Opinion
No. 36327-5-II.
April 8, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Skamania County, No. 07-8-00010-4, E. Thompson Reynolds, J., entered April 11, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Hunt, J., concurred in by Houghton, C.J., and Bridgewater, J.
Brandon Michael Smith appeals his bench trial conviction for third degree assault. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, that we should not hold him to a "reasonable man" standard, and that the trial court erred in entering conclusions of law. We affirm.
Facts I. Assault
Brandon Smith, Kenneth Warner, and Jeremiah Crowell were all students at Stevenson High School in Stevenson, Washington. On February 22, all three boys attended a metal shop class. Crowell was sitting in a chair welding beads with a gas welder, wearing goggles and gloves. Warner and Smith began "throwin' some stuff at [Crowell] . . . random shop things on the ground." Report of Proceedings (RP) (April 11, 2007) at 30. Warner and Smith then sharpened welding rods by repeatedly sticking the rods in the wall. Warner asked Smith, "[Y]ou want to fuck around with Jeremiah [Crowell]?" RP (April 11, 2007) at 32. Smith said, "[Y]eah," and Warner and Smith stuck two long, thin, sharpened welding rods into the forge until they were red hot. RP (April 11, 2007) at 32-33.
Smith and Warner walked over toward Crowell with the rods, and Crowell jumped out of the chair and tried to run away. While Crowell was running away, Smith held out the welding rod and poked Crowell in the buttocks. Crowell "felt like [he] was being burnt, like someone had . . . lit [his] pants on fire." RP (April 11, 2007) at 11. When Crowell told Smith that this hurt, Smith told Crowell to "quit bitching."
After school, Crowell told his grandfather what had happened. The next day, Crowell was still in pain; so he and his foster mother went to the doctor. The doctor prescribed Bacitracin, an antibiotic ointment, and Penicillin for an infection that had developed. The wound caused Crowell pain for two weeks, and "there was puss coming out of it and all kinds of stuff." RP (April 11, 2007) at 22.
Assistant principal Andie Webb discussed the incident with Crowell, Smith, and Smith's mother. Smith told Webb that Crowell had "backed into the rod that he was holding," and Smith signed a statement saying, "Me and a buddy heated up welding rods and burnt Jeremiah [Crowell]." RP (April 11, 2007) at 25-27. Smith did not implicate Warner in the assault.
II. Procedure
The State charged Smith with third degree assault in violation of RCW 9A.36.031(1)(f). Smith waived his right to a jury trial, and the case proceeded to trial by the court.
The State called two witnesses. Crowell testified about how Smith and Warner had brandished sharpened, red-hot welding rods at him, poking him in the buttocks and causing pain, infection, and puss. Webb testified about his investigation of the incident and retold Smith's version of the events.
Smith testified on his own behalf that he was just "messing around" with Crowell, that he did not think anybody was going to get hurt, that he had simply extended the welding rod near Crowell, that Smith had fallen into the welding rod, and that he did not know he had burned Crowell at the time.
The trial court found that Smith had heated a welding rod in a forge and then used the heated rod to stick Crowell in the buttocks. The court ruled that: (1) the action occurred in Skamania County; (2) Smith was criminally negligent; (3) "[n]o reasonable person would ever approach another individual holding a hot welding rod in their hands to the point where they're close enough where this person could be hurt"; (4) Smith's account of the incident was less credible than Crowell's; (5) Crowell was in substantial pain that lasted for a two-week period of time and caused considerable suffering; and (6) Smith was guilty of third degree assault.
Smith appeals.
Analysis
Smith argues that insufficient evidence supports his conviction for third degree assault because: (1) the State did not prove that he acted with criminal negligence, (2) we should not hold a 15-year-old to the "reasonable man" standard, and (3) the trial court erred in entering conclusions of law two, three, and six. These arguments fail.
