Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-12106 No. 6578
01-24-2018
STATE OF ALASKA, Appellant, v. ALEX SHELDON, Appellee.
Appearances: Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Craig W. Richards, Attorney General, and James E. Cantor, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellant. Douglas O. Moody, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. Trial Court No. 2KB-13-397 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the Superior Court, Second Judicial District, Kotzebue, Paul Roetman, Judge. Appearances: Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Craig W. Richards, Attorney General, and James E. Cantor, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellant. Douglas O. Moody, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellee. Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Suddock, Superior Court Judge. Judge ALLARD.
Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 16 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 24(d).
Alex Sheldon, a convicted felon, was found in possession of a sawed-off shotgun by a village public safety officer. Sheldon admitted that he knew his possession of the firearm was illegal and he also admitted that he had another firearm at his house. After he was arrested for weapons misconduct, Sheldon told the officer that he was also in possession of child pornography, and he provided the officer with evidence that this was true. According to Sheldon, he possessed the illegal firearms and the child pornography because he wanted to go back to jail for a long time. Sheldon told the officer that he wanted to go back to jail because he was struggling with certain physical and mental health issues.
The State indicted Sheldon on various charges related to the weapons misconduct. However, the State did not indict Sheldon on any charges related to the child pornography until seventeen months later. By the time the State indicted Sheldon on the child pornography charges, Sheldon had already pleaded guilty to weapons misconduct pursuant to a plea agreement.
AS 11.61.200(a)(1) (third-degree weapons misconduct); former AS 11.46.484 (2012) (fourth-degree criminal mischief).
See AS 11.61.127.
Sheldon moved to dismiss the child pornography charges under Alaska Criminal Rule 45, Alaska's speedy trial rule. Sheldon argued that the child pornography charges arose from "the same criminal episode" as the weapons misconduct charges because his confessions to both sets of charges were motivated by his desire to return to prison. The superior court agreed with this reasoning and dismissed the child pornography charges with prejudice under Rule 45(g).
The State now appeals. For the reasons explained here, we conclude that the superior court erred in ruling that the two sets of charges arose from "the same criminal episode" for purposes of the speedy trial calculations under Rule 45.
The child pornography charges did not arise from the same criminal episode as the weapons misconduct charges
Alaska Criminal Rule 45 governs a defendant's statutory speedy trial rights. Under Rule 45(b), the State is required to try a criminal defendant within 120 days of the date the charging document is served on the defendant, subject to certain exceptions that toll the speedy trial time. Rule 45(c)(3) further provides that if the State files additional charges "aris[ing] out of the same criminal episode" as charges that have already been filed, the starting date for the speedy trial period for the new charges remains the date the earlier charges were served on the defendant "unless the evidence on which the new charge[s] is based was not available to the prosecution on the commencement date for the original charge[s]."
Alaska R. Crim. P. 45(b), (c)(1), (d).
Id.
Here, it is undisputed that the State had sufficient evidence to charge Sheldon with both the weapons misconduct charges and the child pornography charges at the same time. The question presented here, therefore, is whether the superior court erred in concluding that these two sets of charges arose out of the "same criminal episode."
We have previously provided guidance on the meaning of "same criminal episode" in this context. In State v. Dunten, for example, we explained that temporal proximity is not sufficient, standing alone, to establish that two charges arose out of the same criminal episode for purposes of Rule 45. As we explained:
State v. Dunten, 785 P.2d 907, 909-11 (Alaska App. 1990).
No Alaska speedy trial case has found separate charges to arise from the same criminal episode merely because they occurred simultaneously or at closely related times. In each case, some additional similarity between the initial and later charges — either a causal link or a close evidentiary or elemental nexus — has justified the finding of a single criminal episode.
Id. at 909; see also Koch v. State, 653 P.2d 664, 668 (Alaska App. 1982) (negligent homicide charges arose out of same criminal episode as traffic infraction for following too closely); State v. Williams, 653 P.2d 1067, 1070 (Alaska App. 1982), judgment rev'd on other grounds, 681 P.2d 313, 319 (Alaska 1984) (evidence tampering charges arose from same criminal episode as underlying murder charges).
