Opinion
112,530.
07-24-2015
STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Jaiden SMITH, Appellee.
Michael R. Serra, deputy county attorney, Jason W. Belveal, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant. No appearance by appellee.
Michael R. Serra, deputy county attorney, Jason W. Belveal, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant.
No appearance by appellee.
Before MALONE, C.J., McANANY and ATCHESON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
The State appeals the district court's sua sponte dismissal with prejudice of criminal charges against Jaiden Smith for possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to use. The State argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the charges against Smith, or alternatively, that the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed the charges with prejudice. Under the facts and circumstances presented in this case, we agree with the State that the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed the charges with prejudice.
We will attempt to piece together the facts and procedural history of this case from the sparse record on appeal. On July 3, 2014, Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper K. Olson issued a uniform notice to appear and complaint to Smith for possession of marijuana in violation of K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–5706(b)(3) and possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to use in violation of K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–5709(b)(2). An identical citation was issued to Phillip Vaughn Rissen on the same date. Trooper Olson issued the citations at a traffic stop following the search of a vehicle driven by Rissen in which Smith was a passenger. According to the narrative report issued by the trooper, which was referred to by the prosecutor at the first appearance, marijuana was found in the passenger's side compartment of the vehicle. Rissen told the trooper that the marijuana belonged to both him and Smith and the two men had been smoking it earlier. Smith had denied using the marijuana.
The notice to appear directed Smith to appear in district court on or before August 11, 2014, at 9 a.m. for a first appearance. Smith appeared before the district court on July 28, 2014, and asked the court to take up his case. Upon inquiry by the district court, the prosecutor indicated that he had not received an affidavit for prosecution from the Kansas Highway Patrol (KHP)—only the citation and an unsworn narrative report from the trooper. After hearing from the prosecutor, the district court found sua sponte that the uniform notice to appear and complaint issued to Smith was “defective.” The district court initially dismissed the complaint without prejudice and ordered the costs taxed to the State. The district court advised Smith that the charges against him could be refiled and, in the event the charges were refiled, directed the State to issue a summons to Smith.
The district court asked the State whether it intended to refile the charges against Smith. The prosecutor advised that a decision had not yet been made, as the State was still waiting for an affidavit for prosecution from the KHP as well as a lab report on the marijuana. The prosecutor further informed the district court that a citation had also been issued to Rissen, who was alleged to have been driving the vehicle at the time of the stop. Upon learning that Smith was only a passenger in the vehicle, which was a company car driven by Rissen, the district court stated: “Well, and this in no way reflects upon the prosecut[or]'s office, the State. The dismissal for defective complaint is with prejudice to refiling as to this defendant.”
When asked for clarification, the district court engaged in the following exchange with the prosecutor:
“THE COURT: Yeah. I—I'm inclined to think that the summons applies to—I don't think the highway patrol can issue a summonses [sic ] to appear on misdemeanors, can they? Unless it's traffic-related?
“[THE STATE:] I'm not sure is the answer to that question. I have no idea.
“THE COURT: Well, maybe it's going to start sending out summonses on behalf of ... of whom? I guess Jefferson County; is that right? It's dismissed with prejudice to refiling.”
The State reminded the district court that Rissen also had been issued a citation for identical charges arising from the same incident. The State advised the district court that if it was going to dismiss Smith's case with prejudice, it “might as well” dismiss Rissen's case. The prosecutor stated, “that's not fair to do it to him [dismiss the charges against Smith] and then not to the driver.”
The district court reiterated that the State's filing of an affidavit for prosecution and a formal complaint was the proper way to initiate criminal proceedings. The judge stated: “Well, this isn't a traffic offense; it's a criminal offense, which ... is initiated with the filing of a[n] affidavit for prosecution; right?” The prosecutor indicated “the procedure should be that we request an affidavit for prosecution, and they [KHP] provide us with one prior to a court date. And at this point we haven't received an affidavit for prosecution.” The district court responded that the complaints against both Smith and Rissen were being dismissed with prejudice “for those reasons.”
On July 28, 2014, the district court filed a journal entry memorializing the dismissal, writing: “KHP has not provided State w/ affidavit for prosecution. Court on its own initiative dismisses citation with prejudice.” The State timely appealed the dismissal of the charges.
