Defendant voluntarily admitted to the police that he had assaulted the victims and further indicated that he had intended to go down the road and set the vehicle on fire with Cruickshank inside.State v. Stevens, 2003 VT 15, ¶ 2, 175 Vt. 503, 825 A.2d 8 (mem.). A jury convicted petitioner of attempted first-degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, kidnapping, burglary, and violating an abuse prevention order.
State v. Grega, 170 Vt. 573, 575, 750 A.2d 978, 980-81 (1999) (mem.). We faced a similar situation in State v. Stevens, 2003 VT 15, ¶ 10, 175 Vt. 503, 825 A.2d 8 (mem.), where defendant argued an Apprendi error, after failing to raise it in the district court, and failing to claim plain error. We held that defendant had waived the argument, and we follow that same rationale here.
State v. Grega, 168 Vt. 363, 382, 721 A.2d 445, 458 (1998). However, under the U.S. Supreme Court's test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), "the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent the State from trying a defendant in a single trial for two statutory offenses arising from the same event, so long as each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." State v. Stevens, 2003 VT 15, ¶ 7, 175 Vt. 503, 825 A.2d 8 (mem.).
A hammer can constitute a deadly weapon. See State v. Stevens, 2003 VT 15, ¶¶ 7-8, 175 Vt. 503 (mem.) (holding that evidence that defendant attacked victim with hammer supported aggravated-assault charge, which "requires proof of the use of a deadly weapon").
After reviewing the case law, the court concluded that the State could convict petitioner of separate crimes for those separate acts. See State v. Stevens, 2003 VT 15, ¶ 8, 175 Vt. 503 (mem.) (concluding that double jeopardy considerations were not implicated where three charged offenses were based on separate and distinct criminal acts); State v. Karov, 170 Vt. 650, 651-52 (2000) (mem.