Dunten involved a woman who was driving intoxicated with her husband as the passenger in the car. While they were stopped at the side of the road, Dunten and her husband got into an argument, and Dunten shot and killed him. Dunten turned herself in. Dunten was originally charged only with driving under the influence. However, eighteen months later, Dunten was charged with murder. Dunten moved to dismiss the murder indictment under Rule 45, arguing that the murder had arisen from the same criminal episode as the driving under the influence charge. The trial court agreed and dismissed the murder indictment under Rule 45.
Dunten, 785 P.2d at 907.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 908.
Id.
Id. at 908-09.
However, on appeal, we reversed the trial court, concluding that the two charges did not arise from the same criminal episode. We explained that the two charges were related only by their temporal proximity, noting that (1) "[t]he statutory elements of the two offenses are entirely different[;]" (2) "[t]he homicide charge is not causally related to the earlier DWI charge[;]" and (3) "[t]he evidence necessary to establish the initial charge of DWI ... differs significantly from that which would be necessary to establish the subsequent charge of second-degree murder." We acknowledged that Dunten's intoxication would likely be the "cornerstone" of the State's evidence in both cases. We explained, however, that this fact did not mean that the charges arose out of the same criminal episode, because intoxication was not an element of murder and the fact that Dunten drove while intoxicated before and after shooting her husband had "virtually no bearing on the murder charge."
Id. at 911.
Id.
Id.
Id.
We applied similar reasoning in Pitka v. State. Pitka involved a defendant who was arrested for trespassing on his ex-girlfriend's property and causing damage to her property when she tried to get him to leave. During the arrest, the police found cocaine in Pitka's pocket. The State charged Pitka with criminal trespass and criminal mischief, but did not charge Pitka for possession of cocaine until over half a year later. Pitka moved to dismiss the cocaine charge under Rule 45, arguing that the cocaine possession was part of "the same criminal episode" as the criminal trespass and criminal mischief because the police discovered the cocaine during the arrest for the other charges. We affirmed the superior court's rejection of this claim, concluding that there was "no nexus between these crimes other than their simultaneity." We noted, in dicta, that Pitka had "not suggested that his acts of trespass and criminal mischief were motivated by a desire to obtain or sell cocaine, or that these acts were related in any other way to his possession of cocaine."
Pitka v. State,19 P.3d 604 (Alaska App. 2001).
Id. at 605.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 607.
Id. --------
In the current case, Sheldon relied on the dicta in Pitka to argue that the weapons misconduct charges and the child pornography charges in his case arose out of the same criminal episode because they were both motivated by the same desire — that is, they were both motivated by Sheldon's desire to commit a crime and go back to prison. The superior court agreed with this reasoning, and dismissed the child pornography charges under Rule 45.
On appeal, the State argues that Sheldon's reliance on the dicta in Pitka was misplaced. We agree. As the State points out, Sheldon's purported motive for committing these offenses is not an element of either offense. Nor is Sheldon's purported motive relevant to the State's prosecution for either offense or to the evidence that would be required to prove Sheldon's commission of the two different offenses.
As the State also points out, there is no causal relationship between the two offenses. That is, Sheldon was not motivated to commit the child pornography offenses because he had committed the weapons misconduct offenses; nor was he motivated to commit the weapons misconduct offenses because of his possession of the child pornography. Instead, Sheldon apparently committed both offenses for a reason that is entirely external to any prosecution for these offenses.
Given this, we agree with the State that there was an insufficient relationship between the two offenses, other than their temporal proximity, to establish that they both arose out of the same criminal episode for purposes of Criminal Rule 45(c)(3). It was therefore error for the superior court to dismiss the child pornography charges under Rule 45(g).
Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment of the superior court. The child pornography charges are reinstated, and this case is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings on those charges.