I. Standard of Review
"In determining whether the requisite quantum of proof exists, the reviewing court need not be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but only that substantial evidence supports the State's case." State v. Jones, 93 Wn. App. 166, 176, 968 P.2d 888 (1998), review denied, 138 Wn.2d 1003 (1999). Evidence is sufficient to support an adjudication of guilt if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence permits any rational fact finder to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). When a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of evidence, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State and interpret them most strongly against the defendant. State v. Partin, 88 Wn.2d 899, 906-07, 567 P.2d 1136 (1977).
A defendant claiming insufficiency of the evidence admits the truth of the State's evidence and all reasonably drawn inferences therefrom. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201. We view both circumstantial and direct evidence as equally reliable; and we defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, witness credibility, and the persuasiveness of the evidence. State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874-75, 83 P.3d 970 (2004) (citing State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990)).
II. Third Degree Assault
In order to prove third degree assault, the State had to show that Smith, with criminal negligence, caused bodily harm accompanied by substantial pain that extended for a period Page 5 sufficient to cause considerable suffering to Crowell. RCW 9A.36.031(1) (f). The State has met its burden here.
RCW 9A.36.031(1)(f) provides that:
(1) A person is guilty of assault in the third degree if he or she, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first or second degree:
. . . .
(f) With criminal negligence, causes bodily harm accompanied by substantial pain that extends for a period sufficient to cause considerable suffering.
Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the State, as we must, the State presented sufficient evidence that Smith's crime caused bodily harm accompanied by substantial pain that extended for a period sufficient to cause considerable suffering. RCW 9A.36.031(1)(f). There is no dispute that Smith's actions in poking Crowell with a heated rod wounded Crowell, and caused him to experience consistent pain for two weeks; in addition, the wound became infected, with "puss coming out of it," causing the physician to prescribe antibiotics for Crowell to take.
When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the State also presented sufficient evidence to show that Smith acted with criminal negligence. A person acts with criminal negligence "when he fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable man would exercise in the same situation." RCW 9A.08.010(1)(d). Smith and Warner sharpened welding rods by sticking them in a wall, while they talked about "fuck[ing] around with Jeremiah [Crowell]." They heated two welding rods in a forge until they were red-hot, and chased Crowell with them. While Crowell was running away, Smith held out a heated welding rod and poked Crowell in the buttocks with it. When Crowell told Smith that this hurt, Smith told Crowell to "quit bitching." This evidence substantially supports the inference that Smith acted with criminal negligence in injuring Crowell with the heated welding rod.
The trial court ruled that no reasonable person would ever approach another individual holding a hot welding rod to the point where he is close enough to hurt the other person. The trial court also decided that Smith's version of the events was not as credible as Crowell's, which credibility determination we do not review. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d at 874-75. Because the State presented sufficient evidence to meet all of the elements of third degree assault, we hold that sufficient evidence supports Smith's conviction.
III. Reasonable Man Standard
Smith next argues, without citing to authority, that we should not hold him to a "reasonable man" standard because he was only 15 years old at the time. This argument fails.
We presume that children aged 12 and older are capable of committing a crime. RCW 9A.04.050; State v. J.P.S., 135 Wn.2d 34, 37, 954 P.2d 894 (1998). We base criminal negligence on an objective "reasonable man" standard, so a person may be criminally negligent despite impairment in mental capacity. State v. Warden, 80 Wn. App. 448, 456, 909 P.2d 941 (1996), affirmed, 133 Wn.2d 559 (1997). Without any showing that Smith is mentally impaired or somehow incapable of committing this crime, we hold that the "reasonable man" standard governs Smith's acts of criminal negligence, despite his age.
IV. Conclusions of Law
Finally, Smith argues that the trial court erred in entering conclusions of law two, three, and six. These conclusions of law merely state that Smith was criminally negligent, that he did not act in the manner of a "reasonable man," and that Smith is guilty of third degree assault. These conclusions of law simply reiterate that the State proved that Smith committed all of the elements of third degree assault. Because we have already held that substantial evidence supports Smith's conviction for third degree assault, we hold that the trial court correctly entered these conclusions of law. We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Houghton, CJ., Bridgewater, J., concur.