Opinion
No. 111,415.
2015-02-6
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Adrian Paul SQUIRES, Appellant.
Appeal from McPherson District Court; Richard B. Walker, Judge.
Submitted for summary disposition pursuant to K.S.A.2013 Supp. 21–6820(g) and (h).
Before ARNOLD–BURGER, P.J., PIERRON and BUSER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Adrian Squires appeals the district court's decision revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his underlying sentence. We granted Squires' motion for summary disposition in lieu of briefs pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7.041A (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 66).
Squires was convicted of felony interference with law enforcement. On August 30, 2013, he was sentenced to 12 months' probation with an underlying prison term of 6 months.
On January 16, 2014, the State filed a motion to revoke Squires' probation because Squires was convicted in October 2013, in a separate case, of aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer and criminal possession of a firearm; thus, violating the terms of his probation.
Squires chose not to contest the allegations against him and the district court found that he was in violation of the terms of his probation. The district court revoked Squires probation and ordered him to serve his underlying prison term.
Squires filed a timely notice of appeal.
Squires asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and ordered him to serve his underlying prison term.
Unless required by law, probation is a privilege and not as a matter of right. State v. Gary, 282 Kan. 232, 237, 144 P.3d 634 (2006). Once a probation violation has been established, the decision to revoke probation is within the sound discretion of the district court. State v. Skolaut, 286 Kan. 219, 227–28, 182 P.3d 1231 (2008); State v. Graham, 272 Kan. 2, 4, 30 P.3d 310 (2001). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if the action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) is based on an error of law; or (3) is based on an error of fact. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1594, 182 L.Ed.2d 205 (2012).
Squires did not contest that he had been convicted of new crimes after his probation was granted. K.S.A.2013 Supp. 22–3716(c)(8) provides that “[i]f the offender commits a new felony or misdemeanor ... while the offender is on probation ... the court may revoke the probation ... without having previously imposed” intermediate sanctions. Accordingly, there is nothing within the record that would suggest the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Squires' probation.
Affirmed.