Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2415-11T4
02-24-2014
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LAWRENCE SHEERON, a/k/a LARRY SHEARON, LAWRENCE T. SHEERON IV, DANIEL CRAVER, DANIEL J. CRAVER, LARRY SHEERON, LARRY T. SHEERON, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Jacqueline E. Turner, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief). Robert L. Taylor, Cape May County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (J. Vincent Molitor, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Grall and Waugh.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cape May County, Indictment No. 10-08-0585.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Jacqueline E. Turner, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).
Robert L. Taylor, Cape May County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (J. Vincent Molitor, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Lawrence Sheeron appeals the denial of his motion to suppress, which preceded his guilty plea to one count of receiving stolen property in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7. We affirm.
I.
We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record on appeal.
During their investigation of a burglary in Cape May, Detectives Anthony Marino and Douglas Henderson were informed by the victims' daughter, Nicole Heckel, that she had a conversation with Carla Colson and Sheeron at her parents' house the night before the parents left to go out of town. She related that she told Colson and Sheeron that her parents wanted to sell some of their valuables, which she showed them by taking them through the house. Colson expressed interest and told Heckel she would look into their value. Heckel also told the detectives that she, Colson, and Sheeron were drug addicts.
Heckel agreed to participate in a consensual intercept involving Colson and Sheeron. Before Henderson was able to obtain the required approvals for an intercept, however, Heckel informed him that Colson's former husband had told her that Colson and Sheeron were driving to Philadelphia to sell some of the stolen items. Heckel told Henderson where Colson and Sheeron were to meet each other and gave him a description of the vehicle they would be driving to Philadelphia.
After he asked Marino to intercept Colson and Sheeron at their meeting point, Henderson observed the vehicle described by Heckel driving on the Garden State Parkway. There were two people in the vehicle, and Henderson recognized Colson as the passenger. As he followed them, he ascertained through dispatch that the Lower Township Police had stopped Colson in the same vehicle a few days earlier. Henderson then stopped the vehicle.
Henderson informed Colson and Sheeron that he was investigating the burglary and that he had received information that there was stolen property in the vehicle. He also informed both of them of their Miranda rights. Henderson then requested Sheeron's consent to search the vehicle, and explained his right to refuse or to withdraw his consent at any time.
Sheeron agreed to allow the search, except for some bags in the trunk that belonged to Colson. Henderson agreed he would not search them. Sheeron then signed the consent to search form. Henderson allowed Sheeron to stand nearby during the search, so that he could point out Colson's property.
In the glove compartment, Henderson found a store receipt for the sale of an item fitting the description of one of the stolen pieces of jewelry, dated when the Heckels were out of town. He seized that item.
Sheeron then opened the trunk, in which Henderson saw an open black-canvas bag. Henderson observed flatware and silverware in the bag, which he testified was similar to that reported stolen during the burglary. At that point, Marino directed Henderson to stop the search so that the vehicle could be towed and a further search performed after they obtained a search warrant.
Henderson arrested Colson and Sheeron. Colson admitted that she had stolen the property. She advised Henderson that there was an envelope in the vehicle containing cash realized from the sale of some of the items stolen. During his search of Sheeron incident to his arrest, Henderson found an envelope containing a large amount of cash.
Other items stolen from the Heckel home were found in the car during the search authorized by the warrant. Henderson interviewed the owner of the store that issued the receipt found in Sheeron's vehicle. He identified Sheeron as the person who had sold him the items listed on the receipt. His description of Sheeron's female companion at the time of the transaction matched Colson. In August 2010, Sheeron was indicted for burglary, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 (count one); theft, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3 (count two); possession of a controlled dangerous substance, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)(count three); and possession of a prescription legend drug, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10.5(a)(2) (count four).
Sheeron brought a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that Henderson did not have a sufficient basis to stop the vehicle or to request his consent to search it following the stop. After an evidentiary hearing, the motion judge denied the motion to suppress. Sheeron subsequently accepted the State's plea offer, pled guilty, and was sentenced to a four-year term of incarceration, consecutive to the sentence he was serving at the time. The sentencing judge also imposed an eighteen-month period of parole ineligibility. This appeal followed.
II.
Sheeron makes the following argument on appeal:
POINT I: THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE AS THE POLICE LACKED ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO STOP THE DEFENDANT'S CAR AND DETAIN HIM. IN ADDITION, THE CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS NOT PROPERLY OBTAINED. AS A RESULT, THE ENSUING SEARCH OF THE CAR VIOLATED THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS. U.S. CONST. AMENDS. IV; XIV. N.J. Const., Art. I, para. 7.
"'[A]n appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 336 (2010) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). "A trial court's findings should not be disturbed simply because an appellate court 'might have reached a different conclusion were it the trial tribunal' or because 'the trial court decided all evidence or inference conflicts in favor of one side.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). Instead, "an appellate court must defer to the trial court's findings that 'are substantially influenced by [the court's] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Id. at 336-37 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 161). Nevertheless, "[i]t is a well-established principle of appellate review that a reviewing court is neither bound by, nor required to defer to, the legal conclusions of a trial . . . court." State v. Gandhi, 2 01 N.J. 161, 176 (2010).
An investigatory stop of a motor vehicle is lawful if the authorities have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that violations of motor vehicle or other laws have been or are being committed. State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 639-40 (citations omitted), modified on other grounds, 174 N.J. 351 (2002). The basis for making the stop requires "some minimal level of objective justification." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10 (1989) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Golotta, 178 N.J. 205, 213 (2003). It must be based on more than an officer's suspicion or hunch. Sokolow, supra, 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S. Ct. at 1585, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 10. The same standard applies to a police officer's request to search a motor vehicle. Carty, supra, 170 N.J. at 647 (holding that a police officer must have "reasonable and articulable suspicion" to request a motorist's consent to search his or her vehicle).
Accordingly, judicial review of a decision to stop or request permission to search a motor vehicle is highly fact-sensitive. State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003). "Our Court has emphasized that in determining the lawfulness of an investigatory stop, a reviewing court must 'evaluate the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions.'" State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010) (quoting State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986) ).
In this case, the information that formed the basis for the stop was provided by Heckel. Our Supreme Court has noted that an ordinary citizen reporting crime to the police is not viewed with suspicion, and courts assume that a further demonstration of reliability is not necessary. State v. Amelio, 197 N.J. 207, 212-13 (2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1237, 129 S. Ct. 2402, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1297 (2009); State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 362 (2002). "There is an assumption grounded in a common experience that such a person is motivated by factors that are consistent with law enforcement goals." Davis, supra, 104 N.J. at 506.
Although Heckel was not simply "an ordinary citizen," in that she was the daughter of the victims, a friend of the suspects, and admittedly a user of illegal drugs, she had first-hand information about Colson and Sheeron that provided a solid link between them and the crime. She was also willing to cooperate with the police by participating in an intercept.
On the day of the stop, Heckel conveyed information from Colson's former husband concerning the impending trip to Philadelphia with some of the stolen property. With respect to the trip to Philadelphia, she supplied details concerning the vehicle and route that Henderson verified at the time of the stop. Henderson had several opportunities to observe Heckel and evaluate her trustworthiness. And, although apparently not known to Henderson, Colson's former husband was not a truly anonymous informer, in that he was known to Heckel who identified him as her source.
Viewing those facts in the totality of the circumstances and in light of the applicable law, we find no basis to question Judge Kyran Connor's determination that Henderson had a sufficient "reasonable and articulable suspicion" to make the motor vehicle stop and then to request Sheeron's consent to search the vehicle. Consequently, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress essentially for the reasons stated in Judge Connor's oral decision, as amplified above.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).