Opinion
No. 58829-0-I.
September 17, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Snohomish County, No. 06-1-00014-0, Larry E. McKeeman, J., entered September 8, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Anthony Scott appeals his forgery conviction on two grounds. He argues that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that he possessed a forged instrument and that he had the intent to injure or defraud. We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence, and we affirm his conviction.
FACTS
Scott was pulled over by police officers on the suspicion that he was driving a stolen car. When asked for identification, Scott declared his name to be Edward Hanson, and he claimed not to have any identification with him. A search of Scott's person and the car revealed an Oregon identification card that included his picture and the name Edward Hanson. Scott's girl friend arrived at the scene to claim ownership of the car. The officers determined that she had given them a false name, and after a short investigation, she was arrested on an outstanding warrant. The officers suspected that Scott had also given a false name. Scott was arrested for not having a valid operator's license.
The trial record and respondent spell the last name "Hansen," and it is unclear which spelling was used on the Oregon identification card. We adopt Scott's version of the name.
At the jail, Scott admitted that his name was Anthony Scott, not Edward Hanson. He claimed that he had to change his identity after testifying in a homicide trial in Arizona. Unnamed individuals there had given him paperwork to assume a new identity. Scott used those papers to obtain the Oregon identification card. That identification card contained Scott's picture but listed a different name, birth date, and current address.
Scott was subsequently charged with one count of forgery and was convicted after a bench trial.
ANALYSIS
Under Washington's forgery statute, "[a] person is guilty of forgery if, with intent to injure or defraud: . . . [h]e possesses, utters, offers, disposes of, or puts off as true a written instrument which he knows to be forged." RCW 9A.60.020(1)(b). Scott challenges the sufficiency of the evidence showing that he possessed a forged instrument and that he had the requisite intent to injure or defraud. Upon review, we determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence adduced at trial. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). We draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State and most strongly against the defendant. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201.
Forged Written Instrument
First, Scott argues that his Oregon identification card is not a forged written instrument. Scott has not challenged the trial court's finding that his legal name is Anthony J. Scott. Without a challenge, this fact now stands as a verity on appeal. State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994). Instead, Scott argues that his identification card, issued by the Oregon Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), contained false information but is an otherwise genuine document. Scott contends that an instrument that is exactly what it purports to be but contains inaccurate information is not a forgery.
His argument ignores the statutory definitions provided under Washington's forgery provision. A "forged instrument" is "a written instrument which has been falsely made, completed, or altered." RCW 9A.60.010(7). Scott was charged with falsely making the identification card. To "falsely make" is defined as: "to make or draw a complete or incomplete written instrument which purports to be authentic, but which is not authentic either because the ostensible maker is fictitious or because, if real, he did not authorize the making or drawing thereof." RCW 9A.60.010(4). To prove that Scott possessed a forged instrument, the State thus had to show that Scott made the identification card and that this identification card was not authentic.
Despite the fact that the Oregon DMV physically constructed the card, Scott still made the card for purposes of the statute because he ordered the identification card and presented false paperwork that provided the necessary information to complete the identification card. Furthermore, Scott's card is not an authentic instrument under the language of the statute. The identification card purports to be an authentic identification card. It is not authentic, however, as the "ostensible maker" of the card — the Oregon DMV — did not authorize the making of a fake identification card. State agencies issue identification cards after verifying an individual's identity and paperwork, and the identification cards thus become reliable and legal means of proving one's individual identity.
Here, Scott claims that his Oregon identification card is not a forgery because it is, in fact, an identification card issued by the DMV. This is a disingenuous argument. Scott's card did not purport to be simply an identification card; it purported to be Hanson's identification card, even though the man pictured on the card had a different name, birth date, and address. The card did not identify its bearer correctly, and it is thus not the document that it purports to be.
