Although there is no case directly on point on this issue, prior case law interpreting the wiretapping statute is instructive. In State v. Schultz, 176 N.J. Super. 65, 422 A.2d 105 (App.Div. 1980), the court was called on to determine whether the consensual electronic recordings of telephone conversations were subject to the sealing requirement of N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-14. The court stated:
There is no indication that the Legislature intended to circumscribe this expressly permitted method of intercepting communications to any greater degree than the single condition imposed in N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4(c). State v. Schultz, 176 N.J. Super. 65 (App. Div. 1980). There is nothing in N.J.S.A 2A:156A-4(c) which mandates that the prosecutor must particularize his reasons for finding reasonable suspicion to exist
There is no indication that the Legislature intended to circumscribe this expressly permitted method of intercepting communications to any greater degree than the single conditions imposed in N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4(c). State v. Schultz, 176 N.J. Super. 65 [ 422 A.2d 105] (App.Div. 1980). There is nothing in N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4(c) which mandates that the prosecutor must particularize his reasons for finding reasonable suspicion to exist.
However, Plaintiff provides no authority for its presumption that N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-14 imposes such a requirement for consensual recordings. See State v. Schultz, 176 N.J. Super. 65 (App. Div. 1980) (holding that N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-14 "does not apply to consensual recordings but only to judicially authorized intercepts."). Additionally, Defendants represent that they conducted the undercover operation as part of a joint operation with the Fort Lee Police Department. Defts' Reply Brief, ECF No. 57, at 5.
Courts in other jurisdictions have refused to extend post-authorization requirements applying to non-consensual interceptions to the consensual interception arena. See generallyUnited States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373, 1377 (5th Cir. 1978); People v. McGee, 399 N.E.2d 1177, 1182-83 (N.Y. 1979); State v. Napoli, 373 So.2d 933, 934 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1979); State v. Schultz, 422 A.2d 105, 106-07 (N.J.Super. 1980). As an alternate ground for affirming the order of suppression as to the February 1998 interception, Spangler argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that the approval preceded the interception.
Courts have acknowledged that the conditions for authorization of consensual wiretaps are not as strict as those applicable to nonconsensual wiretaps, and have understood that the Legislature did not intend to restrict the activities of law enforcement "to any greater degree than by the one condition it imposed." Statev. Schultz, 176 N.J. Super. 65, 68, 422 A.2d 105 (App.Div. 198 0). Accord State v. Parisi, 181 N.J. Super. 117, 120, 436 A.2d 948 (App.Div. 1981); State v. Bisaccia, 251 N.J. Super. 508, 512, 598 A.2d 944 (Law Div. 1991). Although the statutory condition for the interception of a consensual wiretap is less onerous than, and hence not as protective of privacy as, the conditions that surround the nonconsensual interception of conversations, it cannot be doubted that the Legislature viewed the requirement of supervisory approval as an indispensable protection for the privacy interests implicated even in consensual telephone wiretaps. The history of the statutory provision strongly evidences that intent.
Courts have acknowledged that the conditions for authorization of consensual wiretaps are not as strict as those applicable to non-consensual wiretaps, and have understood that the Legislature did not intend to restrict the activities of law enforcement "to any greater degree than by the one condition it imposed." State v. Schultz, 176 N.J. Super. 65, 68, 422 A.2d 105 (App.Div. 1980). Accord State v. Parisi, 181 N.J. Super. 117, 120, 436 A.2d 948 (App.Div. 1981); State v. Bisaccia, 251 N.J. Super. 508, 512, 598 A.2d 944 (Law Div. 1991).
In so finding the judge read into N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4 c requirements that it does not contain. There is no indication that the Legislature intended to circumscribe this expressly permitted method of intercepting communications to any greater degree than the single condition imposed in N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4 c. State v. Schultz, 176 N.J. Super. 65 (App.Div. 1980). There is nothing in N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4 c which mandates that the prosecutor must particularize his reasons for finding reasonable suspicion to exist.
N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4(b) (1968). There was no proviso requiring the prosecutor to make a determination of reasonable suspicion. State v. Schultz, 176 N.J. Super. 65 (App.Div. 1980). A rule of statutory construction requires consideration of the intent of the Legislature in adopting the law.