Opinion
CR-18-4649
12-14-2018
STATE OF MAINE v. QUINTON SMITH Defendant
ATTORNEY: RICK WINLING FAIRFIELD & ASSOCIATES PA STATE'S ATTORNEY: STEPHANIE ANDERSON
ATTORNEY: RICK WINLING FAIRFIELD & ASSOCIATES PA
STATE'S ATTORNEY: STEPHANIE ANDERSON
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Jed J. French United Criminal Court Judge.
Defendant contends that the Portland Police Department violated his Constitutional rights first by stopping him and then by searching him and his vehicle. Defendant claims that in the absence of reasonable articulable suspicion that Defendant was engaging, or about to engage, in criminal conduct, a civil violation, or a threat to public safety, the police had no constitutional basis for detaining him and searching him and his vehicle. The State contends that given the totality of the circumstances the police had such reasonable articulable suspicion, and argues that in any event the police were authorized to search Defendant's vehicle by virtue of Defendant's conditions of probation.
An evidentiary hearing was held on December 11, 2018. Assistant Attorney General Johanna Gauvreau appeared and argued on behalf of the State. Attorney Stephen Shea appeared and argued on behalf of Defendant. The court heard testimony from Officer Matthew Morrison of the Portland Police Department as well as oral argument from counsel.
For purposes of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, the court makes the following findings of fact: Defendant was driving a rental vehicle in Portland's Bayside neighborhood. Officer Morrison observed the vehicle make four left turns such that it ended up back at the spot where he had first seen it. At that point the vehicle pulled over and let the officers' unmarked police car pass. Approximately fifteen minutes later, Officer Morrison saw the vehicle again, this time reversing thirty feet on the westbound lane of Cumberland Avenue. Defendant parked and exited the car. The officers asked Defendant, "Why are you trying to evade us?" or words to that effect. Defendant then lifted his shirt while stating, "I don't have drugs or a gun on me." At that point the officers exited their vehicle and asked Defendant for his identification. Although Defendant had been driving, he did not have a valid driver's license. Defendant gave consent to a search of his person and his vehicle. A business card in Defendant's pocket revealed that Defendant was on probation. Defendant was then arrested for operating without a license and violation of his probation. After speaking with Defendant's probation officer, a canine officer was called to the scene, and with the help of the police dog officers found crack cocaine wedged between the visor and the roof of the vehicle.
Based on the above facts, the court finds that Defendant was not "stopped" for 4* Amendment purposes until he was asked for his identification. At that point the totality of the circumstances included, not just the rental car, the suspicious four left turns, and the backing up against traffic, but Defendant's conduct in lifting his shirt and proclaiming that he did not have drugs or a gun on him. The court understands that Defendant's counsel questions whether that actually happened given its omission from Officer Morrison's report, but the court finds the officer's testimony regarding Defendant's conduct and words to be credible. The court finds, moreover, that Defendant consented to the search of his person and his vehicle. Even in the absence of such consent, the search of Defendant's vehicle was authorized by Defendant's conditions of probation, which expressly include the condition that Defendant "shall submit to random search and testing for drugs, firearms and dangerous weapons at the direction of a probation or law enforcement officer." In addition to Defendant's consent and the "random search" probation condition, the court finds in any event that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to search the vehicle based on the totality of the circumstances.
Accordingly, having considered the facts in light of the constitutional requirements of Maine and Federal law, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby DENIED.