On appeal, the State first argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the charges initiated by the issuance of a citation to Smith. Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which an appellate court's scope of review is unlimited. State v. Charles, 298 Kan. 993, 1002, 318 P.3d 997 (2014). If the district court lacks jurisdiction to enter an order, an appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter on appeal. State v. McCoin, 278 Kan. 465, 468, 101 P.3d 1204 (2004).
According to the State, the district court dismissed the citation against Smith after finding that it was not appropriate for the KHP to issue a citation for non-traffic-related offenses. The State contends the district court never acquired jurisdiction over Smith in order to dismiss his case because no charges had been filed against him. The State asserts that a prosecution may only commence in district court “upon complaint, indictment, or information” pursuant to K.S.A. 22–3201(a). Therefore, in the absence of a filed complaint or information, the State concludes that prosecution was never legally initiated against Smith and the district court never acquired jurisdiction to dismiss the charges.
As support, the State cites this court's decision in Seaton v. City of Coffeyville, 9 Kan.App.2d 760, 688 P.2d 1240 (1984). In that case, Seaton was tried in municipal court for violation of a municipal ordinance. After being found guilty in that court, Seaton appealed to the district court and was again found guilty in a de novo jury trial. Seaton appealed, arguing that neither the municipal court nor the district court had proper jurisdiction because no complaint against him had ever been filed in the municipal court. On appeal, this court stated that the municipal court's jurisdiction was set forth in K.S.A. 12–4201, which requires that actions in municipal court be commenced by the filing of a complaint. 9 Kan.App.2d at 760. This court found that statute to be clear and unambiguous, concluding: “The filing of a complaint is mandatory to confer jurisdiction upon a municipal court. There is no evidence present before this court that any such filing was made in this case.” 9 Kan.App.2d at 761.
This court's decision in Seaton stands for the basic proposition that the filing of a complaint is mandatory to confer jurisdiction upon a municipal court. The Seaton court was not faced with and did not address the effect of a uniform notice to appear. As to whether a uniform notice to appear is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the district court, this court's decision in State v. Wright, 26 Kan.App.2d 879, 881, 995 P.2d 416 (2000), is more on point. In that case, Wright was convicted of several misdemeanors in district court after being arrested by a city police officer. On appeal, Wright argued that a city police officer was without authority to issue a uniform notice to appear requiring his appearance in the district court. The Wright court disagreed and specifically stated that “[a] uniform notice to appear may serve as a valid complaint.” 26 Kan.App.2d at 881 (citing State v. Boyle, 21 Kan.App.2d 944, 945, 913 P.2d 617 [1996] ). In so finding, the court cited K.S.A. 22–2408, which allows law enforcement officers to serve a written notice to appear. 26 Kan.App.2d at 881.
This court specifically held in Wright that a uniform notice to appear may serve as a valid complaint. Here, the issuance of the uniform notice to appear was sufficient to give the district court jurisdiction over the State's case against Smith, even though the State intended to later file a formal complaint against Smith pursuant to K.S.A. 22–3201. Consequently, we reject the State's argument that the district court did not have jurisdiction over Smith at the time it dismissed the charges against him.
Next, the State contends the district court abused its discretion when it sua sponte dismissed with prejudice the charges against Smith. Though the district court did not specifically state that it was sanctioning the State when it made its ruling, the State asserts that the district court's dismissal was clearly meant to punish law enforcement for its failure to provide an affidavit for prosecution. The State argues that the district court's dismissal was based on an arbitrary and unreasonable analysis and thus must be reversed.
An appellate court reviews a district court's dismissal of criminal charges for an abuse of discretion. State v. Boehmer, 41 Kan.App.2d 598, 602, 203 P.3d 1274 (2009) (citing State v. Clovis, 248 Kan. 313, 331, 807 P.2d 127 [1991] ). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if the action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) is based on an error of law; or (3) is based on an error of fact. State v. Mosher, 299 Kan. 1, 3, 319 P.3d 1253 (2014). The party asserting that the district court abused its discretion bears the burden of showing such abuse of discretion. State v. Rojas–Marceleno, 295 Kan. 525, 531, 285 P.3d 361 (2012).
