Also in the criminal context, we have long held that certiorari may be used to review a magistrate's decision to bind over a defendant after a preliminary hearing. Schiermeister v. Riskedahl, supra; State v. Skar, 313 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1981); State v. Persons, 201 N.W.2d 895 (N.D. 1972); Green v. Whipple, 89 N.W.2d 881 (N.D. 1958). In such cases, we have held, review will extend to whether there is some relevant evidence upon which the lower court made its findings of probable cause.

State v. Morrissey, 295 N.W.2d 307 (N.D. 1980). In State v. Skar, 313 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1981), we explained the nature of our review of a denial of a writ of certiorari under these circumstances: "A committing magistrate, finding probable cause and binding over a defendant on the basis of no evidence of the defendant having committed the crime charged, or on the basis of irrelevant evidence, would be in excess of his jurisdiction.

Errors of law committed by the inferior court in the exercise of its authority cannot be considered; and in such case, no matter how erroneous the decision may be, even on the face of the record, the reviewing court has no power to change, annul, or reverse it in a proceeding in certiorari.State v. Skar, 313 N.W.2d 746, 748-49 (N.D. 1981) (quoting City of Fargo v. Annexation Review Commission, 148 N.W.2d 338, 351-52 (N.D. 1966)). The decision whether the facts reach the level of probable cause to bind over a defendant for trial is a question of law.

"A magistrate exceeds his jurisdiction when his probable cause finding to bind over a defendant is based on either no evidence that the defendant committed the offense or on irrelevant evidence." Schiermeister at 567; see State v. Skar, 313 N.W.2d 746, 749 (N.D. 1981) ("[A] committing magistrate who finds probable cause to bind over a defendant on the basis of some relevant evidence does not exceed his jurisdiction."). C 1

Although we might agree that the officer's testimony was skinny evidence that the Hinkels occupied the apartment, we conclude that it was "some relevant evidence" on which the magistrate could base his finding of probable cause. See Sivertson v. McLees, 407 N.W.2d 799, 800 (N.D. 1987) [concluding that evidence which allowed inference that defendant was involved with stolen property constituted "some relevant evidence"]; State v. Skar, 313 N.W.2d 746, 749 (N.D. 1981) [concluding that circumstantial evidence constituted "some relevant evidence": "That no one actually saw Skar or that someone else could have been in the same area at the same time and could have taken the pickup is an argument for the jury's consideration and not the consideration of this court"]. We decline the Hinkels' request that we change our standard of review to whether "substantial relevant evidence" existed to support a finding of probable cause.

A magistrate exceeds his jurisdiction when his probable cause finding to bind over a defendant is based on either no evidence that the defendant committed the offense or on irrelevant evidence. State v. Skar, 313 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1981). On review, this Court does not weigh the evidence but simply ascertains whether there was some relevant evidence upon which the magistrate found probable cause.

Gajewski v. Bratcher, 221 N.W.2d 614 (N.D. 1974) (on petition for rehearing). Furthermore, it is a common maxim that the law does not permit by indirection what cannot be accomplished directly. Cf., Northern States Power Co. v. Hagen, 314 N.W.2d 32, 38 (N.D. 1981) [PSC could not indirectly assert jurisdiction over wholesale rates by investigating reasonableness of underlying costs in proceeding involving retail rates]; State v. Skar, 313 N.W.2d 746, 748 (N.D. 1981) [appellate court could not broaden scope of review beyond that exercised by the court in which certiorari was sought because it would frustrate statutory purpose and permit counsel to accomplish by indirection what he could not accomplish directly]; Paluck v. Board of County Commissioners, Stark County, 307 N.W.2d 852, 857 (N.D. 1981) [statutes creating tax appeal board because they established a court which was not authorized by the North Dakota Constitution and to label the tax appeal board an administrative agency would permit to be done indirectly what could not be done directly]; Atlas Ready-Mix of Minot, Inc. v. White Properties, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 212, 222 (N.D. 1981) [agreement to purchase materials could not sanction indirectly what it did not sanction directly]; State v. Morrissey, 295 N.W.2d 307, 310 (N.D. 1980) [appellate court cannot broaden scope of review beyond the exercise by the court in which certiorari was sought because it would frustrate the statutory purpose and p