Opinion
ID No. 0401007939.
Submitted: August 22, 2005.
Decided: August 31, 2005.
Upon Consideration of the Defendant's Motion To Determine Competency
Defendant Determined To Be Competent
R. David Favata, Esq., Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware. Attorney for the State.
Sheryl Rush-Milstead, Esq., Public Defenders Office, Dover, Delaware. Attorney for the defendant.
OPINION
This 31st day of August 2005, upon consideration of the defendant's mental competency to stand trial, it appears that:
1. The defendant, Lamond Simmons, is charged with one count of Robbery First Degree, one count of Attempted Robbery First Degree, eleven counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, two counts of Burglary First Degree, three counts of Aggravated Menacing, two counts of Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony, one count of Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Adjudicated Delinquent, four counts of Reckless Endangering First Degree, four counts of Criminal Mischief, Misdemeanor, and two counts of Terroristic Threatening.
2. At the request of the defense, a hearing was held to determine whether the defendant is competent to stand trial.
3 The test of competency to stand trial is set forth at 11 Del. C. § 404(a) as follows:
Whenever the court is satisfied, after hearing, that an accused person, because of mental illness or mental defect, is unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against the accused, or to give evidence in the accused's own behalf or to instruct counsel on his behalf, the court may order the accused person to be confined and treated in the Delaware Psychiatric Center until the accused person is capable of standing trial.
This standard, in addition to its plain language, has been construed to require that a defendant be able (1) to consult with defense counsel rationally, (2) to assist in preparing his defense, and (3) to have both a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. In determining competency, a court must consider all of the circumstances, and base the decision upon the facts of the particular case. Competency does not necessarily turn upon the absence or presence of any particular factor. The burden is upon the State to establish the defendant's competency by a preponderance of the evidence.
State v. Reyes, Del. Super., Cr.A. Nos IN98-08-1664, 1665, Alford, J. (Apr. 28, 2000); State v. Shiels, Del. Super., 593 A.2d 986, 1010 (Nov. 15, 1990).
Shiels, 593 A.2d at 1005.
Diaz v. State, Del. Supr., 508 A.2d 861, 863 (1986).
4. The evidence presented at the hearing established that the defendant, who is currently 17 years of age, has significant intellectual impairment. In 1996, the defendant had a full-scale IQ score of 65, which is in the mild mental retardation range. In 1999 he had a full-scale IQ score of 50, which is in the moderate retardation range. Academically, he is at a first grade or less level.
5. Dr. Mandell J. Much, a psychologist, was called as a witness by the defense. He interviewed the defendant on one occasion on June 24, 2004. He asked specific questions concerning such matters as the nature of the charges, courtroom procedure, the roles of court participants, including defense counsel, and the quality of the defendant's ability to relate to his attorney. The defendant's responses to Dr. Much's questions are inconsistent with mental competency. For example, as to the quality of relating to his attorney, Dr. Much reported that:
Lamond had a basic understanding of the fact that he had a lawyer but was unclear as to her role and how she could assist him in court. Specifically, he did not know that he could/should assist his lawyer in preparing a defense. As indicated before, he did not know what a defense was.
The defendant gave similar responses, or non-responses, in other areas of inquiry. Dr. Much's opinion is that the defendant is not competent to stand trial.
6. Dr. Charlotte M. Selig, also a psychologist, was called as a witness by the State. She interviewed the defendant on one occasion on November 4, 2004. She also administered the Georgia Court Competency Test-MSH Revision and the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA). The results of these two tests were consistent with the defendant's being competent. Dr. Selig also asked specific questions concerning such matters as the nature of the charges, courtroom procedure, the roles of court participants, including defense counsel, and the quality of the defendant's ability to relate to his attorney. The defendant's responses to Dr. Selig's questions tended to show that he is competent to stand trial. As to his capacity to assist counsel, Dr. Selig reported that:
[h]e expressed that he expected his attorney to try to help him `beat the case' and barring that, to help `reduce some of my time'. . . . He discussed his current plan to defend himself against his charges, and that in order to help his lawyer, he responded that he would `tell her what happened so she can represent me.'
Dr. Selig testified that the defendant was able to identify accurately courtroom personnel and their roles and functions, was able to provide a coherent account of the events leading to his arrest, understood the seriousness of the charges, and understood the plea-bargaining process and its advantages ("get less time") versus its disadvantages ("people think you did it, give up trial."). Her opinion is that the defendant is competent to stand trial.
7. I also viewed in its entirety the defendant's 20 minute interview with the police at the time of his arrest, as did Dr. Much and Dr. Selig. The defendant interacted with his two interviewers quite rationally. His immaturity was evident in his hope that he could go home at the conclusion of the interview, but he nonetheless demonstrated an ability to carry on a rational and coherent conversation about the alleged offenses.
8. The defendant's interview with the police officers tends to corroborate Dr. Selig's testimony. After fully considering all of the evidence, I find the testimony of Dr. Selig to have greater persuasive force than the testimony of Dr. Much. I find that Dr. Selig's evaluation of the defendant more accurately assesses the defendant's mental status than does the testimony of Dr. Much. I conclude, based upon the testimony of Dr. Selig and the defendant's interview with the police officers, that he is competent to stand trial.
9. At the hearing the defense sought to impeach the validity of the Georgia Court Competency Test-MSH Revision and the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA) on the grounds that they were designed for adults, not juveniles. In reaching my conclusion, however, I do not rely upon the results of these two tests.
10. I recognize that such things as the specific elements of the offenses charged, the range of penalties associated with each, the plea bargaining process and details of the proceedings may have to be explained to the defendant with patience and in simple terms. I also recognize, based upon the testimony presented at the hearing, that his memory has a shorter span than the average person. At his trial, defense counsel should not hesitate to ask for and the presiding judge should grant recesses as often as may be necessary for counsel to consult with the defendant.