Here, the transcript of the first appearance reflects that the district court dismissed the charges against Smith with prejudice for two reasons. First, the district court appeared to be operating under the assumption that the KHP could not issue a notice to appear in a misdemeanor (nontraffic) case. During the hearing, the judge asked the prosecutor, “I don't think the highway patrol can issue a summonses [sic ] to appear on misdemeanors, can they? Unless it's traffic-related?” Later in the hearing, the judge stated: “Well, this isn't a traffic offense; it's a criminal offense, which ... is initiated with the filing of a[n] affidavit for prosecution and a complaint; right?” The district court found that the uniform notice to appear was “defective” and dismissed it with costs taxed to the State.
K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–2408 governs the issuance of a notice to appear under the Kansas criminal code. The statute provides in pertinent part:
“(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (6) of this section, whenever a law enforcement officer detains any person without a warrant, for any act punishable as a misdemeanor, and such person is not immediately taken before a magistrate for further proceedings, the officer may serve upon such person a written notice to appear in court.
Such notice to appear shall contain the name and address of the person detained, the crime charged, and the time and place when and where such person shall appear in court.
“(2) The time specified in such notice to appear must be at least seven days after such notice is given unless the person shall demand an earlier hearing.
“(5) Such law enforcement officer shall cause to be filed, without unnecessary delay, a complaint in the court in which a person released under subsection (4) is given notice to appear, charging the crime stated in said notice.”
K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–2408(1) provides that a law enforcement officer can issue a notice to appear to any person for any act punishable as a misdemeanor when the person is not arrested and immediately taken before a magistrate. Trooper Olson was authorized to issue Smith a notice to appear in district court for the misdemeanor offenses and there was nothing “defective” about the citation. Thus, the district court's dismissal of the criminal charges against Smith appeared to be based, in part, on an error law. For this reason alone, the district court's dismissal of the criminal charges constituted an abuse of discretion. See Mosher, 299 Kan. at 3.
The district court also dismissed the criminal charges against Smith at the first appearance because the KHP had not yet provided the State with an affidavit for prosecution so that the State could prepare a formal complaint against Smith. Although the district court did not specifically state that it was sanctioning the State when it made its ruling, it appears that the district court's dismissal was meant to punish law enforcement for its failure to provide an affidavit for prosecution in a timely manner.
K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–2408(5) provides that whenever a law enforcement officer issues a notice to appear to any person, such law enforcement officer shall cause to be filed, without unnecessary delay, a complaint charging the person with the crime stated in the notice. The requirements for a formal complaint are set forth in K.S.A. 22–3201. K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–2408(2) provides that the time specified for a hearing in the notice to appear must be at least 7 days after the notice to appear is given unless the person shall demand an earlier hearing.
Here, Trooper Olson issued Smith the notice to appear on July 3, 2014. Pursuant to K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–2408(5), Olson should have caused to be filed an affidavit for prosecution without unreasonable delay so that the State could proceed with filing a formal complaint against Smith pursuant to K.S.A. 22–3201. The notice to appear directed Smith to appear in district court on or before August 11, 2014. Smith appeared before the district court on July 28, 2014, and asked the court to take up his case. The State was not ready to proceed with a formal complaint on that date, so the district court dismissed the charges against Smith with prejudice.
Under certain circumstances, a district court can dismiss criminal charges with prejudice but only as a remedy of last resort. In State v. Bolen, 270 Kan. 337, 342–43, 13 P.3d 1270 (2000), our Supreme Court stated:
“We have recognized that in a proper case, a trial court has the power to dismiss a criminal complaint with prejudice if the interests of justice require such action. State v. Crouch & Reeder, 230 Kan. 783, 788, 641 P.2d 394 (1982). However, such power should be exercised with great caution and only in cases where no other remedy would protect against abuse. 230 Kan. at 788. Dismissal with prejudice should be used only in extreme circumstances. State v. Winter, 238 Kan. 530, 534, 712 P.2d 1228 (1986). Dismissal of charges oftentimes punishes the public rather than the prosecutor and creates a windfall for the defendant. State v. Davis, 266 Kan. 638, 646, 972 P.2d 1099 (1999). Where there has been no showing that the defendant suffered actual prejudice as a result of a prosecutor's misconduct, and alternative means of sanctioning the prosecutor exist for the violation, dismissal of pending charges with prejudice may constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 266 Kan. at 646.” Bolen, 270 Kan. at 342–43.
