01 requires proof of the “specific intention to possess child pornography,” the Court of Appeals stated it was unable to locate any Nebraska cases on the question but found State v. Schuller instructive.State v. Schuller, 287 Neb. 500, 843 N.W.2d 626 (2014).State v. Ramsay, 257 Neb. 430, 436, 598 N.W.2d 51, 56 (1999).
State v. Hansen, 289 Neb. 478, 855 N.W.2d 777 (2014). See, also, State v. Schuller, 287 Neb. 500, 843 N.W.2d 626 (2014). The relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
In furtherance of his argument, Dedrick asserts that the Nebraska Supreme Court previously adopted the definition of constructive possession in State v. Schuller, 287 Neb. 500, 843 N.W.2d 626 (2014), and State v. Warlick, 308 Neb. 656, 956 N.W.2d 269 (2021), and that the pattern instruction departs from the definition set forth in those cases.
An appellate court will sustain a conviction in a bench trial of a criminal case if the properly admitted evidence, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support that conviction. State v. Schuller, 287 Neb. 500, 843 N.W.2d 626 (2014). In making this determination, we do not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, evaluate explanations, or reweigh the evidence presented, which are within a fact finder's province for disposition.
The totality of the evidence presented by the State, of course, must support an inference that the act was wilful and not inadvertent.See State v. Schuller, 287 Neb. 500, 518, 843 N.W.2d 626 (2014) ( “[T]he allegations in this case did not rest solely on the knowing possession of the deleted images; rather, the deleted images were also evidence of [the defendant's] prior possession, i.e., when he searched for, downloaded, and viewed child pornography (and before he deleted it).”)See Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 905(I) (Tex.Crim.App.2012) ( “[E]vidence of pornography found in a computer cache could be sufficient to support a conviction because the presence of the images in the cache is evidence that, at some earlier point, a defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed the images by viewing them online.”).
See United States v. Clark, 24 F.4th 565, 576-77 (6th Cir. 2022) (relying, in part, on the defendant’s use of "two evidence destruction programs" on his computer in concluding that the defendant "knowingly distributed illegal images and videos … on a peer-to-peer network"); State v. Schuller, 287 Neb. 500, 843 N.W.2d 626, 637 (2014) ("It seems reasonable to infer that [the defendant] deleted the files to hide evidence of his earlier knowing possession [of child pornography]."). [24] {67} Second, Defendant’s credibility was tested and contradicted in several material respects.
Id.SeeState v. Schuller , 287 Neb. 500, 507, 843 N.W.2d 626, 632 (2014) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, supra note 51 ). Courts have extended the Franks rationale to omissions in warrant affidavits of material information.
See id.State v. Schuller , 287 Neb. 500, 843 N.W.2d 626 (2014).Id.
Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.State v. Schuller , 287 Neb. 500, 843 N.W.2d 626 (2014).Id.
An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, evaluate explanations, or reweigh the evidence presented, which are within a fact finder's province for disposition. See State v. Schuller, 287 Neb. 500, 843 N.W.2d 626 (2014). The district court did not abuse its discretion in accepting Lindemeier's testimony that he explained to Lee the effect of a motion to continue on the speedy trial clock and that Lee consented to each continuance. Nor did the court in any way hinder Lee from offering evidence to rebut Lindemeier's testimony.