Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2765-12T2
07-10-2014
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. STEVEN E. STALLWORTH, Defendant-Appellant.
Clifford E. Lazzaro, attorney for appellant. Joseph Coronato, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Samuel Marzarella, Supervising Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fuentes and Koblitz.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Indictment Nos. 10-06-1215; 11-06-1055 and 12-07-1516.
Clifford E. Lazzaro, attorney for appellant.
Joseph Coronato, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Samuel Marzarella, Supervising Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Steven E. Stallworth appeals from the order of the trial court denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained by the State pursuant to the execution of two search warrants issued by the Criminal Part authorizing the search of two vehicles. It is undisputed that defendant was occupying these vehicles at the time the police executed the warrant. We affirm.
Pursuant to a negotiated agreement with the State, defendant pled guilty to second degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(2), and second degree possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b, under Ocean County Indictment No. 10-06-1215, and third degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1), under Ocean County Indictment No. 12-07-1516. The court sentenced defendant consistent with the plea agreement to an aggregate term of seven and one-half years of incarceration, with one year of parole ineligibility.
Prior to accepting defendant's plea, the court conducted an evidential hearing to adjudicate defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized from his person at the time of his arrests. Specifically, on November 19, 2009, defendant was driving the Hyundai that was identified in the warrant issued by the court, when he was stopped by the Brick Township Police Department. The officers informed defendant that a warrant had been issued to search the car; the officers read defendant his rights under Miranda and conducted a pat-down search of his person.
According to the police officer, defendant initially pressed his legs against the car to prevent the officer from patting-down his waist and the front of his legs. After refusing to obey several commands to move away from the car, defendant finally complied. The officer was able thereafter to detect in the front right pocket of defendant's pants a clear plastic bag containing approximately fifty grams of cocaine. Investigators from the Ocean County Prosecutor's Office Special Operations Group (SOG) searched the Hyundai and found a small amount of marijuana concealed in the center console. The police found a plastic bag containing a loaded .380 handgun in the hatch area of the car.
The execution of this search warrant on November 19, 2009 was preceded by four months of investigative efforts from SOG Detective David Fox. The affidavit in support of the warrant prepared and signed under oath by Detective Fox stated that he and other investigators met with a confidential informant (CI), who revealed that an individual first identified as "Bobby," and later confirmed as defendant, was selling crack cocaine and driving a Hyundai bearing a specific registration number. Motor vehicle records confirmed defendant as the owner of the car. On October 27, 2009, defendant met the CI at a prearranged location, driving the Hyundai, and sold a quantity of crack cocaine. At the completion of this illicit transaction, SOG investigators followed defendant as he drove the Hyundai back to his residence.
The CI made a second "controlled purchase" from defendant during the week of October 30, 2009, again involving a quantity of crack cocaine. SOG investigators were able to follow defendant as he drove the Hyundai from his place of residence to the prearranged location and completed the illicit sale with the CI. Detective Fox's affidavit in support of the search warrant describes in great detail this investigation and confirms through laboratory analysis the illicit nature of the substance defendant sold to the CI.
A similar investigation preceded the charges reflected in the indictment that involved defendant's use of a Lexus automobile. On January 1, 2012, a CI made a controlled purchase of a quantity of cocaine from defendant. This operation was also under the surveillance and supervision of SOG investigators. An affidavit was presented to the court by SOG investigators documenting the details of the illicit transaction involving defendant while he was riding as a passenger in a four-door silver Lexus bearing a specific vehicle registration number. As with the affidavit involving the Hyundai, the Lexus affidavit established probable cause to search the vehicle and its occupants.
On January 25, 2012, police officers from Brick Township stopped the Lexus identified in the warrant. Defendant was seated in the front passenger side. The police searched defendant pursuant to the lawful automobile stop and the probable cause established in the warrant. Defendant had $3,370 in cash and approximately eight grams of crack cocaine in his pants pocket. The police officers also found small pieces of suspected crack cocaine throughout the interior of the Lexus.
The two warrants to search the Hyundai and Lexus contained nearly identical prefatory language, specifically requesting authorization for the search of the vehicles "ALONG WITH ANY AND ALL OCCUPANTS AND CONTAINERS, BOTH HIDDEN AND UNHIDDEN, LOCATED THEREIN." Unfortunately, by inadvertent oversight, the section of the search warrant that contains the traditional "YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to enter and search" language refers only "to the vehicle hereinabove named," neglecting to include any reference to the vehicle's occupants and/or containers found therein.
In rejecting defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court found as follows:
It is sufficient that the defendant was located in the vehicle for which the search
warrant was issued, as the car itself is the "place of the criminal rendezvous." Further, in both cases at hand the defendant was specifically named in the affidavits as being part of the target of the investigations. The defendant had also previously used the Hyundai Tiburon and Lexus ES to complete several drug transactions. There was undoubtedly a physical nexus between the defendant and an on-going criminal event, as he was directly involved with the two locations for which warrants had been issued. In considering these facts, along with the fact that [defendant] was noted in the affidavit as being involved in the criminal activity, there was good reason to suspect that [defendant] was a participant in the criminal activity and to therefore search him pursuant to the search warrant for the vehicle. The fact that the vehicles were registered to someone other than the defendant is irrelevant.
Against this record, defendant now appeals raising the following argument.
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS.
We reject this argument and affirm. It is beyond any doubt that defendant was the central figure in the investigations that led to the issuance of the search warrants. His participation in these illicit transactions was described in detail by the affiants. The prefatory language setting the basis of the two warrants includes specific terms authorizing the officers who execute the warrants to search any occupants found in the Lexus and the Hyundai. Defendant used both of these vehicles to carry out the controlled sales to the CI.
In State v. De Simone, 60 N.J. 319, 322 (1972), the Court noted:
As to probable cause, it must be remembered that the showing need not equal a prima facie case required to sustain a conviction. No more is demanded than a well-grounded suspicion or belief that an offense is taking place and the individual is party to it. And, with regard to the Fourth Amendment demand for specificity as to the subject to be searched, there is none of the vice of a general warrant if the individual is thus identified by physical nexus to the on-going criminal event itself. In such a setting, the officer executing the warrant has neither the authority nor the opportunity to search everywhere for anyone violating a law. So long as there is good reason to suspect or believe that anyone present at the anticipated scene will probably be a participant, presence becomes the descriptive fact satisfying the aim of the Fourth Amendment. The evil of the general warrant is thereby negated. To insist nonetheless that the individual be otherwise described when circumstances will not permit it, would simply deny government a needed power to deal with crime, without advancing the interest the Amendment was meant to serve.
[(Internal citations omitted).]
Here, defendant was named and identified with particularity. There is no constitutional policy basis to suppress evidence gathered by the police after conducting a careful and thorough investigation that clearly connected defendant to criminal activity and the vehicle to be searched. The facts here do not contain the vices associated with a general warrant. Cf. State v. Sims, 75 N.J. 337, 342 (1978).
Suppressing the evidence gathered by the police under these circumstances would serve only to undermine the public policy embodied by the Fourth Amendment, by converting a technical oversight in the warrant documents to operate as a legitimate violation of the expectation of privacy and the requirement of probable cause supported by a finding of individualized suspicion. In support of both the Hyundai and the Lexus warrants, the State presented affidavits establishing the court's finding of probable cause to search the occupants of these two cars. The mere technical and inadvertent omission of specific language in the second part of the warrant document does not nullify the legal viability of the warrant as a whole.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).