Scott does not discuss the statutory provisions of forgery, but relies instead on several cases that draw a distinction between a forged document and a genuine document that contains false information. Dexter Horton Nat'l Bank v. United States Fid. Guar. Co., 149 Wash. 343, 345, 270 P. 799 (1928); State v. Marshall, 25 Wn. App. 240, 606 P.2d 278 (1980); State v. Esquivel, 71 Wn. App. 868, 863 P.2d 113 (1993). But all of these cases can be distinguished on the facts.
In Dexter Horton, the defendant had endorsed a check made out to his employer with his true name and his correct job title. Dexter Horton, 149 Wash. at 345. Although he was not authorized to receive the funds, the court held that he had not forged the document because the check was exactly what it purported to be. Dexter Horton, 149 Wash. at 351.
In Marshall, a pharmacist had completed a form using his true name and the names of local doctors. Marshall falsely represented that the doctors had actually issued prescriptions, but he had not forged their signatures or his own. Marshall, 25 Wn.App. at 241. The court held there was no forgery since the documents were genuine, and, in these circumstances, "`forgery cannot be charged if the accused signs or uses his own true or actual name.'" Marshall, 25 Wn. App. at 241 (quoting State v. Lutes, 38 Wn.2d 475, 480, 230 P.2d 786 (1951)).
Scott also relies on Esquivel, a combination of two cases, where both defendants showed police officers fake immigration cards containing true and accurate information. Esquivel, 71 Wn. App. at 869. The defendants admitted that the documents were forged but maintained that they did not have an intent to defraud since all of the information listed on the cards was correct. Esquivel, 71 Wn. App. at 870. The appellate court rejected this argument and upheld the forgery convictions. Esquivel, 71 Wn. App. at 870.
These cases do not support Scott's argument. First, Scott never used his real name or other true information to complete the DMV paperwork that resulted in his identification card. Secondly, the identification card was not a genuine document on its face, unlike the check in Dexter Horton and the reimbursement forms in Marshall.
Despite these factual differences, Scott insists these cases support his claim. While it may be true that "[f]orgery does not involve the making of false entries in an otherwise genuine document," Scott's identification card was not an "otherwise genuine document." Esquivel, 71 Wn. App. at 870. Forgery "does involve the manufacture of a false or spurious document made to appear to be other than what it actually is," and Scott's card, once it listed a false identity, became a false document that appeared to be a legally valid identification of Scott as someone named Edward Hanson. Esquivel, 71 Wn. App. at 871.
We conclude the State provided sufficient evidence to prove that the identification card that purported to identify Scott but contained false information is a forged document.
Intent to Defraud
Scott's remaining issue on appeal concerns the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that he possessed the forged instrument with the intent to injure or defraud. He argues that since he never presented his identification card to the police, there is no evidence that he possessed the card with intent to defraud. The evidence did not have to establish that Scott meant to defraud the officers who detained him; the intent to defraud any person will suffice. RCW 10.58.040.
The evidence the State presented supports a finding of intent to defraud. First, Scott possessed the forged instrument. In Esquival, the court stated, "Indeed, the instruments' only value would be to falsely represent the defendants' right to legally be in this country." Esquival, 71 Wn. App. at 872. The same reasoning applies in this case, as the only reason that Scott would possess a forged identity card would be to falsely represent himself as Edward Hanson. Scott cites People v. Miralda, 981 P.2d 676 (Colo.App. 1999) to support his argument that mere possession of a forged instrument is insufficient to show intent. This case can also be distinguished on the fact that in Miralda, the defendant's forged instrument contained true and accurate information, and thus, the card's content itself could not defraud anyone. Furthermore, the Miralda court explained that the use of an assumed name is an additional circumstance that provides sufficient evidence to establish intent, and Scott's identification card contained an incorrect name. Miralda, 981 P.2d at 679.
Second, Scott repeatedly identified himself to the officers as "Edward Hanson," and it is clear that he used this false identity to try and defraud the officers. It is reasonable to infer that Scott possessed the identification card to support his false claims of being Edward Hanson. The State's evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Scott possessed the forged identification card with the intent to defraud.
For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the conviction.