Here, the district court did not find that Smith had suffered any prejudice as a result of the State's failure to file a formal complaint or information by July 28, 2014. In fact, Smith himself asserted no prejudice; rather, he apparently had a conflict with the appearance date listed on his citation because of school and asked the clerk's office to allow him to appear prior to his scheduled date. The fact that Smith was inconvenienced by appearing in court on a date the State was not ready to proceed does not rise to the level of actual prejudice preventing him from defending against the charges. Though lesser sanctions were available to the district court than dismissal with prejudice, it did not consider whether any of these less drastic options might have been appropriate.
A reasonable judge might have dismissed the charges against Smith at the first appearance as long as the dismissal was without prejudice. But dismissal with prejudice should be exercised with great caution and only in extreme circumstances. Bolen, 270 Kan. at 342–43. Under the circumstances here, we conclude the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed the charges with prejudice at the first appearance. We reverse the district court's dismissal and remand with directions to allow the State to reinstate the charges against Smith.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
* * *
ATCHESON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Abuse of judicial discretion is an extraordinarily forgiving standard of review. In keeping with how we ought to look at decisions so governed, I cannot find an abuse of discretion in the Jefferson County District Court's ruling dismissing with prejudice the misdemeanor charges against Defendant Jaiden Smith for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Smith properly appeared for an arraignment as he had been instructed, and the State was unable to proceed because the Kansas Highway Patrol had failed to timely furnish a complaint as required by statute. The district court's ruling, though an especially stem tonic for the State's lethargy, was not so ill-informed or bizarre as to be an abuse of discretion. I, therefore, respectfully dissent and would affirm the district court.
I join my colleagues in finding that the notice to appear issued to Smith was sufficient to begin the criminal prosecution and conferred jurisdiction on the district court and, in turn, on this court. See State v. Wright, 26 Kan.App.2d 879, 881, 995 P.2d 416 (2000) (notice to appear initiates criminal proceeding). So the district court had the authority to dismiss the case, and we have the authority to review that decision.
I also agree that the dismissal is governed by an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Clovis, 248 Kan. 313, 331, 807 P.2d 127 (1991). A district court may be said to have abused its discretion if the result it reaches is “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.” Unruh v. Purina Mills, 289 Kan. 1185, 1202, 221 P.3d 1130 (2009). That is, no reasonable judicial officer would have come to the same conclusion if presented with the same record evidence. An abuse of discretion may also occur if the district court fails to consider or to properly apply controlling legal standards. State v. Woodward, 288 Kan. 297, 299, 202 P.3d 15 (2009). A district court errs in that way when its decision “ ‘goes outside the framework of or fails to properly consider statutory limitations or legal standards.’ “ 288 Kan. at 299 (quoting State v. Shopteese, 283 Kan. 331, 340, 153 P.3d 1208 [2007] ). Finally, a district court may abuse its discretion if a factual predicate necessary for the challenged judicial decision lacks substantial support in the record. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Services Co., 296 Kan. 906, 935, 296 P.3d 1106 (outlining all three bases for an abuse of discretion), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 162 (2013) ; State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 3, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S.Ct. 1594 (2012). The burden is on the State to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. State v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, 996, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012) (“The party asserting an abuse of discretion bears the burden of establishing it.”).
A Kansas Highway Patrol trooper issued a notice to appear to Smith on July 3, 2014, citing him for misdemeanor charges for possession of both marijuana and drug paraphernalia in violation of K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–5606 and K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–5709, respectively. The notice informed Smith he “[m]ust appear on or before” August 11, 2014, in the district court. The notice did not give Smith a date certain for his court appearance. Smith complied with that directive when he showed up on July 28. At the hearing, the deputy county attorney told the district court Smith came in that day because he was supposed to start school on August 11. The proceedings on July 28—when the district court dismissed the charges—were brief. The transcript is only 11 pages.
