "major" cause, what he is really looking for is the event that causes the mental condition to materialize or to become noticeable. However, that is significantly different than finding that the event was a material and substantial factor that caused the depression. When the Hearing Officer accepted Dr. Weisberg's testimony and found this triggering "but for" testimony equated to the substantial factor standard, he committed a legal error which undermined his findings in this particular area.
See Tr. at 20.
Dr. Weisberg stated:
I believe that the job related stress was a major factor in Ms. Stewart's depression at least fifty percent if not more. Some of this may have been due to the problems with the e-mail, with the disciplining or with interactions, a lot of it was due to interpersonal interactions with coworkers, but nevertheless I believe that these interactions were the cause of the depression. So, I believe that the job stress was a major cause of her depression.
In its simplest terms, the only logical conclusion supported by the evidence is that the Claimant's personal tragedies and events prior to the November meeting were the substantial factors in causing her depressive state and the disciplinary meeting simply broke the Claimant's emotional dike and caused her illness to become symptomatic. The Court finds this is not sufficient to establish the causation factor required under Cephas and the Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the Hearing Officer committed legal error in determining that Claimant's depression was substantially related to her employment and the Board's decision is therefore REVERSED.
Because of the Court's Opinion, the admissibility of the report of Dr. Kaye is moot and will not be addressed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.