In contrast, courts interpreting statutes with no specific mention of half-blood relationships have included such relationships within the incest prohibition.See Singh v. Singh, 213 Conn. 637, 569 A.2d 1112, 1121 (1990) (according common meaning to terms "uncle" and "niece" and determining that half-blood relationships fall within incest statute); State v. Sharon H., 429 A.2d 1321, 1326-28 (Del.Super. 1981) (interpreting statute that prohibited marriage between a person and "his or her ancestor, descendant, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, niece, nephew or first cousin" to include half-blood relatives); State v. Skinner, 132 Conn. 163, 43 A.2d 76, 77 (1945), overruled on other grounds, State v. Tillman, 152 Conn. 15, 202 A.2d 494 (1964) (holding that "the word sister, as used in the [incest] statute, applies to and includes a half sister"); State v. Lamb, 209 Iowa 132, 227 N.W. 830, 831-32 (1929) (finding that "sister" includes both whole-blood and half-blood relations within the meaning of the incest statute); Commonwealth v. Ashey, 248 Mass. 259, 142 N.E. 788 (1924) (convicting a half-blood uncle and niece of violating statutes providing that "no man shall marry his . . . sister's daughter" and "no woman shall marry her . . . mother's brother"); State v. Smith, 101 S.C. 293, 85 S.E. 958, 959 (1915) (noting that "the fact that the relationship in this case is only of the half blood . . . i
The State strenuously argues to the contrary but its arguments are not persuasive. In a strained attempt to define a "judgment of acquittal," the State relies on State v. Sharon H., Del.Super., 429 A.2d 1321 (1981). In that case, the State successfully sustained its right to appeal under § 9902(a) a dismissal of an information and other charges by Municipal Court based on the Court's conclusions on the legal issues involved.
The rationale underlying the doctrine is that the State, not the defendant, should be held accountable when the legislature poorly articulates its intent.State v. Sharon H., 429 A.2d 1321, 1328 (Del. Super. 1981). Id.; State v. Ross, 50 A.2d 410, 411 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1946).
The rationale underlying the doctrine is that the State, not the defendant, should be held accountable when the legislature poorly articulates its intent.State v. Sharon H., 429 A.2d 1321, 1328 (Del. Super. 1981). Id.; State v. Ross, 50 A.2d 410, 411 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1946).
Id. (quoting McElroy, 561 A.2d at 157); see also Fischer, 285 A.2d at 419 ("We agree with the Court below in its conclusion that other types of prejudice may be sufficient to move the exercise of its discretion under Rule 48(b)."); Budd Metal Co. Inc., 447 A.2d at 1188 ("Nor is prejudice in the traditional sense required for the Superior Court to exercise its broad discretion under rule 48(b)."); Hughey v. State, 522 A.2d at 335, 340 n. 10 (Del. 1987) (quoting State v. Sharon H., 429 A.2d 1321, 1325 (Del. Super. 1981) ("[S]ome showing of prejudice . . . is needed to justify the exercise of the Court's discretion in favor of a defendant to dismiss."). --------
We do so now, while recognizing that such a rule may have an exception under the facts of a particular case. While Rule 48(b) does not condition a dismissal of an indictment on any finding other than "unnecessary delay" and makes no reference to a need of a defendant to show prejudice to have resulted from the delay, some showing of prejudice has been consistently required for relief to be granted. Fischer, 285 A.2d at 419 ("We agree with the Court below in its conclusion that other types of prejudice may be sufficient to move the exercise of its discretion under Rule 48(b)"); Budd Metal, 447 A.2d at 1188 ("Nor is prejudice in the traditional sense required for the Superior Court to exercise its broad discretion under rule 48(b)"); Hughey, 522 A.2d at 340 n. 10, quoting State v. Sharon H., Del.Super., 429 A.2d 1321, 1325 (1981) ("[S]ome showing of prejudice, . . . is needed to justify the exercise of the Court's discretion in favor of a defendant to dismiss"). See also Weston v. State, Del.Supr., 554 A.2d 1119, 1122 (1989).
Thus, strict construction does not require the Court to adopt an unreasonable construction, or one which results in an injustice which the Legislature should not be presumed to have intended." State v. Sharon H., Del.Super., 429 A.2d 1321, 1328 (1981). See also Graffagnino v. Amoco Chem. Co., Del.Supr., 389 A.2d 1302, 1304 (1978); Dooley v. Rhodes, Del.Supr., 135 A.2d 114, 117 (1957).
"[S]ome showing of prejudice, . . . is needed to justify the exercise of the Court's discretion in favor of a defendant to dismiss." State v. Sharon H., Del.Super., 429 A.2d 1321, 1325 (1981). Although Hughey analogizes the facts of State v. Glaindez, Del.Supr., 346 A.2d 156 (1975), to the facts of his case, Glaindez is distinguishable.
Def.'s Mot. ¶ 3.Id. at ¶ 6 (citing State v. Sharon H., 429 A.2d 1321, 1328 (Del. Super 1981)).Id. at ¶ 7 (citing State v. Colasuonno, 432 A.2d 334, 338 (Del. Super. 1981)).
On the other hand, if the decision is a judgment of acquittal after trial, the only avenue of appeal for the State is 10 Del. C. § 9903. State v. Sharon H, Del.Super., 429 A.2d 1321, 1326 (1981) (where the trial court has entered a judgment of acquittal, the State's only appeal route is 10 Del. C. § 9903). Furthermore, under § 9903 (and the Courts implementing Rule 38.1(b)), the State must apply for leave to appeal "a substantial question of law or procedure" and the Court, in its absolute discretion, may or may not permit the appeal. State v. Williams, Del.Super., Cr.A. No. K-81-11-0054A (Kent County), Christie, J. (December 7, 1981) (denying leave to appeal trial court evidentiary rulings under § 9903 because the rulings were not substantial and were not made under circumstances which would preclude reconsideration of the issues if the same issues were to arise in another trial in the Court of Common Pleas).