As provided in K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–2408(1), a law enforcement officer may issue a notice to appear to a person for a misdemeanor offense without arresting or further detaining that person. The notice to appear must include the “time and place” for the person to appear in district court. The appearance date must be at least 7 days after the officer issues the notice. K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–2408(2). The officer is then required to file a complaint with the district court “without unnecessary delay.” K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–2408(5). A complaint is a “concise written statement of the essential facts constituting the crime charged” signed by a “person with knowledge of the facts.” K.S.A. 22–3201(b). The notice to appear lacked factual representations and was not, therefore, a substitute for a complaint.
Smith's appearance in the district court technically was for an arraignment, as required in K.S.A. 22–3205, at which time he should have been given a copy of the complaint, informed of its contents, and asked to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty. Upon arraignment, the district court could then schedule further proceedings as might be necessary. On July 28, the deputy county attorney informed the district court the State could not go forward because his office had not received a complaint from the trooper. The district court initially stated it would dismiss the charges without prejudice. But the district court later decided the dismissal should be with prejudice, barring any further prosecution of Smith.
The deputy county attorney told the district court that Phillip Vaughn Rissen, the driver of the car the trooper stopped, had also been charged. Although Rissen had not yet appeared in response to the notice, the deputy county attorney suggested it would only be fair to treat him the same as Smith. As the hearing drew to a close, the deputy county attorney reiterated that the proper procedure required the highway patrol to forward an affidavit or complaint for prosecution and that hadn't happened with respect to Smith or Rissen. The district court then stated the charges against both Smith and Rissen would be “dismissed for those reasons.”
I see no abuse of judicial discretion in what happened. First, nobody has suggested the district court misunderstood some material fact or relied on unproven facts in ruling as it did. There was no error or abuse in that respect.
The majority finds the district court misapprehended the applicable law. I don't discern a failure to understand the pertinent legal framework or legal standards in a way that gives rise to an abuse of discretion. The discussion between the deputy county attorney and the district court about how a prosecution for a misdemeanor other than a traffic offense may be initiated and the role of a notice to appear in that process could be characterized as diffuse and imprecise. Smith did not have a lawyer and was mostly an observer.
The district court did refer to the notice to appear and the complaint as “defective.” The notice was not defective in the sense it was legally incomplete, but it was legally insufficient to permit the district court to arraign Smith or otherwise proceed with the prosecution. And there was no complaint. That was the problem. Later during the hearing, the district court indicated that perhaps a notice to appear could not be used for misdemeanors other than traffic offenses and that a complaint was required to begin criminal proceedings. Assuming the district court were stating a legal conclusion, the conclusion was wrong. But, again, the problem wasn't that the State failed to properly begin the prosecution. The State lacked a complaint necessary to carry on the prosecution when Smith came to court to be arraigned. The district court correctly understood the gist of the legal issue—the State did not have the necessary paperwork to proceed with the prosecution of Smith on July 28. Although the district court may have been somewhat loose in its use of legal terminology to describe the charging documents and in fully appreciating the role of a notice to appear, the district court adequately sized up the situation. The State couldn't go forward absent a complaint charging Smith, and it didn't have one. So I fail to see a material misunderstanding of the pertinent law or the legal situation rendering the district court's ruling an abuse of discretion on that score.
We then come to the final way a district court may abuse its discretion. That's by entering a ruling so weird no sensible judge would do the same thing. I certainly recognize that a district court rarely should dismiss criminal charges with prejudice, especially early in the process for correctable omissions or oversights. The majority fairly outlines the law in that regard. The Kansas Supreme Court has clearly stated the remedy of dismissal with prejudice should be reserved for exceptional situations and invoked only when no other remedy would be adequate. State v. Bolen, 270 Kan. 337, 342–43, 13 P.3d 1270 (2000). Dismissal of criminal charges with prejudice as a sanction for the State's action or inaction necessarily extends that sanction to the people of the state in whose name crimes are prosecuted. 270 Kan. at 343.
Here, however, there are circumstances that pull the district court's ruling into an orbit sufficiently aligned with judicial discretion that there was no abuse.
First, the offenses here are misdemeanors rather than felonies, unlike Bolen, where the court did find an abuse of discretion in a dismissal with prejudice. But that distinction alone is far from determinative. Even among misdemeanors, however, these offenses are unusual. They involve no impermissible physical contact with another person, see, e.g., domestic battery, K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–5414(a) ; sexual battery, K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–5505(a), or threats of physical harm, see, e.g., assault, K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–5412(a). And they entail no deprivation of or interference with another person's property, see, e.g., theft, K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–5801(a) ; giving a worthless check, K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–5821(a). All crimes are not created equal. The nature of the offense is a factor in weighing the exercise of judicial discretion as to disposition.
Second, Smith showed up in the district court as he was directed in the notice to appear. He came to court to deal with the charges on July 28, more than 3 weeks after he had received the notice and in conformity with the directive he appear on or before August 11. If the State wants individuals receiving notices to appear to show up on specific dates, the documents should say so. Smith did nothing improper.
The record suggests Smith traveled from his home in Topeka to Oskaloosa, a roundtrip of roughly 60 miles. Nothing in the record indicates the trip imposed some unusual burden on him. He was inconvenienced the same way anyone else would have been. Had the district court continued the arraignment, Smith would have had to come back again. He would have been similarly inconvenienced in having to do so. Smith, however, apparently would not have suffered any legal prejudice had the case been continued. He certainly did not indicate that some defense he intended to offer would have been compromised if the case were delayed. Mere inconvenience to Smith, in contrast to tangible legal prejudice, doesn't especially favor the district court's decision. But no readily available alternative remedy would have alleviated the inconvenience.
Finally, the reason for the State's inability to proceed on July 28 factors into the analysis. The statute governing notices to appear requires the law enforcement officer to provide a complaint “without unnecessary delay.” K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–2408(5). The term is neither defined nor establishes a fixed time period. But the same statute also provides that an appearance date in a notice must be at least 7 days after the officer issues the notice. K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–2408(2). Read together, those provisions suggest the legislature viewed 7 days to be a necessary delay accommodating the preparation of a complaint. Or 7 days would, at least, be indicative of a general timeframe for doing so. See State v. Coman, 294 Kan. 84, 93, 273 P.3d 701 (2012) (various provisions of a statute may be considered together to discern legislative meaning or purpose).
Here, of course, the county attorney's office had yet to receive a complaint more than 3 weeks after the trooper gave Smith the notice to appear, although the notice informed Smith he could come to district court by then to address the charges. The deputy county attorney offered no explanation to the district court for the delay, let alone one that would render it necessitous. A compelling circumstance, such as the officer's illness or injury, would seem to fit. To the contrary, late in the hearing, the deputy county attorney indicated getting timely complaints from the highway patrol had been a continuing problem. Those considerations lend support to the reasonableness of the district court's discretionary call.
Ultimately, all of the specific circumstances have to be taken together to assess whether the district court abused its judicial discretion. This is, I suppose, a closer case than many.
In the nearly 5 years I have been on this court, I have regularly voted to affirm district court rulings I know I would not have made were I sitting on the trial bench simply because our standard of review required an abuse of discretion to reverse. Disagreement with the district court—even strong disagreement—doesn't translate to an abuse of discretion. Nor does the district court's lack of sagacity. In this case, I'm not at all sure I would have done what the district court did.
I have also recognized there are cases in which a district court would not have abused its discretion however it ruled on a given issue. See Arbor Lake, LLC v. Enterprise Bank & Trust, No. 109,757, 2014 WL 4723732, at *4 (Kan.App.2014) (unpublished opinion); Brick Masters, Inc. v. Murray & Sons Construction Co, Inc., No. 107,426, 2013 WL 1729249, at *3 (Kan.App.), rev. denied 297 Kan. 1243 (2013) (unpublished opinion). Taking account of the particular circumstances here, I believe this, too, is such a case. The district court would not have abused its discretion had it continued Smith's appearance date, requiring him to return; dismissed the cases without prejudice, as it originally indicated; or dismissed the cases with prejudice, as it ultimately did. I would, therefore, affirm the district court.